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ABSTRACT
The increasing importance of bank prudential regulation in an
era of financial liberalization and intense competition, together
with the lack of empirical research on capital adequacy in the
Spanish banking system, shape the motivation for this study.
This research examines the impact of the Spanish bank capital
adequacy regulation on capital augmentations (changes in the total
amount of the capital) of banking institutions operating in Spain.
The period analyzed is 1987-90, during which deregulation and the
1985 risk-based capital requirements have been two major forces in
the Spanish banking markets.
An empirical model of capital augmentations is developed for
Spanish banks. The general model (employing regulatory and
book-value capital) for both private and savings banks appears to
explain better the capital augmentations of savings banks compared
with those of private banks. One of the main findings in this
general model is that capital adequacy regulation appears to be a
stricter constraint for savings banks. Market-value capital is
also employed in the model for the Spanish private banks quoted on
the Spanish stock market, but the explanatory power of the model
is not improved. When bank size is introduced into the analysis,
the results appear to indicate that larger banks might have
certain advantages in terms of capital ratios and in terms of
capital augmentations.
The findings of this research have implications for the role
of the market in regulating capital adequacy, for the deregulation
- reregulation framework of banking, the economic desirability of
'functional' (versus institutional) supervisory regulation of
banks, and for the competitive neutrality of bank legislation.
xix
CHAPTER 1: AIMS  AND METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER 1 : AIMS AND METHODOLOGY
In this first chapter, the purpose of the analysis and the
methodological framework in which the research is organized are
examined. An introduction of the relationship between bank capital
requirements and bank capital augmentations, the central concern
of this thesis, is also provided.
1.1.- CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND CAPITAL AUGMENTATIONS : AN
INTRODUCTION.
Capital adequacy has always been a major issue in banking and
has consolidated itself as an enduring banking problem in an era
of financial deregulation and an increasingly competitive
environment. There are many dimensions of capital adequacy. For
example, bank pricing and competition are important aspects
associated with the 'level playing fields' movement towards
convergence in capital adequacy requirements and regulation.
Another dimension, which is to be dealt with extensively in this
thesis, is to what extent capital regulation affects the behaviour
of the banking firm in terms of capital augmentations, increases
in capital. There may also be different regulatory effects on
capital augmentations across different types of credit
institutions. Asymmetric capital requirements regulations may
disadvantage those banks subject to comparatively stricter capital
adequacy rules and/or those banks with lower legal possibilities
1
CHAPTER 1: AIMS AND METHODOLOGY
to raise capital. This could have important policy and strategic
implications for banking markets.
At a fundamental level, capital adequacy is related to a
bank's corresponding risk exposure. Ceteris paribus, the higher a
bank's risk exposure, the more capital should be required.
However, the apparent exactitude of capital ratios has been
largely illusory. Simple balance-sheet ratios (such as
capital/deposits) may be irrelevant nowadays as capital regulation
tools since financial innovations have altered the traditional
bank business mix and the underlying economics of banking.
Banking theory seems to support the view that capital
adequacy constraints may have significant effects on different
aspects of banking behaviour and performance. For example, the
imposition of different capital adequacy ratios may have a
different impact on the overall riskiness of bank portfolios.
Another aspect of banking behaviour is how capital may be
increased in nominal and/or real terms. Capital augmentations can
be defined as increases in nominal and/or real bank capital.
As far as the empirical evidence of the effects of capital
regulation on bank conduct is concerned, there seems to be no
general agreement. Several empirical studies have shown that
regulators have not succeeded in imposing their capital standards
upon the banks they presumably regulate. However, there are other
studies that show strong evidence of regulation affecting bank's
capital decisions. There is very little empirical research
evidence on this issue for the different European banking systems.
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1.2.-PURPOSE OF OUR STUDY.
The main purpose of this study emerges from two important
factors that must be borne in mind. First, the need for further
research on the issues related to the relationship between capital
adequacy and capital augmentations. Second, the study is applied
to one of the most peculiar European banking systems, the Spanish
banking system, where very little research has been done on the
issue, and this must be borne in mind. One of the main
characteristics of the Spanish banking system is that the
operational and legal differences across different types of
banking institution have been reduced in recent years. However,
there are still important differences across different depository
institutions in terms of the possibilities of raising capital. The
policy and strategic implications of this need to be evaluated
within the terms of reference of this thesis.
The main purpose of this research is analysis of the impact
of capital regulation on banks' capital augmentations for 1987-90,
using (primarily) accounting data for all the private and savings
banks in Spain. Although the focus will be on accounting data, the
researcher will also employ market-value data for those private
banks quoted on the Stock Exchange.
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The main research questions addressed in this analysis are
the following:
a) What is the impact of bank capital regulation on
capital augmentations of banks operating in Spain during 1987-90 ?
Is the impact different across different types of banking
institution ?
b) What other economic variables influence capital
augmentations ? Is the impact of these variables on capital
augmentations greater than the effects of capital regulation ?
This research is organized as follows:
+ First, the most important institutional and structural
features of the Spanish banking system and its bank regulation are
identified. Then, an exploratory analysis of the main book-value,
regulatory and market-value capital adequacy trends in the Spanish
banking system is performed. This is necessary in order to
understand the framework and environment in which our empirical
work is to be undertaken.
+ A relevant theoretical background is developed for the
main research questions of the thesis. We will explain and
synthesize the capital adequacy literature which has studied the
relationship between capital regulation and bank capital
augmentations. A theoretical model of capital augmentation in
banking and the theoretical analysis of the main managerial and
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regulatory determinants of bank capital augmentations will be
studied. This survey will identify the main testable hypotheses,
relevant to the main aim of this thesis that the literature
suggests.
+ The main empirical models and methodologies which have
tested the impact of capital regulation on banks' capital
augmentations will be analyzed. Then, the models are redefined by
including particular features of the Spanish banking system. These
particular features will emerge from the chapters devoted to the
exploratory analysis of the Spanish banking system and from the
field survey carried out amongst several large Spanish banks.
+ The impact of capital regulation on different
definitions of capital augmentations in the Spanish banking system
during 1987-90 is examined and tested. The researcher also aims at
appraising to what extent managerial variables affect bank capital
augmentations. Tests will be undertaken for the different types of
institutions so that one can evaluate if there are differences
across different types of institutions in the ways they augment
capital.
+ Finally, the implications of our findings are
explored. We discuss what our results imply for the Spanish hank
capital regulation and supervision in terms of competitive
neutrality. Policy and strategic issues from the stand:w•ant of
banks and regulators will be also developed from this analysis.
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1.3.-METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK.
In order to attain the objectives of this research, our
research is organized in the manner described below. Figure 1.1
displays a flow diagram of the structure of the thesis.
In Figure 1.1 it can be observed that following this
introductory chapter, Chapter 2 deals with the main institutional
and structural features of the Spanish banking system. Chapter 3
examines bank regulation in Spain, focusing particularly on bank
capital adequacy requirements regulation. Chapter 4 provides an
exploratory analysis of the main capital adequacy trends in the
Spanish banking system. Chapter 5 provides a revision of the
theoretical capital adequacy literature, which has focused on the
relationship between capital adequacy and bank capital
augmentations. Chapter 6 will identify the main empirical models
and methodologies which have tested the influence of capital
regulation on banks' capital augmentations. Chapter 7 provides the
hypotheses, model, data and initial results of our empirical
analysis on the effects of capital regulation on capital
augmentations for the Spanish banking system. Chapter 8 undertakes
follow-up tests which will complete the analysis of how banks
operating in Spain augment capital. From these results, Chapter 9
will suggest policy implications for the Spanish banking system.
Finally, the conclusions and limitations of our thesis will be put
forward in Chapter 10.
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CHAPTER 2 :THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM
INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL FEATURES
2.1.- INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the Spanish banking system has been described
as a closed system: heavily regulated, protected from external
competition, conservative in terms of innovations and controlled
by the large banks, which own at the same time big portions of
industry. However, since Spain joined the EC in 1986, the
description presented above is no longer appropriate. The idea of
a convergence towards a true Single European Market after 1992 has
become an increasingly certain horizon for which banking firms and
regulatory authorities have prepared for some time. Both firms and
regulatory authorities are well aware of the importance of the
changes that will be taking place, and they are already reacting
to the new competitive environment that is expected to prevail
after 1992.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the main features
of the institutional, structural and overall competitive structure
of the Spanish banking system. This is our 'laboratory', and an
essential prelude to the rest of the thesis.
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2.2.- IMPORTANCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM.
2.2.1.- Importance and Evolution of the Financial Sector.
Table 2.1 summarizes three economic dimensions of the
financial sectors for eight European countries; here the financial
sector is defined as including credit and insurance institutions.
The Spanish financial system appears to be of above the average
(excluding outliers) economic dimensions for EC standards, and is
only surpassed by Luxembourg and the U.K., which are international
financial centres. One would believe that this could be either due
to higher prices (because of inefficiencies and/or market power)
or is an indication of extensive financial services provided to
domestic and foreign clients. The latter seems not to be the case.
Table 2.1 provides some sample information on observed labour
productivity. Column 1 divided by column 2 produces a ratio of
labour productivity in the financial sector relative to the whole
economy: this is 2.9 for Spain and 1.7 for the average of the rest
of the EC (EUR 8). This overperformance of Spain could arise
because the human and physical capital employed in the sector is
above average or as a result of non-competitive pricing.
Column 3 divided by column 2 produces a ratio of remuneration
per employee relative to the rest of the economy: this ratio is
2.4 for Spain and 1.67 for the rest of the EC (EUR 8): this
suggests that the Spanish financial industry also enjoys an above
average remuneration per employee relative to the rest of the
economy. The ratio for Spain is close to that of a sophisticated
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Employment	 Wage bill
(% GDP)a (% total
employment) b
(% total for
economy)
Belgium 5.7 3.8 6.3
W. Germany 5.4 3.0 4.4
Spain 6.4 2.8 6.7
France 4.3 2.8 3.8
Italy 4.9 1.8 5.6
Luxembourg c 14.9 5.7 12.2
Netherlands 5.2 3.7 4.9
U.K. 11.8 3.7 8.5
EUR 8 d 6.4 2.9 6.2
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financial sector like that of the U.K. (2.3 for the U.K.) which
employs higher quality human capital and indicates the
possibility of non-competitive wages in the industry in
Spain, possibly appropriating some of the oligopolistic rents
that could explain high observed productivity.
Table 2.1 : Economic Dimensions of the Financial Services
Sector for Eight European Countries (1985).
a.- Including net interest payment
b.- Employees in employment plus the self-employed
c.- Data for 1982
d.- This aggregate accounted for 95 % of Total EEC GDP in 1985 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1988)
Table 2.2 shows the participations of the three sectors of
the economy (financial institutions, public sector and households
and firms) in the total variation of assets and liabilities
(financial flows) of the resident sectors for 1978, 1983 and
1 0
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1986.The important participation of financial institutions in the
financial flows is a logical consequence of their own role as
intermediaries of resources. However, the relative loss in
importance in the financial flows in recent years can be observed
in Table 2.2; financial disintermediation appears to lie behind
this decreasing trend. Disintermediation is the process whereby
borrowers and financial investors by-pass banks and transact
business directly. We will return later on to this phenomenon.
Table 2.2: Participations in the Total Variation of Assets
and Liabilities of Resident Sectors (1978, 1983 and 1986)(%).
1978	 1983	 1986
A	 L	 A	 L	 A
Finan. Institutions
	 52.7 52.6	 45.3 37.9	 45.9 43.5
Public Sector	 4.0	 7.9	 12.5 27.3	 3.9 23.5
Households and firms
	 43.3 39.5
	
42.2 34.8
	 50.2 33.0
A = Assets L = Liabilities
(*) Consolidated, therefore the intrasector flows are excluded.
Source: Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas (1988, p.40)
Table 2.3 : Participation of the Intrasector Flows in the
Variation of Assets and Liabilities of the Sector (1978, 1983
and 1986) (%).
1978 
	 1983 	 1986 
A	 L	 A	 L	 A	 L
Finan. Institutions
	 5.3	 5.5	 38.5 38.7	 6.3	 7.1
Public Sector	 --	 --	 13.0	 6.0	 0.1	 --
Households and firms
	 1.4	 1.6	 5.0	 5.7	 14.5 23.6
Source: Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas (1988, p.40)
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In Table 2.2 one can also note the increasingly important
role of the public sector in the creation of financial
liabilities. This is a consequence of the increasing finance
needs of the public sector as a result of its deficits.
Table 2.3 displays the percentages of intrasector financial
flows. One can notice the relatively high percentage of
intrasector operations for the financial firms group in 1983.
This resulted from the financial relationship between the Treasury
and the credit institutions, performed by the Bank of Spain, that
reached its climax in the following manner: the Bank of Spain gave
credit to the Treasury and placed its liabilities (in the form of
monetary control certificates) in the credit institutions. From
1984 onwards, these certificates were replaced by Treasury bills.
The financial disintermediation can also be seen in Table
2.3. There is an increasing trend in the participation of the
intrasector flows in the total financial flows of households
and firms. Firms increasingly obtain funds directly from the
financial markets. A major part of these funds are supplied by
the households.
To sum up, two main conclusions can be drawn from this
subsection:
- As for the economic importance of the financial sector
in Spain, one can say that the sector appears to be of above
average economic dimensions by EC standards. This could possibly
be due to non-competitive pricing in the industry.
- As for the evolution of the sector, although the
financial institutions still play the central role in the
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financial flows of the economy, the importance of the industry has
been declining in recent years as a result of the direct
participation of the public sector, households and firms in the
financial markets (disintermediation).
2.2.2.- Financial Markets.
The stage of development of Spanish financial markets is
very asymmetrical: highly developed markets with a degree of
sophistication comparable to the most advanced European markets
have been living alongside sleepy markets with some regulations
and practices dating back to the nineteenth century. In the
mid-1970s, the strict regulation and control of every financial
activity by the Bank of Spain and/or the Ministry of Economy,
together with the cosy status quo of the banking sector, led the
financial sector to a level of underdevelopment that contrasted
with other parts of the Spanish economy. Regulations began to be
loosened up and reform was very different across markets. The
chief explanation for this asymmetry in the evolution is probably
that reforms were implemented only when they contributed towards
solving some urgent needs of the public sector. These urgent needs
reflected the necessity of creating flexible ways of deficit
financing (in a scenario of runaway public sector deficits until
1985) and, also, the necessity of flexible monetary policy
instruments that could provide the Bank of Spain with the required
tools to bring two-digit inflation under control.
The previous explanations are corroborated by an examination
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of the situation of the Spanish financial markets at the time of
the accession to the EC, and its evolution to the present. The
most developed markets are the interbank market and the market
for short and medium-term government debt. Their degree of
sophistication contrasted with the situation of the other
segments of the money and capital markets, such as the stock
market and the markets for private debt instruments (long-term
private bonds, mortgages and derivative instruments, etc.). The
demands of a booming economy together with the spectre of the 1992
liberalization have led to a rapid development of many of these
markets.
The government debt securities market has, apart from
funding the public sector's cash deficits, two other missions of
transcendental significance: the control of cash in the economic
system (through open-market operations) and the setting of the
reference interest rate for the whole credit system.
Table 2.4 presents the main stylized facts of Spain's money,
bond and stock markets. Part A shows the growing importance of
the interbank market, which is closely linked to the process of
liquidity creation by the Bank of Spain. Nowadays, the market is
sizeable, deep, and works very efficiently with a simple and
direct clearing system. Part B shows that the development of the
short-term bond market has been less gradual than in the
interbank market. This, in turn, has been due to the changing
needs of the Treasury regarding the financing of sizeable budget
deficits, to the relative after-tax real unattractiveness of
deposit interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and also
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to the increasing sophistication of monetary control. As may be
observed, total market volume has grown quite spectacularly
between 1982 and 1988, representing in this last year about 22
per cent of Spanish GDP.
Table	 2.4:	 Spanish	 Money,	 Bond
(1982-88)	 (billion Spanish pesetas).
and Stock	 markets,
1982 1985 1987 1988
A. Interbank marketa
Total daily flows 138 412 790
Deposits outstanding 300 962 2695
B. Short-term bond market
Treasury bills (Pagares)
Gross issue 131 4708 3314 2965
Outstanding stock 115 5100 5332 5051
Treasury notes (Letras)
Gross issue 2538 3658
Outstanding stock _ -
C. Long-term bond market
Treasury bonds (Bonos)
Gross issue 151 387 1038 1163
Outstanding stock 606 1100 3287 4267
Private fixed interest
rate bonds
Gross issue 574 1086 640 759b
Outstanding stock 2120 3655 4220 4350
D. Stock Exchange
Volume 172 621 4766 3021
Net issue 141 207 456 495
Capitalization 1403 3007 7240 9640
Market index 69 122 358 397
(1970 = 100)
a.- Daily averages
b.- Flows from January to November and stocks outstanding in
November.
Source : Vinals (1990) in Bliss and Braga (1990, p.190)
Other short-term bond markets are the mortgage market and
the commercial paper market. The first has not taken off yet, and
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the second enjoyed a large success before the appearance of
Treasury notes. Nowadays, the commercial paper market is
particularly ripe for development, given the recent strong growth
of private investment and the relatively high transformation
costs of the banking sector. Nevertheless, the market will not be
consolidated until the unfavourable fiscal treatment - relative
to Treasury bills- is eliminated, and until the archaic operating
mechanics of the market are changed.
Part C of Table 2.4 summarizes the recent evolution of the
Spanish long-term bond market. The main instruments traded are
private fixed interest rate bonds ('obligaciones privadas') and
Treasury bonds ('obligaciones' for maturities above 5 years, and
'bonos' for maturities below). The Treasury bond market started
from a very low level and grew slowly until 1986, when the
outstanding stock almost tripled as a result of the aggressive
issuing policy of the Treasury in that year in an environment
where the private sector held expectations of future lower
interest rates and of the development of a sophisticated Treasury
bond market. Since then, the delay in the introduction of the
expected market reform and the restrictive monetary policy stance
since 1987 have led to a Treasury bond supply and demand
contraction which has slowed down market growth. Nevertheless,
the future of the Treasury bond market looks bright if and when
the current demand management problems leading to very high
short-term interest rates are solved. Once this is achieved, the
recent technical improvements in the market will make it deeper
and more liquid, efficient and transparent; it is expected that
16
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the market will become a centrepiece of the Spanish financial
system.
Where things look rather less encouraging is in the private
long-term bond market. As shown in Table 2.4, while the relative
size of this market was rather large in 1982, its growth since
then has been much slower than in the public sector long-term bond
market, even suffering a decline in gross issues since 1987. This
recent setback was linked to the near-bankruptcy of one of the
major utility companies in the country which prompted a very
negative reaction in the market. This episode - which surprised
most market participants- points out the problems caused by the
absence of a reliable debt-rating service that could orientate
investors.
Other negative factors in the market are the recent increase
in interest rate volatility, the low degree of development of
pension funds and other natural buyers of long-term bonds, and
the lack of long-term public sector bond issues which leaves the
private market without a point of reference. In any case, the
lack of development of the long-term private bond market has
fairly negative implications for the access of firms to
badly-needed long term capital, as is the case with utilities
and other capital-intensive industries. This makes firms resort
to the Euromarket, to higher than desirable short-term financing,
or to tapping the less reliable equity market. Still, for many
small firms bank credit is the only option to finance long-term
capital investment.
Moving on now to the stock market, there is a presumption -
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both in public and private circles - that this is the segment of
the financial markets that could be most negatively affected by
the 1992 Single European Market. However, it should be pointed
out that this vulnerability is also shared by most of the
continental stock markets of the EC, including the French,
Italian and German markets.
There are four organized markets in Spain for the public
trading of securities: Madrid (founded in 1831), Barcelona
(1915), Bilbao (1890) and Valencia (1980) Stock Exchanges.
Madrid is the Spanish biggest stock market with 80 per cent of the
total market in 1989. The so-called continuous market, which is a
computer-assisted trading system, in which transactions can be
carried out from any point in Spain, came into operation in April
1989, and is expected to handle eventually most of the
transactions in Spain (between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of
total Spanish trading). The recently created options and futures
markets operate separately, and are managed by organizations
other than the Official Stock Exchange.
Part D of Table 2.4 shows that the evolution of the stock
market has been remarkable in recent years, especially during
1985-87. However, in order to complete the picture of the Spanish
stock market, it is necessary to make additional remarks. First,
the exceptional performance of the market from 1985 until October
1987 may have artificially increased Spanish capitalization above
normal values. Second, the market is very narrow, with fewer than
400 quoted companies, out of which only about 60 have enough
liquidity to be acceptable in the portfolios of large investors.
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Moreover, banks and public utilities account for about 75 per
cent of total assets traded, prices are still subject to the
manipulations of large shareholders, and insider trading has not
until now been regulated. Finally, until mid-1989 the
compensation and liquidation process was archaic; the official
intermediary agents ('agente de bolsa') charged a fixed fee
(independent of volume) that discriminated against small
investors, and there was a lack of self-regulatory power of the
Exchanges. All these features have hindered the efficiency of the
Spanish stock market until recently.
The fear that the Spanish stock market would be badly hurt
by 1992 has led the authorities, starting in mid-1989, to issue
legislation to overhaul the market and to get rid of most of the
above mentioned problems. Given the important role that the stock
market can play in helping Spanish firms adjust to increasing
international competition derived from the "EC cum 1992" shock, it
is critical that additional legal reforms take place soon and that
incentives are provided to expand simultaneously market supply and
demand.
2.2.3.- Importance and Evolution of the Banking Sector.
One can again undertake a comparative analysis with other EC
countries in order to study the relative size of the Spanish
banking sector. The economic dimension employed here as an
indicator of banking sector size is bank loans outstanding as a
percentage of GDP. Table 2.5 displays these values for eight EC
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countries for 1985. It may be noted that the figures for
Luxembourg are somewhat distorted because of its financial centre
status.
Table 2.5 : Bank Loans Outstanding as a Percentage of GDP
for 8 EC Countries (1985).
Country	 Bank loans as % of GDP
Belgium	 1428
W. Germany	 139
Spain	 99
France	 938
Italy	 96
Luxembourg	 6916
Netherlands	 130
U.K.	 208
EUR 8 8	142
a.- 1982 data
b.- Weighted average
Source:Commission of the European Communities (1988)
It can be seen from Table 2.5 that Spain has one of the
lowest values of total bank loans as a percentage of GDP, and the
Spanish percentage is well below the average of the other EC
countries (EUR 8). The relative size of the banking sector in
Spain appears smaller by EC standards. This seems to contrast
with the earlier finding for the financial sector as a whole;
earlier on, it was found that the financial sector in Spain seems
to be of above average economic dimensions by EC standards. This
might result from the use of two different measures (gross
value-added and bank loans as a percentage of GDP). High relative
gross value-added and low relative bank loans may be explained by
the existence of high intermediation margins (non-competitive
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pricing).
One can also examine the evolution of the intermediation
performed by the banking sector. There are different ways of
measuring the level of intermediation of the banks. A simple and
rather intuitive measure will be used: this is the ratio which
measures the percentage that the liabilities of the financial
institutions (excluding those that are assets of other financial
institutions) represent in the total financial assets of the rest
of sectors (public sector, non-financial firms, households and
external sector). Table 2.6 displays the values of this ratio for
financial institutions, private banks and savings banks for 1975
and 1981-87.
Table 2.6: Evolution of the Intermediation : Liabilities of
Financial Intermediaries as a Percentage of Total Financial
Assets of the Rest of Sectors (1975, 1981-87).
1975 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Fin. institutions 88.0 83.7 79.4 76.2 74.9 73.7 72.5 72.9
Private banks	 51.2 47.6 45.4 42.9 42.7 40.1 37.0 37.6
Savings banks	 20.6 19.0 19.1 19.1 19.4 20.7 21.3 21.4
Source: Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas (1988, p. 309)
Table 2.7 : Number of Financial Institutions in Spain
1980 1983 1986 1989 Variation
1980-89
Banking institutions	 371	 380	 364	 341	 - 30
Other financial institutions	 412	 508	 419	 411	 - 1
Total	 783	 888	 783	 752	 - 31
Source: Negueruela and Gomez (1990, p.171)
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In Table 2.6, one can notice again the loss of importance of
the financial institutions' intermediation, particularly after
1982, although in 1987 the disintermediation process appears to
peter out. As one can observe in Table 2.6, the savings banks do
not seem to be affected by this disintermediation process and the
ratio appears approximately constant throughout the period.
However, private banks have lost almost 14 points since 1975. When
comparing between groups of institutions, one must take another
variable into account. This is the relative market share which may
explain partially the evolution of these ratios for the two types
of banks.
The last variable to be analyzed here is the evolution of the
number of the financial and banking institutions in the market
during the period 1980-89: see Table 2.7. Under the heading of
banking institutions are included private banks, savings banks,
credit co-operatives and official credit institutions.
In Table 2.7 one can observe a decrease in the number of
financial institutions during the period 1980-89, which is mainly
explained by the decrease in the number of banks. The banking
crisis that the Spanish banking system suffered in the 1980s seems
to lie behind this decline in the number of banks.
The main conclusions one can draw from this subsection are:
- The Spanish banking sector appears to be of relatively
smaller size by EC standards as measured by total bank loans as
a percentage of GDP; this contrasts with the earlier finding of
relatively high gross value-added as a percentage of GDP. This
result may be explained by non-competitive pricing and/or the
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existence of an extensive network of financial services provided
to domestic and foreign customers.
- The level of intermediation performed by the banking
institutions in Spain has been declining during the 1980s, and
the private banks are the institutions most badly affected.
2.3.- INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM.
2.3.1.- Types of Bank Institution in Spain.
2.3.1.1.- Introduction.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the institutions of the credit system
and the banking system in Spain. The credit system contains the
Bank of Spain, the banking system and the Official Credit
Institutions. There are three main types of banking institution in
the Spanish banking system: private banks, savings banks and
credit cooperatives. Nowadays, the main difference between them is
their ownership structure. Otherwise, they have almost identical
operational capabilities.
Private banks (except Banco Exterior) are privately owned
banks. According to the regulatory differences that used to
exist among domestic banks and the legislative differences that
still exist. between domestic and foreign banks, private banks can
be classified into corporate banks, commercial banks, mixed banks
and foreign banks.
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Figure 2.1: Credit System and Banking System in Spain
CREDIT SYSTEM
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Savings banks are non-for-profit institutions. Profits are
allocated to charitable projects (Obra Social in Spanish) run by
the savings banks. The boards of the savings banks are controlled
by local and regional governments and are grouped in the
Confederation of Spanish Savings Banks (Confederacion Espanola de
Cajas de Ahorros = CECA), which unlike in the rest of the EC, has
limited powers over the individual banks.
Credit cooperatives are constituted by members that can be
individuals or other cooperatives. The rural savings banks (cajas
rurales) are the most important and their operations are related
to the agriculture, forestry and social conditions of the rural
areas. Credit cooperatives will not be examined because of their
small importance in the Spanish banking system as a whole.
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2.3.1.2.- Private and Savings Banks: Main Differences.
Three main areas can be identified with regard to the most
important differences between private and savings banks. These
areas are: ownership, legal and regulatory framework and
operational differences.
2.3.1.2.a.- Ownership
Nowadays, ownership is the main difference between
private and savings banks. Table 2.8 shows the sector ownership
for 1985-88.
Table 2.8: Banking Sector Ownership (1985-88)
Total banking sector assets (%)
Category	 1985
	
1988	 Change
Private	 53.3	 49.0	 - 4.3
Public
	 7.9	 2.3	 - 5.6
Mutual	 31.5	 37.7	 6.2
Foreign	 7.3	 11.0	 3.7
Totals	 100.0	 100.0
Source: Gardener and Molyneux (1990, p.270)
The Banco Exterior is one of the two institutions (the other
is the Postal Savings Banks) that comprise the public-sector
financial institutions and it operates as a commercial bank. Apart
from this case, the ownership of the commercial banks is private
or foreign. In Table 2.8, one can observe the decline in the
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relative total assets of the private-owned banks (basically
domestic commercial banks) and the increase in the relative total
assets of the branches of the foreign banks (basically they are
commercial banks). Under the heading of mutual ownership
structure, we find savings banks and credit cooperatives: it can
be seen that the relative total assets of the mutual-owned banks
have increased during this period.
2.3.1.2.b.- Legal and Regulatory Framework.
The regulations that have affected both types of
institution have been complex and different. However, since
1974-75 a new trend towards an equal legal treatment for both
types of institution has emerged. Many rules which used to
discriminate between these firms are no longer in effect. The aim
of this process was to eliminate discrimination and to encourage
competition among financial intermediaries by allowing them to
have access to the different markets under the same operating
conditions, to determine prices, or in terms of the compulsory
solvency ratios they have to bear. This area will be further
examined in Chapter 3 when the researcher deals with bank
regulation in Spain.
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2.3.1.2.c.- Operational Differences.
As it will be seen when it comes to examining the competitive
structure of the Spanish banking system in section 2.4, private
banks (chiefly commercial banks) control the largest share of the
market, but savings banks have been steadily gaining ground at the
expense of private banks. In the 1980s, savings banks market share
has increased while the share controlled by the private banks has
gradually decreased. The main reasons for this trend are the
disappearance of the web of regulations that prevented savings
banks expansion (deregulation) and, as seen earlier, the faster
pace of disintermediation process
markets.
In
in the private banks traditional
between private and savings banks, their asset and liability
structure can be analyzed. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 show respectively
the asset and liability structures for private and savings banks.
On the asset structure side (Table 2.9), one can see that the
structures for both types of institution have converged during the
period 1982-87. The percentage of financial investment in loans
decreased dramatically for private banks and moderately for
savings banks. The securities portfolio of savings banks is
relatively higher than the one for the private banks, even though
savings banks have a lower level of industrial participations.
Savings banks are more concentrated in fixed income securities. In
the period considered, the portfolio of securities decreased
substantially for savings banks but only slightly for private
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banks. Investment in the interbank market and in monetary assets
increased for both. In the interbank market, private banks appear
to have become more active than the savings banks. As for monetary
assets, after 1984 investment in Treasury notes increased
substantially, even above what was compulsory owing to the lack of
investment opportunities; the disintermediation process was
emerging. Private and savings banks are still concentrated in
different market niches. Savings banks are mainly dedicated to
middle and low income retail banking, devoting a sizeable part of
their credit to households and mortgage loans, whereas private
banks lean more to middle and high retail consumers and to
wholesale banking.
Table 2.9: Asset Structure for Private and Savings Banks
(1982-87)	 (%)	 (*)
Private Banks
Loans SecuritiesBank of Spain and	 Interbank
monetary assets	 market
1982 7.2 5.1 74.7 12.9
1983 12.2 8.3 67.7 11.8
1984 16.4 13.2 57.4 13.0
1985 19.8 13.7 52.9 13.7
1986 20.4 13.6 52.9 13.1
1987 22.0 14.1 51.4 12.6
Savings Banks
1982 9.3 9.2 52.3 29.2
1983 15.4 9.2 51.2 24.2
1984 23.2 8.8 47.3 20.7
1985 27.1 11.6 42.3 19.2
1986 24.4 13.6 42.8 19.2
1987 25.4 11.3 46.2 17.1
(*) Some of the numbers do not add up to 100 because of rounding
Source: Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas (1988, p. 301)
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On the liability side (see Table 2.10), one can observe that
savings banks obtain relatively more funds from cheap deposits
(checking and savings accounts) than the private banks. One
can, nevertheless, notice a decrease in the proportion of cheap
deposits for both types of institution. Long-term deposits were
almost stable for savings banks and decreased by 20 points for
private banks during the period considered. During the period
1983-85 there was a movement towards negotiable securities,
particularly in the case of private banks. In 1985-87 there was a
movement towards endorsement of Treasury notes, again particularly
in the case of the private banks which became very active in this
area. Table 2.10 appears to indicate that changes were drastic for
private banks and moderate for savings banks. These movements
could be explained in terms of tax (in the case of the Treasury
notes) and were also linked to the recovery in the demand for
credit from 1985 onwards. Since then, banks, rather than financing
the government (purchasing Treasury notes), have been financing
the private sector and transferring the notes to their clients. On
the liability side, it is not as clear as on the asset side that
the structures for private and savings banks have converged.
Finally, as a conclusion, one can say that the operational
characteristics in terms of asset structure have converged for
private and savings banks but, this is unclear in terms of their
corresponding liability structures.
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Table 2.10: Liability Structure for Private and Savings
Banks (1982-87) (%) (*)
Private Banks
Checking and
savings
accounts
Term	 Negotiable
deposits	 liabilities
and CDs
Asset
endorsement
Other
1982 41.1 48.4 4.2 6.4
1983 38.2 41.1 14.9 5.7
1984 35.9 31.5 25.7 1.5 5.4
1985 36.8 29.8 18.9 8.6 5.8
1986 38.3 33.8 4.1 17.6 6.2
1987 37.5 28.9 5.5 23.3 4.8
Savings Banks
1982 57.6 40.6 0.1 1.7
1983 55.9 39.9 0.2 4.0
1984 50.7 37.2 4.4 2.0 5.8
1985 48.4 36.0 4.9 4.0 6.7
1986 49.2 39.2 0.3 3.4 7.9
1987 50.3 36.7 0.6 6.2 6.2
(*) Some of the numbers do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas (1988, p.303)
2.3.1.3.- Commercial and Investment Banking in Spain.
Investment banks (industrial banks, or 'bancos industriales'
in Spanish terms) were created in 1962 and had different
regulations from those of the commercial banks. However,
nowadays there is no difference in legal treatment between them.
The Spanish banks have the characteristics of "universal banking"
which makes the distinction between commercial and investment
banks less relevant for the Spanish case since most commercial
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banks offer investment banking services.
2.3.1.3.a.- The Spanish Model: Universal Banking.
The relationship between the banking system and the
industrial sector has been discussed extensively in the
literature. There are two opposite models of banking system
relationships with the industrial sector (Manas, 1989 and Torrero
1988). The first model is the one adopted by Japan and Germany in
which banks have important equity holdings in industrial firms,
are represented at the company's boards and, hence, have a direct
participation in their management. The opposite model, is best
exemplified by the UK and the US where the banking systems do not
have such strong and direct (equity) relationships with the
industrial firms and thus, they are not involved directly in the
management of the firms. The banks that follow the latter model
have no strong role in financing industrial firms, and the main
source of long-term, equity financing for the industrial firms is
identified in the Stock Exchange market.
The Spanish banking system has the characteristics of
'universal banking' and hence it is more in line with the German
or Japanese model rather than the model followed by the UK and US
(Manas, 1989 and Torrero, 1988). As a matter of fact, the Spanish
industrialization process since the end of the 19th century could
not be understood without a reference to the major role that
commercial banks played in it (Kindleberger, 1984). As with the
rest of the countries that follow the universal banking model, the
31
CHAPTER z: THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM: INSTITUTIONAL MM
Spanish banking system has maintained important links with the
non-financial sector of the economy. Although in recent history
there are examples of regulatory efforts to encourage a movement
by the Spanish banking system towards the Anglosaxon model (such
as the 1962 Law which allowed the creation of investment banks),
the Spanish banks still maintain strong and direct links with the
industry. In the next subsection, the importance of these links
are evaluated.
2.3.1.3.b.- Importance of Industrial Participations.
Spanish banks have often been important shareholders as well
as lenders to industrial firms. While this feature may have
economic advantages, like the reduction of information asymmetries
between lenders and borrowers, it also has a major disadvantage in
terms of excessive concentration of debt and equity risk in a
bank's asset structure. Those risks materialized in the deep and
severe banking crisis that occurred after 1978 - and which
affected almost half of the banks existing in 1977 - as a result
of the strong industrial crisis suffered by the Spanish economy.
Although the crisis ended with a recomposition of banking groups
and with the creation of public institutions in charge of closely
monitoring the performance of banks in trouble, the close links
between some of the major banks and industry still prevail.
It is difficult to obtain an accurate quantitative picture of
the importance of the bank's industrial portfolio, since there are
only aggregate data publicly available and these data may be
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biased downwards because of the joint effect of inflation and
prudential accounting standards. Bearing these problems in mind,
according to Vinals (1990),the Spanish banks held in 1988 almost 1
trillion pesetas in shares, of which 730 billions were held by the
seven major banks. This figure is equivalent to about 10 per cent
of the stock market capitalization at the end of 1988 and also
equivalent to almost 50 per cent of total bank equity (capital
plus reserves).
Table 2.11 displays the portfolio of non-financial firms'
shares as a percentage of the total shares' portfolio held by
banks for five countries. In Table 2.11 one can observe that
leaving Japan out, where the shares' portfolio only contains
industrial participations, Spain has the highest percentage of
industrial participations by banks in the shares' portfolio.
Although the different tax and accounting rules could affect the
balance-sheet valuation of shares (see Foster, 1986 p.190), the
active role of the Spanish banking system in industry appears
clear in this table. As for the evolution of the industrial
participation, the decline in the percentage of industrial
participations in the period studied can be observed. The
differences between Spain and the other countries in the table
(leaving Japan out) seem to have been reduced. The relative
decline in the percentage of industrial participations held by
banks may be explained by the recomposition of the banking groups
after the banking crisis. However, the future of important
segments of the banking system cannot be detached from the future
of the industry.
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Table 2.11:	 Industrial	 Participations'	 Portfolio	 (	 as	 a
Percentage of Total	 Shares'	 Portfolio)	 for	 Five	 National
Banking Systems.
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
W. Germany	 49.4 46.8 48.8 50.0 49.4 52.4
Spain	 81.0 69.6 72.2 66.7 68.0 64.3 67.1
Japan	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
U.K.	 16.9 14.6 17.5 15.5 22.0 22.0
Italy	 7.3 11.0 16.3 17.5 19.3
Source: Chulia (1990, p.76)
There are several ways in which the potential effects of the
1992 single financial market for Europe could affect these strong
relationships between banks and industries. One of these ways has
to do with our topic of capital adequacy regulation. The
harmonization of solvency requirements across the EC may entail
a severe limitation in the size of bank industrial holdings with
regard to bank's equity. If Spanish banks had to sell a
substantial proportion of their industrial participations, there
would be a revolution in Spanish industry since many big firms
would have to undergo a fundamental change in their controlling
shareholders.
2.3.1.4.- Foreign Banks in Spain.
2.3.1.4.a.- Introduction.
In 1978, after decades of prohibition, foreign banks were
again allowed to set up in Spain. However, rather restrictive
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conditions were set out for foreign banks:
- Foreign banks could not open more than three
offices and thus, they were prevented from expanding into retail
banking.
- However, the most stringent restriction was the
requirement of maximum financing with resort to the internal
market (not including interbank loans) of 40 per cent of their
total credits. Hence, they were forced to employ expensive credit
sources (such as the interbank market).
Spain's entry into the EC brought about the elimination or
softening of many of the discriminatory rules against foreign
banks, although not all of these rules have disappeared as it will
be seen later on in Chapter 3.
2.3.1.4.b.- Importance and Evolution of the Foreign
Banks in Spain.
At the end of 1989 there were 54 foreign banks in Spain. We
need to examine their importance in terms of market share for
some products. Table 2.12 displays the evolution of the
importance of the foreign banks in terms of market share of some
products (credit and securities, total assets and interbank
liabilities).
In Table 2.12, one can observe the increasing importance of
the foreign banks in Spain. At the end of 1989, they accounted
for 13 per cent of the credit given by all the banks in Spain. One
can also note the active role of the foreign banks in the
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interbank markets. At the end of the 1989, they accounted for
about one third of the interbank liabilities.
Table	 2.12:	 Importance	 of	 the	 Foreign
(as a Percentage of total Spanish Banking)
Banks	 in	 Spain
(1980-89)
1980 1983 1986 1989
Credit + securities
Total Assets
5.2
5.8
9.5
10.4
12.6
12.1
13.0
13.7
Interbank liabilities 24.0 30.4 34.0 32.3
Source: Negueruela and Gomez (1990, p.173)
Table 2.13: Comparison of	 the	 Balance-sheet
Foreign and Domestic Banks (1985-87).
Structure	 of
Foreign Banks Domestic Banks
1985 1986 1987 1985 1986	 1987
Assets
1. Credit system 14.7 18.7 22.9 20.4 18.3	 19.6
2. Other finan.	 inst. 0.7 1.8 4.0 0.4 0.6	 0.9
3. Public sector 7.6 13.8 15.2 18.1 22.0	 19.6
4. Private sector 51.6 46.2 43.5 42.4 43.4	 43.3
5. Foreign sector 13.8 18.5 10.3 11.3 10.4	 8.3
6. Real assets 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.3 2.1	 1.0
7. Sundries 11.0 0.3 3.5 5.2 3.1	 6.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0	 100.0
Liabilities
1. Credit system 55.3 60.5 59.7 18.7 19.2	 16.2
2. Other finan.	 inst. 0.9 2.3 1.3 0.5 0.6	 0.7
3. Public sector 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.7 2.6	 2.6
4. Private sector 3.6 3.1 9.2 55.8 56.4	 55.8
4.1	 Deposits (1.4) (1.2) (1.6) (45.4) (40.8)(37.8)
4.2	 Other (1.5) (1.0) (6.1) (7.3) (12.4)(14.4)
5. Foreign sector 23.6 27.4 19.4 10.4 10.1	 9.8
6. Capital 5.2 6.1 6.0 8.5 9.4	 9.3
7. Sundries 11.2 0.3 4.0 4.4 1.8	 5.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0	 100.0
Source: Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas (1988, p. 307)
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In Table 2.13 it can be observed that in 1986-87 the foreign
banks obtained around 60 per cent of their credit sources from the
interbank market, which is an expensive credit source, and they
obtained only 9.2 per cent of their credit sources from their
clients in 1987 (this percentage was even smaller in 1985-86).
This may be explained by the restrictions placed on foreign banks.
This situation contrasts with the domestic banks who obtained 56
per cent of their credit sources from their clients and only 16
per cent from the interbank market in 1987.
As for the assets, credit to the private sector accounts for
around 45 per cent of the total credit given by the foreign banks
in 1986-87. Credit to the public sector as a percentage of total
assets increased during the period as credit to the foreign sector
as a percentage of total assets decreased. Credit to the private
sector was chiefly given to large firms: in many cases in the form
of syndicated loans (a financial innovation introduced by the
foreign banks during that period). One can also observe that there
seems to be a convergence between domestic and foreign banks in
terms of asset structure. In 1987, the asset structures for both
types of bank appear more similar than in 1985.
To sum up, the entry of foreign banks in the Spanish
financial sector was a healthy shock. They brought in badly
needed competition to the wholesale market: they introduced many
financial innovations (such as the syndicated loan) and they had
an important role in the development of money and capital
markets, in particular in the interbank markets.
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2.3.2.- The Framework of the Banking Activities in Spain
during the 1980s.
2.3.2.1.- Banking Crisis and the Current Health of the
Spanish Banking System.
It is no exaggeration to affirm that in the period 1978-85,
the Spanish banking system went through one of the most serious
banking crisis that has taken place in any OECD country during
recent years. Initially, the crisis affected middle-sized and
small banks but, at a later stage, a big bank group (Rumasa) was
also affected. Some big banks, such as Banesto and Banco Hispano
Americana were not allowed to pay out dividends until they
restored adequate solvency standards.
Table 2.14 displays data related to the banks involved in
the banking crisis. From 1977 to 1983, 51 banks were affected by
the crisis which represents almost half of the banks existing in
1977. The amount of accounts, branches and staff affected by the
crisis appears very important.
The deep recession of the period 1975-83 was the detonator
of the banking crisis in Spain. The effects of the crisis were
aggravated by the lack of an appropriate monitoring policy
because of the absence of technical and legal resources in the
hands of the Bank of Spain (stemming from a lack of foresight by
the relevant policymakers).
After the major restructuring brought about by the crisis,
the improvement of the economic conditions and the tough solvency
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and regulatory requirements imposed by the Bank of Spain have
resulted in a generally sound banking system with strong balance
sheets. Spanish banks have devoted a great deal of their large
operational profits to cover fully their contingent liabilities
(mainly remaining bad loans and employees' retirement plans).
Moreover, Spanish banks have almost no exposure to country-risk.
To sum up, one can say that Spanish banks faced the 1992 challenge
with generally healthy balance-sheets.
Table 2.14: Spain's Banking Crisis (1978-83).
Year Number of
banks
Total
liabilities
(in million
of pesetas)
Number of
accounts
(thousands)
Number of
branches
Staff
1978 4 67998 185 120 1977
1979 2 46357 201 61 1026
1980 9 295063 775 371 6553
1981 4 144899 362 151 2143
1982 11 750223 1829 726 10761
1983 21 1145382 1946 1193 13204
Total 51 2449922 5298 2622 35664
Source: Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas (1988, p. 241)
2.3.2.2.- Main Trends and Changes in the Spanish
Financial and Banking Systems.
In the 1980s, there have been many changes in the
environment where the Spanish banking firms engage in business
which has affected the banking business itself. Negueruela and
Gomez (1988) identify four major areas where important changes
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have taken place. These are the following:
a) The process of liberalization of the Spanish financial
system which started in 1977 ( two years after Franco's death).
The following measures have been the most important in that
sense:
-Total freedom for banking firms to determine interest
rates and commissions in their operations.
-Reduction in the bank ratios to be held which monitor a
part of the bank resources.
- Increase in the operational possibilities of the
financial firms in terms of the activities they can engage in, and
reduction in the differences established for commercial and
savings banks.
- Reduction in the entry barriers to banking competition
and an increase in the range of institutions which can engage in
banking business.
- New perspectives in the regulation and supervision of
banking activities which now focus more on the solvency aspects
of the institutions and the protection of the consumers.
b) The economic environment in which firms perform their
activities was no longer a generalized crisis environment after
1985. High economic growth was one of the features of the new
environment which has made possible an important growth in
the banking business, in the financial culture of the public and
in the new financial products and markets. This can be illustrated
with the growth rates of Spain' Gross Domestic Product in real
terms during 1986-90, which are shown in Table 2.15.
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Table 2.15 : Spain's Real GDP Growth Rates (1986-90) (%)
Year	 Real GDP Growth Rate
1986	 3.2
1987	 5.6
1988	 5.2
1989	 4.8
1990	 3.7
Source: Boletin Estadistico - Bank of Spain (1991)
Table 2.16: Spanish Government Net Financing (1987-90)
Year	 Net Financing
1987	 - 1596.6
1988	 - 1299.3
1989	 - 1126.9
1990	 - 1387.0
Source: Boletin Estadistico - Bank of Spain (1991)
c) The growth in the financial needs of the public sector
and the change in its finance policy which has resulted in the
public sector becoming the major issuer of financial assets and a
fundamental factor in determining the interest rates of the
Spanish economy. This is illustrated in Table 2.16, where the
Spanish Government Net Financing during 1987-90 is displayed. It
can be noticed that throughout the period considered, there has
been a Government deficit that needed to be financed through
financial assets.
d) Spain's entry into the EC and the configuration of the
European Single Market have been factors that have largely
affected the regulatory changes and modified substantially the
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expectations about the future framework in which the banks will
develop their activities in Spain.
As a consequence of all these changes, a dramatic
transformation of the competition conditions of the Spanish
banking industry has come about. This will be analyzed later on in
the next section devoted to the competitive structure of the
Spanish banking industry.
2.4.- STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE SPANISH BANKING INDUSTRY.
2.4.1.- Introduction.
As an introduction to this section, several economic
measures of the Spanish banking system compared with other
European countries, will be examined. Torrero (1988) undertook a
comparative analysis in this area and he employs data from OECD
Bank Profitability (1988) and from the Boletin Economico del Banco
de Espana. Five countries are considered (Germany, Italy, France,
Sweden and Spain) using 1986 data. Table 2.17 summarizes his
findings and shows the different measures. The data shown are for
private and savings banks pooled together.
The main features of these data are the following:
- The number of population per branch in Spain is the
lowest in the table.
- The number of employees per branch is again the lowest
of all the countries in the table.
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- The volume of average assets per employee and per
branch are the lowest in the table.
Table 2.17 : Comparative Analysis of Economic Measures for
the Banking Systems of 5 European Countries (1986).
Country Population Employees Volume of Volume of
per branch per branch Average Assets
per employee(*)
Av. Assets
per branch(*)
Germany 1534 n.a. n.a. 30.7
Italy 4189 22.5 2.04 45.9
France 2614 17.3 2.47 42.7
Sweden 2731 13.7 2.61 35.8
Spain 1185 7.4 1.24 9.2
(*) In U.S. $ million
n.a. = not available
Source: Torrero (1988, pp. 139-142)
From this one can say that it appears from these data that
the Spanish commercial and savings banks prefer to open a large
amount of branches with basic services. It is difficult to believe
that with the low number of employees per branch the banks can
offer a broad range of services in all the branches.
An issue related to these figures is that of "overbanking"
in Spain, a topic very often discussed in the literature (see, for
example, Torrero 1988). From Table 2.17 one can say that the
Spanish banking system appears "overbanked" compared with the
other four countries in the table. Torrero (1988) argues that the
Spanish banking system seems to need restructuring in terms of
nuraber of branches, employees and management systems.
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2.4.2.- Profitability and Efficiency.
Relative to their European counterparts, the performance of
the Spanish banking sector is usually characterized by two
distinctive features: high transformation costs and at the same
time, high profitability. Spanish banks appear to have high
intermediation margins that allow them to incur high operational
costs, while maintaining good levels of profitability. The usual
interpretation of these two facts that are accepted as
conventional wisdom in the literature is that although Spanish
banks appear to be inefficient in terms of costs, they are able to
remain profitable because of the exercise of market power.
Table 2.18 shows a comparative analysis of private and
savings banks in Spain in terms of profitability and
transformation costs for 1981-87. In Table 2.18, one can observe
that savings banks show consistently higher profits (both in terms
of return on assets and return on equity) and hig er net interest
income even if they do not show the tendency of private banks to
decrease their operating expenses (mostly labour) as a pro•Artion
of assets.
As the rates of inflation up to 1984 were of two digits (14.6
per cent in 1981 and 12.2 per cent in 1983 according to Bank of
Spain's Boletin Estadistico (1985)), real returns for private
banks adjusted for inflation were negative until 194
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Table 2.18: Comparative Analysis of Private Banks and
Savings Banks in Spain (1981-87).
Ratio (1) = Net interest income/ Assets
Ratio (2) = Operating expenses/ Assets
Ratio (3) = Profit before tax/ Assets
Ratio (4) = Staff costs/ Assets
Ratio (5) = Equity/ Assets (*)
Ratio (6) = Profit-before tax/ equity
Private Banks
1981 1983 1985 1986 1987
Ratio	 (1) 4.15 3.95 3.57 3.73 3.89
Ratio	 (2) 3.42 3.09 2.80 3.00 3.04
Ratio	 (3) 0.75 0.65 0.72 0.81 1.00
Ratio	 (4) 2.31 2.08 1.88 2.10 2.12
Ratio	 (5) 6.48 5.94 5.52 5.68 --
Ratio	 (6) 11.54 10.94 13.04 14.36 16.69
Savings banks
1981 1983 1985 1986 1987
Ratio	 (1) 4.73 5.28 4.28 4.68 4.87
Ratio	 (2) 3.55 3.61 3.39 3.83 3.51
Ratio	 (3) 1.03 1.06 1.04 0.91 1.22
Ratio	 (4) 2.36 2.35 2.20 2.65
Ratio
	 (5) 6.04 5.82 5.51 5.38
Ratio	 (6) 17.10 18.19 18.92 16.89 22.27
(*) Equity equals capital plus
	 reserves minus provisions
(arithmetic average of years n-1 and n).
Source: Dermine (1990, p. 273)
Table 2.19 displays a comparative analysis of banking
systems (1986) in terms of profitability and transformation
costs. It will help us to determine whether the Spanish banking
system has relatively higher profitability and transformation
costs for EC and OECD standards.
According to Table 2.19,	 in 1986 Spanish banking
institutions (private and savings banks) compare favourably with
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OECD countries in terms of return on assets. In return on equity
terms they do not fare so well. This may be due to the higher
provisions of Spanish institutions, which is manifested as a lower
leverage; Table 2.19 illustrates this position. Spain has tough
equity requirements (a minimum equity-to-assets ratio of 5 per
cent in 1987).
Table 2.19 : Comparative Analysis of Banking Systems a , 1986.
Private Banks	 Savings Banks
Spain
EECOECD
Average
b
 Average c Spain
4-country
Average
8-country
Average°
Ratio (1) 3.73 2.56 2.40 4.68 3.42 3.23
Ratio (2) 3.00 2.23 2.22 3.83 2.62 2.87
Ratio (3) 0.81 0.65 0.68 0.91 0.83 0.84
Ratio (4) 2.10 1.44 1.28 2.65 1.65 1.52
Ratio (5) 17.61 25.02 26.63 18.59 23.78 29.18
Ratio (6) 14.36 15.36 18.03 16.89 19.97 19.44
a.- Table 2.16 for ratios (1)-(6)
b.- It includes all EEC countries except Denmark, Greece and
Ireland.
c.- It contains all OECD countries except Denmark, Greece,
Ireland, Austria, Iceland, Turkey, Australia and N. Zealand.
d.- Spain, West Germany, Belgium and Italy.
e.- The four above plus Finland,Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
Source: Dermine (1990, p. 284).
Spanish banking institutions have very high intermediation
margins by EC and OECD standards as measured by the ratio of net
interest income to assets. They have also higher operating
expenses and labour costs ratios. This can be interpreted as
evidence of inefficiencies derived from the regulated and
protected environment, but it may also indicate a retail-oriented
banking system.
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The market power of the banks, which will be examined in
section 2.4.4, might be shaping the high intermediation spreads.
Banks may be able to charge higher intermediation mark-ups
because of their market power. However, there are two other
factors that could lie behind bank's high margins of
intermediation in Spain. These are the following:
+ High taxes of financial intermediation: sometimes the
literature overlooks the fact that financial intermediation is
more heavily taxed in Spain than elsewhere in Europe. Wide
interest differentials may just mean a high tax wedge between
lending and borrowing rates.
+ Different consumer tastes : some surveys have found
that when asked about the main factors affecting their bank
choice, the consumers have listed vicinity and service quality far
above interest rates (Manas, 1989).
The interpretation of international comparisons must be
treated with care. For example, the relative inefficiency of the
Spanish system may have different interpretations. It may imply
that the same levels and qualities of outputs and services are
produced at a higher cost. It may also reflect the fact the
Spanish banking is more retail-oriented and that clients receive
higher quality in terms of convenience (as seen in the
introduction of this section with the relatively high number of
branches), in which the output composition is not the same and
costs should be higher.
Finally, one must comment on one of the latest developments
in the Spanish banking system which is the accounts' war or
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'guerra del pasivo' whereby many institutions of the Spanish
banking market began to offer high interest rates on current
accounts since 1989-90. Private banks were mainly the institutions
involved in the accounts war whose main objective was to attract
deposits. As can be noted in Table 2.20, the impact of this
accounts war on the interest rates paid on current accounts and
total financial costs in 1990 appears higher for private banks
than for savings banks. Both interest rates on current accounts
and financial costs have increased considerably for private banks
in 1990. The implications of the accounts war for the Spanish
banks are still difficult to tell, but the impact of it on the
cost of deposits and costs of funds appear clear in Table
2.20.
Table 2.20: Average Interest Rates (r) on Current Accounts
and Aggregate Financial Costs for Spanish Banks (1987-90).
Private Banks	 Savings Banks
Year	 r (%)	 Financial Costs	 r (%)	 Financial Costs
1987	 7.51	 2053129	 6.49	 789504
1988	 7.15
	 2060071	 6.79	 935997
1989	 8.05	 2716654
	 6.81	 1229787
1990	 10.15	 3424651
	 7.25
	 1383339
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario and CECA (1987, 1988,1989
and 1990).
2.4.3.- Concentration and Market Share.
Given the apparent coexistence of high intermediation costs
and significant profitability in the Spanish banking system, one
might conclude that Spanish banks exercise some kind of monopoly
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power. This issue of the exercise by Spanish banks of some degree
of monopoly power must be examined. In this subsection, the
researcher looks at market concentration which under the
traditional industrial organization (I.0.) paradigm of 'market
structure - conduct - performance' (S-C-P) is the most relevant
structural dimension for the study of possession of monopoly
powerl.
First, we study the market shares of the different
institutions (private banks, savings banks and credit
cooperatives). Table 2.21 displays the market shares of these
institutions in the Spanish banking system for 1976-89.
The general picture in Table 2.21 is the dominance of the
private institutions, which account for more than 60 per cent of
Total Assets of the banking institutions. However, over the years
the savings banks have tended to gain market share at the expense
of the private banks. Thus, the only institutions that provide
direct competition in many different markets are the savings
banks. This has been made possible by allowing the savings banks
to have almost the same powers as the private banks.
Table 2.21 : Market Shares of Institutions in the Spanish
Banking System (1976-89).
Percentage of Total Assets
1976 1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Private banks 71.6 70.2 68.1 67.0 65.0 64.3 62.2 61.1
Savings banks 25.9 26.7 29.0 29.9 31.8 32.5 34.8 36.1
Credit cooperativ. 2.5 3.1 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.8
Source :Banco de Espana. Boletin Estadistico.
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Table 2.22 contains two alternative indices of concentration
for the period 1980-88. Part A shows the total market share in
total deposits by the biggest 5, 10, 20 and 50 banks according to
varying institutional criteria. It can be observed that during the
1980s there seems to be a process which tended to reduce the
market share of the 5 largest commercial banks. This process was
reversed in 1988, with the merger of two of the big seven banks
into BBV (formerly Banco de Bilbao and Banco de Vizcaya).
The existence of a trend towards lower concentration is not
so clear, however, when one looks at bank groups. This implies
that the relative size of the group with respect to the parent
company increased, which may be either a consequence of the
process of absorption of smaller banks after the banking crisis
or, rather, a deliberate strategic choice. Again, the mergers
break the stability of the market share of the big five banks,
which suddenly jumps to 66 per cent in 1988.
When one looks at private and savings banks together, a
process towards lower concentration between 1980 and 1988 is also
detected. This may be due to the faster pace of expansion of
savings banks during the period - as some of the regulatory
constraints imposed on them were partially relaxed - together
with their smaller size relative to the major private banks.
However, the merger previously discussed breaks the trend towards
lower concentration, as also happened in the other cases
examined.
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Table 2.22: Indices of Concentration in the Spanish Banking
Sector (1980-88).
Individual Banks
	 Bank Groups
1980 1988 1988a 1980 1988 1988b
A.Number
of banks
5	 50 46 52 58 58 66
10	 68 66 68 84 83 86
20	 80 80 81
50	 93 95 96
B.Herfindahl
index	 0.062 0.056 0.066 0.090 0.109
Private and Savings Banks
1980 1988 1988a 1988b
A. Number of banks
5 33 28 31 39
10 49 45 47 57
20 62 59 60 71
50 80 79 80 89
B. Herfindahl
index	 0.031 0.026	 0.030	 0.045
a.- Consolidated data for BBV used.
b.- Data corresponds to private bank groups (after mergers) and
savings banks.
Source: Vifials (1990) in Bliss and Braga (1990, p.187)
In part B of Table 2.22 the Herfindahl index is displayed,
which is defined as the sum of squares of market shares of firms
in a particular market or industry. This index ranges from near
zero (pure competition) to 1 (pure monopoly), and its reverse
gives the equivalent number of firms of identical size that
generate the same market concentration. This index is attractive
because it does not have the disadvantages of the absolute
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concentration index ( dependence on the number of firms and not
accounting for differences in size) 2 . The computed values of H in
Table 2.22 seem to corroborate quite precisely the trend towards
lower concentration observed in the 1980s until it was sharply
reversed by the recent mergers.
In order to better understand these figures of concentration
ratios, an international comparative analysis of concentration
ratios is analyzed 2 . We will employ Molyneux's results (1990)
which are displayed in Table 2.23. In this table, concentration
concentration measures are computed for the banking systems of the
EC countries. In Table 2.23 it is interesting to note that out of
the largest five banking sectors (Germany, U.K., France, Italy and
Spain), France and Italy appear far more concentrated than the
other three. The Spanish banking sector appears one of the least
concentrated in the EC.
Table 2.23: Market Concentration and Size of Banking
in the EC,	 1986.
Sectors
Number of
banks in
the market	 Country
Concentration
% Assets
5 firm	 3 firm
Concentration
% Deposits
5 firm	 3 firm
4465 Germany 31.2 21.2 30.5 19.1
661 U.K. 32.6 26.5 30.3 21.6
367 France 63.0 42.3 65.2 45.5
980 Italy 55.1 35.2 68.5 41.6
349 Spain 34.7 21.9 38.8 24.3
81 Netherlands --- 71.3 --- 83.9
86 Belgium 84.7 57.1 87.5 59.0
120 Luxembourg 22.4 16.7 --- 16.5
216 Denmark 50.9 36.7 58.9 45.3
n.a. Greece --- 49.7
40 Portugal 49.7 49.6
43 Ireland 71.0
Source: Molyneux (1990, p. 169)
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The main conclusion in this subsection is that from 1980 to
1988 there was a trend towards lower concentration in the Spanish
banking industry which was sharply reversed by the recent
mergers. The mergers represent a reversal of the previous
long-term trend towards lower concentration.
2.4.4.- Market Power.
The data presented in previous subsections, in particular
the international comparisons, are not inconsistent with a
relatively high degree of market power in the Spanish banking
sector. In this section the researcher will examine if there is
any initial evidence that Spanish banks enjoy market power.
The measure of market power employed here is Tobin's q ratio,
which is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the
replacement value of its assets 4 . Table 2.24 contains the q ratios
for banking sectors of several major countries.
The q ratio for the seven Spanish largest private banks in
the period 1978-1985 has been slightly above one only in 1978 and
1981, which appears to result from the effects of the severe
banking crisis during the period. The data for 1978 and 1981 seem
to indicate that in those years, banks had undervalued assets or
'hidden value' in their balance-sheets.
International comparisons of averages over the period 1974-82
show Spain, with a ratio of 1.62, above France, West Germany
and the U.K. as can be noted in Table 2.24. The evidence shown
here appears to support the hypothesis that the Spanish banks
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seem to enjoy some kind of market power.
Table 2.24: q-ratios
Market price/book value Market price/book value
Countries (average 1974-82) (1978)
France 0.89 0.94
Switzerland 1.65 1.61
West Germany 1.34 1.43
U.K. 0.59 0.68
Japan 1.92 1.62
U.S.A. 0.90 0.87
Spain 1.62 1.10
Source: Dermine (1990, p.292)
The evidence provided by the stock market prices must be
treated with some caution, given that, as described in section
2.2.2, the stock market is underdeveloped in Spain and generally
controlled by the large banks. In particular the price of the
stock of a bank is typically manipulated by the same institution
buying or selling in the market5.
2.5.- SYNTHESIS.
In this chapter the researcher has reviewed the main broad
institutional and structural characteristics of the Spanish
banking system. This exploratory analysis of the Spanish banking
sector is necessary in order to understand the framework and
environment in which banks operate in Spain.
Until very recently the Spanish banking system has been
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described as a rather static, sheltered, over-regulated,
relatively inefficient sector and controlled by the large banks,
which at the same time own big portions of the industry. However,
since Spain's entry into the EC in 1986, this description is no
longer appropriate. Both banking firms and regulatory authorities
are well aware of the importance of the changes that will be
taking place after 1992 and are already reacting to the new
competitive environment.
Many important changes have taken place in the Spanish
financial sector during the 1980s: liberalization, new
perspectives in the regulation and supervision of banks, the good
economic environment, Spain's entry into the EC and the large
growth of the financial needs of the public sector. As a result
of these changes, a dramatic transformation of the competitive
conditions of the Spanish banking industry has come about.
Several indicators of profitability, efficiency,
concentration and market power have also been analyzed in order to
obtain a general picture of the setting of the Spanish banking
industry. The Spanish banks seem to have high transformation costs
and at the same time high profitability by EC standards. The usual
interpretation of these two facts is that Spanish banks are
inefficient and profitable at the same time because they are able
to exercise some kind of market power. The market power evidence
shown here appears to support this hypothesis.
There was a trend towards lower concentration in the Spanish
banking sector from 1980 to 1988, which was sharply reversed by
the recent mergers.
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The implications for competition of the integration of the
European financial markets after 1992 must be borne in mind since
this is a factor that points towards even higher competition in
the Spanish banking sector.
NOTES:
1.- See for example, Ferguson (1988) for a review of the S-C-P
paradigm.
2.- See for example, Ferguson (1988) for the features of the
Eerfindhal index.
3.- A word of caution about using traditional measures of
concentration is needed, such as the market share held by a
specified number of the largest banks for international
comparisons. Honohan and Kinsella (1982) argue that cross-country
comparisons of traditional measures of concentration are of
limited use for answering normative questions such as: is the
banking system too concentrated in our country?. They emphasize
that the traditional concentration measures are mainly sensitive
to the degree to which market share is held by the largest banks.
These measures are intuitively acceptable in measuring the degree
to which market power is concentrated in a small number of firms
and empirical evidence confirms that they are correlated with
descriptive characteristics of non-competitive behaviour such as
profits. One must bear these considerations in mind for
international comparisons.
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4.- Dermine (1990) argues that this replacement value is in
practice approximated by the book value. A ratio close to one
implies competitive behaviour, while larger ratios are deemed as
evidence of market power, since according to the valuation of the
market, the firm is expected to earn supranormal returns. The q
ratio has the advantage of incorporating and adjustment for risk,
but it is not free from accounting measurement problems when using
approximations and relies heavily on the efficiency of the stock
market as pricing mechanism.
5.- Econometric evidence of major aspects of pricing in the
Spanish equity market is given by Rubio (1986) and Alonso and
Rubio (1988).
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3.1.- INTRODUCTION.
As with most countries, the Spanish financial system and in
particular the banking sector is one of the most regulated
industries in the economy. Several justifications have been
suggested for the wide range of regulations that are imposed on
the banks (Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas, 1988):
+ The protection of depositors: hence, solvency
regulation of the institutions.
+ The protection of the banking consumer: regulation on
the relationships between banking firms and consumers.
+ Monetary control: regulation on bank liquidity
requirements.
+ Limiting competition among banks to secure solvency:
regulation on interest rates or on geographical expansion.
+ Allocation of bank credit to industries considered to
have priority in the economy: regulatory facilities for credit to
key industries of the economy.
• Attempts to encourage certain banking models:
regulation on commercial and/or investment banking.
Although the comparative importance of some of the regulatory
objectives have changed over time, they have brought about
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specific regulations that have affected the structure and type of
business developed by the different groups of banking institution.
In this chapter, the researcher examines the bank regulation
in Spain i , focusing in particular on capital adequacy regulation.
In the opening section, the regulatory bodies and framework are
examined. Before examining the present bank regulation in Spain,
the philosophy and evolution of bank regulation will be studied.
In the next two sections the bank solvency regulation is analyzed,
together with the present capital requirements in Spain. Finally,
a relevant synthesis of the chapter is provided.
3.2 .- REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY BODIES AND FRAMEWORK: THE
BANK OF SPAIN.
3.2.1.- The Bank of Spain's Monetary Policy Role: Targets and
Instruments.
The Bank of Spain has been the only issuing bank since 1874
and is also the bank of the State and of the banking system. It
acts for the government in implementing monetary policy, exchange
controls and in supervising deposit-taking institutions. Probably
the most important function of any central bank is to undertake
monetary control operations. Monetary control operations aim to
control a monetary variable chosen as a target (such as the amount
of money supply, the level of interest rates or exchange rates)
which is assumed to be linked to the evolution of a macroeconomic
variable or variables (for example GDP growth or rate of
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inflation) which comprise the goal that the government attempts to
achieve with its overall macroeconomic policies.
The Bank of Spain employed the control of M 3 (which is the
monetary aggregate that includes notes and coin in circulation
with the non-bank private sector, non-bank private sector sight
bank deposits, non-bank private sector savings bank deposits and
non-bank private sector time bank deposits and certificates of
deposits) as the intermediate monetary target up to 1984. From
1984 onwards, the so-called ALP (whose meaning is liquid assets)
or M4that contains M3 and other liquid liabilities of the credit
system, money-market institutions and Government with the non-bank
private sector has been employed.
Once the intermediate target variable has been selected,
and as the Bank of Spain cannot have a direct influence on the
target variable, the Bank selects a variable under its control
that affects the evolution of the intermediate target variable.
This variable is the currently Banking System Liquid Assets (ACSB
in Spanish) in Spain. This is a variable that the Bank of Spain
can influence mainly through the following instruments and
operational methods:
a) Open market operations: where the Bank operates in
the market and buys or sells government debt (from 1984 to 1987
Treasury bills mainly, and from 1987 onwards mainly with Treasury
notes ) to the non-bank private sector. In general, if the Bank
sells government debt, the money supply decreases ceteris paribus
and vice versa. Since 1987 when Treasury notes replaced Treasury
bills as the main form of government debt in the open market
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operations, these operations are organized in the form of auction.
These auctions are held regularly every fortnight.
b) Lender-of-last-resort (LLR) operations: the Bank of
Spain has acted as a LLR for the banking system since 1977. The
Bank of Spain stands ready to supply funds to the banking system
if liquidity (or much worse) solvency problems arise. The current
system generally operates on a daily basis. The market operates in
the form of auction through the Money Market Telephone Service;
the maturity of the loans is usually one day. The Bank does not
disclose the amount of funds it is willing to supply. This
important market occasionally reaches a total volume of 1 trillion
of pesetas.
c) Reserve requirements (Coeficiente legal de caja):
minimum cash, liquid assets or deposits at the Bank of Spain
ratios that banks are required to hold.
3.2.2.- The Bank of Spain's Regulatory and Supervisory Role.
The Bank of Spain is responsible for the regulations and
inspections of all private banks, savings banks, co-operative
banks and intermediary money-market houses that operate within the
banking system in Spain. The powers and duties of the Bank of
Spain as well as its role in the monetary policy process are
outlined in the Nationalization and Reorganization of the Bank of
Spain Decree of 1962. The application of sanctions is still
governed by the Banking Law of 1946, which did not provide the
necessary structures to deal with a bank crisis of the size of the
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Spanish one during the early 1980s. More authority in relation to
the conduct of the Government's monetary policy was given to the
Bank of Spain through a 1980 Law.
The Bank of Spain provides information to the rest of the
credit system through the Central de Riesgos Bancarios
(Centralized Banking Risk Department) in which all the
information relating to bank customers is centralized, and
through the Central de Balances (Centralized Balance-sheets
Department), which compiles the information voluntarily sent to
the Bank by nonfinancial firms, who seek interfirm comparison
information.
Under the 1962 Decree, the Bank carries out periodic,
ordinary inspections of banks, as well as extraordinary
inspections. If any violation is noticed, the Bank of Spain
proposes to the Ministry of Economy that sanctions should be
applied. The sanctions can range from simply bringing it to banks'
attention; public or private warnings; a fine of a specified
amount; suspension of the privileges deriving from its
relationship with the Bank of Spain; suspension of directors;
striking banks and bankers off the register; and dissolving the
firms. The gaps and shortcomings which were seen to exist during
the crisis resulted in an increase in legislation, and there has
been a growth in the number of inspectors so as to cope more
quickly with crises.
In 1982 there was another development as a consequence of
the crisis. The information that banking institutions provided to
the Bank of Spain lacked uniformity, but from that year all
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institutions began to produce accounts using the same conventions
of valuation and classification. Yet the most important effects
of the 1982 law were those which dictated norms for modern and
stringent accounting standards, tightened up the regulations for
the reporting of balance sheet and profit and loss accounts, and
established that each institution submit confidential reports
which break down in detail each account of the financial
statement. Such regulation was necessary in order for the Bank to
exercise its supervisory function. In an attempt to achieve the
best modern accounting standards, these requirements, which
caused concern among bankers in 1982, were tightened up in 1985.
For some time the Bank of Spain has given strong
encouragement to the banks to adopt external auditing. Until
fairly recently, the auditors appointed were directors or even
employees of the bank, but now in 1986 external auditors have
been introduced, although many banks adopted external audits in
1985 for the first time. The Bank of Spain understands that the
external auditors are important allies because they perform an
activity complementary to its inspecting task. As in some
European banking systems, external auditors have a legal duty to
report to the authorities any infraction of the regulations; for
instance, the Rumasa group crisis in 1983 was triggered off by an
external auditing report.
Until 1979, supervision of the Spanish banking system
concentrated on monitoring the fulfillment of the compulsory
ratios, but the banking crisis demonstrated the inadequacy of
these methods. In 1980 the supervisory process changed from a
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general view of the banking system to a bank-by-bank analysis,
based on a continuous assessment of the standards of banking
decisions and practices, and accompanied by an increase in the
number of inspections, as can be seen in Table 3.1. Nowadays, the
Bank of Spain is proud of using the international standard system
called CAMEL to judge the 'quality of a bank'. The CAMEL method
derives its name from the initials of Capital (the level of
capital),the quality of Assets, the quality of Management,
Earnings (level and composition of profits) and analysis of the
current and prospective Liquidity position.
Table 3.1: Bank of Spain Inspections, 1979-84
Number of Inspections
Ordinary Extraordinary
1979 80 81 82 83 84 79 80 81 82 83 84
Private banks 21 25 30 37 26 24 17 9 38 4 22 --
Savings banks 7 15 11 20 15 22 1 5 --
Co-operatives 10 23 18 32 31 30
Total 38 63 59 89 72 76 17 10 43 4 22 --
Source: Bank of Spain, Memoria de Actividades (1979-85)
Therefore, the Bank of Spain is intensifying its inspection
in an effort to prevent banks from getting into difficulties, and
to penalize bad banking practices. This is the only way one can
explain the measures adopted with two of the large seven bank
groups (before the BBV merger). In 1984 Banco Hispano Americano
had difficulty in turning round Banco-Urquijo-Union ( one of its
subsidiaries), and as recommended by the Bank of Spain, it had to
pass its dividend. The Bank of Spain was not satisfied with the
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bank's management; Hispano had a new chairman and vice-chairman.
The outcome of the inspections at Banco Central and Banesto was
similar, and the Bank of Spain appointed a director to the board
of Banco Central. These measures adopted against two of the three
largest banking institutions give an idea of the present power of
the Bank of Spain, which contrasts with the situation in 1978 when
it was unable to adopt similar measures of any kind.
3.3.- BANK REGULATION IN SPAIN : EVOLUTION AND PHILOSOPHY.
The Spanish banking industry has traditionally been heavily
regulated in terms of interest rates, entry, branching, and
investment and reserve requirements. Furthermore, these
regulations have placed different constraints on different
institutions, such as banks and savings banks, for example.
A major change in philosophy took place and liberalization
advanced significantly during the 1970s; this has accelerated
recently, transforming banking into a free-market business.
3.3.1.- Bank Regulation up to 1985: from Complete Regulation
to Liberalization.
In 1962, the 'Ley de Ordenacion Bancaria' (Regulation of
Banking and Credit Law) allowed the establishment of new banks and
tried to separate commercial from so-called 'industrial' banks.
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Nevertheless, banks tended to follow the tradition of universal
banks. During the 1960s, regulations operated on deposit and loan
rates, and the investments of financial institutions through
investment requirements. Spanish banks have been required to
provide loans to specific priority sectors (traditionally,
agriculture, housing, export-oriented activities, etc.) or to hold
public debt at below-market rates. The philosophy shaping bank
regulation (and regulation generally) was assisting the
Government's efforts towards enhancing the economic development of
the country's basic industries.
In 1969 the process of liberalization of the financial system
began with a change of philosophy towards more free-market
positions. The discount rate of the Bank of Spain became the
reference rate to fix deposit and credit rates according to
certain margins, with the exception of deposits of more than
two-year maturity in industrial banks, loans of more than
three-year maturity, deposits in foreign currency, interbank
transactions and checking accounts. Reserve requirements for the
purposes of monetary control were introduced for private and
savings banks.
In 1974, the liberalization process received a major impulse
with the authorization of new banks and free branching (backed by
enough capital), making the operations that industrial,
commercial and savings banks were allowed to perform more
homogeneous, reducing the investment coefficients and completely
liberalizing interest rates for operations of more than two-year
maturity. Monetary control was rationalized using reserve
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requirements, credits from the Bank of Spain to the banking
system and open-market operations as instruments of monetary
policy.
In 1977, interest rates of more than one-year maturity were
freed and the process of putting all banking institutions on the
same footing continued, which tended to equalize investment (down)
and reserve coefficients across institutions and allowed savings
banks to perform increasingly the same operations as others,
including participation in the Bank of Spain's auctions.
Nevertheless, until very recently savings banks have been
restricted to investing mostly in their own geographic region,
thereby cutting down the possibilities of diversification.
Savings banks have traditionally suffered stricter
regulations in terms of geographical limits to their operations,
higher investment coefficients and distribution of profits. It is
only since 1973 that they have been able to operate in the market
for time deposits of more than two years; since 1975 they have
been allowed to expand their number of branches, but only within
their own geographic region.
Foreign bank entry was regulated in 1978 with a view to
restricting its participation in the retail market. Foreign banks
were subjected to various restrictions, which remained in place
until 1986.
In 1981, several interest rates were liberalized, including
loan rates of all maturities and deposit rates of more than six
months' maturity for more than a million pesetas. Bank dividends
were also liberalized. In 1985 freedom of branching was complete,
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except for foreign banks and for the geographical limits imposed
on savings banks which have recently been removed.
3.3.2.- Bank Regulation since 1985: the Effects of Spain's
Entry into the EC.
In 1986 Spain joined the EC which resulted inter alia in a
major change in the philosophy or viewpoint of the legislations in
general since no regulation from that year onwards could deviate
from the EC norm. There are many bank regulatory consequences of
Spain's entry into the EC. The Spanish bank legislation had to be
adapted to be in line with the EC one. Basically, three aspects of
the Spanish bank regulation were changed:
- First, the principle of non-discrimination against
institutions of other EC members. This means that all the rules
that prevent banking firms from other EC countries from
establishing in Spain and from providing services under the same
conditions as the domestic bank institutions must be abolished.
This process will last up to 1992 and the different
discriminatory rules will be abolished gradually.
- The second basic aspect has to do with the First
Banking Co-ordination Directive (in effect since 1977), which laid
down the minimum conditions to be observed before authorizing the
creation of a new credit institution. This means that from 1992
onwards, the Spanish authorities must accept the creation of any
EC bank which complies with the conditions laid down. As it will
be seen later on, this eliminates the criteria called 'market
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economic needs' when studying the applications submitted to open a
bank. Related to this issue, one must make reference to the EC
First and Second Banking Co-ordination Directives. The ultimate
goal of these two Directives is to set out a system whereby a
credit institution whose head office is in any EC country may open
branches in any other EC country. The Commission's approach
towards attaining an EC single banking market hinges upon two main
principles: 'home country control' and 'mutual recognition'. 'Home
country control' stipulates that institutions operating across
national boundaries should be supervised mainly by the regulatory
authority of the country in which their head office is located.
The Commission views this as acceptable provided there is 'mutual
recognition'	 that each country's supervisory system are
equivalent. These Directives mentioned embody these two principles
which will allow any bank authorized by its home regulators to
provide a universal range of banking services anywhere in the EC.
- The third aspect is related to the limitation of risk
concentration. The (1987/062) Large Exposures Directive
(LED) led to a change in the control system of those risk
concentrations in Spain.
The continuing developments towards a free-market system in
the banking industry in Spain must also be studied. In 1987, all
interest rates and service charges were liberalized; hence, the
process of liberalization was completed and the free-market
philosophy reached its highest point to date.
The process of liberalization (also called market structural
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deregulation) has been accompanied by a corresponding trend
towards supervisory re-regulation. To some extent this reflects an
underlying conflict between competition and regulation. Structural
deregulation has been stimulated by the political adoption of a
general regulatory philosophy that emphasizes the advantages of
the 'free-hand' of the market in resource allocation. The
practical experiences of the market, however, have suggested that
structural deregulation may have associated with it significant
costs in the form of periodic high risk-taking by certain
'pockets' of financial institution. As a result, supervisory
re-regulation appears to be necessary in order to match the
increased risk potentials for financial institutions that may be
associated with structural deregulation. In 1985, this supervisory
re-regulation was manifested in the reform of the capital adequacy
requirements in Spain.
In this section the researcher has outlined the evolution of
bank regulation in Spain and the change in philosophy or
perspective that has taken place from 1962 onwards. Up to the
1970s, the banking sector was heavily regulated and different
institutions experienced different constraints. The efforts to
develop the Spanish economy seemed to shape that heavily regulated
environment. The process of liberalization and a change towards a
more free-market positions in the banking sector started in 1969
and continued gradually up to 1987 when all interest rates and
charges were freed. Supervisory re-regulation (especially reform
of the capital adequacy requirements) also came into effect to
match the increased risk potential for financial institutions that
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may be associated with the process of liberalization or structural
deregulation. Spain's entry into the EC simultaneously resulted in
changes of philosophy or in the viewpoint of the legislator since
legislation had to be adapted to be in line with EC legislation.
3.4.- THE PRESENT BANK REGULATION IN SPAIN.
3.4.1.- Entry and Expansion Regulation.
The requirement whereby a previous authorization is
necessary to engage in banking activities, as well as the
regulation on the geographical expansion of the institutions,
affect the structure of the banking system. There are two major
considerations when it comes to examining the authorization
requirement : the solvency of the new credit institution and the
degree of competition in the banking system.
These two considerations need to be reconciled since it
appears contradictory that it is necessary for new entrants to
secure solvency when new competition reduces margins and, thus,
solvency. Financial regulatory authorities generally aim at
reaching an equilibrium between the market determination of the
degree of competition and the need to impose barriers of entry in
terms inter alia of solvency requirements.
The requirements for new banks to comply with can be
objective or discretionary. When the requirements are objective,
the new banks only have to comply with the rules laid down in
order to obtain the authorization. Alternatively, when they are
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discretionary, the authority keeps the right to interpret whether
certain requirements are fulfilled. The most typical example of
discretionary requirement for the Spanish banking case is the
'market economic need' (necesidad economica de mercado). This
requirement means that only the institution which shows that there
exists a economic need for its creation (in terms of population,
economic characteristics, existence of other institutions in the
area, etc.) where they wish to set up a new institution will
obtain the authorization. The EC legislations prohibit the use of
this principle in particular and the existence of a discretionary
procedure of authorization in general.
As for the regulation on geographical expansion, solvency and
competition considerations are also important. Solvency is taken
into consideration as follows : the authorities try to make sure
that an institution is able to absorb the creation of new branches
without negative effects on its operational characteristics. The
authorities try to prevent these institutions from becoming too
large in terms of numbers of branches compared with their basic
financial magnitudes. Very often, equity is thought to be a
measure of expansion capacity.
Competition considerations are also relevant. In the past,
when the interest rates were regulated, the firms could not
compete in terms of prices. They used to compete by opening more
branches and then providing the services closer to the customer.
As for the actual Spanish regulation on entry and
expansion of banking institutions, the main points are the
following :
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a) As far as the creation of new banking institutions,
for the Spanish and EC banks the criteria of "market economic
need" is held up to 1992 but in an objective way as laid down in
the First Directive. However, for the non-EC banks, this criteria
will continue to be applied after 1992: thus the authorization for
these banks will be discretionary.
b) As far as the expansion of banking institutions is
concerned, up to 1985 the regulation was based upon the existence
of sufficient equity. Since 1985, the system changed completely,
although the possibilities of expansion are still related to bank
equity. However, the way they are now linked is less direct and
more flexible. The role of capital, then, is also important in
this regulation.
3.4.2.- Banking Ratio Requirements.
Nowadays, the commercial and savings banks and the credit
cooperatives in Spain are subject to the following three ratio
requirements :
1) Cash ratio (coeficiente de caja): this requirement
obliges banks to hold a certain percentage (previously fixed) of
their liabilities in the form of deposits in the Bank of Spain
and in cash. These requirements are essentially instruments of
monetary policy.
2) Investment ratio (coeficiente de inversion): the main
aim of this requirement is to allocate financial resources of the
banks to sectors considered to have priority; the maximum level of
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the ratio is 35 %. In addition, up to 1986 there were two
maximums for the two types of assets where the resources should be
invested : 15 % for the short-term and medium-term debt issued by
the Government (this ratio was called PPT ratio whose translation
would be Treasury Bills ratio) and 25 % for other sectors (support
for the exports industry, employment, social needs etc). The
latter was also called the investment ratio; nowadays, there is
only an unified investment ratio.
3) Own funds ratio (coeficiente de recursos propios):
this requirement aims at securing the solvency of the banks by
obliging them to hold a minimum level of equity as a function of
the risk of the institution.
In Table 3.2, the broad evolution of the investment (PPT and
investment ratios) and cash ratios for 1981-90 is displayed. Up to
1985, the investment ratio shown as private banks corresponds to
the commercial banks: the industrial banks ratio was slightly
lower. One can observe that up to 1985, the savings banks had to
comply with higher ratios than the private banks.
From 1986 onwards, it can be noted that there is no
distinction between private and savings banks in terms of ratios
to be held. One can also notice the decreasing trend in the ratios
through time. The process of deregulation seems to be shaping this
trend. From 1987 onwards there is no distinction between
Investment and PPT ratios. There exists just one unified
investment ratio nowadays. At the end of 1992, the investment
ratio disappears,	 in	 order
	 to	 comply with the EC
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legislation.
Table 3.2 : Investment Ratios (PPT and Investment ratios) and
Cash Ratios : Evolution in the Period 1981-90.
Private Banks
Investment
ratio
PPT
ratio
Cash
ratio Total
December
1981 21.0 8.75 29.75
1982 21.0 9.75 30.75
1983 21.5 -- 11.75 33.25
1984 21.5 12.0 18.00 51.50
1985 16.5 10.0 18.00 41.00
1986
1987
13.0
N
Unified
11.0
v
10.0 18.00
18.50
41.00
29.50
1988 11.0 16.50 27.50
1989 9.5 17.00 26.50
1990 7.0 5.00 12.00
Savings Banks
Investment	 PPT	 Cash
ratio	 ratio	 ratio Total
December
1981 45.0	 8.75 53.75
1982 39.0	 9.75 48.75
1983 35.25	 11.75 47.00
1984 35.25	 12.0	 18.00 65.25
1985 26.50	 10.0	 18.00 54.50
1986 13.0	 10.0	 18.00 41.00
Unified	
vN1987 11.00	 18.50 29.50
1988 11.00	 16.50 27.50
1989 9.50	 17.00 26.50
1990 7.00	 5.00 12.00
Source: Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas (1988, P.	 227);
and Parejo, Rodriguez and Cuervo (1992, pp 176-189).
The decreasing trend in the liquidity ratios can also be
observed in Table 3.2. By 1990 the required cash ratio was lowered
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to 5 per cent. The reduction in the ratio appears to have enhanced
banking competition in Spain, since banks engaged in an accounts
war in order to capture deposits that, from 1990 only required 5
per cent of cash ratio.
3.4.3.- Regulation on Interest Rates.
The regulation of bank interest rates is basically the
imposition of a legal ceiling on the rates paid to depositors and
charged in banks' assets. When this regulation came into effect,
the major justification for it was to secure solvency of the
institutions by trying to prevent excessive competition between
banks. However, nowadays this regulation is no longer in effect.
The current features of financial markets, instruments and
intermediaries and the process of deregulation have effectively
rendered this regulation no longer valid in practice.
In Spain, the process of deregulation of interest rates has
been gradual in order not to affect negatively the markets. The
process began in 1969 by liberalizing the interest rates on
operations with long-term maturities. The process of deregulation
of interest rates in Spain was brought to an end in 1987 when all
the interest rates are deregulated (except those included in the
investment ratios). In 1987, the commissions charged by banks were
also liberalized.
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3.5.- BANK SOLVENCY REGULATION IN SPAIN.
3.5.1.- Introduction.
In this section, one needs to examine the bank solvency
regulation in Spain before dealing with the capital adequacy
regulation which is a key part of the broader concept of solvency
regulation.
Why regulate bank solvency ? The problem is complex: a
bank with financial problems could be viewed as a sign that the
banking system is not doing well or is 'fragile'. This might
affect the rest of the institutions in the market because of the
interrelationships among depository institutions. Depositors might
feel that problems in one bank could affect other banks through
the interrelationships among banks. This is called
'contagion-risk', and the actions taken to secure solvency are
then, important for the system as a whole.
Solvency may be defined broadly and simply as the degree of
viability of a firm in the long run. This viability depends upon
two factors. The first is its capability of obtaining profits. The
second one is its capability of avoiding or absorbing losses.
Given the characteristics of the banking business, the latter is
vital for banking. The quality of bank assets is a central factor
when it comes to avoiding losses. In addition, the larger the
equity and provision funds of a bank, the higher its capability to
absorb losses and thus, the greater is its solvency. In this
context, Maisel (1981, p.20), building on an earlier study by
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Sharpe (1978) defined adequate bank capital as follows:
"Capital is adequate either when it reduces the chances of
future insolvency of an institution to some predetermined minimum
level or, alternatively, when the premium paid by the bank to the
insurer is 'fair'; that is, when it fully covers the risks borne
by the insurer. Such risks, in turn, depend upon the risk in the
portfolio selected by the bank, on its capital, and on terms of
the insurance with respect to when insolvency will be determined
and what losses will be paid"
At this stage, it will be as well to make clear the
differences between equity and provisions. Provisions are to cover
probable losses or commitments by the firm, whereas equity
represents shareholders (owners) funds available to absorb
unexpected losses.
In the following subsections, the evolution of the solvency
regulation in Spain, and the present bank solvency regulation are
examined.
3.5.2.- Evolution and Philosophy of the Solvency Regulation
in Spain up to 1985.
The 1962 Law mentioned above embodies an enhancement in the
process of regulation of and intervention in the banking system by
the Government. The main goal of the 1962 Law is the solvency of
the banking system. The guarantee ratio (coeficiente de garantia)
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which linked equity with the deposits of a bank (it was the
inverse of the gearing ratio) began to play a major role in the
system as well as the liquidity ratio. The objective was to secure
the solvency and liquidity of the banking firms. The obligations
of creating legal reserves and having a minimum level of equity
were also laid down in the Law.
The philosophy lying behind the 1962 Law (and stated in the
Law) as to the solvency ratios is double. As said earlier, the
protection of depositors by securing solvency is the first concern
of the Law. The solvency of the banks was the main goal of the Law
in the heavily regulated and interventionist (by the Government)
environment of the 1960s. However, the solvency ratio began to
play a role in the monetary policy from that moment onwards. Thus,
the philosophy shaping the 1962 Law as to the solvency ratio was
both the solvency of the banks and the use of the ratio as an
instrument of monetary policy.
The solvency ratio was first only imposed on the industrial
banks in 1962 (originally a level of 15 per cent and in 1968 a 10
per cent ). In 1974 the application of the solvency ratio is
extended to the commercial and mixed banks (a level of 8 per cent)
and in 1979 and 1980 to the savings banks and credit cooperatives,
respectively. Thus, this solvency ratio regulation used to
discriminate between institutions as a function of their specific
characteristics: there were differences between commercial and
industrial banks. Yet the savings banks were the most
discriminated against since the only way for them to increase
their equity was through reserves which limited the amount of
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profits devoted to Social Works Funds as a function of the
solvency ratio held.
The guarantee ratio aimed at protecting depositors by
attempting to secure a sufficient level of equity that would serve
as a guarantee for depositors in the case of the bank getting into
financial difficulties. In addition, there used to be several
restrictions and limitations placed upon the opening of branches,
fixed assets, industrial participations portfolio, firm risk,
business volume in foreign currency and risk concentration. All
the restrictions depended on the level of equity.
This guarantee ratio had many disadvantages since it
did not capture the risk financed with funds other than deposits
and, hence, it did not link equity with the true dimension and
composition of the bank business.
In 1977, the Deposit Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantia de
Depasitos) was set up in Spain. In 1981, apart from continuing the
liberalization process, the legislation enhanced the solvency
control mechanisms through Bank of Spain's regulation in terms of
accounting standards and provision for loan losses.
3.5.3.- Solvency Regulation since 1985: the Role of the
Capital Adequacy Regulation.
The main change in solvency regulation took place in 1985
when the solvency ratio regulation was changed. The solvency
ratio as computed according to the 1962 Law (Capital / Deposits)
had several technical and practical problems. First, deposits
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do not capture a bank's risk exposure adequately and hence
computing the solvency ratio in terms of deposits is
inappropriate. It did not link equity with the true dimension
and composition of the bank business which made the ratio
irrelevant. Secondly, the supervisory authority had very little
leeway to carry out a correct policy of assessment and
classification of assets according to the risk they bear. Thirdly,
the different rules on the solvency ratio were too complex and
different for each type of banking institution, which resulted in
a lack of effectiveness and in important infractions and
circumvention of the regulation.
Being aware of all these difficulties and problems, the
regulatory authorities considered that a reform of the solvency
or capital adequacy ratio regulation was necessary. In 1985 the
reform took place, and in the draft of the reform the objectives
of the new regulation were stated. They were the following:
+ Technical improvements in the concept and mechanism of
application of the solvency ratio.
+ Enhancement of own funds of the banking institutions so as
to face the higher risk of banking activities.
+ Development of the ways of increasing the own funds not
only through reserves but also through the use of
subordinated debt and restructuring assets by reducing relatively
the assets with higher risk.
+ Simplification of the regulation by eliminating partial
rules as the limits of concentration risks.
+ Two ratios (a general one and a selective one) are
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established as a function of the risk. The higher ratio of both
must be fulfilled.
+ General application of the new legislation to all the
banking institutions except in the case of the unavoidable
differences of savings banks and credit cooperatives.
The solvency of the depository institutions must be based
fundamentally upon an adequate level of capital and a good
portfolio-risk diversification as well as a good provisions policy
(Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas, 1988). The new Spanish
capital requirements for banks aims to achieve an adequate level
of capital and adequate portfolio-risk diversification.
The current Spanish capital-adequacy requirements model is in
line with the 1988 BIS Recommendations and the 1989 EC Directives
on the issue. Spain did not take part directly in the BIS
Agreement but adhered later to the BIS Recommendations.
The 1985 solvency ratio regulation with all its improvements
is the most important part of banks solvency regulation nowadays,
and it will be described in section 3.6. The philosophy and role
of this solvency or capital adequacy ratio regulation needs a
further comment. As suggested in section 3.3.2, there has been a
clear movement in recent years towards greater detail and
codification of supervision, whose best example is the new
solvency ratio regulation. This seems to reflect the underlying
conflict between competition and regulation since market
structural deregulation (which encouraged the intensifying
competition) and supervisory re-regulation (like capital adequacy
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regulation) have come about together.
The practical experiences of the market (as happened during
the banking crisis in Spain), have suggested that structural
deregulation (and also a lack of adequate supervisory and
monitoring bodies and instruments up to the early 1980s) may have
associated with it important costs in the form of high risk-taking
by some credit institutions. As a consequence of this, supervisory
re-regulation (such as solvency ratio regulation) appears to be
needed in order to match the increased risk potentials for banks
that may be associated with structural deregulation. The new
capital adequacy regulation aims at achieving a 'safe playing
field' for the banking market once the 'level playing field' has
been accomplished through the process of liberalization and
deregulation.
3.5.4.- The Present Bank Solvency Regulation in Spain.
Apart from the bank capital-adequacy regulation (which will
be considered in the next section), there are three pieces of
regulatory action other than capital adequacy requirements that
aim at securing bank solvency. These are the following:
- Deposit Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantia de Dep6sitos).
- Provision for loan losses.
- Country-risk provisions.
The Deposit Guarantee Fund for private banks was created in
1977, and the Deposit Guarantee Fund for savings banks was created
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in 1982. Their ultimate goals are not only to guarantee deposits,
but also to get involved in actions related to the solvency of the
institutions such as intervening to save banks in crisis. In the
period 1978-82, the Fund intervened to save 26 private banks in
Spain (see Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas, 1988). The Fund was
first created for private banks since the banking crisis affected
private banks more negatively.
Although the membership in the Fund is, in theory, voluntary,
it is obligatory in practice since non-member banks cannot obtain
financial resources from the Bank of Spain. The Fund guarantees up
to 1.5 million pesetas per depositor. 50 per cent of the resources
of the Fund are provided by the Bank of Spain and the other 50 per
cent by the banks' contributions. Private and savings banks had to
contribute with a percentage of their deposits. These percentages
have changed over time: when the Fund was created, the percentage
was 0.1 per cent of total deposits for both private and savings
banks; in 1985 it was set at 0.12 per cent for private and savings
banks; the contribution was lowered to 0.03 per cent for savings
banks in 1988 as a consequence of the increasing reserves of the
Fund since no action had been needed so far to save a savings
bank; in the case of the private banks, in 1989 the percentage was
increased to 0.2 per cent, and to 0.25 in 1990 per cent; recently,
in January 1993 the percentage has been lowered to 0.15 per cent
for private banks.
The provision for loan losses is very important in banking
since one of the major risks in banking activities is the credit
default-risk, the probability of experiencing losses on a loan.
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The Spanish regulation on the provision for loan losses can be
divided into two parts:
- First, the legislation lays down rules to classify
assets (there are rules to know when an assets becomes a possible
loss).
- Secondly, the legislation also establishes the
minimum amounts to be held for the doubtful assets: there are 4
ratios (25, 50, 75 and 100 %) according to the category of the
assets.
The country-risk provisions have been a major issue in
international banking and have become the focus of risk management
in international banking. Whenever a financial institution
transacts across a national border or in foreign currency,
exposure to transfer or convertibility risk, known jointly as
"country risk", exists. This matter became central in the
international debt crisis in August 1982. The Spanish regulation
classifies the countries according to risk. There are five types
of countries which have different ratios to be held:
* Group 1 (OECD countries): no provision is obligatory.
* Group 2 (no classified countries) : 1.5 %
* Group 3 (temporary difficulties) : 15 %
* Group 4 (doubtful countries) :
- 20 %, the first year when it is classified in
this category.
- 35 %, from the 2nd year onwards.
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* Group 5 (very doubtful countries):
- 50 %, the first year.
- 75 %, the 2nd year.
- 90 %, the 3rd year onwards.
Generic provision (for Groups 3 to 5) = 35 %
The provisions for Groups 3 to 5 can not be lower than 35 %
(generic provision).
3.6.-THE PRESENT BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS IN SPAIN.
3.6.1.- Introduction.
Capital adequacy enters into the operation of banking
institutions in two ways. First, there is an absolute amount of
initial capital required for the establishment of banks; this is a
clear barrier to entry to banking markets. The second way in which
capital adequacy enters into the operations of the banks is
through the imposition under prudential regulations of minimum
capital ratios which all banks must attain or exceed. This second
are is the main concern of this thesis.
The Spanish capital requirements for banks aim to achieve an
adequate level of capital and an adequate portfolio
diversification. The current capital ratio requirements model is
in line with the BIS Agreement (July 1988) and the respective EC
Directives. We first need to study both the BIS and the EC
Standards to learn the sources from where the Spanish contemporary
capital regulation has developed. Then, the Spanish capital
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regulation will be analyzed.
3.6.2.- The BIS Proposals.
3.6.2.1.- The Risk Assets Ratio.
The BIS proposals for convergence of capital adequacy are
based upon a Risk Assets Ratio approach (RAR). The Basle
Committee considers (1988, para 9):
" a weighted risk ratio in which capital is related to
different categories of asset or off-balance-sheet exposure,
weighted according to broad categories of relative riskiness is
the preferred method for assessing the capital adequacy of
banks."
Thus, the PAR model is the core appraisal and monitoring
system which the contemporary convergence movement has centered
upon. Conceptually, it is a comparatively simple model. Total
bank assets (A) are divided into a number (n) of 'equivalent risk
classes', a l (where A is the summatory of a i ). Separate 'risk
weights' are assigned to each of these equivalent risk classes of
asset (risk weights = r i ). These risks are not absolute measures:
they reflect the relative riskiness of the respective asset
category (a 1 ). 'Weighted assets' is then computed as follows:
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w=Ea*r	 (3.1)
Let (supervisory-measured) bank capital be C and a bank's
computed RAR be R. ( = C/W).The latter is compared with the minimum
specified supervisory RAR level, R. A bank is presumed to have
adequate capital if R
a 
R
s
. Condition R
a
< R
s 
is indicative a
priori of inadequate capital.
The risk weights assigned to each of the equivalent risk
classes are designed to reflect (largely) the relative credit
risk. This means inter alia that the model is not an accurate risk
appraisal tool since it does not recognize the wide differences
that may exist in the riskiness of assets within a single risk
class. As it will be seen below, this is particularly important in
the case of credits to the private sector.
The framework of risk weights has been kept as simple as
possible. Only five risk weights are employed: 0, 10, 20, 50 and
100 per cent. Assets are allocated into categories of relative
riskiness according to their deemed credit-exposure. The scheme
focuses on credit risk and country transfer risk as a further
aspect of credit risk. The weighting structure of the convergence
RAR scheme is set out in Annexes 2 and 3 of the Basle paper
(1988). In this thesis, the researcher is only interested in the
study of on-balance sheet items and the researcher will not
consider off-balance sheet operations. Table 3.3 displays the BIS
risk weights by category of on-balance-sheet assets.
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Table 3.3: Risk weights by category of on-balance-sheet asset
(Basle Agreement).
Assets	 Weight
Group 1: Cash, Balances at and claims on
domestic central bank; loans to domestic
central governments; securities issued by
domestic central governments; loans and
other assets collateralised by cash or
domestic central government securities or
fully guaranteed by domestic central governments.
Group 2: Claims on domestic non-central
public sector entities and loans guaranteed
by such entities (at national discretion).
Group 3: Claims on domestic and foreign
banks with an original maturity of under
1 year; claims on domestic banks with an
original maturity of 1 year and over and
loans guaranteed by domestic banks; claims
on foreign central governments in local
currency financed by local currency
liabilities; cash items in process of collection.
Group 4: Loans to owner-occupiers for
residential house purchase fully secured
by mortgage.
Group 5: Claims on the private sector;
cross-border claims on foreign banks with
an original maturity of 1 year and over;
fixed assets; real estate and other
investments; capital instruments issued
by other banks (unless deducted from
capital); all other assets.
0%
0, 10, 20
or 50 %.
20 %
50 %
100 %
Source : Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory
Practice (1988, Annex 2)
The Basle Committee is continuing work on several issues
related to bank risk. The existing capital convergence framework
essentially addresses only credit risk. However, banks are exposed
to a range of other forms of risk such as interest rate risk,
foreign exchange risk, position risk, and settlement and
operational risks. Since the Basle Accord was promulgated, both
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the Basle Committee and the European Commission have been pursuing
intensively the ways in which other types of risk might most
appropriately be incorporated within the regulatory arrangements.
In the course of pursuing this work, there has been increasing
contact between banking regulators and the authorities responsible
for the regulation of securities business, particularly the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). All
three groupings are now coordinating very closely to develop a
common approach to trading and interest rate risk in particular.
These developments are beyond the scope of this research, since we
are only concerned with commercial bank capital adequacy.
3.6.2.2.- BIS Capital Definition.
Let us now examine the numerator of the capital adequacy
ratio (R. ), that is, the capital. How can we define capital ? Wide
differences still exist between countries on how capital should be
defined. Pecchioli (1987, p. 108) provides a comparative view of
the basic components of capital for solvency (supervisory)
purposes in a wide range of European and other countries. Although
considerable differences in detail exist between countries, there
seems to be a general agreement on the functions of core capital
for capital adequacy purposes. Pecchioli (1987, p.107) summarizes
this as follows :
+ They must be permanently available to absorb losses.
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+ They must impose no contractual charges against
earnings.
+ They must not be redeemable at owner's request.
The Basle Agreement for capital adequacy purposes suggests
two Tiers of capital. Tier 1 capital (core capital) comprises
equity capital, published reserves, minority interests in equity
of subsidiaries less than wholly owned, and current year profits
(at national discretion). Equity capital consists of issued and
fully paid-up ordinary shares/common stock, non-cumulative and
perpetual preferred stock. Goodwill must be deducted from Tier 1.
Tier 2 capital includes undisclosed reserves, asset
revaluation reserves, general provisions/ general loan loss
reserves, hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments and
subordinated term debt. Tier 2 capital may be included by
supervisors up to a maximum of 100 % Tier 1 capital. Subordinated
debt is limited to a maximum of 50 % of Tier 1. There are also
limits on general provisions/general loan loss reserves and
asset revaluation reserves (as unrealized reserves).
The deductions from Total Capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2 -
Deductions) are investments in unconsolidated banking and
financial subsidiaries and investments in capital of other banks
and financial institutions.
As far as the minimum target RAR (see equation 3.1)
established in the Basle Agreement is concerned, a minimum target
of RAR of 8 % was agreed for the end of 1992. The transitional
arrangements can be found in Committee on Banking Regulation and
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Supervisory Practices (1988, Annex 4). As our analysis focuses on
1987-90 for the Spanish banking system, it is interesting to note
in those transitional arrangements that by the end of 1990, a
minimum ratio of 7.25 per cent should be observed.
The Basle Committee is continuing work on the capital
adequacy framework by monitoring national implementation and
taking account of the effects of accounting standards and fiscal
policy on this implementations. In February 1991, the Basle
Committee published proposals aimed at achieving a more uniform
definition of the treatment of provisions in the capital
definition.
There have been recent debates internationally with regard to
the creation of novel forms of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Many
banks have attempted to create new forms of Tier 1 and Tier 2
capital in order to circumvent the current capital regulation.
These financial innovations have included variable rates notes,
perpetual preferred stock and repackaged perpetual debt. There has
been a debate on whether revaluation surpluses may be upgraded to
Tier 1 capital. These important issues have a crucial bearing on
capital augmentation strategies since they exemplify banks'
attempt to have a wider range of financial instruments to augment
capital.
Regulators have been forced to abandon a sole reliance on
general principles and to adopt a case-by-case approach to all
these kinds of proposals. The Group of Ten (G-10) supervisors have
created a subcommittee - the Capital Liaison Group - to monitor
capital definitions on a continuing basis. The Basle forum appears
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to have been strengthened under the pressures it has experienced
since 1988 to modify and adjust its original proposals.
3.6.3.- The EC Directives.
3.6.3.1.- Evolution and Characteristics.
Work at Brussels on the development and testing of capital
adequacy ratios for banks and other credit institutions began in
the late 1970s. The work at Brussels and Basle overlapped to
some extent, but there were important differences. The work on
capital adequacy at Brussels was designed to cover banks and all
credit institutions within the EC, and to be legally binding in
all EC members. At Brussels, the focus was more on domestic
activities rather than on international banking. Work at Basle
was geared towards international banks, and their proposals do not
have the force of law. There are also other definitional
differences between Brussels and Basle that are reviewed below.
During the 1980s a consensus emerged within Europe that
convergence of capital adequacy was a desirable requirement.
Before the Second Banking Directives's provisions for mutual
recognition and home country control can take effect, a
harmonized approach towards capital adequacy is necessary.
European legislation will need to be in place for defining own
funds and prescribing at least the general framework of a
harmonized solvency ratio.
One of the legislative aspects the EC has considered
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necessary to harmonize in order to establish a Single European
Market for banking services is the solvency ratio. This has been
considered in two Directives. The first one, the Own Funds
Directive (89/299) harmonizes the definition of capital of credit
institutions. It defines the funds of unconsolidated capital to
be employed and the numerator (or capital adequacy base) for
solvency ratios. These definitions are very similar to those of
the BIS Committee. The second one, the Solvency Ratio Directive
(89/647), harmonizes solvency ratios for credit institutions. Its
objective was to harmonize solvency ratios for credit
institutions within the EC.
The EC solvency ratio seems to reflect closely the Basle
proposals. The Directive proposals are minimum standards: they
lay down the minimum rules that home member states should
observe. Individual members may establish stricter though not
looser rules for their own institutions than those suggested by
the Directives. The benefit of a common approach and philosophy,
therefore, may be weakened by the competitive possibilities of
this requirements. As Gardener (1989b) argues, it still leaves
open the opportunity of some 'competition in laxity' to develop
between major financial centers.
3.6.3.2.- Related Regulatory Areas.
There are related regulatory areas in the EC legislation that
although they do not directly affect commercial bank capital
adequacy, the main concern in this thesis, they are relevant in
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this context.
The Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) (90/141) aims mainly at
securities houses. The CAD establishes minimum capital
requirements for the investment firms. These requirements are
lower than those laid down for credit institutions in the Second
Banking Co-ordination Directive. The CAD imposes additional
capital requirements on banks when they deal in securities. CAD
uses a method of establishing solvency that takes account of a
wide range of different risks: these include position risk,
settlement risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, etc.
German banks objected particularly strongly because as
universal banks they make no distinction between their banking and
securities activities and consequently they are subject to both
Directives at once. This appears to be less of a problem for banks
in countries like the UK where banks conduct business through
separately regulated subsidiaries.
CAD has raised many important issues, and these seem unlikely
to be resolved in the foreseeable future. One question is whether
banks and securities houses should be treated the same.
Although many believe not, the institutional convergence between
investment and commercial banking may reduce the case for complete
regulatory separation. The compromise proposal in CAD is that
banks (at national supervisors discretion) should be allowed to
separate their securities trading activities.
Another of the features of the EC Directives on the issue
which has most affected the new solvency ratio in Spain is the
requirement to analyze the depository institutions on a
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consolidated basis (Consolidated Supervision Directive,
(83/350) and the modifications introduced in the Directive
90/605)). The solvency ratio for the banks is monitored according
to the consolidated balance-sheet by the authorities of the
country in which their head office is located.
Finally, one needs to mention the Large Exposures Directive
(87/062) which harmonizes credit exposure limits for banks and
the Deposit Guarantee Directive (87/063) that sets out to ensure
that EC depositors are covered by suitable deposit-insurance
compensation schemes.
3.6.3.3.- Main Differences between BIS and EC Solvency
Ratios.
The main definitional differences in terms of regulatory
capital that the EC Directives have with respect to the Basle
framework are:
1) Tier 1: in the EC Directives, current year profits are
included if verified by auditors. In addition, funds for general
banking risks are included as a separate category but they are not
included when a limit on Tier 2 is fixed.
2) Tier 2: latent revaluation reserves are not allowed in the
EC Directives. The commitments of co-operative members must be
specified as included and they are included in subordinated debt
limit. Finally, excess provisions of up to 4 % of specified assets
are permitted, at national discretion.
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3) Deductions:
* From Tier 1:
- Goodwill and other intangibles.
- Own shares held at book value.
- Current year losses.
* From Total:
- Investments in capital of other banks and
financial institutions:
(a) only where they exceed 10 % of investee
institution's capital whole amount and
(b) such investments where these total are more than
10 % of reporting institution's own funds before
deduction of investments in (a) (excess amount).
4) Floors/ceilings: no limit is set on general provisions
included in Tier 2.
The minimum ratio specified by the EC Directives is 8 %
and must be implemented by end of 1992 (equal to Basle). There are
slight differences in risk weights and in other features between
Basle and the EC Directives2.
3.6.4.- The Current Spanish Solvency Ratio.
3.6.4.1.- Introduction.
A risk-based capital adequacy requirement has been in place
since 1985, but the EC Directives have yet to be implemented. The
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existing system applies to all credit institutions on a
consolidated basis.
The Spanish capital adequacy ratio is a mixed one in which
two main elements co-exist simultaneously:
- A RAR in line with the Basle Agreements and EC Directives.
This needs further explanation below.
- For deposit-takers there is also a global or non-selective
ratio computed on a non-weighted balance-sheet. The minimum
non-selective capital ratio must be a 5 % of the total investments
net of provisions and depreciation.
The latter means a limit placed on the possibilities of
transforming assets to comply with the RAR. If the portfolio of a
bank is moved towards investments with lower risk and, thus, less
equity is needed according to RAR, the equity needs will decrease
till falling below the equity requirements set by the
non-selective ratio, which at that moment, will be the one to
comply with.
3.6.4.2.- Risk-Weighting in the Spanish Solvency Ratio.
The Spanish risk-based ratio specifies capital requirements
rather than weights. In other words, in Spain the weightings and
the level of the minimum ratio (8%) are applied to each asset
category simultaneously. For example, instead of applying first
the weightings (0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 %) to each assets category
and then requiring defined capital equal to 8 % on the weighted
assets (like in the Basle RAR), in Spain both weighting and
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minimum ratio are applied together and simultaneously to each
assets category. Thus, the ratios applied in Spain would be: 0 %,
1.6 % (which is a 20 % of 8 %), 4 % (a 50 % of 8 %) and 8 % (100 %
of 8 %). The actual ratios in Spain are not exactly these figures,
but the general philosophy is as summarized here.
In order to examine the similarity of both systems, the
following mathematical equation will be used:
Let us consider
a 	 a the different risk asset categories laid down in BIS.1
	 r
n the weightings applied to each risk asset category.
	
 the minimum specified supervisory ratio level.
	 b the selective ratio or own funds needs for each asset1
category in the Spanish solvency ratio.
	
 capital
The Basle Agreement model would be :
C / (a * r + 	 + a
n
* r
n
)	 R1	 1 (3.2)
which would be equivalent to the Spanish one which is
C L. (a * b + 	 + a * b )1	 1	 n	 n
where b = r * R
The actual ratios applied in Spain are displayed in Table
3.4. It is important to note that the ratio (Rs ) applied in Spain
is 7.5 % instead of 8 % (minimum BIS ratio for 1992). Another
difference between both models is that there are more asset
categories in the Spanish capital ratio.
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Table 3.4 : Selective (RAR) Solvency Ratios in Spain
(Weighting and Minimum Ratio together).
Risk assets categories	 Selective	 Variation margin
(RAR) ratio	 delegated to the
Bank of Spain
Group a:Credit riskless
assets:Cash; deposits in
Bank of Spain; loans to
public sector; loans fully 	
collaterised by cash;
currency forwards contracts.
Group b:Assets with
minimum risk: Credit
institutions securities.
Group c: Guaranteed Assets:
Loans fully secured by
mortgage; credits fully
secured by credit
institutions; loans with
other guarantees; loans to
state-owned firms.
Group d: Normal risks:
Non-guaranteed loans; all
other loans; long or short 	
positions in foreign currency.
Group e: risk capital;
industrial participations
other than in banks.
Source: Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango and Vargas (1988, p.256)
7.50 
	
 5 to 8
16.00 
	
 5 to 16
Group f:Fixed assets
and others:fixed assets;
participations in other banks;
subordinated debt with other ---35.00
credit institutions.
(Group g:Intangible assets 	 100.00
not deducted from equity.
10 to 35
0.25
1.25
3.75
0 to 0.75
0.50 to 1.50
2 to 4
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In the Spanish risk weighting in balance sheet, there are
also distinctions between OECD and non-OECD countries and between
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the public and private sectors, but no distinction is made within
the public sector. Another difference is that in Spain, the
treatment does not differ according to maturity.
According to a Price Waterhouse Survey (1991) on the
implementation of capital adequacy convergence proposals, it may
emerge on the implementation of the EC than in certain areas the
Spanish requirements are more demanding than the Basle minima: eg.
higher weightings being applied to capital investments in
corporates; a low weighting being applied to OECD government debt.
3.6.4.3.-Capital Definition in the Spanish Solvency
Ratio.
In the Spanish capital adequacy regulation, there is no Tier
1 / Tier 2 split. In general a more restrictive definition applies
than in the BIS Proposals. In the Spanish legislation, the capital
definition for private banks, includes share equity, disclosed
reserves, general provisions, and the subordinated debt. The
capital definition for savings banks includes foundation funds,
disclosed reserves, general provisions, Social Works funds and the
subordinated debt. We will return to these definitions in section
4.2.2.
The differences in terms of capital definition between the
Spanish regulation and the BIS are that in Spain:
- Undisclosed reserves and hybrid instruments are excluded.
- General Provisions exclude a specific 1 % provision for
"insolvencies"
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- Current year losses are deducted.
- Subordinated debt is limited to 20 % of the calculated
capital requirements and to 30 % of total own funds.
- However, no limit is applied to general provisions and
investments in other banks are not deducted but carry a 35 %
capital requirement.
3.6.4.4.- The Cases of Risk Concentration and Foreign
Branches.
Finally, there are two important questions that are
associated with the solvency ratio. These are the following:
* Regulation on Risk Concentration: the solvency ratio
appraised above is not sufficient alone to monitor the risk
concentration of a bank. In order to limit the risk
concentration, without having to use prohibition, a factor was
included in the solvency ratio to dissuade banking institutions
out of risk concentrations. This has been implemented by imposing
penalties, in terms of larger own funds needs, for operations
entailing risk concentration. The Spanish legislation on the
issue closely follows the (1987/062) EC Large Exposures Directive
whose main points are as follows:
a) A definition: the risk of a consolidated credit
institution with a client or group of clients related becomes a
large exposure ('gran riesgo') when the value of the risk is
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equal to or higher than 15 % of the own funds of the consolidated
institution. If this percentage (15 %) is exceeded, then double
the solvency ratio on these assets must be maintained. If it is
higher than 30 %, a triple multiple will be applied.
b) A first limit: the highest risk of a credit
institution with one client may not be higher than 40 % of the
own funds of the consolidated credit institution.
C) A second limit: the total sum of the 'large
exposures' (as defined in a)) borne by a consolidated credit
institution may not exceed 800 % of the own funds of the
institution.
* Solvency Ratio regulation on the Branches of Foreign
Banks: this is a major issue in the EC because the EC legislation
will lay down after 1992 that the solvency ratio will be demanded
in the country of origin of the bank, which means that the
different regulation on the branches of foreign banks will no
longer be applicable after 1992. The philosophy shaping the
different capital regulation for foreign banks is the creation of
barriers of entry to competition rather than the solvency of the
institution. However, after 1992 it will no longer be applied.
103
CHAPTER 3: BANK REGULATION AND CAPITAL ADEQUACY IN SPAIN
3.7.- SYNTHESIS.
In this chapter the bank regulation in Spain has been
examined, focusing particularly upon the solvency regulation.
Capital adequacy requirements in Spain have been analyzed in more
detail.
The Spanish banking sector is one of the most regulated
industries in the economy. Several justifications for this have
been suggested: protection of depositors and banking consumers,
monetary control, limiting competition, allocation of bank credit
to priority sectors and attempts to encourage certain banking
models. Before the process of liberalization that took place from
the late 1960s to the 1980s, banking regulation in Spain was
shaped by the philosophy that prioritized the economic development
of the country (through allocation of bank credit to priority
sectors), limiting competition and the solvency of the system.
Once the liberalization process began, limiting competition and
government intervention lost ground as philosophy of regulation,
but then the solvency of the system became the central issue as to
philosophy of regulation.
Legislation in terms of entry and expansion of banking
institutions have been made equal for almost all kinds of
institution (deregulation). Supervisory re-regulation (such as the
reform of the solvency ratio requirements) came also into effect
to match the increased risk potential for financial institutions
that may be associated with the process of liberalization and as a
consequence of it, with the process of intensifying competition.
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The reform of the bank capital adequacy requirements in Spain in
1985 is the best example of the supervisory re-regulation. The
present Spanish capital adequacy model is strongly influenced by
the Basle RAR model and the EC Directives.
NOTES:
1.- All the banking regulation in Spain can be found in Bank of
Spain (1988), Legislacion de Entidades de Deposito y Otros
Intermediarios Financieros. Normativa General.
2.- See Price Waterhouse (1991) for a review of the main
differences between Basle framework and EC Directives.
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CHAPTER 4 : EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY TRENDS IN THE
SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM.
4.1.- INTRODUCTION.
This chapter is a preliminary analysis of capital adequacy
trends in the Spanish banking system. This is necessary before any
theoretical and more rigorous empirical work is undertaken in
order to delineate the framework, our 'laboratory', where capital
adequacy regulation takes place.
Before undertaking any analysis of capital adequacy trends,
the researcher needs to define first what is the relevant capital
definition. According to Sinkey (1992, p.713), there are at least
three possible definitions of bank capital:
a) Book-value capital: is valued according to accepted
accounting procedures standards. Banking books are kept on a book
value or historical cost basis. If one wishes to measure
book-value bank capital or accounting net worth, one simply
subtracts the book value of liabilities from the book value of
assets (Net Worth = Assets - Liabilities). Sinkey argues that this
procedure is economically correct so long as the book and market
values do not diverge too widely.
b) Regulatory capital: is what bank regulators consider as
capital. Section 3.6 of Chapter 3 provided the different capital
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definitions and minimum standards of the BIS proposals, the EC
Directives and the Spanish capital regulationl . A practical
problem is that these values are not normally revealed to the
market.
C) Market-value capital: is the value of bank equity
according to the market. Specifically it equals the product of the
price per share and the number of shares outstanding. Sinkey
argues that unlike book-value capital and regulatory capital,
market-value capital reflects the real worth of the relative
cushion available for absorbing the realized risks of banking and,
hence, the only real determinant of adequacy is the aggregate
consensus of the market. He also maintains that although market
values are more volatile than book values, there is no reason to
prefer a measure that is less volatile, if the resulting number is
misleading or based on old information. A practical issue here is
whether the market has sufficient information to evaluate fully a
bank's risk and return position and, correspondingly, value net
worth. In recent years and in many developed financial systems,
banks and analysts have paid increasing attention to market-based
measures. In the case of Spain, a practical problem emerges as a
result of the very reduced sample of private banks listed on the
Stock Exchange and, hence, a very reduced sample of market-value
capital data is available.
In this chapter, the researcher examines the capital adequacy
trends in the Spanish banking system according to the three
definitions above. At the end of each section, international
comparisons of those capital trends with the major European
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banking systems, are made.
4.2.- TRENDS IN BOOK VALUE BANK CAPITAL IN THE SPANISH
BANKING SYSTEM.
4.2.1.- Introduction.
This section analyzes the main trends in book-value bank
capital adequacy in the Spanish banking system. First, the
researcher examines the book-value capital base. Then, several
capital ratios will be computed and appraised. Finally, the
internal capital generation rate will be analyzed. This exercise
will be undertaken with the public accounting or book-value data
that we will employ later in our empirical work.
4.2.2.- Capital Base of Spanish Banks.
An exploratory analysis on the data to be employed later on
in our empirical analysis will be performed. Data for 123 private
banks and 76 savings banks (except in 1990 with only 64 savings
banks after several mergers in the sector) will be used. We
examine the evolution of the capital adequacy trends in the period
1987-1990. Due to the important differences in methods of raising
capital for the Spanish private banks and savings banks, both
both cases will be considered separately.
Capital is not an unambiguous or homogeneous concept and,
hence, there is no single, universal definition of bank capital.
108
CHAPTER 4: EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY TRENDS IN ...
In the Spanish banking system, the concept of what is book-value
bank capital differs between private and savings banks. The four
main components of book-value private banks' capital base are
share capital, disclosed reserves, general provisions and
subordinated debt2.
Disclosed reserves must be differentiated from other types of
reserves. Disclosed reserves are usually created or increased by
appropriations of retained earnings, share premiums or other
surplus (Llewellyn, 1989). However, there also are other types of
reserves that are undisclosed or arising from the revaluation of
tangible fixed assets. The latter reserves are not included in the
capital definition.
General and specific provisions must also be differentiated.
General provisions are held against possible or latent loss, but
these losses have not as yet been identified. Specific provisions
are held specifically against lower valuations of particular
claims, and are charged to the profit & loss account.
Due to the different legal possibilities for savings banks to
raise capital, the main concepts of book-value savings banks
capital base are the following:
- Foundation Funds (F. Funds): this concept is the
equivalent to share equity in private banks but since the
Spanish savings banks have no share equity by law, this
concept is rather unimportant. The values which appear here
correspond to foundation funds provided generally by local and/or
regional authorities where the savings bank operate.
- Reserves.
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- Social Works funds (Fondos de la Obra Social): instead
of paying out dividends, since there is no share equity, the
Spanish Savings banks have to allocate a part of their profits
into Social Works funds. From now onwards these funds will be
denominated S.W. funds.
- General provisions for bad debt.
- Subordinated debt.
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 display the evolution of the
different components of the aggregate capital structure in
absolute terms and as a percentage of the capital base,
respectively, of the Spanish private banks during the period
1987-90. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the evolution for the Spanish
savings banks.
In Tables 4.1 and 4.3, it can be seen that the capital base
has been increasing for both private and savings banks during the
period 1987-90. All the components of the bank capital base have
also been increasing during the period.
Table 4.1	 :	 Aggregate	 Capital	 Structure	 of
Private Banks (in Spanish pesetas million).(*)
the	 Spanish
1987 1988 1989 1990
Share Capital 566625 731582 831010 903708
plus Reserves 1069582 1476899 1472254 1671714
Equals Equity 1636207 2208481 2303264 2575422
plus Subord. Debt 41882 117222 209942 326632
plus Bad debt Prov. 550311 553480 528598 540402
Equals CAPITAL BASE 2228400 2879183 3041804 3442456
(*) The aggregate contains 123 private banks.
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario (1987-90); Own Results.
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The increasing share of subordinated debt in the capital
structure for both private and savings banks during the period
1987-90 may also be observed in Figure 4.1. One can also notice
that the share of traditional components of the capital base, such
as share capital and reserves for private banks and reserves and
Social Works funds for savings banks, remain very similar.
Table 4.2 : Aggregate Capital Structure of the Spanish
Private Banks (% share of each component).(*)
1987 1988 1989 1990
Share Capital 25.5 25.4 27.3 26.2
plus Reserves 48.0 51.3 48.4 48.6
Equals Equity 73.5 76.7 75.7 74.8
plus Subord. Debt 1.9 4.1 7.0 9.5
plus Bad debt Prov. 24.6 19.2 17.3 15.7
Equals CAPITAL BASE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(*) The aggregate contains 123 private banks.
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario (1987-90); Own Results.
Table 4.3	 :	 Aggregate	 Capital	 Structure	 of	 the
Savings Banks (in Spanish pesetas million).(*)
Spanish
1987 1988 1989 1990
F. Funds 974 974 974 31473
plus Reserves 662608 814500 900390 1112465
plus S.W. Funds 90272 106136 123447 178635
plus Subord. Debt 21059 125115 144374 162842
plus Bad debt Prov. 189780 218137 246205 287281
Equals CAPITAL BASE 964693 1264862 1415390 1772696
(*) The aggregate contains 76 savings banks during 1987-89 and 64
banks in 1990.
Source: CECA (1987-90); Own Results.
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Figure 4.1: Capital Base Structure (1987, 1990)
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Tables 4.2 and 4.4 show the increasing relative importance
of subordinated debt in the capital base for both private and
savings banks. The relative importance of the rest of the
components of the capital base for private banks remains,
apparently, very similar in the period, except for the provisions
for bad loans which decrease continually. On the savings banks
side, the rest of the components appear to maintain a similar
share of the capital base in the period. In Table 4.3, one can
observe that the foundation fund increases dramatically in the
savings banks in 1990. This seems to have been caused by the
existence of an outlier, which is a savings bank involved in a
merger process.
Table	 4.4.-	 Aggregate	 Capital	 Structure	 of	 the
Savings Banks (% share of each component).(*)
Spanish
1987 1988 1989 1990
F. Funds 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.80
plus Reserves 68.72 64.39 63.61 62.75
plus S.W. funds 9.39 8.40 8.72 10.08
plus Subord. Debt 2.19 9.90 10.21 9.19
plus Bad debt Prov. 19.69 17.30 17.45 16.18
Equals CAPITAL BASE 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(*) The aggregate contains 76 savings banks during 1987-89 and 64
banks in 1990.
Source: CECA (1987-90); Own Results.
The contribution of the various components of the increase in
the capital base in the period is analyzed in Tables 4.5. and 4.6
for the Spanish private and savings banks, respectively.
From Tables 4.5 and 4.6, reserves appear to account for
50-60 per cent (except in 1989 for private banks) of the total
year-by-year rise in capital for both private and savings banks.
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In 1987, this percentage is even higher for savings banks (72.95
per cent). 1989 is the only exception for private banks since
reserves decreased in that year, and the private banks as a whole
augmented their capital accounts through external sources of
capital. In 1989, private banks apparently augmented their capital
by issuing new equity and subordinated debt. Except for private
banks in 1989, the internal capital generation represents the
largest source of increase in capital. This would seem
particularly true for the Spanish savings banks which cannot issue
share capital. The internal capital generation for savings banks
(Reserves + Social Works funds + Bad debt Provisions) as a
percentage of the total capital augmentations represents
approximately 95 per cent in 1987, 65 per cent in 1988, 85 per
cent in 1989, and 90 per cent in 1990.
The increasing importance of subordinated debt can also be
observed from its contribution to the rise in bank capital in
Tables 4.5 and 4.6. This is possible because the Bank of Spain
allowed the inclusion of this instrument in the bank capital
adequacy regulation created in 1985. Although the contribution of
subordinated debt to the rise in bank capital seems to increase
dramatically until 1988 for savings banks and until 1989 for
private banks, the Bank of Spain's limit placed on the
subordinated debt ratio (subordinated debt as a proportion of the
total capital base could not exceed 50 per cent) appears to
restrict clearly the possibilities of the use of this instrument
to augment capital. It can be observed that the use of this
instrument has decreased for savings banks in 1989-90 and for
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private banks in 1990.
Table 4.5 : Contributions to Rise in
Capital	 (1987-90)	 (in %).
Spanish	 Private	 Banks
1987 1988 1989 1990
Share Capital 13.12 25.35 61.15 18.15
Reserves 59.21 62.58 - 2.87 49.78
Subordinated Debt 9.11 11.58 57.02 29.12
Bad debt Provision 18.56 0.49 -15.30 2.95
CAPITAL BASE 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
A CAPITAL BASE 311812 650783 162621 400652
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario (1987-90); Own Results.
Table 4.6 : Contributions to Rise in 	 Spanish	 Savings	 Banks
Capital in 1987-90 (in Spanish pesetas million and % share).
1987 1988 1989 1990
Foundation Funds 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.53
Reserves 72.95 50.60 57.06 59.36
Social Works funds -	 1.71 5.28 11.50 15.44
Subordinated Debt 3.75 34.67 12.80 5.17
Bad debt Provision 25.01 9.45 18.64 11.50
CAPITAL BASE 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
A CAPITAL BASE 102313 300169 150528 357305
Source: CECA (1987-90); Own Results.
In 1988, the participation capital (cuotas participativas)
was introduced in Spain3 . It is a financial instrument meant to
help savings banks augment capital and according to CECA (1991),
it has the following main characteristics:
- It is primary capital in terms of supervision.
- It lacks voting rights or any other political right.
- Its maturity is indefinite.
- It can be employed to absorb losses.
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- Its remuneration is subject to the existence of
surplus and to the limits set by the government.
No Spanish savings bank had issued participation capital up
to 1991. Therefore, its importance as a means of augmenting
capital is still very limited.
4.2.3.- Book-Value Capital Ratios of Spanish banks.
The evolution of basic book-value capital ratios in the
Spanish banking system during the period 1987-90 needs to be
examined at this stage to compare the evolution of the capital
accounts with the evolution of assets. The main trends in
different book-value capital ratios are displayed in Tables 4.7
and 4.8 for Spanish private banks and Spanish savings banks
respectively (this view is completed in Figure 4.2).
Table 4.7 :	 Aggregate
Banks (%).
Capital Ratios	 of Spanish Private
1987 1988 1989 1990
Capital-assets ratioa 7.4 8.7 7.8 8.2
Equity-assets ratiob 5.4 6.7 5.9 6.1
Free capital ratioc 5.6 6.2 5.9 6.2
Free equity ratiod 3.6 4.2 4.0 4.1
Subord. debt ratio` 2.5 5.0 8.4 11.3
a.- Capital base to total assets.
b.- Equity to total assets.
C.- Capital base less fixed assets to total assets.
d.- Equity less fixed assets to total assets.
e.- Subordinated debt to equity plus subordinated debt.
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario (1987-90); Own Results.
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First of all, in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 one can observe that the
capital-assets ratio, the equity-assets ratio, the free capital
ratio and the free equity ratio appear to show no clear tendency
during the period and they remain approximately around the same
values for private and savings banks, respectively. However,
all 1990 values are higher than 1987 values for those ratios.
Seemingly, this indicates that the aggregate capital base, the
equity, the free capital and the free equity value have increased
at a higher rate than the assets from 1987 to 1990. Another
characteristic one can notice is that these four capital ratios
seem to move together over time. The time-series comovement of
capital ratios could be expected in this type of analysis4.
Secondly, it can be observed that the capital-assets and
equity-assets ratios seem to be just slightly higher for the
Spanish private banks than for the savings banks during the period
Table 4.8 :	 Aggregate
Banks
	 (%)	 (*).
Capital Ratios	 of Spanish Savings
1987 1988 1989 1990
Capital-assets ratio 6.6 7.2 6.8 7.7
Equity-assets ratio 5.1 5.2 4.9 5.7
Free capital ratio 2.9 3.7 3.5 3.7
Free equity ratio 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.8
Subord. debt ratio 2.7 11.9 12.3 11.0
(*) The different ratios have been computed as in Table 4.7 but
for the savings banks equity is assumed to consist of foundation
funds plus reserves plus Social Works funds.
Source: CECA (1987-90); Own Results.
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Figure 4.2: Capital Ratios for Spanish Banks (1987-90)
Private banks
Year
---'--- Capital-Assets ratio
--°-- Free Capital ratio
Equity-Assets ratio
— Free Equity Ratio
Savings banks
8
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studied. The different possibilities for private and savings banks
to raise capital might cause this difference in these two ratios.
However, there appear to be larger differences in free capital and
free equity ratios between private and savings banks. Spanish
savings banks seem to have much lower free capital and free equity
ratios than private banks. Thus, savings banks seem to have a
greater portion of fixed assets in their balance-sheet than the
private banks.
Finally, the subordinated debt ratios for both Spanish
private and savings banks show the relative, increasing
importance of subordinated debt, which seems to gain ground on the
equity instruments. In 1987, 1988 and 1989, savings banks
have apparently employed more subordinated debt in relative terms
than the private banks. However, by 1990 private banks seem
to have caught up with savings banks in terms of relative use of
subordinated debt.
4.2.4.- The Internal Capital Generation in the Spanish
Banking System.
A very important variable with regard to bank capital
adequacy is the banks' internal capital generation rate. Banks
facing the need for additional capital very often tend to turn to
the retention of earnings. It is a key issue to examine banks'
internal capital generation rate since it appears the main source
for additional capital as found in Tables 4.5 and 4.6.
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The internal capital generation rate is influenced by the
profitability and the dividend policy of the firm. In this
context, Sinkey (1992, p. 764) defines the internal capital
generation rate (g) as follows5:
g = ROE x RR	 (4.1)
where ROE is Return on Equity (the relevant measure of
profitability for stockholders) and the RR is the retention ratio.
If after-tax earnings are used, RR is equal to (1-PR) where PR is
the dividend payout ratio. If before-tax returns are employed, RR
is equal to (1-t-PR) where t is the taxes to earnings ratio and
before-tax ROE must be employed. As the researcher has before-tax
values, the latter will be used.
The issue of the internal capital generation in the Spanish
banking system is relevant for both savings and private banks.
Internal capital generation is a key issue for the Spanish savings
banks since until recent years the only way savings banks could
augment capital was through retained earnings.
Spanish savings banks were not allowed to have
situation may change in the future if savings
the participation capital, a capital instrument
in Spain, which (as explained in the previous
This is so because
share equity. This
banks make use of
introduced in 1988
section) does not
give any voting right in the bank but entitles holders to receive
a percentage of the earnings. However, this instrument had not
been issued by any savings bank by the end of 1990. Thus, in the
period considered (1987-90), savings banks needed to rely upon
their profitability to augment capital standards.
As the Spanish savings banks do not pay out dividends, and,
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hence their retention ratio (RR) is 100 per cent, the researcher
will examine the profitability of the savings banks during the
period, which due to these operational features of these
institutions, represents their internal capital generation rate
(g). In Table 4.9, the values of aggregate before-tax earnings
during 1987-90 for the private and savings banks are displayed.
The figures in Table 4.9 for the savings banks represent
their internal possibilities to increase capital. Table 4.9 shows
no clear tendency of the savings banks' earnings during the
period. 1988 seemed a bad year in terms of before-tax earnings for
Spanish savings banks. However, 1989 seemed a very good year. If
the average of the last three years (1988, 1989 and 1990) is
calculated, the figure is approximately the same as the 1987 value
(pesetas million 177534 is the average whereas the 1987 value is
pesetas million 178847), which appears to indicate that there is
no upwards trend in the aggregate net earnings. Therefore, savings
banks' main capital source, that is, profitability, seems to have
remained constant during the period, which in turn seems to set
limits on the possibilities to increase capital in the savings
banks.
As far as private banks in Spain are concerned, Table 4.9
indicates that there has been an upward trend in the before-tax
earnings for those banks during 1987-90. The increase in earnings
in 1988 and 1989 appear higher than in 1990 when earnings seem to
have grown at a slower rate. This apparently reflects the impact
of the accounts war, in which the private banks engaged in 1990,
on profitability. The impact of the accounts war on financial
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costs and interest rates paid on current accounts was illustrated
in Table 2.20 in Chapter 2.
Table 4.9: Aggregate Before Tax Earnings for Private and
Savings Banks. (1987 - 90) (in Spanish pesetas million).
Year	 Private Banks	 Savings Banks
1987	 305006	 180997
1988	 449650	 135530
1989	 579240	 211661
1990	 626700	 194402
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario (1987-90); CECA (1987-90).
As far as Spanish private banks are concerned, retained
earnings and new share equity issues play the critical role in
augmenting capital. Spanish private banks have a choice when
needing additional capital: the internal capital generation and
the issue of new equity. It is also interesting to note that
private banks' managers face a problem that Spanish savings banks'
managers do not: earnings distribution between dividend pay-out
and retained earnings.
Let us compute the internal capital Generation rate (g) as
described in Formula (4.1) for the private banks operating in
Spain. First of all, the aggregate earnings distribution for the
private banks operating in Spain during 1986-89 is displayed in
Table 4.10. The tax-earnings ratio, the dividend pay-out ratio and
the retention ratio are given by the values of Corporate Tax,
Dividends and Retained Earnings as a percentage of before-tax
earnings for every year. We have distinguished between Spanish
banks and foreign banks. If the Total Banks column is examined, it
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Table 4.10: Private banks: Aggregate Before Tax Earnings
(1986-89) (in Spanish million andDistribution. pesetas %).
Spanish
Private Banks
Foreign	 Total
Banks	 Banks
Amount	 %	 Amount	 %	 Amount	 %
1986
Corporate Tax	 54423	 24.0	 5943	 32.7	 60366	 25.2
Dividends	 67368	 29.7	 91	 0.5	 67459	 28.1
Retained Earnings	 105258	 46.3	 12136	 66.8	 112006	 46.7
TOTAL	 227049	 100.0	 18170	 100.0	 239831	 100.0
1987
Corporate Tax	 78167	 26.5	 4696	 32.1	 82863
	 26.8
Dividends
	 90142	 30.6	 5	 0.1	 90147	 29.1
Retained Earnings	 126688	 42.9	 9921	 67.8	 136609	 44.1
TOTAL	 294997	 100.0	 14622	 100.0	 309619	 100.0
1988
Corporate Tax	 125811	 29.2	 6634	 29.2	 132445	 29.2
Dividends
	
142301	 33.0	 393	 1.7	 142694	 31.4
Retained Earnings	 163062	 37.8	 15658	 69.1	 178720	 39.4
TOTAL	 431174	 100.0	 22685	 100.0	 453859	 100.0
1989
Corporate Tax	 181972	 32.5	 7370	 34.2	 189342	 32.6
Dividends
	
185508	 33.2	 548	 2.5	 186056	 32.1
Retained Earnings	 191960	 34.3	 13636	 63.3	 205596	 35.3
TOTAL	 559440	 100.0	 21554	 100.0	 580994	 100.0
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seems that earnings have been increasing throughout the period,
which appears to have allowed the private banks to accommodate
dividends increases and retained earnings increases. The absolute
dividend pay-out actually tripled and the retained earnings
increased by 90 per cent during 1986-89. The tax-to-earnings ratio
has steadily increased in the period except for the foreign banks.
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario (1987-90); Own Results.
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However, the cases of Spanish private banks and of foreign
banks appear dramatically different. The dividend pay-out ratio
for Spanish banks has remained between 30 and 35 per cent during
the period. However, foreign banks had a dividend pay-out ratio
between 0.1 and 2.5 per cent during the period. Seemingly, foreign
banks have hardly paid out dividends during the period. Foreign
banks' retention ratio is 65-70 per cent in the period, whereas
Spanish banks retention ratio is approximately 35-45 per cent
during the period. The retention ratio seems to have a downwards
trend during 1986-89 for Spanish private banks and also for all
the private banks together. However, it has remained stable for
foreign private banks.
One also needs ROE values during 1986-89 to calculate the
internal capital generation rate. The aggregate ROE estimations
for the private banks operating in Spain can be found in Table
4.11.
It can be observed in Table 4.11 that ROE appears to have an
upwards trend during 1986-89 when all the private banks are
considered. These ROE values for all the banks seem to be
strongly influenced by the ROE values for the Spanish private
banks which account for the largest part of the private banks.
However, the ROE values for the foreign banks operating in Spain
appear much more erratic in 1986-89 and, except for 1986, lower
than those for the Spanish private banks.
Once the retention ratios and ROE values have been examined,
one can compute the internal capital generation rates (g) for the
private banks operating in Spain. Formula (4.1) is employed and
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the results are reported in Table 4.12.
Table 4.11: Aggregate Before Tax ROE for Private Banks in
Spain. (1986-89) (%).
Return on Equity (%)
YEAR Spanish Private Banks Foreign Banks Total Banks
1986 16.20 26.11 16.76
1987 20.15 17.11 20.02
1988 23.31 20.68 23.12
1989 26.04 16.07 25.46
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario (1986-89); Own Results.
Table 4.12: Aggregate Internal Capital Generation Rates (g)
for Private Banks (1986-89). (%).
Internal Capital Generation Rate (g)
YEAR Spanish Private Banks Foreign Banks Total Banks
1986 7.5 17.4 7.8
1987 8.6 11.6 8.8
1988 8.8 14.2 9.1
1989 8.9 10.1 9.0
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario (1986-89); Own Results.
The internal capital generation rate for total banks ( i.e.
Spanish private and foreign banks in Spain) have been increasing
during 1986-89. This seems to have been caused mainly by the ROE
increases in the period, as found in Table 4.9. Foreign banks have
had a higher internal capital generation rate than the Spanish
private banks. Apparently, the comparatively higher retention
ratios seem to lie behind this result. However, foreign banks'
internal capital generation rate has been decreasing during the
period. In Table 4.11 it was noted that foreign banks'
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profitability in terms of ROE has been deteriorating from 1987 to
1989. This seems the likely explanation for the decrease in "g"
values.
The contrary appears to have happened to the internal capital
generation rates of the Spanish private banks since they have been
improving during the period considered as a consequence of the
increases in profitability. Although the retention ratio has
deteriorated during the period for the Spanish private banks, the
high ROE values have allowed these banks to have higher "g"
values.
4.2.5.- Equity Issues in the Spanish Banking System.
The external sources of capital also need to be explored for
the Spanish banks. The external sources of capital seem only
relevant for the private banks in Spain, since savings banks are
not allowed to issue equity.
Table 4.13 shows the new equity issues (in pesetas) for the
private banks operating in Spain during 1987-90. One may note
that 1988 was the year in which private banks issued the largest
amount of new equity, and 1989 was also a year in which private
banks were very active in terms of new equity issues.
Another feature that one can observe in Table 4.13 is that
several banks were involved in more than one new equity issue
during 1987-90. The number of banks involved in new equity issues
is lower than the number of new equity issues, which indicates
that several banks issued new equity more than once during a
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certain year. In fact, several banks, particularly very large
banks, issued new equity three times during a certain year. Thus,
some banks appear to be able to tap the external sources of
capital more often than others.
Table 4.13 : Bank Equity Issues in Spain (1987-90)
Number of
New Issues
Number of
Banks
Total Amount
(in pesetas million)
1987 39 30 49190
1988 76 51 175301
1989 55 42 103050
1990 47 36 90910
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario (1987-90); Own Results.
A very important factor associated with the issues of new
equity is the potential ownership dilution that may occur. The
theoretical implications of ownership dilution are investigated
in Chapter 5. In this section, our concern is focused on some
empirical data on the number of stockholders for the Spanish
private banks. Table 4.14 displays the number of shareholders in
the Spanish private banks. Shareholders are divided into small
shareholders (less than 100 shares), medium-sized shareholders
(between 100 and 500 shares) and large shareholders (more than 500
shares).
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Table 4.14 : Number of Bank Shareholders in Spain (1987-90)
Less than
	
Between 100	 More than
100 shares	 and 500 shares	 500 shares	 TOTAL
1987	 1423815
	 486358	 160632	 2070805
1988	 1425426	 569160	 191476	 2186062
1989	 1357246	 571803	 206392	 2135441
1990	 1260932	 573810	 250378
	
2085210
Source : Consejo Superior Bancario (1987-1990)
One may note that the number of large and medium-sized
shareholders seems to have increased significantly during
1987-90, and the number of small shareholders seems to have
decreased during the same period. Thus, there seems to have been a
concentration process in terms of private banks' stock holdings in
Spain during 1987-90. In other words, the evidence provided in
Table 4.14 does not appear to support that there have been
dilution ownership effects associated with bank equity issues in
Spain during 1987-90.
4.2.6.- International Comparisons of Book-Value Capital
Trends.
One also needs to compare the book-value capital trends of
the Spanish banking system with the book-value capital trends of
the banking systems of several European major countries. There are
data available on the comparison of the values of the
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equity/assets ratio and the comparison of internal capital
generation rates.
Morgan Stanley regularly estimates several key performance
measures and ratios for selected banks in different countries. The
selected banks are usually the largest banks in these countries.
One of the ratios Morgan Stanley computes is the equity/assets
ratio. In Morgan Stanley estimates, the sample of Spanish banks
appear to maintain relatively high equity ratios compared with
other European countries. This can be seen in Table 4.15, where
average equity/assets ratios for selected banks of five major
European countries at the end of 1988 and 1990 are displayed.
At the end of 1988, the average equity/assets ratio of the
Spanish selected banks seemed the highest compared with the other
four countries. However, there appears to be a decline in this
ratio by the end of 1990. Only U.K. banks in the sample seem to
maintain similar average values of the equity/assets ratio to the
Spanish banks. French and German banks appear to have higher
leverage than the other countries since their ratios are
comparatively lower.
There is also information available on international
comparisons of the internal capital generation rates for selected
banks. Salomon Brothers (1992, Figure 8, p.23) have computed those
rates for some of the largest banks of several countries. From
these figures the researcher has calculated the average of those
internal capital generation rates for those selected banks of the
five European banks considered in Table 4.15. Those average values
during 1987-90 are shown in Table 4.16.
129
CHAPTER 4: EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY TRENDS IN ...
Table 4.15: Average Equity / Assets Ratios for Selected Banks
of Five Major European Countries (1988, 1990). (%)
Country	 Number of Banks
	 1988
	 1990
France	 5	 2.96	 3.16
Germany	 5	 3.16	 3.28
Italy	 11a	 5.30	 5.21
Spain	 9b
	
6.35	 5.97
U.K.	 9	 6.12	 5.34
a.- In 1988, only seven Italian banks were selected.
b.- In 1990, only eight Spanish banks were selected.
Source: Morgan Stanley (1990a, 1991c)
According to Table 4.16, the Spanish banks seem to have
enjoyed the highest internal capital generation rates (g) of the
five countries considered. Those Spanish selected banks appear to
have g values well above the rest of the countries considered. The
U.K. banks seem to be a special case with extreme observations
since the capital generation rates values change dramatically
during the period covered.
Table 4.16: Average Internal Capital Generation Rates (g)
	 of
Selected Banks for Five European Countries (1987-90).
	 (%)
Country Number of Banks 1987 1988 1989 1990
France 8 8.16 8.87 10.62 7.92
Germany 3 3.48 5.30 5.02 4.30
Italy 4 6.43 6.59 4.68 6.81
Spain 6 10.30 12.83 11.81 9.82
U.K. 4 -	 7.06 13.92 -	 9.23 2.68
Source: Salomon Brothers (1992, figure 8, p.23)
Apparently, the best year in terms of g values for the
European banks seemed to be 1988 when the maximum values
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throughout 1987-90 were obtained in the five countries. Since
then, there has been a decline in g values. This result was also
found in Table 4.12 for the aggregate private banks operating in
Spain.
4.3.- TRENDS IN REGULATORY BANK CAPITAL IN THE SPANISH
BANKING SYSTEM.
4.3.1.- Introduction.
In this section the main features of banks operating in Spain
in terms of regulatory bank capital are analyzed. Specifically,
the researcher is concerned with the extent to which those banks
appear to have fulfilled the minimum regulatory capital standards.
Unfortunately, the information related to the fulfillment of
the regulatory standards by banks operating in Spain is limited;
an economic justification for this limitation is given by Revell
(1989). Revell argues that in the present era of narrowing
margins, the raising of minimum capital ratios by the authorities
and a need for extra capital in order to expand and to initiate
new services, the performance by a credit institution on the
capital coefficient is probably the most important single
indicator of its soundness, more important even than the figure
of profit or net surplus that it earned during the previous year.
Given this importance, it is surely strange that in no country do
the authorities publish statistics of the fulfillment of capital
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coefficients by banks, either in the aggregate or by individual
institutions.
Using the limited information available, first the
fulfillment of the Spanish regulatory capital standards is
studied. Then, the position of the largest private banks in terms
of the BIS proposals is analyzed. Finally, the position of the
Spanish banks in terms of the EC regulatory capital standards is
evaluated.
4.3.2.- The Fulfillment of Spanish Regulatory Capital
Standards.
As an introduction to this subsection, one needs to report
Price Waterhouse survey results (1991) among the Spanish banks.
According to the survey, all but a few very small banks had
reached the equivalent of the BIS (1988) 8 per cent level by the
end of 1990. None of the banks surveyed had so far needed to raise
capital specifically to meet the standards but future action may
be necessary in one case. Likewise changes to the asset portfolio
had not yet been necessary.
Let us analyze the evolution of the old capital regulatory
standards, employing the ratios Capital / Assets and Capital /
Deposits. The latter was the ratio employed before the reform of
1985. Before 1985, the regulatory capital standards contained
only equity and disclosed reserves. The upper part of Table
4.17 shows the aggregate evolution of those two ratios for private
and savings banks during 1980-89.
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Table 4.17: Aggregate Regulatory Capital Ratios
Banks and Savings Banks (1980-89)
for Private
Private Banks Savings Banks
1980 1983 1986 1989 1980 1983 1986 1989
Capital 1 /
Total Assets 5.98 4.71 5.10 6.02 5.11 4.23 4.47 4.25
Capital 1 /
Deposits 8.99 7.37 10.03 10.26 5.98 5.09 5.41 5.30
Capital 2/
Assets 5.98 4.71 6.10 7.88 5.11 6.13 6.39 8.14
Capital 1 /
Investment 10.41 9.08 11.51 13.11 12.28 9.13 12.1 9.88
Capital 2 /
Investment 10.41 9.08 13.72 17.15 12.28 13.2 17.3 19.1
Notes: 
Capital 1 = Equity capital + published reserves
Capital 2 = Capital 1 + subordinated debt + Other capital
instruments
Investment = Credit investment.
Source : Negueruela and Gomez (1990 P. 178)
In the upper part of Table 4.17 it can be noticed that
private banks seemed to show an upwards trends in both ratios.
Savings banks appear to show a downwards trend in both ratios
during the period and they are also much lower than those for
private banks. This result might be caused by the non-existence of
share equity in savings banks.
The lower part of Table 4.17 contains, the recent
evolution of the aggregate generic ratio ( Capital 2 / Assets)
which currently is being applied in Spain. It can be observed that
after 1985 both private and savings were well above the minimum
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required (5 per cent). Both groups of banks seem to have upwards
trends in their aggregate generic ratios. Seemingly, savings banks
have slightly higher aggregate generic ratios than the private
banks throughout the period.
If one now focuses on the other two ratios, whose denominator
is credit investment, it can be noticed that as banks were not
allowed to issue subordinated debt before 1985, some values of the
ratios Capital 1 / Investment and Capital 2 / Investment are the
same in 1980 and 1983. One can also observe that the Capital 1 /
Investment ratio has been increasing for the private banks in the
period, whereas it has been decreasing for the savings banks. The
aggregate values of that ratio appear higher for private banks
than for savings banks. However, the Capital 2 / Investment ratios
appear higher for the savings banks than for the private banks.
Savings banks seem very active in terms of subordinated debt
issues and other capital instruments issues.
The only available information on the fulfillment of capital
ratios by Spanish banks is referred to the savings banks. Table
4.18 shows the levels of both generic and specific ratios for
Spanish savings banks at the end of 1988 and 1990.
In Table 4.18, it can be observed that the position of the
savings banks in terms of fulfillment of the capital standards
imposed by the Spanish bank regulators has improved from 1988 to
1990. In 1988, eleven savings banks failed to meet the generic or
global capital ratio and fourteen failed to fulfill the specific
or selective capital ratio (nine failed to fulfill both ratios).
However, at the end of 1990, only three savings banks failed to
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meet the specific ratio and all the banks reached the minimum
generic ratio.
Table 4.18: Fulfillment of Spanish Regulatory Capital
Standards by Savings Banks. (End of 1988 and 1990).
Global coefficient
1988	 1990
Number % of Aggregate Assets
Less than 5 %
	
11	 0	 0
5 - 6 %	 30	 19	 15.52
6 - 7 %	 18	 18	 22.68
Over 7 %	 18	 26	 61.80
TOTAL	 77	 63	 100.00
Specific coefficient
(actual / required ratio)
Less than 1	 14	 3	 0.80
1 - 1.5	 51	 43	 68.49
1.5 - 2	 10	 16	 29.82
Over 2	 2	 1	 0.89
Source: CECA (1989, 1991)
The three savings banks which failed to meet the regulatory
standards at the end of 1990 account for less than 1 per cent of
aggregate assets of the Spanish savings banks. Consequently, those
three banks appear to be of small size. The position of the
Spanish savings banks as a whole in terms of Spanish regulatory
capital definitions seem robust at the end of 1990.
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4.3.3.- The Position of Spanish Banks in terms of BIS
Regulatory Standards.
One can also analyze the position of the Spanish banks in
terms of BIS capital ratios. Unfortunately again, we only have
information about a limited sample of banks operating in Spain.
The sample contains the nine biggest Spanish private banks. Table
4.19 shows the BIS capital ratios for these banks during 1988-89.
Table	 4.19:	 BIS	 Capital	 Ratios	 for
Spanish Private Banks (1988-90). the	 nine	 Largest
BIS capital ratio (%)
Bank	 1988 1989 1990
BBV	 10.4 9.7 11.7
Banco Central	 11.0 11.7 12.0
Banco Exterior	 8.8 9.9 10.7
Hispano Americano	 9.0 10.0 9.7
Banco Popular	 12.3 11.9 12.6
Banco Santander	 10.6 10.6 13.6
Banco Zaragozano	 9.0 10.0 n.a.
Banesto	 7.6 10.6 10.2
Bankinter
	 11.0 12.0 11.7
n.a = not available
Source: Morgan Stanley (1990a, 1991b)
In Table 4.19 it may be noticed that the nine biggest Spanish
private banks appear well-capitalized in terms of BIS ratios
from 1988 to 1990. Only one bank did not reach the BIS minimum
ratio in 1988, but in 1989 and 1990 all the banks were well above
8 per cent. It can also be observed that those banks tended to
have in 1990 higher BIS ratios than in 1988. Although they had
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reached the BIS minimum ratio in 1988, they had further improved
their position by the end of 1990.
From this small sample of Spanish banks, one can observe that
in principle, the BIS proposals do not appear to be more demanding
than the Spanish capital regulation. The banks in the sample
maintain ratios well above the BIS minimum ratio.
4.3.4.- The Position of Spanish Banks in terms of the EC
Capital Adequacy Ratios.
Spanish bank capital adequacy legislation will have to be
adapted in the future to comply with the 1989 EC Solvency Ratio
Directive. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze the position of
the Spanish banks in terms of the EC capital standards.
The researcher only has the position of the Spanish savings
banks in terms of the EC solvency ratio by the end of 1990. These
EC ratios for the Spanish savings banks are shown in Table 4.20.
In Table 4.20, it seems that all the Spanish savings banks
would have complied with the EC minimum Solvency Ratio (8 %) by
the end of 1990. All the savings banks are well above 8 % and many
of them even doubled that percentage. The average ratio is
14.71%, which is practically almost double the EC requirement.
Therefore, they seem very well-capitalized in terms of the EC
regulation.
From this evidence it would seem that the EC regulatory
capital requirements are less demanding than the requirements
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currently applied in Spain. Consequently, when the EC Solvency
Ratio comes into effect, the banks operating in Spain appear to be
well-prepared for the challenge.
Table 4.20: Fulfillment of EC Regulatory Standards by
Spanish Savings Banks (End of 1990).
EEC Solvency Ratio Number of Banks % of Aggregate Assets
8 - 11 % 14 11.60
11 - 14 % 24 32.40
14 - 17 % 16 30.13
17 - 20 % 4 17.42
Over 20 % 5 8.45
TOTAL 63 100.00
Source: CECA (1991)
4.3.5.- International Comparisons of Fulfillment of Capital
Adequacy Standards.
In order to establish international comparisons of regulatory
capital standards, BIS regulatory capital definitions will be
used. Since 1988, Morgan Stanley provides estimates of the BIS
capital ratios held by selected banks of several European
countries.
When an international comparison with the largest banks of
other EC countries is established, the position of the Spanish
selected largest banks in terms of BIS ratios appears to be higher
at the end of 1990. This can be observed in Table 4.21 where the
average BIS capital ratios for selected banks of five European
countries are displayed.
The average values of the BIS ratios for the five selected EC
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countries appear well above the BIS minimum (8 %) both at the end
of 1988 and of 1990. The U.K. banks in the sample seemed to have
the highest BIS ratios at the end of 1988, but the Spanish banks
appear to have the highest ratios at the end of 1990. German and
French banks have lower BIS capital ratios, but they still
maintain ratios which are higher than the BIS minimum.
Table 4.21 : Average BIS Capital Ratios for Selected banks of
Five European Countries (End of 1988,1989 and 1990). (%)
Country	 Number of banks	 1988	 1990
France	 5	 > 8.40	 > 8.72
Germany	 5	 > 9.60	 > 9.80 E
Italy	 11a	 > 9.86	 10.02 E
Spain	 9b
	
9.97	 11.51
U.K.	 9	 10.65	 10.53
a.- In 1988, only seven Italian banks were selected.
b.- In 1990, only eight Spanish banks were selected.
E = estimation undertaken by Morgan Stanley
Source: Morgan Stanley (1990a, 1991c)
All things considered, the main conclusion one can draw is
that the Spanish banks appear well-capitalized in terms of
regulatory capital standards and they appear to be well above the
BIS regulatory minimum and above the values of banks in
other major European countries.
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4.4.- TRENDS IN MARKET-VALUE BANK CAPITAL IN THE SPANISH
BANKING SYSTEM.
4.4.1.- Introduction.
This section is devoted to the analysis of market valuation
of Spanish private banks. The researcher will employ Madrid Stock
Exchange data for the private banks quoted in that market. As
displayed in Table 4.22, out of the 123 private banks operating in
Spain, only 30 private banks during 1988-90 and 29 banks in 1987
were quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange6.
Table 4.22: Number of Private Banks Quoted on Madrid Stock
Exchange (1987-90).
Year	 Number
1987	 29
1988	 30
1989	 30
1990	 30
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario (1987-1990)
In this section, three indicators of market valuation of bank
capital are evaluated for those private banks quoted on the Madrid
Stock Exchange. The three indicators are the index of stock price
of bank shares relative to the all share index, the market price
to book value equity ratio and the price-to-earnings ratio.
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4.4.2.- Bank Shares Stock Price Index in Spain.
The first indicator is the index of the stock market-price of
bank shares relative to all share index. This is a measure of the
performance of bank stock prices relative to all others and which
abstracts from movements in the absolute level of both sets of
prices (Llewellyn, 1989).
As it can be noticed in Table 4.23 and Figure 4.3, the banks
index has been higher than the all-share index, in annual average
terms during 1987-90. The maximum value of the banks index
relative to the all-share index was that of 1988 and then it
decreased in 1989 and 1990. In Table 4.23, it can also be observed
that both banks index and all share index have moved in the same
direction during the period considered. They both reached their
maximum value in 1989 and both had a dramatic fall in 1990.
Table 4.23: Banks Index Relative to All Share Index for
Private Banks in Spain (1987-90). (annual average)
Year	 Banks Index (1)	 All Share Index (2)	 (1) / (2)
1987
	 324.79
	
249.96
	
1.30
1988
	
392.76
	
277.15
	
1.42
1989
	
406.11
	
301.10
	
1.35
1990
	
328.06
	
258.81
	
1.27
Source: Boletin Estadistico - Bank of Spain (1991)
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Figure 4.3: Spanish Banks' Share Index (1987-90)
Bank .
 Share Index
	 —H All Share Index
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During 1987-89, the marketplace seemed to increase its
confidence in the banking sector shares performance since bank
share prices rose. However, in 1990 the banks share prices fell
and the market seemed to have lost confidence in the performance
of banks equity shares.
The fact that the banks share index is higher than the all-
share index appears to show that the marketplace gives a relative
premium to the shares of the banking sector. The marketplace seems
to value the private banks sector relatively higher than the
average sector. Hence, the market appears to have confidence in
the prospects of a relatively higher performance of the private
banks equity share.
4.4.3.- Market Price to Book Value Capital Ratio of the
Spanish Banks.
The market price to book value ratio of a firm indicates to
what extent the market valuation of this firm's equity diverges
from the book-value of equity. According to Sinkey (1992, p.264),
the divergence between the market and the book values of equity is
called "hidden capital" or "hidden value". He emphasizes that
there exists hidden value in the banking firm for two reasons:
(a) Accountant's misvaluations of the credit and
interest-rate risks incorporated in items on bank's balance
sheets.
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(b) Accountant's neglect of the contingent claims or
values associated with off-balance sheet activities and
government guarantees that are not formally booked under
accounting procedures.
The market price to book value ratio (P/BV) for the nine
largest Spanish commercial banks appear well above 100 % at the
end of 1988, 1989 and 1990. This can be observed in Table 4.24
where the P/BV ratios for the nine Spanish largest commercial
banks are displayed. Hence, the market values of bank appear to
diverge from the book-values of bank equity for the nine largest
Spanish banks during 1988-90. Some of the banks in the sample have
market values of equity which double or even triple the book-value
of equity. This seems particularly true in 1988 where the highest
P/BV values take place. This result is likely to imply high
"hidden value" in the balance-sheet of these banks.
Gardener and Molyneux (1992) argue that unlocking the hidden
value is one possible component of a bank's capital augmentation
strategy. This strategy can benefit from a merger process since
mergers require the revaluation of assets and incidental
liabilities; since in Spain such a revaluation is not taxable,
these large banks would have benefited from a merger process in
terms of capital augmentations without paying taxes on the hidden
value which is allocated in the capital augmentation.
Morgan Stanley (1990a, p.6) maintains that in Spain it is
possible to unlock hidden values in investments and property
through mergers. This has already happened on several occasions in
the banking industry, the most notable being BBV.
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However, since 1989, there seems to be a downwards trend in
the P/BV values for those banks. It was found in Table 4.24, that
after reaching a peak value in 1989, the banks shares index fell.
This might be one of the causes shaping the downwards trend in
P1 BV.
Table 4.24: P/BV Values for the Nine Largest Commercial Banks
in Spain (1988-90).	 (%)	 (*)
Bank 1988 1989 1990
BBV 204 169 142
Banesto 302 171 166
Banco Central 262 223 191
Banco Exterior n.a. 164 162
Banco Hispano Americano 209 164 139
Banco Popular Espanol 222 209 201
Banco de Santander 324 208 203
Bankinter 184 162 134
Banco Zaragozano 126 221 n.a.
(*) All figures as of the end of each year
n.a.= not available.
Source: Morgan Stanley (1990b, 1991b)
One also needs to examine how those P/BV ratios compare with
other European countries. Morgan Stanley (1990a, Table 3, p.5)
elaborated international comparisons of the P/BV ratios and a
Hidden Value Index that Morgan Stanley computed. Those results are
displayed in Table 4.25.
In Table 4.25, one can notice that Spanish banks appear to
have comparatively high price/book value ratios. Germany, Italy
and Switzerland also appear to have comparatively high P/BV
ratios. These differences between the market value and the book
value reflect inter alia "hidden value" in the balance sheet of
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these banks.
Against the P/BV, the highest numbers being the most
expensive shares, Morgan Stanley has placed their own index number
as to how they perceive the elements of hidden value in the
accounts. This is based on U.K. = 100 and there is some
understandable correlation between the P/BV and the index. The
principal hidden values are found in Germany, Italy, Spain and
Switzerland as it might be expected from the P/BV ratio values for
these countries.
Table 4.25: P/BV and Hidden Value Index. (%) (*)
Country	 P/BV	 Hidden Value Index
Belgium	 90	 100
Denmark	 77	 95
Finland	 112	 120
France	 101	 110
Germany	 138	 150
Ireland	 167	 100
Italy	 214	 160
Netherlands	 79	 110
Norway	 94	 90
Spain	 196	 150
Switzerland	 188	 180
U.K.	 98	 100
(*) 1988 P/BV.
Source: Morgan Stanley (1990a, Table 3, p.5).
To sum up, one can draw the conclusion that Spain appears one
of the European countries with higher P/BV values, which in turn,
means that there seems to be high hidden value in the
balance-sheets of Spanish banks.
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4.4.4.- Price-to-Earnings Ratio of the Spanish Banks.
The price-earnings ratio (PER) of a share is the ratio of
market price of a share to earnings per share or EPS. Sinkey
(1992) defines it as the benchmark measure of the relative value
of a firm's earnings in the marketplace. Llewellyn (1989) defines
it as an indicator of what investors are prepared to pay for the
earnings of a share.
Llewellyn (1989) emphasizes that the PER will be high when
ceteris paribus, (i) investors believe that future earnings will
be rising relative to current earnings, (ii) when the perceived
risk attached to those expected earnings is low, or (iii) when the
attractiveness of alternative investments is low. The ratio will
also rise when there are speculative purchases of equities
independently of expectations and future earnings. Table 4.26 and
Figure 4.4 show the aggregate PER for the banking sector and for
the total firms in Madrid Stock Exchange.
Table 4.26: Aggregate Price-Earnings Ratios for the Banking
Sector and for Total Firms (1987-90).
Year	 Banks	 Total Firms
1987	 21.14	 16.59
1988	 16.75	 14.68
1989	 14.24	 14.80
1990	 9.87	 10.17
Source: Boletin Estadistico - Bank of Spain (1991)
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The aggregate PER for the banking sector has been falling
from 1987 to 1990 (Table 4.26 and Figure 4.4). The decrease in the
aggregate PER for the banking sector might be caused by either the
fact that future expectations of earnings in the sector are
falling relative to current prices or by the fact that the
perceived risk attached to those expected earnings of the sector
is higher than the current earnings' risk.
The decrease in the aggregate PER for the banking sector from
1987 to 1990 does not appear to have been caused by a far higher
attractiveness of alternative investments since the price-earnings
ratio for the total of firms in the Stock market, which could be
considered as a proxy of the attractiveness of alternative
investments, also fell during 1987-90. However, the decrease in
PER appears more dramatic for the banking sector than for the
total firms. Actually, after 1988 when the PER for the banking
sector was well above the PER for the total firms, the PER for the
banking sector fell even lower than the PER for the total firms.
4.5.- BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY TRENDS IN SPAIN: SYNTHESIS.
The main capital adequacy trends in terms of book-value
capital, supervisory capital and market-value capital have been
explored for the Spanish banking system during 1987-90. The main
conclusions one can draw are the following:
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1) As far as book-value capital adequacy trends, Spanish
private banks and savings banks have different possibilities of
raising capital. Spanish savings banks are not allowed to issue
share capital and, thus, they rely on their profitability almost
completely to raise capital. Since 1985, Spanish banking
institutions can issue subordinated debt and this seems to have
helped particularly the savings banks augment capital. Private
banks also have issued a considerable amount of subordinated debt.
The different possibilities to raise capital might lie behind the
fact that private banks maintain higher accounting capital ratios
than savings banks.
The Spanish banks seem to maintain higher equity/assets
ratios by European banking standards. In the case of the Spanish
private banks, they seem to have higher internal capital
generation rates than banks in other major European banking
systems.
2) As for regulatory or supervisory standards, Spanish appear
well-capitalized. Only a very few banks have not reached the
Spanish minimum regulatory standards. Spanish banks appear to be
in an even higher position in terms of both BIS and EC Directive
capital standards. Apparently, this appears that the current
Spanish capital adequacy regulation is more demanding than the BIS
and the EC regulation.
3) Finally, the market-value capital adequacy trends were
explored. We found that the market-value of equity of Spanish
banks is well above the book-value capital and the P/BV ratio for
Spanish banks appears one of the highest among the major European
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countries. Seemingly, this implies the existence of a great deal
of hidden value in the balance-sheets of Spanish banks.
NOTES:
1- See Section 3.6 in Chapter 3 for regulatory definitions of
capital according to the 1988 BIS Agreement, the 1989 EC
Directive and the Spanish capital regulation.
2.- This is an application of Llewellyn's classification of
capital base (1989).
3.- See Revell (1989) for an explanation of the characteristics of
participation capital in Spain and elsewhere.
4.- See Foster (1986, p. 115-116) and Barnes (1987) for an
analysis of time-series comovement of financial ratios.
5.- Equation (4.1) is an approximation of the internal capital
generation rate that understates the true rate. To be more
accurate, g is equal to (ROE - RR)/(1 - ROE - • R). However, Sinkey
(1992, p.764) considers the approximation of g as "accurate
enough".
6.- A few banks not quoted in Madrid were quoted in the other
Spanish Stock Exchanges: in 1987, two banks were quoted in Bilbao
and one in Valencia; in 1988, two in Bilbao and one in Barcelona;
in 1989, two in Bilbao and one in Barcelona; in 1990, one in
Barcelona.
151
CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION ON BANK ...
CHAPTER 5 : THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION ON BANK
CAPITAL AUGMENTATIONS : THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.
5.1.- INTRODUCTION.
Our main concern in this thesis is the analysis of the
effects of bank capital adequacy regulation on bank capital
augmentations in the Spanish banking system. With this primary
objective in mind we need to analyze the determinants of bank
capital augmentations and particularly, to appraise the role of
bank capital regulation as a determinant of bank capital raising.
The researcher defines capital augmentation as capital
growth; in other words, the amount that bank capital increases in
a certain period. Capital augmentations may be nominal and/or
real. A nominal capital augmentation implies an increase in
book-value capital. A real capital augmentation is generated by an
increase in market-value capital.
Capital adequacy augmentations must be differentiated from
capital augmentations. At a fundamental level, capital adequacy is
related to a bank's corresponding risk exposure. Ceteris paribus,
the higher a bank's risk exposure, the more capital is required.
Thus, a capital adequacy augmentation implies that the
relationship measured by the ratio capital / bank risk has been
increased. These augmentations may be nominal and/or real. A
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nominal capital adequacy augmentation takes place in the
book-value and regulatory relationship capital / bank risk.
However, a real capital adequacy augmentation is generated by an
increase in the relationship capital / bank risk as measured by
the market.
According to Gardener (1992), capital augmentation is a
component of the bank's overall funding planning and
co-ordination. The starting point in determining the amount of
capital needed, that is to say, how much capital the bank needs to
raise, is the bank's financial plan. One needs to appraise what
factors influence capital augmentations, some of which are outside
of management control. As emphasized by Gardener (1992), a good
example of the latter would be the supervisory regime.
Following the three types of bank capital defined in Chapter
4 (book-value, supervisory and market-value capital), one can also
define capital augmentations according to those types of capital:
book-value capital augmentations, supervisory capital
augmentations and market-value capital augmentations. Increases or
decreases in each of these measures bay be mutually exclusive of
any changes in the other two. For example, market-value capital
can increase without having any corresponding effect on book-value
or supervisory capital augmentation.
There is a vast theoretical literature that has examined the
bank capital investment decision. One needs to review the
theoretical studies which have appraised the determinants of bank
capital augmentation and the impact of bank capital adequacy
regulation on bank capital augmentations. This chapter is devoted
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to the analysis of those theoretical determinants and models and
the study of the effects of capital regulation in this context.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, the
theoretical objectives of capital adequacy regulation are
reviewed. Next, the researcher studies the main banking
theoretical literature which has examined the capital structure
issue in the banking firm. In the next section, we move on to our
specific concern of the theoretical effects of capital adequacy on
bank capital augmentations. This will be undertaken in a more
general framework in which all the determinants of bank capital
augmentations will be considered. Finally, the synthesis and
testable hypotheses which the theoretical models imply will be
provided.
5.2.- THE OBJECTIVES OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION.
The banking industry is one of the most highly regulated
industries in the economy and bank capital regulation plays a
basic role in bank regulation. In few other industries is the
capital capital investment decision so subjected to supervision
and regulation.
Government bank capital regulation occurs most directly in
the process of bank examination by the bank supervisory agencies.
The primary, stated goal of all of the varied forms of government
regulation of banking is the maintenance of a safe and sound
banking system and to protect depositors. In Spain's 1962
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Regulation of Banking and Law (Ley de OrdenaciOn Bancaria), this
concern is clearly stated l . The severe external consequences of
the collapse of the financial system have focused public concern
on safety.
Historically, this regulation has entailed attempts to
compel greater solvency and liquidity on the part of individual
banks than they would adopt voluntarily. This is the basis of
bank portfolio regulation in general and capital regulation
in particular. Edmister (1986, p. 413) emphasizes that regulation
changes the alternative actions available to financial
institution management and, therefore, becomes a factor in
management decision making. As depicted in Figure 5.1, government
regulations cause changes in the portfolios, security issues and
operations of financial firms. Regulations aim to influence the
derivative actions of the value/profit maximizing financial firms
so that the public policy objectives of financial stability and
other macroeconomic goals can be accomplished.
In implementing this legislative intent, bank examiners
devote the greater part of their efforts simultaneously to a
determination of the "riskiness" of a bank's assets and the
adequacy of its capital. In this context, the primary function of
bank capital is to act as a kind of internal insurance fund in
order to protect a bank against uncertainties (Gardener, 1985).
Regulators seek to gauge the probable extent of any decline in
bank asset values and the ability of a bank's capital to
absorb such declines without depositors incurring losses.
If, simultaneously, the asset portfolio is regarded as too
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risky and, therefore, capital inadequate, the relevant supervisory
agency will attempt to compel a change in the bank's balance
sheet: more capital and/or fewer risk assets (Peltzman, 1970).
Therefore it would seem that more adequate capital and a less
risky asset portfolio are substitutes in the eyes of the
supervisors.
Figure 5.1 : Objectives of Government Bank Regulation.
Regulation	 Financial firm	 Public policy objectives
Regulations	 Portfolios	 Financial stability
Supervision	 Security issues	 Other macroeconomic goals
Insurance	 Operations
Source: Edmister (1986, p. 413)
Before a RAR was generally established, regulators tended to
dedicate their greatest 'capital-adequacy analysis' efforts
towards analyzing banks capital rather than the examination of the
details of the corresponding asset portfolio. Peltzman (1970)
argues that it was difficult for a bank regulator to estimate
accurately the riskiness of the different asset elements in a
bank's portfolio because, inter alia, they reflect a great variety
of local market conditions, bank management and other
circumstances. However, after RARs had been generally established,
bank supervisors attempted both to examine banks' capital and to
appraise banks' portfolios. Indeed, this was the objective of
using a RAR approach.
Santomero (1984) supports the idea that regulation, if
it is to be effective, must be combined with adequate
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understanding of the behavioral response of the banking
institutions. Bank regulators must understand how banking firms
would respond to regulation in order to avoid banks circumventing
regulation, which might result in the regulation not achieving
the desired results.
While the degree to which regulators succeed in having their
notions of adequate capital implemented by the banks can only be
determined empirically, Peltzman believes that these notions have
more than the force of suggestion behind them. For example,
the American banking law specifically requires that the federal
supervisory agencies certify the capital adequacy of banking
firms and they also have legal powers to compel individual banks
to increase capital. Institutions with inadequate capital can, at
any time, be penalized by expulsion from membership in the
Federal Reserve system (U.S. Code, Title 12, 1964). The Spanish
banking law lays down sanctions against banking firms which do
not have adequate capital. In addition, these banks cannot
obtain finance from the Bank of Spain (Trujillo, Cuervo-Arango,
Vargas, 1988).
Contrarily, Mayne (1972) argues that in fact bank supervisors
must rely upon persuasion, harassment, or possibly public citation
to convince bank management to increase capital funds. This would
result in the amount of bank capital being primarily determined by
bank management. According to Mayne, it would seem more
appropriate for the supervisors to focus their efforts upon the
quality of bank management rather than on elaborating tests of
bank capital adequacy.
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The role of deposit insurance must also be considered in this
context. In a compulsory deposit insurance system, central banks
or monetary authorities guarantee, partially or totally, the
coverage of potential banks' deposits losses. Thus, in the case of
bank bankruptcy, these institutions will repay, partially or
totally, bank depositors' losses. In return each insured bank pays
an annual premium as a percentage of the total deposit balance.
The legislative interest in the creation of a deposit
insurance system is, compensating depositors and ensuring a safe
haven for depositor's funds 2 . However, Lewis and Davis (1987)
maintain that the economic rationale for the existence of deposit
insurance systems relies fundamentally on the necessity of
building or maintaining confidence in the credit institutions and
in the financial system as a whole rather than recompensing
people after the loss of deposits. Therefore, this approach
suggests reducing the external diseconomies arising from frequent
bank's failures.
5.3.- BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE.
5.3.1.- Capital Adequacy and Modelling the Banking Firm.
A bank is the prototypical financial firm. There are
considerable outward differences between the wealth invested by
owners of financial institutions and that of other industries. The
capital of a financial firm consists largely of financial assets
and only to a small degree of the physical plant and equipment
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generally associated with capital in other industries3.
Furthermore, these physical differences are associated with
important functional differences. A financial institution, like
any other firm, combines the inputs which it purchases to produce
the output which it sells. The primary business of banking is one
of collecting funds from the community and extending credit to
economic units for useful and profitable purposes. Banking
institutions are also involved in nonbanking financial services
such as brokerage services, accounting and information services.
In this production process, bank capital serves two basic
functions: first, it is an input into the production process, as
in any other business. Second, bank capital is used to attract
deposit funds, which are also a necessary input into the
production process (Peltzman, 1970; Mingo, 1975). Dietrich and
James (1983) also consider the role of bank capital as a residual
capable of absorbing losses.
Before considering how banking theory has appraised the
capital structure decision in the banking firm, one first needs to
examine a complete model of the banking firm to understand more
fully the framework in which the capital decision is made.
Sinkey (1992, p.96) distinguishes between partial and complete
model of the banking firm. Partial models focus on either asset
selection or liability management. In other words, they analyze
only part of the banking firm's behaviour. However, a complete
model of the banking firm, explains the bank's asset and liability
decision (and their interaction if any) and the size of the firm.
Baltensperger (1980), in a review of the alternative approaches to
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the theory of the banking firm, provides a complete model of the
banking firm. In his model, a simultaneous determination of asset
structure, liability structure, and size is demonstrated. His
model considers real resource costs, liquidity costs, and
insolvency costs. His balance-sheet constraint can be stated as:
R +E=D+K= A,	 (5.1)
where R = reserves, E = earnings assets, D = deposits, K = capital
and A = assets. There are three choice variables in this model:
(1) A, which determines the portfolio size of the bank, (2) the
ratio E/A, which determines the asset structure of the bank, and
(3) the ratio D/A, which determines the liability structure of the
bank. Bank managers are assumed to choose three variables so as
to maximize expected profit, E(n).
The profit function of of Baltensperger's model can be
explained as follows:
1.- There is a spread management component defined as:
[ra - cd - (1 - d)k]A	 (5.2)
where a = E/A, d = D/A, r = expected return on assets,
c = interest cost of deposits and k = opportunity cost of
equity capital.
Substituting the ratios for their values, one can rewrite
equation (5.2) as
[rE - cD - kK]
	
(5.3)
2.- The second component focuses on real resources costs or
"overhead" (0), and is a function of the size and
composition of the bank's balance-sheet:
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0(A,a,d)	 (5.4)
3.- The third component measures liquidity costs (Q) are a
function of a bank's balance-sheet characteristics and is
expressed as
Q(A,a,d)	 (5.5)
4.- The fourth component focuses on solvency costs (S), They
are a function of a bank's size, asset structure, and
capital structure:
S(A,a,d)	 (5.6)
Combining equations (5.2) and (5.4) to (5.6), expected
profits becomes
E(n) = [ra - cd - (1 - d)k]A - 0(A,a,d)
- Q(A,a,d) - S(A,a,d) 	 (5.7)
Substituting equations (5.3) for equation (5.2) and deleting
the functional form notation on the cost expressions 0, Q, and S,
equation (5.7) can be rewritten as
E(n) = rE - CD - kK - 0 - Q - S
	 (5.8)
Equation (5.7) reflects the heart of the optimization process
in this framework. To maximize expected profit, the bank must
determine the optimal values of A, a, and d as an interdependent
set (i.e. [A, a, d*]) in terms of the parameters of the
underlying return and cost functions4.
Baltensperger's model determines the optimal structure of the
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bank's asset and liability portfolio as well as its optimal scale.
He shows that all of these decisions will be made in an
interdependent way. Therefore, the capital decision of the banking
firm will be made in an interdependent way with the rest
of the decisions; one cannot separate the capital decision from
the rest of the decisions of the banking firm.
Once a complete model of the banking firm has been examined,
one can consider how the capital structure aspects have been dealt
with in banking theory. The capital decision of the banking firm
has been largely appraised by the economic literature. The capital
decision of the banking firm is a complex issue since the optimal
choice of size and leverage is determined by the assumed financial
environment and the raison d'être of the bank (Santomero, 1984).
An optimal capital structure is one that maximizes the value of
the firm.
In unregulated competitive markets, with no bankruptcy costs,
corporate income taxation or other market imperfections,
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that there is no optimal
capital structure. Thus, in order to derive an optimal capital
structure, one must specify, first, the role played by the banking
institution and second, the extent to which one wishes to deviate
from the perfect market paradigm in explaining its operation.
Restoring one or more of those excluded conditions can
produce an optimal debt/equity ratio, that is, an optimal capital
structure. For example, Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that
allowing interest on debt to be tax-deductible provides an
incentive for firms to substitute debt for equity in their
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financial structure. However, when there exists bankruptcy costs,
increasing leverage provides a growing offset to the incentives to
expand debt. Under these two conditions (taxes and bankruptcy
costs), a value-maximizing firm may reach an internal optimum,
with positive equity in its financial structure (Kraus and
Litzenberg, 1973 and Turnbull, 1979).
Sealey (1983), in a discussion of the applicability of
capital structure theory to depository intermediaries, argues that
the theory of corporate finance remains largely inapplicable
without qualifications and modifications to the banking firm.
There are two main reasons for this lack of applicability to
banks. First, liquidity considerations are usually excluded from
models employed to develop rules for corporate financial
decisions. This is an important omission for banks since a
significant part of their economic output is in the form of
liquidity services. The second reason is that finance theory has
not integrated production and financial decision making in a way
that is applicable to depository financial institutions.
Sealey (1983) developed a theory of capital structure
decisions of financial intermediaries based upon market
equilibrium. His one-period model showed that the valuation
equation of a financial intermediary differs from that of a
non-financial firm by a liquidity premium paid by the public for
liquidity services. These results are different from those
obtained by Fama (1980): 'Fama's results' basically support the
argument that when banking is competitive, the portfolio
management activities of banks fall, in principle, under the
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Modigliani and Miller theorem (1958) on the irrelevance of pure
financing decisions. Sealey disagrees with Fama, because he
assumed a different environment for banks.
In his comprehensive survey of the literature on the capital
decision, Santomero (1984) suggested that the corporate finance
literature needed to develop further in order to help in the
search for a private determination of optimal capital.
The main recent theoretical studiess that have appraised the
relationship between the value of the banking firm and capital
adequacy, are summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Capital Adequacy and Value of the Banking Firm:
Recent Theoretical Studies.
Author	 Year	 Source	 Comment
Descriptive theories of
financial institutions under
uncertainty.
An imperfect-markets and
risk-aversion models on bank
capital decisions.
A profit-maximization model
subject to regulator's
soundness requirement.
A normative approach to
bank capital adequacy and
its determinants.
Finacial theory employed to
explain deposit insurance,
capital regulation and
optimal bank capital.
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• • • •
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
2
•
Fama 1980	 JME	 A general equilibrium look
at banking in the finance
theory.
Baltensperger 1980
	 JME	 A survey of alternative
approaches to banking firm
theory.
Sealey
O'Hara
Santomero
Crouhy and
Galai
Sealey
Osterberg
1983	 JOF	 Focus on value of the banking
firm and capital structure.
1983	 JOF	 A dynamic theory of the
banking firm.
1984	 JMCB	 Survey on models of the
banking firm, including the
capital decision.
1986	 JBF	 Study of optimal capital
structure and capital
adequacy under different
regultory environments.
1987	 CFD	 Description of present state
of financial intermediation.
1990 FRBC A review of the literature on
bank capital requirements and
leverage.
Key to Abbreviations:
CFD = Chicago Federal Conference
FRBC = Federal Reserve Bank Cleveland Economic Review
JBF = Journal of Banking and Finance
JFQA = Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
JMCB = Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
JME = Journal of Monetary Economics
JOF = Journal of Finance
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5.3.2.- Market-determined Bank Capital Structures and
Regulation-determined Bank Capital Structures.
Bank capital structure traditionally has been viewed
primarily in terms of depositors' interests. This view is mainly
concerned with the adequacy of bank capital: that is to say, with
the role of capital in bearing risk and protecting depositors
against loss.
Another perspective to view the capital position is in terms
of optimality from the standpoint of shareholder interests. Since
banks are generally private economic units, it is reasonable to
assume that shareholder interests will influence, if not control,
capital decisions. Taking the viewpoint of shareholders, Pringle
(1974) maintains that capital is an important managerial decision
variable and that it plays a key role in the financial management
of the banking firm. He argues that in addition to the traditional
function of risk-bearing, capital is important in adjusting the
maturity structure of liabilities. In this context, Pringle argues
that practicing bankers sometimes characterize the function of
capital in terms of "underwriting" or "providing a base" for
deposit and asset expansion. Thus, from the standpoint of
shareholder interests, capital is important for two reasons: as a
risk-bearing and as a managerial decision variable.
When bank capital is unregulated, its level reflects only
the shareholders' optimality. However, there is no a priori reason
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to assume that this level is optimal also from the standpoint of
society (Santomero and Watson, 1977; Talmor, 1980).
The shareholders preference for market-based bank capital
positions or regulation-determined bank capital positions has been
discussed in the literature. Pringle (1974) analyzes bank capital
in terms of optimality from the standpoint of the shareholder
rather than adequacy from the standpoint of depositors. He shows
that, viewed from the perspective of shareholder interest, there
is in principle an optimal capital position. In contrast, from
the perspective of depositor interests, he finds it difficult to
believe that an optimum exists. His paper indicates that where
shareholder interests are controlling, the key determinants of
optimal capital policies are future-oriented, market-based
variables (i.e. expectations regarding future loan demand,
deposits levels and financing costs) and the regulatory approach
has little relevance to shareholder interests.
Pringle's main conclusion is that market-determined capital
structures are preferable to those imposed by regulators and
supervisors. However, Taggart and Greenbaum (1978) believe that
the market-determined capital positions may vary widely according
to the regulatory setting.
Sealey (1983) also develops a model which provides a more
fundamental explanation of leverage in terms of shareholder
utility based upon technological conditions that govern the
intermediary services production. If substantial cost economies
exist in the production of deposit services, then Sealey indicates
that high leverage decisions by intermediary managers may be
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justified as maximizing shareholder utility.
Crouhy and Galai (1986) emphasize that the imposition of
certain regulatory measures may allow a simple optimal capital
structure to arise. They consider three different regulatory
environments. In unregulated markets, there is no optimal capital
structure and hence equity-holders are indifferent to the level of
capital imposed by regulators. With an interest rate ceiling,
capital regulation is still irrelevant and there exists an optimal
capital structure. With deposit insurance they find that capital
regulation is relevant for insurers and shareholders, and there is
also an optimal capital position.
5.4.- THE DETERMINANTS OF BANK CAPITAL AUGMENTATIONS:
MANAGERIAL DETERMINANTS AND THE ROLE OF REGULATION.
5.4.1.- Introduction.
This section is devoted to the analysis of the theoretical
models which have been employed in the literature to analyze
capital augmentations in banking. Basically, these models provide
the determinants of bank capital augmentations: that is, which
variables affect the way credit institutions decide on capital
augmentations.
The determinants of bank capital augmentations can be divided
into two classes: managerial determinants and regulatory-based
determinants.	 The	 research	 considers	 both	 classes	 of
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determinants, but we will lay particular emphasis on the way
capital adequacy regulation affects bank capital augmentations.
The latter is the main research question driving this thesis.
This section starts by reviewing the main theoretical models
of capital augmentation. Then, the managerial determinants of
capital augmentations are examined. Finally, the impact of
regulation on capital augmentations is examined.
5.4.2.- Modelling Bank Capital Augmentation.
In order to undertake the analysis of the impact of Spanish
capital adequacy regulation on bank's capital augmentation, one
needs ideally to have a theoretical model from which one can build
our empirical model to test that impact. For a number of reasons,
the researcher has chosen Peltzman's model (1965 and 1970) of bank
capital augmentation. The general relevance of this model to the
Spanish banking system is discussed in sub-section 5.4.2.3. Yet,
one needs first to explore the theoretical model of capital
augmentations in banking.
5.4.2.1.- The Capital Augmentation Model with no
Regulation.
One first requires a model of the flow of new capital into
banking which delineates and predicts bank conduct in the absence
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of regulation and then specifies the separate effects of
regulation. In Peltzman's model (1970) - a 'classic paper' in the
banking literature - the flow of capital into banking is
considered as a response to a discrepancy between the desired or
long-term equilibrium stock (C* ) 6 and the currently existing stock
(C). This may be written mathematically as follows:
(dC/dt) .= f(C*- C)	 (5.8)
We hypothesize that one of the determinants of C * is the
expected rate of return on capital in banking (n). This may be
written:
C
*
= g(n,...)	 (5.9)
The ellipsis represents other determinants of C* which we
will not analyze at present. Combining equations (5.8) and (5.9),
one can obtain:
(dC/dt).= h(n, C,...)	 (5.10)
and
h
n
 > 0, hc < 0
At this stage, Peltzman treats size effects separately and
recalls that the major purpose of bank capital is to protect
depositors against a decline in the value of bank assets. Thus, C
will be larger the larger a bank's deposits, and it will grow
secularly with deposits. Let us approximate this size effect by
•
setting C equal to some desired fraction (k* ) of expected
deposits (D ), or
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which, in natural logarithms, is in C = in k + in D. Then,
equation (5.8) is modified by writing
(d in C / dt) = f (in k*- in k) + f (in D - in D)
	 (5.12)
This clearly divides the intended capital investment rate
into two adjustment processes - adjustment to a discrepancy
between expected and actual deposits and adjustment to a
discrepancy between the desired and actual capital-deposits ratio.
Peltzman argues that since there is typically a pronounced secular
trend in deposits, it will be useful to assume continuously
complete adjustment of capital to expected deposit changes7.
Therefore, one can specify
= (d in D/ dt)..	 (5.13)
In other words, since deposits are trend dominated, expected
deposit growth is constant or changes very slowly over time. This
stability lowers the costs of continuously complete adaptation of
capital to deposit growth, and one can assume that such adaptation
takes place. Peltzman then applies the capital investment model to
those changes in capital not motivated by deposit changes: that
is, changes in the capital to deposits ratio. Hence, one can write
in k = G(n,...)	 (5.14)
and combine this with the first term on the right-hand side of the
equation (5.10) in :
f	 H(n, in k,...).	 (5.15)
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Finally, Peltzman converts equation (5.12) into an
operational one by making the assumption of equality of intended
and actual investment, and rewrites it as
(d in Cl dt) = H + (d in D /dt) * .	 (5.16)
Two other determinants of the desired stock of capital should
be considered. Firstly, the rate of return on alternative uses for
bank capital. For any given expected rate of return on bank
capital, investment in banking should vary inversely with the rate
of return on alternative employments for bank capital. Secondly,
a measure of portfolio risk should also be included. Peltzman
employs the ratio of U.S. government bonds to deposits as a
measure of portfolio risk.
The cost of capital as such is a variable which is not
considered in Peltzman's model. The expected rate of return on
capital which is a explanatory variable in his model might be
considered as a proxy for cost of capital. This is discussed
further in section 5.4.3.1.
5.4.2.2.- The Inclusion of Bank Capital Regulation on
the Capital Augmentation Model.
Peltzman (1970) also includes the impact of bank regulation
on bank capital investment. The regulation effects are determined
by a set of variables such as capital adequacy ratios or deposit
insurance. Thus, Peltzman's capital investment model can be
summarized as follows:
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(d in C/dt) = H (n, in k, n°, g, R) + (d in D/dt) .	(5.17)
where n° represents the rate of return on investments alternative
to banking, g stands for the ratio of government bonds to deposits
as a measure of the default risk of bank portfolios and R
represents the set of variables which measure the impact of bank
regulation.
5.4.2.3.- Relevance of Peltzman's Model to the
Spanish Banking System.
The researcher has selected Peltzman's theoretical model of
capital augmentation in the banking firm since it is a very good
theoretical approximation to the way Spanish banks decide on
capital augmentation. In a field survey that the researcher
undertook among the largest Spanish private and savings banks, it
was found that the key variables that the Spanish bankers
suggested were basically those specified in Peltzman's model. The
main results of the field survey can be found in Appendix A.
Fundamentally, the main variables that the interviewed
Spanish bankers, suggested as determinants of the capital
augmentations they undertake are the following:
1) Spanish capital adequacy regulation: according to the
bankers interviewed, this was the most important variable when
deciding on capital augmentations. Regulation is a key variable
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in Peltzman's model, and the way it works in his model in terms of
portfolio risk and capital is very similar to the way Spanish
bankers suggested. This is discussed next.
2) Regulatory capital and bank portfolio risk: Spanish
bankers suggested that if their regulatory capital is
found inadequate, they tend to augment capital, rather than change
bank portfolio mix and growth. In other words, they tend to
adjust capital to portfolio mix; they rarely alter portfolio
composition and risk. This means that in Spain, the relationship
between capital augmentation and portfolio risk appears to be
rather one-directional. In Peltzman's model, the relationship is
also one-directional: capital augmentation is the dependent
variable and is influenced by two variables coming from bank's
portfolio (deposits and portfolio risk). Therefore, rather than as
a regulatory determinant from the standpoint of the individual
banks, portfolio risk is considered as a managerial determinant,
and the only regulatory determinant from their perspective is
capital. This appears clearly not to fit in with RAR philosophy,
but it certainly tends to be Spanish bankers' preference to
accomplish regulatory standards.
3) Profitability: in the field survey, Spanish bankers
stated that the main managerial variable affecting capital
augmentation was profitability. Profitability is also a key
variable in Peltzman's theoretical model, although his model does
not consider related issues like retained earnings or dividend
pay-out.
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All things considered, according to the field survey carried
out, it seems that Peltzman's model is highly consistent with the
way Spanish bankers augment capital. Peltzman's model, therefore,
will provide a theoretical background to our empirical work on the
Spanish banking system.
5.4.3.- Managerial Determinants of Bank Capital Augmentation.
Once our theoretical model of capital augmentation and its
relevance to the Spanish case have been analyzed, one needs to
examine in detail the different variables which affect banks'
capital augmentation.
The economic literature on bank capital augmentation has
defined the following variables as main managerial determinants of
bank capital raising: the cost of capital, with the related issues
of profitability, retained earnings, dividend policy and access to
external sources of funds (Derry, 1982; Zimmer and McCauley,
1991; Gardener, 1992), portfolio risk and liquidity (Peltzman,
1970; Mayne, 1972; Mingo, 1975; Dietrich and James, 1983; Yeager
and Seitz, 1985). These determinants must be analyzed in order to
understand the way they affect capital augmentations in banking.
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5.4.3.1.- The Cost of Capital: Profitability, Retained
Earnings, Dividend Policy and External Sources of
Capital.
A) Introduction to Cost of Funds and Cost of Capital.
A major issue when depository institutions make decisions on
capital investment is the study of the costs of the different
methods to augment capital. This issue of cost of capital must be
first examined in the more general framework of the cost of funds
to depository institutions.
Central to the analysis of the cost of funds is the fact that
the average cost of funds is influenced by the mix of funds
employed by the bank. One major objective of financial structure
management in a profit-maximizing firm is the minimization of the
cost of funds. Profitability may be increased by lowering the cost
of funds, since this increases the spread between cost of funds
and return on assets, ceteris paribus.
Fixed liabilities, such as debt and deposit liabilities,
normally tend to cost much less than equity or other non-specific
claims (Yeager and Seitz, 1985, p.101). Basically, Yeager and
Seitz (1985) suggest two main reasons for that difference in cost.
Firstly, investors as a group appear to invest in more risky
equity and non-specific claims only when they anticipate a return
from such claims that exceeds those available from debt and
deposit claims. Secondly, interest payments to fixed claims are
tax-deductible expenses, while dividends to shareholders must be
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paid from after-tax income.
Since debt liabilities generally have a lower after-tax cost
than equity funds, one would expect the average cost of funds to
decrease when the debt-to-assets ratio increases. Indeed, this
will occur over some range. However, as the debt-to-assets ratio
continues to increase, the bank's debt becomes an increasingly
risky investment and the return required to attract such funds
rises (Yeager and Seitz, 1985). Furthermore, continual addition of
debt increases the risk to equity investors, driving up the
required return on equity. Therefore, there are limits beyond
which the addition of fixed obligations increases, rather than
decreases, the average cost of funds.
This can also be examined by considering the relationship
between the debt-to-assets ratios and the value of the banking
firm. Sinkey (1992, p.729) demonstrates that combining costly
bankruptcy with the tax-deducibility of interest expenses,
produces a situation in which bankruptcy costs provide a
disincentive that offsets the tax-shield incentive to expand
debt. In other words, as a firm increases its use of debt, its
risk of not being able to cover its fixed interest expenses
increases. As Figure 5.2 shows, under these dual conditions, an
optimal capital structure (D/A ) exists in which the value of the
*	 .banking firm (V) Is maximized.
Fundamentally, there are two main ways for a firm to augment
capital: first, the internal capital generation or retained
earnings (where profitability and dividend policy are important
issues), and, second, having access to external sources of capital
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Figure 5.2: Financial Structure and Firm Value
(D/A) *	 1	 D/A
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(issuing different equity instruments). Both methods to increase
capital and the cost involved in both are to be examined next.
B) The Internal Capital Generation:	 Profitability,
Retained Earnings and Dividend Policy.
A bank's major source of capital is its earnings stream, a
fact especially true for banks without easy access to capital
markets. In Tables 4.5 and 4.6 in Chapter 4, we found empirical
evidence that the main source of capital for both private and
savings banks operating in Spain was their earnings stream and,
more specifically, their retained earnings. This was especially
true for the Spanish savings banks since they cannot issue share
equity. Therefore, the first response of bankers facing the need
for additional capital is probably, retained earnings. However,
bankers must appraise their capital costs, especially, the costs
to their shareholders. It seems generally accepted that increasing
capital through the retention of earnings is the least painful and
most desirable method available (Derry, 1982; Sinkey,1992).
However, this method is not without costs.
According to Mingo and Wolkowitz (1977), the cost of capital
of retained earnings is the opportunity cost of funds to the
shareholders. Such opportunity costs will be increasing if the
shareholders face imperfect markets for their investable funds.
For the smaller, regional banks in the U.S., they argue that the
shareholders are usually local businessmen who face a
downward-sloped marginal efficiency of investment function in
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their various local business activities. For the larger national
banks in the U.S., the opportunity costs of retained earnings are
often the returns to imperfectly competitive nonbanking activities
by the parent holding company that could be funded by the
subsidiary bank's dividends.
In Chapter 4 the internal capital generation rate was
defined. The formula is given by (4.1):
g = ROE x RR	 (4.1)
where ROE is Return on Equity and RR is the retention ratio. This
can also be expressed as follows (Sinkey, 1992, p. 764):
g = PM x AU x EM x RR	 (5.18)
where PM is profit margin (= net income/operating income), AU is
asset utilization (= operating income/average assets) and EM is
equity multiplier (= average asset/average equity). Gardener
(1992) emphasizes that from a managerial perspective, the four key
elements on the right of equation (5.18) are essential
determinants of a bank's rate of internal capital generation.
The link between capital adequacy (or net worth) and earnings
is well-established. Revell (1975, p.116), for example, employed a
very simple formula that expresses the dynamic relationship
between earnings and net worth:
ra
S = r + 100 + a
	 (5.19)
where S is surplus (retained earnings or profit), r is the change
in the solvency ratio and a is the rate of change of total assets.
This model can be simulated under different growth of total
assets in order to show the rates of earnings required to maintain
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various solvency ratios. This kind of model is very simple,
but it illustrates the importance of internal capital generation
within a bank's overall capital augmentation and the corresponding
expansion of a bank's business mix and balance-sheet.
As suggested in Chapter 4, a bank's dividend policy bears a
direct relationship to its rate of internal capital generation.
The dividend payout ratio (PR) is equal to (1-RR). Then equation
(4.1) can be re-expressed as follows:
g = ROE (1 - PR) 	 (5.20)
In addition to this obvious relationship to the internal
capital generation rate, a bank's dividend policy has an important
bearing on bank market-value capital. In this context, a reduction
of dividends is likely to have a dramatic negative effect on the
market value of the stock (Derry, 1982). To a lesser degree, the
failure of dividends to keep pace with increased earnings and
expectations seems to have the same result. Foster (1986, p.387)
provides U.S. empirical evidence (for 1983-84) of the effects of a
change in the dividend policy on the behaviour of security prices
of different samples of industrial companies. He found that firms
that increase dividends, announce special or extra dividends, or
initiate dividend payments for the first time experience positive
abnormal returns. However, he also finds that firms that decrease
or omit dividend payments experience significant negative abnormal
returns.
A perceived drop in value of the shares by the market not
only affects current equity holders but also may limit the bank's
181
CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION ON BANK ...
ability to raise capital in the future. Thus, the trade-off
between retained earnings and dividend payout might affect both
internal capital generation and external capital generation.
C) External Sources of Capital.
When market or regulatory forces require a depository
institution to augment its capital beyond its internal capital
generation rate and the institution does not reduce balance sheet
growth and/or does not change balance-sheet business mix, the
institution must turn to external sources of capital. Although
both equity and debt capital are available for such purposes,
under the new international and EC capital guidelines established
for 1992, common equity has been assigned a more critical role.
Accordingly, preferred stock and subordinated debt will count less
in the eyes of the regulators in terms of meeting capital
requirements. Healthy banks need to have access to external
sources of capital to permit growth opportunities to be
accomplished without unduly extending the bank's capital cushion
or unduly increasing the internal retained earnings. Problem banks
need to have access to external sources of capital to replenish
the erosion of their capital account due to asset losses.
In principle, a banking firm has a choice between common
stock, subordinated debt and preferred stock (Derry, 1982; Sinkey,
1992). The advantages and disadvantages of each must be weighed
carefully. The sale of common stock in a public offering has one
important advantage. It solves the capital adequacy question at
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once and, at least in the short-term, completely. Equity capital
is also desirable because all of it counts in measuring the
supervisory bank's capital adequacy, it is permanent and because
the dividend payments are not a fixed, legal expense. However, the
disadvantages become apparent when costs are considered. An
important disadvantage is the high cost of an equity issue
relative to debt. The high cost of equity relates to the
bankruptcy-cost potential created by the use of less expensive
debt (Sinkey, 1992). Ceteris paribus, an equity issue reduces the
bankruptcy potential whereas a debt issue increases the bankruptcy
potential. Hence, the equity issue is more expensive due to the
advantages that involves. Another disadvantage is the ownership
dilution. In the absence of preemptive rights, the current
shareholders lose an element of control. The degree of concern
over ownership dilution varies from bank to bank depending upon
individual circumstances, but it cannot be ignored.
Subordinated debt is desirable for holders for the reason
that the interest payments associated with the debt are a
tax-deductible expense. In addition, it has no potentially
diluting effects on earnings and control of a common stock issue.
One disadvantage (to issuers) of a debt issue is its fixed
interest rates. In other words, no matter how well the bank is
performing, the interest payments have to be made. Another
disadvantage is what Sinkey (1992) denominates "its lack of
permanency". This means that there is uncertainty about whether or
not the debt can be rolled over at maturity. A shortcoming of
subordinated debt in terms of supervisory capital is the fact that
183
citiwnm	 THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION ON BANK
only a portion of it may actually count in measuring a bank's
capital adequacy.
In Chapter 4, it was shown that Spanish banks have been
issuing important amounts of subordinated notes since 1985 when
this financial instruments was introduced in Spain. Spanish
savings banks appear particularly active in the subordinated notes
market. Since they cannot share equity, subordinated debt plays a
more important role than for private banks.
Derry (1982) suggests that debt issues have other costs that
are not easily measured and may be impossible to quantify. There
is attached to the issue of debt an opportunity cost that has to
be factored into the decision. Generally, the market will only
accept a certain degree of leverage for a bank. One must remember
that a debt issue now reduces the bank's ability to issue debt
later. it is also highly likely to increase the cost of any future
issue due to the bond buyer.
An alternative to either common stock or subordinated debt is
preferred stock, which is a hybrid of the two forms. Although
preferred stock adds to the equity base, it is treated in the same
manner as debt in the computation of cost of capital since the
financing charges associated with it are derived in the same
manner. Preferred stock is safer than equity capital but riskier
than debt from the investor's perspective. From the issuer's
perspective, it provides flexibility but lacks the tax
deductibility associated with interest on debt. The latter is a
major drawback to the use of preferred stock. The tax shield does
not exist, and the true cost of preferred stock is higher than
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debt even at the same stated rate, flotation costs and market
adjustments (Derry, 1982).
In Chapter 3, when the researcher analyzed Spain's definition
of regulatory capital, it was indicated that the hybrid capital
instruments such as preferred stock, were not included in the
capital definition. Therefore, preferred stock is irrelevant in
our analysis of capital augmentations in the Spanish banking
system.
The access to capital markets and capital financing is a
major issue when the external sources of capital are considered.
In finance theory, the assumption of equal access to capital
markets is frequently invoked8 .However, in the real world of
banking capital markets, equal access is a fiction, as numerous
banks simply have no opportunity to tap domestic capital markets
and obviously they have no access to foreign capital markets.
Therefore, any model considering the determinants of capital
investment should take into consideration the fact that there
exist differences among credit institutions in the possibilities
of tapping domestic and foreign capital markets. There are banks
which can tap both capital markets; some can only tap the domestic
capital markets; others have no access to capital markets at all.
This important difference in access to capital markets must be
captured in models of capital augmentation through, for example,
using dummy variables for those banks with access to capital
markets.
In Chapter 4, we discovered that Spanish savings banks and
many private banks are not quoted on any Stock Exchange. This
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appears to give lower possibilities of tapping domestic and
international capital markets to those banks than for banks quoted
on domestic and/or international Stock exchanges. This is a
feature that should be captured in our empirical models for the
Spanish banking system.
D) The Determination of the Cost of Capital.
The cost of capital influences not only the tenacity with
which the bank management will argue for lower capital
requirements but also numerous internal decisions (Edmister,
1986). Edmister argues that after determining the cost of capital
for each source (debt, retained earnings and new equity), bank
management is in a position to plan for future capital needs.
Essentially bankers can continue to raise capital from the same
sources and in the same proportions as it has done in the past.
Alternatively, bankers can alter the sources tapped and
proportions used to optimize its cost of capital.
The banker is very often assumed to face other than a
perfectly elastic supply of capital so that a bank cannot float
new equity, retain earnings or issue new debt without incurring an
increasing cost of capital (Mingo and Wolkowitz, 1977). Therefore
the cost of capital is specified as
g = g (K);	 gK > 0
	 (5.21)
Mingo and Wolkowitz (1977) specified the cost of capital in
equation (5.21) as an average cost. However, since the capital
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supply function defines the marginal cost of capital, they assume
that marginal cost is everywhere above average cost, so that an
increase in marginal cost implies an increase in average cost
(g). A capital market advantage is defined in terms of a
relatively flat supply of capital curve, i.e. a low g:. To the
extent that a credit institution is faced with a relatively more
elastic capital supply function, it is able to augment capital
without incurring as great an increase in cost. Second-order
conditions require that g which means that the cost of
capital increases at an increasing rate.
The capital structure of most depository institutions
includes some elements of each of the sources examined in the two
previous subsections. The key to effective long-range capital
planning is the proper mix of these elements (Derry, 1982). The
best way to determine the optimum mix is to determine the
overall cost of capital. We need to review the main models that
can be employed to determine the cost of capital.
Yeager and Seitz (1985, p.105) indicate that one widely used
model of computing the cost of equity is the dividend growth
model:
K
e
-
	 + g	 (5.22)
where: Ke= Required return on equity
D = Dividends expected over the next year
P = Current market price of stock
g= Constant annual growth rate of dividends (expected
to continue indefinitely).
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Another model suggested by Yeager and Seitz to measure the
cost of equity is the risk-adjusted required return approach:
K = R + b(E - R )	 (5.23)
e	 f	 m	 f
where :	 Rf = Rate available on risk-free investments, such as
treasury bills.
b = A measure of sensitivity of returns for the
particular security to conditions affecting common stock
returns in general.
E
m
 = Expected return for securities in general.
The application of the dividend growth approach model
requires stable dividend growth and the risk-adjusted return model
requires historical market price data for stock. Lacking these,
Yeager and Seitz argue that a firm may consider returns available
on comparable securities for which there is an active market to
estimate the returns available to investors in opportunities of
equal risk.
Yeager and Seitz emphasize that for mutual institutions there
is no possibility of a market price of equity. The Spanish savings
banks are mutual institutions, and so none of the models above
can be employed to calculate the cost of equity of those
institutions.
The cost of subordinated notes and debentures is also
considered by Yeager and Seitz (1985, p. 106). The cost of
subordinated notes begins with the yield to maturity of existing
notes, or the interest rate that would be required to sell new
securities of this kind. Since interest is a tax-deductible
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expense, the effective interest cost is less than the yield to
maturity. The after -tax cost of debt is as follows:
Kd = Y(1 - T)
	 (5.24)
where: K = After-tax cost of debenture debt
d
Y = Yield to maturity on existing debenture or required
yield on new debentures
T = Effective marginal corporate rate tax.
A general model which computes an overall cost of capital can
be found in Gardener (1992), p.30). His model calculates a
weighted average of cost of capital (WACC) in the following
manner:
where: K= WACC
C
w = market value weight of capital funds type i in thei
bank's capital structure
k 1 = specific, after-tax cost of capital funds type.
In this context, Sinkey (1992, p.67) suggests a model to help
banks develop funds-raising strategies to minimize its overall
funding costs and maximize the value of the firm. His model is
denominated EVA (Economic Value Added) and is a practical
illustration of the importance to management of allocating and
managing capital internally:
EVA = (Rc - Kc ) x K
	 (5.26)
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where Rc is return on capital, K is cost of capital and K isc
average total capital. This model shows clearly than when the cost
of capital exceeds the return on capital, management is not adding
"economic value" to the firm.
The problem with these models for our purposes is that market
values of capital funds are needed. Again, since there are many
Spanish banking institutions (savings banks and many private
banks) with no market value of capital funds, the models cannot be
generally applied to our sample of the Spanish banking system. Due
to the very limited sample of private banks quoted on the Stock
Exchange, the market value analysis will be restricted only to
those banks.
In order to overcome the problem of not having market values
for most of the banking institutions in Spain, one needs to find
in the literature a measure of cost of capital that can be
generally applied to the Spanish banking institutions. One of the
measures of cost of capital, which has been one of the measures
most frequently found in the literature is the current rate of
return on equity (ROE) (Derry 1982). The advantage of this measure
is that it is available for all the banks in the Spanish banking
sector
Zimmer and McCauley (1991) discuss three potential problems
in using current profit rates as proxies for cost of capital. The
problems are the following:
a) Profitability: if investors expect a bank's profitability
to rise, its current profit rate understates its true cost of
capital because investors are paying up for earnings not yet in
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evidence.
b) Cyclicity of profits: if a firm is having a bad year,
its current profit rate does not proxy future profits well. In
this case, the current profit rate would understate the cost of
capital.
C) Undercapitalization: cost of capital can easily be
overstated for an undercapitalized bank. If asset losses reduce a
bank's equity to levels below regulatory capital standards, the
bank must reduce assets, change business mix or augment capital.
If new equity is issued to augment capital, the current
shareholders will share current earnings with the new owners; if
assets are reduced, the current shareholders will lose the income
earned by the assets. In either case, earnings per share are set
to decline. Investors for their part should recognize the
impending dilution of their claim or asset shrinkage and value the
share in anticipation of reduced earnings per share. As a result,
the current earnings in relation to market capitalization of an
undercapitalized banks will tend to overstate its cost of capital.
In spite of all the difficulties involved in the use of this
measure of cost of capital, it is one of the measures that can be
generally employed as a proxy cost of capital for all the
banking institutions in Spain. This measure can be computed for
all the banking institutions operating in Spain; it will then
allow us to make comparisons across all the banking institutions
in Spain on the effects of cost of capital on capital
augmentations.
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5.4.3.2.- Portfolio risk.
The second determinant of bank capital investment to be
examined is the bank's portfolio risk. The portfolio risk of
banking institutions is affected by market-based variables and
regulation. In this section the researcher only considers the
portfolio risk as a managerial determinant of bank capital
investment and the effects of regulation on portfolio risk are
left out.
In the marketplace, the two main factors to perceive whether
a bank is solvent or insolvent are its portfolio risk and its
quantum of capital. Insolvency occurs when the liabilities of a
business exceed the value of its assets. The amount of shrinkage
in assets that can occur without resulting in insolvency is
related to the amount of capital in the financial structure. Thus,
the risk of insolvency depends positively upon the risk of asset
value shrinkage (that is, portfolio risk), and negatively upon the
amount of capital in the financial structure. In other words, the
lower is the bank portfolio risk, the lower the amount of capital
needed in the respective financial structure.
The interaction between the amount of capital and portfolio
risk shapes the philosophy of the PAR. As explained in Chapter 3,
the interaction between the amount of capital and portfolio risk
shapes the philosophy of the RAR. The PAR model can be defined as
follows: one must first compute for each bank its PAR (R. ) in the
following way:
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R-
	 (5.27)
a
where C is supervisory-measured capital and W are 'weighted
assets' as defined in formula (3.1) in Chapter 3. The RAR for each
banks is compared to the minimum specified regulatory level, R. A
bank is presumed to have adequate capital if Rao:t R. Condition
R< R is indicative a priori of inadequate capital. A bank in
a
the latter condition, must augment capital and/or lower portfolio
risk by reducing asset growth and/or changing business mix.
In order to examine how the RAR can change over time, the
easiest way seems to differentiate the RAR with respect to time.
Keeley (1988 p.12) differentiates the capital/assets ratio with
respect to time to appraise how the ratio changes over time; his
model can be found in formula (6.5) in the next chapter. His model
has been applied to the RAR and it can be expressed as follows:
d(C/W)/dt = (C/W) [(1/C)(dC/dt) - (1/W)(dW/dt)] 	 (5.28)
where C and W are defined as in (5.27) and t is time. Equation
(5.28) indicates that the rate of change of the RAR is equal to
the percentage augmentation rate of capital minus the percentage
growth rate of weighted assets' risk, multiplied by the initial
RAR. Thus, banks can increase their RAR by increasing capital
augmentation relative to growth rate of weighted assets' risk.
In the literature, one can find many classifications of bank
portfolio risk and no generalized risk taxonomy can be exhaustive.
Gardener (1989a) and Sinkey (1992, p. 401) include the following
risks in their portfolio risks classifications: credit risk,
country risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, leverage (debt
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servicing) risk, currency risk and contingent (arising from
commitments) risk".
According to Sinkey (1992, P. 401), the critical portfolio
risks in banking are credit or default risk, liquidity risk and
interest-rate risk. Due to the important role that liquidity plays
in the depository institutions (Sealey, 1983), liquidity risk will
be examined separately in the next section. Now, the focus will be
on credit risk and interest-rate risk.
Credit risk emerges from the fact that lending by banks is a
risky business (Lewis and Davis, 1987, p. 76). Lenders are likely
to be less well-informed than borrowers about the contingencies
under which borrowers operate, and to be unable to control
subsequent actions of borrowers to take advantage of this
situation and escape fulfillment of their obligation. These
factors generate uncertainty about the extent and speed of
repayment of principal and interest, and hence give rise to
default risk in bank lending. Bank managers must exercise
discretion in deciding upon proper borrowers.
Sinkey (1992, p. 715) maintains that supervisors focus upon
credit risk for commercial banks. Sinkey argues that the link
between capital and credit risk is capital's ability to absorb
losses due to default by bank's customers. He emphasizes that
since credit risk has been the major risk faced by commercial
banks in the past and most likely will be the critical risk for
the future, the Basle Agreement (1988) ignores other sources of
bank risk. However, as described in Chapter 3, the Basle Committee
is now also looking at risks like liquidity and interest rate
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risk.
The interest rate risk is associated with losses from
unexpected changes in interest rates. Such losses occur when
unexpected increases in interest rates decrease the market value
of an institution's assets more quickly than the market value of
its liabilities. Kaufman (1984) maintains that this differential
change in market values occurs if the banking firm's assets are
less interest sensitive than its deposits: that is, if the
earnings rates on assets adjust more slowly to market changes in
interest rates than does the payout on deposits. Under the same
balance sheet condition, the firm experiences a gain when interest
rates decline unexpectedly.
Hence, banking institutions expose themselves to interest
rate risk whenever the interest rate sensitivity of the two sides
of their balance sheet is not equal. Interest-rate risk management
is a key issue in the financial management of a banking firmn.
As far as empirical evidence of the evolution of banks'
portfolio mix and risk in Spain, is concerned, Table 5.2 gives
some summary data of the evolution of the asset structure for both
Spanish private and savings banks. Table 5.2 contains the same
data as Table 2.9 in Chapter 2, but it only focuses on 1982 and
1987.
In Table 5.2, one can observe that the percentage of
financial investment in loans decreased dramatically for private
banks and moderately so for savings banks. The portfolio of
securities decreased substantially for savings banks but only
slightly for private banks. Investment in the interbank market and
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in monetary assets appears to have increased substantially. In
particular, after 1984 investment in Treasury notes (Pagares del
Tesoro) increased substantially, even above what was compulsory
owing to the lack of other investment opportunities. The
disintermediation process explained in Chapter 2 seems to shape
the evolution of Spanish banks' portfolios.
Table 5.2: Summary Data of Asset Structure
Savings Banks (1982 and 1987).	 (%)	 (*)
for	 Private	 and
Private Banks Savings Banks
1982 1987 1982 1987
Bank of Spain
and monetary assets 7.2 22.0 9.3 25.4
Interbank market 5.1 14.1 9.2 11.3
Loans 74.7 51.4 52.3 46.2
Securities 12.9 12.6 29.2 17.1
(*) The numbers do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Trujillo et al, (1988, p.301)
The implications of Table 5.2 in terms of portfolio risk
appear to be that the structure of aggregate on-balance-sheet
portfolios of Spanish banks appears to have become less risky from
1982 to 1987. The percentage of loans and securities, which are
generally riskier than monetary assets, has decreased. The
percentage of monetary assets (mainly very liquid government
bonds), in turn, has increased. Thus a less risky structure of
Spanish bank's portfolio seems to have come about from 1982 to
1987.
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5.4.3.3 . - Liquidity.
The third managerial determinant of bank capital investment
to be analyzed, is bank's liquidity. A separate section is needed
for liquidity risk because of its importance in the banking firm.
Sealey (1983) considers the importance of liquidity in the
depository institutions by maintaining that since a large part of
the services provided to the public by a depository intermediary
is in the form of liquidity services, any model that ignores
liquidity cannot adequately deal with this type of intermediary.
One needs, then, to consider liquidity in our model of bank
capital augmentations to reflect
banking firm.
Liquidity refers to the
adequately the nature of the
ability to meet financial obligations
as they come due. Bank liquidity management is the process of
generating funds to meet contractual or relationship obligations
at reasonable prices at all times (Sinkey, 1992, p. 426). Sinkey
(1992, p.420) suggests a model for the confidence in a depository
institution, which includes liquidity. The actual model is
expressed as follows:
Confidence = f[NW, SOE, IQ, L(G)] 	 (5.29)
where NW stands for net worth or capital, SOE stands for stability
of earnings, IQ stands for the quality of information regarding
the bank's earnings and asset quality, and L(G) stands for
liquidity as a function of government guarantees such as the U.S.
federal safety net. Both capital and liquidity play a key role for
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the confidence in a banking firm.
Sealey (1983), in a model of the depository financial
intermediary, emphasizes that the impetus for the existence of
intermediaries is the demand for liquidity services by investors.
Depository intermediaries produce such liquidity services, and
investors are willing to pay a premium for liquidity since a
penalty cost is incurred for being illiquid. Sealey also maintains
that liquidity is a key issue in the valuation of a financial
intermediary since the difference between the valuation equation
of a financial intermediary and that of a nonfinancial firm is
accounted for by a liquidity premium paid by the public in
exchange for liquidity services.
The most important link between liquidity and capital
adequacy has to do with the main function of capital adequacy:
helping to preserve bank solvency. Crouhy and Galai (1986) argue
that while insolvency yields liquidity problems to any kind of
corporation, the reverse is quite specific and of vital importance
to the banking industry. The holder of any financial instrument,
like a bond, cannot get the corporation to redeem it before it
legally matures, even if bad news is learned. However, depositors,
can withdraw their funds in person or by writing cheques. A rapid
withdrawal of funds by some depositors might generate panic among
other depositors, and further trigger a bank run. These liquidity
problems force the bank to sell assets at distress prices and to
borrow at very high rates. This is likely to produce losses which
might exceed the bank capital. In this process, a bank's
reputational capital becomes impaired.
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Regulators tend to focus mainly on capital adequacy, but as
Crouhy and Galai (1986) maintain, recent history shows that
illiquidity, rather than the lack of capital per se, is a primary
cause of banking firms economic insolvency. A liquidity crisis
might itself result from a loss of public confidence in the bank.
The inability of the bank to maintain confidence might be
associated in some ways with the insufficient capital base of a
bank. Then the cost of liquidating assets plays a vital role in
explaining why a bank confronted by liquidity problems has become
insolvent.
Therefore, one of the main functions of bank liquidity is to
demonstrate to the marketplace, which tends to be risk-averse
dominated, that the bank is "safe". The same role is played by the
bank capital adequacy. As a conclusion, we could say that good
liquidity management could lead to less liquidity risk and ceteris
paribus, less risk held by the bank. If banks hold less risk,
ceteris paribus, the adequate capital required for a bank is also
lower. Thus, in this sense, the better the liquidity management,
the lower the capital adequacy needs for a bank.
As far as the liquidity evolution of Spanish banks is
concerned, Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide some empirical evidence of
it. Both tables display summary data of the asset and liability
structure of the Spanish banks, respectively, and give us insight
into the evolution of the liquidity of Spanish banks. Tables 5.2
and 5.3 summarize Tables 2.9 and 2.10 of Chapter 2.
In Table 5.2, one can note that the more liquid assets
(monetary assets) have increased dramatically as a percentage of
199
CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION ON BANK ...
total assets from 1982 to 1987, which appears to imply that the
asset side of the aggregate Spanish banks has become more liquid.
In Table 5.3, it can be observed that on the liability structure,
the most demanding liabilities in terms of liquidity, such as
current and savings accounts, have decreased as a percentage of
total liabilities. Therefore, on both sides of the balance-sheet,
Spanish banks have apparently reduced their liquidity risk from
1982 to 1987.
Table 5.3: Summary Data of Liability 	 Structure	 for
and Savings Banks (1982 and 1987).
	 (%)	 (*)
Private
Private Banks Savings Banks
1982 1987 1982 1987
Checking and
savings accounts 41.1 37.5 57.6 50.3
Term and credit
deposits 48.4 28.9 40.6 36.7
Negotiable liabilities 4.2 5.5 0.1 0.6
Asset endorsement 23.3 6.2
Other 6.4 4.8 1.5 6.2
(*) The numbers do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Trujillo et al, (1988, p. 303)
5.4.4.- The Effects of Capital Adequacy Regulation on Bank
Capital Augmentations.
The microeconomic effects of bank capital adequacy regulation
on bank capital augmentations are our main area of concern in this
thesis. There is some theoretical literature which has analyzed
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the impact of solvency regulation on the bank capital
augmentation process. A related issue to be explored is the impact
of bank capital adequacy regulation on banks' portfolio risk. This
issue is very important in this context, since regulatory capital
augmentations in a RAR scheme can be accomplished by reducing bank
portfolio risk.
This subsection is divided into two parts. In the first part,
the literature that has studied the effects of capital adequacy
regulation on bank capital augmentations is surveyed. Then a
review is undertaken of the literature which has appraised the
impact of capital adequacy on bank portfolios.
5.4.4.1.- The Effects of Capital Adequacy Regulation on
Bank Capital Augmentations.
A) The Impact of Capital Adequacy Regulation on Bank
Capital Augmentations with no Deposit Insurance.
Regulators' notions of what constitutes an adequate level of
capital are related in microeconomic terms to bank portfolio
composition; in macroeconomic terms they are related to the
competitive conditions and the general levels of risk in the
system12 . Peltzman (1970) argues that the critical test of
regulatory effectiveness in microeconomic terms is the degree to
which regulators succeed in getting the bankers' investments
decisions to conform with regulatory standards.
The regulators have attempted to systematize their notions of
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how capital should respond to portfolio factors in various
formulae for capital adequacy. An important reason for this
systematization of bank capital adequacy requirements is to
substitute a "rule of law" for regulatory discretion and to
demonstrate the objectivity of supervisory judgment, since a
formula will convince bank management that its special situation
is receiving comparable treatment and equitable consideration. It
seems that departures from the formulae are permitted, but the
formulas are supposed to yield an estimate of adequate capital for
the "average bank" (Peltzman, 1970, p. 9).
The systematization of capital adequacy standards is very
important for the reason that the variables of concern for
regulators and bankers are often the same. It permits us to test
the effectiveness of regulation by first determining the amount of
capital that would be adequate for the supervisory authorities and
then comparing it with the actual amount held by banks.
Osterberg (1991) documents the interactions between the
regulatory effects and the market forces effects and the
difficulty in discerning the influence of such guidelines. He
argues that the primary difficulty in discerning the influence of
capital regulation guidelines lies in disentangling the impacts of
regulatory and market forces.
Banking theory seems to support the view that capital
requirements may have significant effects on bank conduct and
structure (Gardener, 1988b). In this context, Mingo and Wolkowitz
(1977) document a model with strong neoclassical microeconomic
roots in which profit maximization is assumed to be managements's
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goal with the primary external constraint being the regulator's
soundness requirement. By solving the model, they determine how
the bank's balance sheet would be adjusted in response to a change
in regulatory requirements.- They hypothesize the following balance
sheet:
A + A' +C = D+ K	 (5.30)
where A = loans, A' = government securities, C = required cash
reserves, D = total deposits and K = capital.
In their model bank profits are defined as the difference
between revenue and costs which can be written as:
U = pA + RA' - gK - hD	 (5.31)
where p is the rate of return on loans, r is the rate of return
on government securities, g is the cost of capital, and h is the
cost of deposits.
Mingo and Wolkowitz assume that the manager maximizes bank's
economic profits (H) subject to a regulatory-imposed soundness
constraint (T). The soundness function measures a bank's strength
by comparing the weighted quantities of assets to the weighted
quantities of liabilities in a bank's balance sheet. The soundness
function is
T = aA + a'A' + cC + kK - cD	 (5.32)
where all lower letters represent the weights associated with
balance sheet entries. The weights are all positive values, and
C > a' > a. Therefore, for bank with given total assets and
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capital, an increase in loans necessarily comes at the expense of
a decline in securities or cash (which have larger soundness
weights). Additional bank capital (K), no matter what the asset
form in which the capital proceeds are held, implies greater
soundness. Greater deposits (D) imply less soundness, unless
deposits are held entirely in the form of cash.
The model is solved via the method of Lagrange multipliers.
This involves taking first-order partial derivatives with respect
to each of the endogenous variables (A, a, K, D), and the
Lagrange multiplier (A).
When solving the model, the impact on bank capital of an
increase in regulatory-imposed soundness is given by the following
expression:
ApAA+ 2pA dA
(a'+k)[	 (a' - a)
(5.33)
cIt	 [Kg K K	 2g0
which gives a positive value, under reasonable governing
parametric conditions. Thus, they demonstrate that under
reasonable governing parametric conditions, a regulator-imposed
improvement in soundness will result in an increase in bank
capital. They also demonstrate that an improvement in soundness
will result in a decrease in deposits, an increase in loan quality
and a decrease in loan levels. They also emphasize that the
greater is a bank's capital market advantage, the more prone it is
to make its adjustment in its capital position, leaving loan
quality and deposits relatively unchanged. Hence, the effects of
dK
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capital regulation interact with the access to capital markets (a
managerial variable previously reviewed in this chapter).
As a main conclusion of this section, the theoretical
literature appears to support that there are major effects of bank
capital regulation on banks' capital augmentations, and those
effects seem to be positive. In other words, the higher the
solvency constraint, the higher the bank capital.
B) The Impact of Capital Adequacy Regulation on Bank
Capital Augmentations with Deposit Insurance.
A major issue on the impact of solvency regulation on bank
capital augmentations is the existence of a deposit insurance
system and its effects on capital augmentation. We need to review
the main literature on that issue to reflect better the Spanish
model of capital augmentation since the Spanish solvency
regulation includes a deposit insurance system.
Earlier on in this chapter, it was noted that the major
interest of bank capital adequacy legislators is to raise the
overall level of protection of deposits. The date of the onset of
regulation in the U.S. (the 1930s) coincides with the institution
of a Federal deposit insurance and a series of reforms designed to
make the banking system more stable. All of this seems to serve to
lower the banker-desired capital stock, and this can partly or
completely compensate the level effect of compensation (Peltzman,
1970). This conflict between the higher supervisor-desired capital
stock and the lower banker-desired capital stock is due to deposit
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insurance. Once a deposit insurance system is set up, bankers
might try to substitute deposit insurance for capital and
regulators attempt to prevent their doing so (Peltzman, 1970).
With no deposit insurance and ignoring nondeposit
liabilities, the balance sheet identity requires that total assets
are equal to total deposits plus capital; hence, greater capital
implies that, for any given asset portfolio, there is a lower
probability of asset losses resulting in a decline in depositors'
net worth. However, if deposits are insured, depositors are
unlikely to worry about a bank's capital position. Consequently,
Mingo (1975) argues that for purposes of attracting and
maintaining deposits funds, deposit insurance would appear to be a
direct substitute for capital in the eyes of bank management.
Nevertheless, Mingo (1975) also argues that deposit insurance
cannot be a perfect substitute for bank capital for purposes of
guaranteeing "soundness". Even if all deposits were insured at
zero cost to bankers, there would still be differences in bank
capital positions arising from different attitudes towards
insolvency risk.
Sharpe (1978) has provided a formal setting for the analysis
of capital adequacy in the presence of deposit insurance. Using a
state-preference approach, he worked out a measure of that
adequacy which takes into consideration the risk of banks' assets,
of the interest rate risk associated with deposits, of the
relationship existing between them and, finally, of the ratio of
the value of banks' assets to the default value of deposits.
Thus, a bank can be said to have an 'adequate capital' in this
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environment if the present value of the insurers' liability is not
larger than the insurance premium.
An indirect confirmation of the substitution effect between
capital and insurance can be derived from Taggart-Greenbaum
analysis (1978) which aimed to measure the effects of a variety of
regulatory settings on capital decisions of the banking firm.
Considering banks' capital both as a source of funds (enabling
banks to purchase earnings assets) and as a cushion (absorbing
fluctuations in assets value), three models on the bank capital
decisions under different regulatory settings are developed. The
first, when only reserve requirements exist, the second when both
a reserve requirement and an interest ceiling on deposit interest
rate exist and, the third when a compulsory deposit insurance is
added to the restriction of the second setting.
They assume that, apart from any risk reduction to
shareholders, the protection that additional capital provides to
depositors may induce adjustments in deposits terms which in turn
benefit the shareholders. They found in every case a marginal
benefit for the bank to increase its own capital. Comparing the
three different regulatory environments, the incentive to augment
equity results were weaker in the third environment than in the
first two. This occurs because the deposit insurance system fails
to reward banks for the loss-protection function of capital. Thus,
in that case banks will aim to augment equity only if deposits are
insufficient to finance favourable lending opportunities:
insurance becomes a good substitute of capital for soundness
purposes.
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Taggart and Greenbaum (1978) also show that with partial
insurance the incentives for bank shareholders to increase bank
capital depend upon the extent of deposit insurance coverage, the
degree of monopoly power and the effectiveness of deposit rate
ceilings on partially insured deposits. Deposit rate ceilings on
uninsured deposits provide an incentive for credit institutions
to augment their capital as a means of competing for deposits.
Buser, Chen and Kane (1981), in a study of the deposit
insurance and the value of the banking firm, argue that exclusive
reliance on an explicit flat-rate premium would interfere with the
simultaneous promotion of sound banking practices by supervisors
and regulatory oversight for nonmember banks of the deposit
insurance. The reason for this is that a value-maximizing
nonmember bank would not join the deposit insurance if the
explicit insurance premium exceeded the tax subsidy on deposit
borrowings. At flat rates below its break-even level, an insured
bank would reap subsidies from taxes and insurance. In this
situation, the combined subsidy would strictly be a function of
bank leverage. Recognizing the existence of implicit as well as
explicit prices for the insurance, Buser, Chen and Kane see that
the deposit insurance fund currently achieves a comparable effect
by employing a risk-rated structure of implicit premia in the form
of regulatory interference. Regulatory standards for capital
adequacy emerge as the critical element in the insurers' pricing
strategy, in that those standards determine the anticipated net
value of deposit insurance to stockholders as a function Oof bank
leverage.
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Since in practice deposit insurance coverage is less than
complete, Dietrich and James (1983) wonder if the private
incentives provided by uninsured depositors (i.e. adjustments in
deposit terms associated with capital alterations) have a
significant effect on the level of bank capital. They believe that
it is likely that the factors affecting uninsured depositor's
demand for bank capitalization may be similar to the factors
affecting the insurer's desired capital levels. However, Santomero
(1984) finds that over the past several decades, failed
institutions have been dealt with in a manner that has protected
all depositors, rather than only the insured category. Therefore,
the concerns of the noninsured depositors in terms of some
assurance of the solvency of the bank, seem to have been made less
relevant.
To sum up in this subsection, one can draw the conclusion
that the literature on the impact of deposit insurance on capital
augmentations appear inconclusive. Some authors maintain that
there is a substitution effect between capital and deposit
insurance. However, other authors argue that the substitution
effect is not always necessarily the case.
209
CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION ON BANK ...
5.4.4.2.- The Effects of Capital Regulation on Portfolio
Risk.
A) The Impact of Capital Regulation on Portfolio Risk
with no Deposit Insurance.
The effects of capital adequacy regulation on bank portfolio
risk is a related issue to our research. There is a rich and
extensive literature on the impact of bank regulation on asset and
portfolio risk 13 . The researcher focuses on the effects of capital
regulation on bank portfolio risk.
Typically the mere addition of capital to the bank's
balance-sheet is assumed to reduce risk (Di Cagno, 1990, p. 30).
The capital base of a bank protects the institution from the risk
of insolvency by absorbing losses in times of poor performance.
Koehn and Santomero (1980) demonstrated that an increase of a
regulatory capital-asset ratio causes a reshuffle of a bank's
portfolio from less risky to riskier assets. The degree to which
this reshuffling occurs depends upon the risk aversion
coefficient of the bank. For highly risk-averse institutions, the
elasticity value of high risk assets with respect to the capital
constraint is less than the elasticity for other institutions with
less risk aversion. They argue that the impact of the required
capital-asset ratio upon the average probability of failure of the
bank is ambiguous. They maintain that the relationship between the
bank portfolio risk, the amount of bank capital held and the
chance of bankruptcy is not straightforward. In other words, an
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increase of the capital constraint may lead to a lower as well as
to a higher probability of bank failure depending upon the amount
of relative risk aversion shown by depository institutions.
Furlong and Keeley (1987), however, suggest that regulatory
increases in capital standards will not require greater efforts to
restrain asset risk. On the contrary, the marginal rate of
increasing risk assets declines as leverage falls. Consequently,
less leverage (more capital) reduces the gain from risk taking. In
their theoretical model, they introduce a further differentiation
in the analysis of the effect of capital requirements on bank
riskiness: the actual possibility of bankruptcy. When this
possibility is not introduced in their theoretical model, the
results arising from an increase of capital requirements on bank
riskiness are identical to those suggested by Koehn and Santomero
(1980).
However, restricting the analysis to the situation where
bankruptcy is not possible makes it useless for policy provisions
since capital regulation is necessary only when bank failures may
actually take place. So Furlong and Keeley include in their model
the probability that bankruptcy occurs given by the fact that the
bank effectively would pay less than the promised rate on deposit
if the rate of return on assets and leverage were lower than
expected.
The impact of the imposition of different capital adequacy
regulatory ratios has been explored by Lackman (1986). He
emphasizes that in theory, the imposition of different capital
adequacy ratios might all have distinct effects on the overall
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riskiness of bank portfolios. In the theoretical model developed
by Lackman, when the capital/deposits ratio is applied, this
always reduces the variance of return on equity, but to varying
degrees among different banks. It will also increase the expected
return and the probability of losses. When the capital/risky asset
ratio is applied, this causes a shift of bank portfolio towards
less risky assets and reduces the variance of return on capital.
The last ratio examined by Lackman is the adjusted risky asset
ratio which is shown to cause a shift of bank portfolios towards
less risky assets and reduces the variance of the return on
capital.
Thus, different capital adequacy schemes are likely to have
distinct effects on bank decisions in terms of bank portfolio and
capital structure. The last two ratios (capital/risky asset ratio
and adjusted risky asset ratio) seem to produce the results which
appear closer to what bank examiners prefer.
Table 5.4 summarizes the main findings in the theoretical
literature on the impact of bank capital adequacy on portfolio
risk. The main conclusion that one can draw is that the literature
is inconclusive since there are contradictory findings. The
effects on portfolio risk are different across different capital
ratios schemes. If risk is contained in the regulatory capital
formula (such as in capital/risky assets and capital/adjusted
risky assets), the effects on portfolio risk that the regulators
desire (lower risk) can be accomplished. There are also different
results depending on whether the bankruptcy possibility is
included or not in the model. When it is included, the desirable
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Table 5.4 : Summary of Theoretical Effects of Capital
Regulation on Banks' Portfolio Risk.
Authors	 Case analyzed	 Impact / Comment
Dependent on
risk-aversion
coefficient
(possibility of
riskier portfolios)
Reduces the ROE
variance and increases
expected return and
probability of losses.
Capital 
(b) Risky Assets
Capital 
(c) Adj. Risky Assets
Less risky portfolios
and lower ROE
variance.
Less risky portfolios
and lower ROE
variance.
Furlong and
Keeley (1987)
Two cases:
(a) With possibility
of bankruptcy
Lower portfolio risk
(b) Without possibility
of bankruptcy
Di Cagno (1990)
	 Review of the
different cases
Results similar to
Koehn and
Santomero (1980)
Survey of the
literature
Koehn and	 Capital
Santomero (1980)	 Assets
Lackman (1986)
Three cases:
Capital 
(a) Deposits
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regulatory objectives can be achieved.
B) The Impact of Capital Regulation on Portfolio Risk
with Deposit Insurance.
The existence of a deposit insurance system may give insured
bankers an artificial incentive to undertake more risk than they
would in the absence of regulation and deposit insurance
(Santomero, 1984; Di Cagno, 1990). Santomero (1984) believes that
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the mantle of regulation has in and of itself a built-in incentive
to increase risk and leverage. The deposit insurance system
guarantees all depositors up to a statutory limit which results in
the liability of the depository institution being de jure a
riskless asset for these depositors. Accordingly, there is no
incentive for these depositors to respond to bank riskiness per
se. Di Cagno (1990) emphasizes the fact that much of the risk
failure passes to the deposit insurer; this might lead aggressive
management to follow a more expansionary and riskier policy.
Hence, deposit insurance could have the perverse effect of
increasing, instead of reducing, the riskiness of the banking
system.
The effects of capital requirements on banks portfolio risk
with deposit insurance have been analyzed by Kareken and Wallace
(1978). Employing a state-preference framework and comparing a
laissez-faire equilibrium model with one including both deposit
insurance and capital ratios, they conclude that a capital
requirement, by itself, does nothing to forestall bankruptcy.
Given a basic profit function where assets, deposits and
other liabilities constitute the set of choice variables for the
banks and assuming the cost of insurance included in the total
cost sustained by the bank, Kareken and Wallace worked out the
corresponding equilibrium for each of the combined insurance
schemes considered.
In particular, apart from the deposit insurance which remains
always binding, they studied the existence of a minimum amount of
bank capital constraint, the prohibition of issuing other
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liabilities (interest rate ceiling) and two different portfolio
constraints. The first portfolio constraint imposes that whatever
state of the world occurs, the bank can meet some fraction of its
commitment to the owners of its deposits and other liabilities;
the second regulation framework limits the differences between the
various state-specific pay-off of portfolios.
Assuming that banking institutions are profit-maximizers,
they determined, through the basic profit function, both
competitive and monopolistic banking industry equilibria in a
laissez faire environment. Kareken and Wallace then introduced,
through comparative static analysis, the different combined
insurance-regulatory schemes and appraised their effects on the
optimal equilibrium. Therefore, they demonstrated that if bank
liabilities are insured at a variable premium and banks do not
have other regulatory constraints, the relevant profit function
remains precisely that of the laissez-faire banking industry.
To approximate reality, they introduced two kinds of
insurance-regulatory schemes in the previous framework. Under the
first, all bank liabilities are insured at a fixed premium and
capital standards, interest rate ceilings and the first portfolio
constraint apply. Under the second, all bank liabilities are
insured at the previous premium and all the previous regulations
apply, but the second kind of portfolio constraint is employed. In
that case, the level of equilibrium of total deposit liabilities
results in lower than the laissez-faire case. A positive insurance
rate acts in that equilibrium as a tax. Thus, it would become
optimal only if regulation makes bank liabilities safe and then,
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those liabilities are nominally insured. In the second case, the
equilibrium will also become optimal if regulatory parameters are
such that there are no bankruptcy states and the insurance premium
is equal to zero.
To sum up, Kareken and Wallace draw the following
conclusions:
(i) Without deposit insurance and regulation, bankruptcy does
not occur.
(ii) Under a fixed premium insurance scheme, the banking
industry holds as risky a portfolio as regulation allows.
(iii) Hence, in this framework, regulation of banks
constitutes a necessary complement to deposit insurance, rather
than an alternative.
Osterberg and Thomson (1989), in a review of the literature,
find that with risk- and leverage- related deposit rates and
insurance premia, the incentive to increase leverage is smaller
than when the deposit rates and insurance premia are fixed.
Allowing explicit deposit costs to vary with risk and leverage
also reduces the portfolio variance. In addition, asset choice is
influenced by the response of the risk premium to increases in
portfolio variance.
They also emphasize that, as in the case where explicit
deposit costs do not vary with risk and leverage, the impact of
increased capital requirements on portfolio behaviour for banks
paying risk-based deposit insurance premiums is ambiguous. In both
cases, the impact of increased requirements on asset choice is
indeterminate, as are the responses of portfolio variance,
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expected profits and the probability of bankruptcy. Nevertheless,
allowing deposit rates to vary with portfolio risk and leverage,
results in a reduction in portfolio variance and in the incentive
to increase leverage. These would seem to be desirable results
from a regulator's viewpoint.
5.5.- SYNTHESIS AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES.
This chapter has reviewed the main theoretical aspects which
shape bank capital decisions, where capital adequacy regulation
appears to play a key role. First, we surveyed the effects of
capital regulation desired by bank regulators and supervisors:
that is, the macroeconomic and particularly microeconomic
objectives of capital regulation. Second, the researcher examined
the interactions between bank capital adequacy regulation and the
models of the banking firm and the issue of the preference for
market-determined capital positions or regulation-determined
capital positions. Then, the largest part of the chapter was
devoted to the study of what banking theory considers as
determinants of bank capital augmentations. A general model of
capital augmentations, managerial determinants and the role of
regulation were appraised.
From this survey of the theory of the determinants of bank
capital augmentations, several relevant testable hypotheses may be
developed. These are the main testable hypotheses that one can
draw from the theory reviewed:
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a) The impact of regulation on bank capital augmentations: in
this context a number of sub-hypotheses arise:
a.1) Have bank capital adequacy standards formulated by
regulators had any effect on bank capital augmentations ?
a.2) It was noted in this chapter that the regulatory
capital augmentations may be obtained through lowering portfolio
risk. Therefore, a related subhypothesis is: Have bank capital
adequacy regulations had any impact on bank portfolio risk ?
a.3) What is the impact of deposit insurance membership
on capital augmentations?
a.4) To sum up: To what extent have regulators succeeded
in getting the banker's capital decisions to conform with
regulatory standards ?
b) The impact of managerial determinants of bank capital
augmentations: again several sub-hypotheses emerge:
b.1) To what extent have the cost of funds and the cost
of capital influenced bank augmentations? In this hypothesis,
several sub-hypotheses emerge:
b.1.1) What is the influence of internal capital
generation (with the related issues of profitability, retained
earnings and dividend policy) on bank augmentations?
b.1.2) To what extent has access to domestic and
international capital markets influenced bank capital
augmentations?
b.2) To what extent has bank portfolio risk been a
determinant of bank capital augmentations?
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b.3) Has liquidity management affected bank capital
augmentations?
b.4) What other Spanish-specific determinants have
affected bank capital augmentations?
c) Two final related testable hypotheses may arise from the
two previous hypotheses:
c.1) To what extent is it possible to disentangle the
impacts of regulatory and market forces ?
c.2) Does the impact of capital regulation depend on
market forces ?
Once the main theories on the effects of capital regulation
on bank capital augmentations have been analyzed and the main
testable hypotheses that emerge from those theories have been
promulgated, the next stage should be to explore the relevant
empirical literature and methodologies that have attempted to test
the regulatory effects of capital adequacy on capital
augmentations. This will be the task of the following chapter.
NOTES:
1.- This is also the case for many other countries: see for
example, U.S. Banking Act of 1933.
2.- See for example, U.S. Banking Act of 1933 and Spain's
3048/1977 Royal Decree whereby the Deposit Insurance Fund was
created.
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3.- See Spellman (1982, pp. 51-54) for a comparison of the
production firm and a financial firm.
4.- The optimization process involves finding [A, a, d] such
that the relevant marginal revenues and marginal costs are equal:
see Baltensperger (1980).
5.- See Sinkey (1992, pp. 102-105) for a survey of the evolution
and development of the theory of the banking firm.
6.- The asterisk denotes intention or expectation.
7.- If one specifies only partial adjustment to expected deposit
growth in any period and if deposits are growing secularly, the
model would imply a continuously growing divergence between C * and
C. This is untenable in a model which attempts to explain how C
and C are brought together.
8.- See, for example, Modigliani and Miller (1958); Copeland and
Weston (1988, p.439) review the main assumptions of the finance
theory with regard to capital markets.
9.- It should be noted that a relatively flat supply curve implies
a relatively elastic supply curve.
10.- See Sinkey (1989) for a study of these types of portfolio
risk.
11.- See Kaufman (1984) for an extensive analysis of interest
rate risk management.
12.- The Basle Agreement (1988) considers the macroeconomic
implications of competition and general levels of risk in the
system.
13.- See Di Cagno (1990) for a survey of this literature.
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CHAPTER 6 : EMPIRICAL MODELS ON THE EFFECTS OF BANK CAPITAL
ADEQUACY ON BANK CAPITAL AUGMENTATIONS.
6.1.- INTRODUCTION.
Once the main theories of the determinants of bank capital
augmentations have been analyzed (where supervisory capital
regulation appears to be a key determinant), we need to review the
main empirical methodologies and models that have tested the
impact of capital regulation on banks' capital augmentations. The
purpose of this chapter is to examine the empirical literature on
the effects of capital regulation on bank capital augmentations,
from which we can construct our specific models that will be
employed later on to test the effects of capital regulation on
bank capital augmentations in the Spanish banking system. Thus,
this chapter is best seen as a kind of "bridge" between the
hypotheses we obtained from the main theories (in the last
chapter) and our specific empirical tests for the Spanish banking
system.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we
review the main methodologies for measuring and evaluating the
effects of any economic regulation. Then, we move on to our
specific case: that is, the methodologies and models that the
literature provides on the effects of capital adequacy regulation
221
cmumm 6: EMPIRICAL MODELS ON THE EFFECTS OF BANK CAPITAL .
on bank capital augmentations. Finally, in the concluding
synthesis the researcher surveys the main findings in the
literature and lays down the main testable models.
6.2.- A GENERAL VIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
ON FIRM CONDUCT.
6.2.1.- Economic Regulation and Conduct.
In a broad sense, all firms are regulated today. They must
comply with legislation laying down minimum wage rates, safe
working conditions and environmental standards, to name just a
few. However, in an important minority of industries the
government actively intervenes and regulates business decisions
in much greater detail (Weiss and Strickland, 1976, pp 1-3) 1 ; one
example of these industries is the banking industry (Revell, 1975;
Llewellyn, 1986; and Gardener, 1986a)2.
We are mainly interested in the effects of "economic
regulation" on firm conduct and performance. By "economic
regulation" we refer to both direct legislation and
administrative regulation of prices and entry into specific
industries or markets. We follow conventional treatment in
distinguishing economic regulation from a host of other forms of
government intervention in markets, including "social regulation"
of environmental, health and safety practices, antitrust policy,
and tax and tariff policies (Joskow and Rose, 1988).
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"Conduct" refers to the behaviour (actions) of the firms in
the market; to the decisions those firms make and also to the way
in which these decisions are taken (Ferguson, 1988, P. 8). For
example, it focuses on how firms set prices, how firms decide on
their advertising and research budgets, or how firms decide on
capital investment. In this thesis, we are merely interested in
one aspect of bank conduct: that is, bank capital augmentation.
We focus upon the hypothesis whether bank capital regulation
affects bank conduct in terms of capital augmentations.
The effects of regulation are likely to depend upon a
variety of factors: the motivation for regulation, the nature of
regulatory instruments and structure of the regulatory process,
the industry's economic characteristics, and the legal and
political environment in which regulation takes place (Joskow and
Rose, 1988). Given the substantial variation in these economic
and institutional characteristics, the expected effects of
regulation are likely to differ considerably across industries
and through time.
6.2.2.-Methodologies for Measuring and Evaluating the
Effects of Regulation on Firm Conduct.
The most basic question one can ask about economic
regulation is whether it makes a difference to the behaviour of
the regulated industry. Crampton (1964) argues that the
enumeration of an endless succession of regulatory actions
provides evidence, not of effective regulation but of the desire
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to regulate. The regulation may prohibit conduct that no one
wishes to engage in or it may encourage conduct which will take
place anyway. Even if the regulation deals with conduct that
would take a different course in the absence of regulation, it is
always possible that the objective so devoutly desired by the
regulators will not be accomplished.
In order to determine whether the observed economic
behaviour in a particular industry is due to the existence of
regulation, the possible effect of regulation must be isolated
from other factors influencing behaviour. Furthermore, if we aim
to determine the effects of a certain regulation on the observed
economic behaviour in the industry, we must isolate the possible
effect of this regulation from other regulations affecting
conduct.
According to Joskow and Rose (1988), there are four basic
empirical methodologies for measuring the effects of regulation.
These are the following:
a) Comparing regulated and unregulated firms and
markets: if the only difference between the samples of firms
analyzed is the nature of the regulatory constraints the firms
are subject to, differences in behaviour and performance can be
attributed to regulation. This approach may rely either on
cross-sectional variation, comparing similar firms operating
under different regulatory structures; or on time series
variation, comparing the same firms operating under a changing
regulatory environment. Both cross-sectional and time series
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analyses involve a common method. First, the dependent variable
of interest - such as price, cost, or profitability - must be
defined, and modelled as a function of exogenous economic
characteristics that influence performance independent of
regulation and a control for the influence of regulation.
Regulation generally is measured as a dummy variable indicating
whether an observation is drawn from the "regulated" or
"unregulated" regime. The effect of regulation is inferred from
the sign and magnitude of the coefficient on the regulatory dummy
variable.
b) Using variations in the intensity of regulation: in
many cases it may not be possible to obtain data on firms or
markets that are subject to fundamentally different regulatory
regimes. We may have observations only on firms and markets
subject to qualitatively similar regulatory constraints. These
situations are clearly not conducive to the "dummy variable"
approach discussed above. Yet there may be quantitative
differences in the regulatory constraints applied over time and
space that, under particular theories of regulation and their
effects, would be expected to yield differences in outcomes
in one or more dimensions. These variations may arise from
differences in regulatory structures or processes, or from the
effects of changing economic conditions on regulation. Proper
application of this approach requires a detailed understanding of
variations in regulatory rules and procedures and the
specification of a precise model of how these variations affect
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the behavioral and performance variables of interest.
c) Using controlled environment experiments: data
generated by actual regulatory and economic conditions may not
provide sufficient experimental evidence to estimate the effects
of regulation3. As an alternative to relying upon the "natural
experiments" provided by actual experience, evidence from
controlled experiments is increasingly used to measure regulatory
effects. These experiments are designed to generate data
suitable for testing specific hypotheses about the effects of
variations in institutional arrangements and public policies. Two
types of experimental evidence are potentially available. Field
experiments may be designed to study the behaviour of real
economic agents. In these, economic conditions or institutional
structures are varied in systematic ways, and behavioural
responses are used to quantify the effects of alternative
regulatory, public policy, or market arrangements. Laboratory
experiments involve human experimental subjects taking part in a
set of laboratory "games", designed to provide the subjects with
economic conditions that they would face under various market and
institutional arrangements. Institutional details can be varied
in a way that carefully controls for other causal variables.
d) Structural / simulation models of regulated firms and
markets: in all too many cases, none of the previous approaches
can readily be used. For example, there may be no significant
variations in regulatory regimes, in the intensity of regulatory
226
CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL MODELS ON THE EFFECTS OF BANK CAPITAL ...
constraints, or in economic conditions that would enable one to
measure directly the effects of regulation on conduct and
performance. Controlled experiments may be too expensive or too
complex to perform. In these cases, structural models of
behaviour or performance, combined with simulation techniques,
may provide a means of estimating regulatory effects. The task is
in some ways easier for firms operating in regulated industries
than for those operating in unregulated industries. Regulatory
agencies frequently collect detailed firm-level information on
revenue, outputs, costs, capital stocks, etc.
A simple application of structural models employs asset
pricing theory. Regulation may create assets that have value only
in a regulated environment, such as operating certificates for
regulated trucking companies, taxicab medallions and other types
of licenses. If these assets are traded, their prices will
reflect the capitalized value of expected regulatory rents
accruing to the holder4.
Table 6.1 provides for each of the four basic methodologies
above two major examples of empirical work that have employed the
respective methodology.
The approach to be employed in our empirical tests on the
impact of bank capital regulation on banks' capital augmentations
for the Spanish banking system during 1987-90 is (b): that is,
using variations in the intensity of regulation. There are several
reasons for this.
Firstly, there appears from our preliminary research and
field survey to be different intensities of capital regulation for
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private and savings banks: that is, cross-sectional variation in
the intensity of regulation across banking firms. Although they
have to comply with the same standards, savings banks cannot issue
share equity, which appears to be an important constraint compared
with private banks. We wish to examine those differences between
private banks and savings banks operating in Spain in order to
appraise whether the capital augmentation model differs across
private and savings banks.
Table 6.1 : Empirical Studies on the Effects of Economic
Regulation.
Methodology	 Author	 Comment
a) Comparing regulated
and unregulated firms
and markets
Stigler and
	 Seminal paper on
Friedland (1962)
	 regulated
electricity prices
in "regulated" and
"unregulated" U. S.
states.
Rose (1985)	 Event study of
regulatory rents
in U.S. trucking
industry
b) Using variations 	 Gollop and	 The structure of
in the intensity of	 Karlson (1978)	 specific
regulation	 regulatory
instruments is
analyzed.
Norton (1982)	 Based on variation
in regulatory
resources.
228
Designed to
generate suitable
data for measuring
the effects of
variations in
public policies.
The effects of
regulatory pricing
rules on inland
barge transport in
the U.S.
Regulatory assets
are measured for
several U.S.
industries.
C) Using controlled	 Smith (1982)
environment experiments
Hong and Plot
(1982)
d) Structural /	 Schwert (1981)
Simulation models
Smirlock,
	 Analysis based on
Gilligan and
	 Tobin's q which
Marshall (1984)
	 provides
inferences
independent of the
form of regulatory
ratemaking.
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Finally, from the survey performed among several major banks
in Spain, we found that those banks also monitor both BIS capital
ratios (since 1988) and EC Directives solvency ratios (since
1989). Therefore, the intensity of regulation is likely to be
different since BIS Recommendations and EC Capital Adequacy
Directives were approved. We must determine whether this is the
case for the Spanish banks in terms of capital augmentations. In
other words, we must determine if the model of capital
augmentations has changed for the Spanish banking system in 1988
(BIS Agreement) and in 1989 (EC Directive), when the intensity of
capital regulation seems to have changed.
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Once we know the approach to carry out our tests, we need to
review the main methodologies and models that can be found in the
literature which have undertaken tests on the effects of capital
adequacy regulation on banks' capital augmentations.
6.3.- MAIN EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGIES AND MODELS TO TEST THE
EFFECTS OF CAPITAL REGULATION ON BANK CAPITAL AUGMENTATIONS.
6.3.1.-Introduction.
There is a significant U.S. empirical literature that has
tested the effects of bank capital regulation upon bank capital
augmentations; early studies in this literature date back in
1970-75. But there are more recent articles containing
methodologies and empirical models to measure these effects. This
section will start with the early models and then move on to
examine the more recent methodologies.
6.3.2.- Early studies.
Peltzman (1970) performed the first empirical study on the
effects of capital regulation on bank conduct. He directly
estimated the magnitude of the effect of government regulation on
capital investment in commercial banking by testing the simple
capital investment model for a bank that was explained in the
equation (5.17) in Chapter 5. Two variables representing the
influence of bank capital regulation on bank capital were
230
CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL MODELS ON THE EFFECTS OF BANK CAPITAL . . .
included among the explanatory variables: a variable representing
the bank capital adequacy ratio and the deposit insurance ratio.
In order to measure the effectiveness of bank capital
regulation, he considered both the ability of regulators to
prevent bank management from substituting deposit insurance for
capital, and the ability of regulators to influence changes in
bank capital when their standards of capital adequacy differed
from those of bank management.
Peltzman tested the following equation, employing
cross-section data using state aggregates of U.S. banks in the
period 1963-65:
Y = f (X1,X12,X31,X41,X51,X6i, (X62 ,X63,X64 ) ,X71 ,X72)
	 (6.1)
where:
Y = percentage change in bank capital, year t;
X11 =1  ratio of market value of bank equity capital to its book
value, year t-1;
X12=1  bank net operating earnings as percentage of capital,
t-1;
XM= ratio of U.S. government bonds to deposits net of cash
assets, t;
X41= ratio of bank capital to deposits net of cash assets, t;
X51 = average annual percentage change in deposits net of cash
assets, previous five years;
X61 = percentage of bank deposits insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), t;
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X ,X ,X = ratio of adequate capital to capital actually
62 63 64
held by banks, t, where adequate capital is respectively
computed by:
X62= formula developed by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System;
X = adjusted risk-assets formula;
63
X
64
= formula developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York;
X71= dummy variable (1 in 1963, 0 otherwise);
X
72
= dummy variable (1 in 1965, 0 otherwise).
Peltzman's empirical model has desirable features for our
research objectives:
1) His dependent variable is the capital augmentation rate,
which is also our key dependent variable.
2) He defines two alternative definitions of rate of return:
X and X. Since Spanish savings banks and many private banks
11	 12
have no market values, we have, then an alternative to measure
rate of return for those banks.
3) The inclusion of the same type of regulatory variables we
will estimate for the Spanish case: capital ratios and deposit
insurance.
4) He distinguished between different years and our analysis
will also distinguish between different years. However, unlike in
Peltzman's article, dummy variables will not be employed in our
research to distinguish between years; a different equation will
be estimated for each year.
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However, there are also important limitations of Peltzman's
model for our research objectives. First of all, he uses data
aggregated by state. We, however, are to use nonaggregated data
for each bank. Variations in individual variables across banks in
a state are not captured in data aggregated by state. However,
with nonaggregated data, these variations are captured. Secondly,
the measure of portfolio risk is included in the regulatory
formula, and there is no separate measure of portfolio risk to
test the influence of it on capital augmentations. Therefore, it
is not possible to disentangle the effects of portfolio risk on
capital augmentations. However, our analysis will comprise a
variable representing supervisory capital regulation and a
separate variable representing portfolio risk. Thirdly, no mention
of the different access to capital markets is made in his model.
Finally, there is no distinction between book-value capital,
market-value capital and regulatory capital in his model, and
there is no distinction across U.S. banks in terms of the
different intensity of regulation. The latter is overcome by Mayne
(1972).
Mayne's work (1972) tested the hypothesis that in the U.S.
there exist significant differences in the amount of capital funds
held by national banks, by state banks belonging to the Federal
Reserve System, and by nonmember banks insured by the FDIC -
differences that are not explained by inter-bank variations in
asset and liability structure, earnings, growth, or economic
environment. Mayne sets out to determine whether or not banks
which are similar except for the supervisory jurisdiction under
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which they operate do, in fact, maintain essentially similar
capital positions.
Mayne employed the following single equation linear model
for cross-section data during the period 1962-1968. The sample of
banks used each year of the period varied, ranging from 804 banks
in 1962 to 727 banks in 1968 (operating in four U.S.
states s ):
C = a +(3 1 NA 1 -Fg 2 SM1 +1s 3As i + 8 4T1D 1+ 8 5EG 1+ 8 6EL 1+ P7AG1+
+ p8cA +8 914E1 1j-1°1+ f3 11C0 1 + g i ; i = 1, 2, ... ,n; (6.2)
n = number of sample banks in a cross-section year;
where:
C = average total capital funds in year t to average total
assets in year t.
NA = dummy variable ( 1 for national banks in year t, 0
otherwise);
SM = dummy variable ( 1 for state-chartered Federal Reserve
System member banks in year t, 0 otherwise);
AS (size) = assets, in millions of dollars, in logarithm form
in year t;
TD (deposit structure) = ratio of average time deposits in
year t to average total adjusted deposits in year t;
EG (earnings growth) = ratio of before-tax adjusted operating
earnings in year t to before-tax adjusted operating
earnings in 1961;
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EL (earnings level) = ratio of before-tax adjusted operating
earnings in year t to average total assets in year t;
AG (asset growth) = ratio of average assets in year t to
average to average assets in 1961;
CA (liquidity) = ratio of cash accounts ( cash in vault,
Federal Reserve balances for member banks, due from
banks) in year t to average assets in t;
MR (portfolio risk) = ratio of average minimum risk assets
(total U.S. Government securities exclusive of Federal
agencies units, plus securities loans to dealers and
real estate loans) in year t to average assets in year
t;
LO (loss experience) ratios of average actual loan
charge-offs and losses net of recoveries in year t to
income from loans in year t;
CO (economic environment) = county growth code, integer
values ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high) representing
average annual rates of growth.
Mayne's work has the following desirable features for our
research objectives:
1) The inclusion of different intensities in regulation
(with the use of dummy variables). Dummy variables will not be
included to test different intensities in regulation, but
different equations will be estimated for different types of
institutions in order to test for distinct intensity in
regulation.
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2) The inclusion of several relevant variables for the
Spanish case (as the field survey in Appendix A showed to be
necessary): portfolio risk, liquidity and profitability.
3) The alternative specification of profitability (earnings
growth and earnings level) and portfolio risk (MR - defined
in formula (6.2) - and loss experience).
Mayne's work has some limitations in relation to our
research. First it may be argued that too many variables were
included in her model. This could result in statistical problems
such as multicollinearity and interpretation problems. Due to the
large number of independent variables, the role of key variables
in the capital position cannot be clearly identified. Another
disadvantage is the use of a limited sample of U.S. banks, which,
then, cannot be considered the general case for U.S. banks. Our
purpose, however, is to perform the tests on the whole Spanish
banking system.
Mingo (1975) also suggested a model of capital augmentations.
In his model, he tested two hypotheses:
1) Regulators have been unable to prevent bankers from
substituting deposit insurance for bank capital.
2) Regulators have been unable to occasion increases in bank
capital when such capital was deemed sub-standard by the bank
examiners.
He tested the following model for 323 U.S. banks in 1970:
% AK = f(NI/K, US/TD, K/TD, % ATD, % INS, ABC', MEMBER) (6.3)
where
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% AK = percentage change in bank capital in year t. Capital
is defined as total equity capital plus reserves;
NI/K = proxy for expected rate of return; ratio of net income
to bank capital in year t-1;
US/TD= measure of default risk of bank's portfolio; ratio of
U.S. securities to deposits net of cash, year t;
K/TD = ratio of bank capital to deposit net of cash, year t;
%ATD = percentage growth in total deposits over previous
three years;
%INS = percentage of total deposits insured by FDIC;
ABC' = negative inverse ratio of each bank's observed
accounting equity capital to the amount of capital
desired by the regulator;
MEMBER = dummy variable (1 if bank is Federal Reserve member,
0 otherwise).
The dependent variable and the first five explanatory
variables in equation (6.3) are identical to Peltzman's
specification. Most of these variables are included to explain the
long-run desired capital-deposits position of the bank: (NI/K)_Iis
a proxy for the expected rate of return on capital. It assumes
that the last period's average return on capital is considered by
the bank as an indication of the marginal return. Mingo maintains
that since the marginal return on capital is likely to be below
the average return, NI/K represents an overestimate of the
banker's incentive to add to capital purely for investment
purposes. The term % INS stands for the proportion of deposits in
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less volatile, small denomination consumer deposits; thus, the
higher is % INS, the less need there is for bank capital as
protection against failure. US/TD measures asset default risk,
proxied as the proportion of the bank's portfolio held in riskless
government securities. Since some of the change in bank capital
can be attributed to an adjustment between the existing
capital-deposit's position and the long-run desired position, the
level of the capital-deposit's ratio (K/TD) is included as an
explanatory variable. The percentage growth in deposits (% LTD) is
also included as an independent variable because Peltzman's model
and Mingo's model attempt to explain the capital investment
process apart from straightforward responses to deposit changes.
In Mingo (1975), there are three major areas in which
Peltzman's treatment is improved. First, since Peltzman employed
data aggregated by state, he used the mean state ABC ratio as a
proxy for supervisors' desires. However, there may be wide
variation in individual ABC ratios across banks in a state.
Therefore, two states with identical mean ABC ratios may have
enormously different distributions of ABC ratios across individual
depository institutions. Empirically, this can be potentially
misleading for the reason that regulators are likely to pressure a
bank to add to capital when its ABC ratio is low, but they are
unlikely to call for capital disinvestment when a bank's ABC ratio
is too high. Thus, aggregated data may be inadequate for purposes
of measuring regulatory influence on capital.
Second, the basis for the use of disaggregated data is also
the basis for expecting a nonlinear relationship between the
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regulator's view of the adequacy of a bank's capital stock and
bank capital investment. In other words, it is likely that
relatively greater pressure to invest is exerted by the
supervisors on banks with relatively low observed capital.
Consequently, one should expect the partial derivative
a(% AK)/a(ABC) to decrease in absolute value as the ABC value
rises, becoming zero for ABC values greater than unity (i.e. for
super- adequate bank capital positions).
Finally, once individual bank data are utilized, we may
include other explanatory variables that may not be appropriate
when aggregate data are used (i.e. MEMBER in Mingo's model).
6.3.3.- Recent studies.
During the 1980s there have been several empirical studies
on the effects of capital regulation on bank capital investment
and ratios. The first major empirical study is that of Dietrich
and James (1983).
Their sample of banks was much larger than those of the
previous studies. More than 10,000 U.S. commercial banks were
included in the sample and the period considered was 1971-1975
which permitted them to achieve a statistical precision not
possible in earlier studies.
Their procedure replicates the Peltzman/Mingo regression
based on the following equation:
% AK = f (NI/K, US/TD, K/TD, % LTD, INS, MEMBER, ABC')
	 (6.4)
All variables are as defined in Mingo (1975). The regression
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coefficient on the ABC' variable is interpreted as the change in
capital due to regulatory influence. The inverse formulation
(ABC') is utilized to permit a nonlinear response to regulatory
pressure, i.e. a capital response decreasing in absolute value as
the regulator's ABC variable increases. According to the
researchers, the negative formulation is employed for convenience,
so that if regulation is effective, the expected sign on the ABC'
coefficient is negative. The level of capital desired by the
regulator is measured according to a complex weighted average of
each bank's assets and liabilities.
Their empirical model has the following desirable features
for our research:
1) It is the most advanced and refined model of bank capital
augmentations. They learned from mistakes made by Peltzman, Mayne
and Mingo and they developed the most refined model to date. Their
model includes the variables that Spanish bankers in our field
survey (see Appendix A) expressed to be determinants of capital
augmentations: regulation and profitability.
2) They employed data during a period (1971-75) where most
ceilings on U.S. interest rates had already been eliminated.
Therefore, the competitive environment of their tests was the most
similar of all the models we have examined to the Spanish case
during 1987-90.
As far as the main disadvantages of their model, it must be
said that unlike the Spanish case with private, savings and
foreign banks, they do not distinguish among banks in terms of the
intensity of regulation. Another disadvantage is that variables
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such as liquidity and access to capital markets are not included
in their model.
Marcus (1983) and Keeley (1988) suggest empirical models that
although they are not models of capital augmentations, the
implications of the models are highly related to capital
augmentations.
Marcus (1983) estimates a model of the determination of bank
capital-asset ratios which differs in three ways from earlier
research. First, time series, cross-section estimation is
employed, rather than simple cross-section estimation. Second,
market values rather than book values of capital are used. Third,
the model allows asymmetric treatment of equity and subordinated
debt.
Bank capital is defined by Marcus as the sum of the market
values of equity and debt. The dependent variable in his equation
is the ratio of capital to noncash assets. The capital measure
includes subordinated long-term debt as well as equity. The
independent variables used by Marcus are the following: market
interest rate, the tax advantage of deposit relative to equity
finance, a dummy variable for national banks, debt as a fraction
of noncash assets, interest rate volatility, bank size and
government bonds as a fraction of assets and two regulatory
variables (cease-and-desist orders and a variable or regulatory
pressure variable) 6 . He selected one hundred and fifteen banks at
random from the 1978 Bank Compustat tape which includes data for
20 years through the end of 1977. Data going back at least 15
years were available for 44 of these banks.
241
CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL MODELS ON THE EFFECTS OF BANK CAPITAL ...
Keeley (1988) examined the effectiveness of U.S. capital
adequacy regulation during the period 1981-85, employing the data
(coming from the balance sheet and income statements) of the 150
largest bank holding companies, where stock is publicly traded.
His study investigated whether the new capital requirements,
binding from December 1981, caused banks with capital ratios
below the minimum to raise their book-value capital ratios to meet
the new standards. With regard to previous studies he considered
whether observed increases in book value capital represent an
actual market-value capital infusion or whether they merely come
from accounting changes. Keeley argues that there is not a close
correspondence between book and market value. For example, banks
might respond to more stringent capital regulation by selling and
then repurchasing appreciated assets. This would increase the book
value capital and assets by the amount of the capital gain.
Thereby it would augment the book value capital-to-asset ratio,
but it would have no impact upon the market value ratio of the
risk exposure of deposit insurance system. This has implications
for our study: it could be found that there is no correspondence
between the evolution of book-value capital augmentations and
market-value capital augmentations.
Hence it seems at least possible that banks meet the new
capital requirements simply by making use of accounting techniques
and that no real change takes place in bank's balance sheet. The
issue of whether a market-value capital infusion took place is
particularly important in judging the effectiveness of the capital
regulation, because the risk exposure of the insurance fund
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depends upon the market values of bank's assets and liabilities
and not upon their book values.
Therefore, Keeley studies first the changes in banks' book-
value capital ratios caused by regulation; second, the sources of
these changes; and third, the effects on market-value
capital-to-asset ratios employing a measure based on stock prices.
In order to analyze the sources of the book capital-to-asset
ratio changes, he differentiated the ratio of capital, C, to
assets, A with respect to time:
d(C/A)/dt = (C/A) [(1/C)(dC/dt) - (1/A)(dA/dt)] 	 (6.5)
Equation (6.5) indicates that the rate of change of the
capital-to-asset ratio is equal to the percentage growth rate of
capital minus the percentage growth rate of assets times the
initial capital-to-asset ratio. Consequently, banks can increase
their capital ratios by either augmenting capital growth relative
to asset growth or vice versa.
Keeley's model could be helpful to test the impact of capital
augmentations on capital ratios. His model has desirable features
for our research objectives:
1) The study of the correspondence between book-value and
market-value capital augmentations: Keeley indicates that there
appears to be no correspondence between book-value and
market-value capital. Our analysis should comprise an analysis of
that correspondence.
2) The impact of capital augmentations on capital ratios:
Keeley investigated how the evolution of U.S. banks' capital
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ratios was affected by capital augmentations and/or changes in
asset growth. Our research will explore the importance of the
impact of both capital augmentations and changes in asset growth
on capital ratios.
There is, for present purposes, a significant limitation in
Keeley's analysis: he does not consider the influence of changes
in portfolio risk on capital ratios. He only considers asset
growth, but in a RAR environment, portfolio risk must included in
the analysis.
6.4 .- MAIN EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND SYNTHESIS.
6.4.1.- Main Empirical Findings.
The main empirical findings on the effects of bank capital
adequacy regulation on bank capital augmentations are summarized
in Table 6.2. Further explanation of the major points is provided
below.
From Table 6.2, one can deduce that the empirical evidence
provided by the studies survey may appear somewhat mixed and
inconclusive. However, many of the contradictions have been
overcome thanks to further improvements in the empirical models
employed. Recent empirical models, like that of Dietrich and James
(1983) have overcome many of the contradictions and difficulties
of previous models.
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Table 6.2 : The Effects of Capital Adequacy Regulation on Bank
Capital Augmentations.
Authors	 Year	 Source	 Comment
Peltzman	 1970	 JPE	 No evidence that U.S. bank
investment behaviour conforms
to the regulatory standards.
Mayne	 1972	 JOF	 Evidence seems to negate U.S.
supervisory impact on bank
capital.
Mingo	 1975
	 JOF	 Strong evidence of regulation
effect's on U.S. bank capital.
Kimball
	 1983
	 JOF	 Findings consonant with
Dietrich	 Peltzman's: no evidence of
and James
	 regulatory effects on capital
in U.S. banks
Marcus
Hislop
Keeley
1983
	 JOF	 Regulators exert little
influence on the response to
to economy-wide shocks to bank
capitalization in the U.S.
1987	 TB	 A survey of large banks in
London showed strong evidence
of Bank of England's
regulation impact on capital.
1988	 FRSF	 Uniform capital requirements
achieved their intended impact
on book capital-assets ratios
in the U.S.
Wall and
	
1988	 JFSR	 Evidence of U.S. regulatory
Peterson	 effects on large banks equity
capital-assets ratios.
Key to Abbreviations :
FRSF : Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review
JOF : Journal of Finance
JPE : Journal of Political Economy
JFSR : Journal of Financial Services Research
TB : The Banker
245
CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL MODELS ON THE EFFECTS OF BANK CAPITAL . . .
Let us add some relevant comments on the empirical results
found in the literature. Peltzman (1970) also concludes that
regulators have failed to maintain at least the same overall level
of capital adequacy as would obtain without deposit insurance.
Thus, bank management seems to treat deposit insurance as a
substitute for bank capital.
Peltzman also explored the fact, not captured by the
estimated model, that regulation might affect portfolio items
other than capital. He underlined that crude evidence does not
indicate that any such regulation-induced portfolio changes have
occurred in the period under examination.
Mayne's conclusions (1972) are that although the evidence is
somewhat mixed, it does not seem to support the hypothesis that
there exists significant differences in the amount of bank capital
held by national, state Federal Reserve System member, and
nonmember banks, when the influence of other factors is held
constant. The differences that are evident are rarely of such
magnitude as to be important either in a statistical or economic
sense. Mayne believes that systematic differences among the bank
classes in management conservatism, or responsiveness to bank
examiners' suggestions for additional capital, may offset
differing agency standards which in turn, negates supervisory
impact on capital.
On the contrary Mingo (1975) found strong evidence of
regulation effects on bank's capital decisions: in Mingo's
analysis, regulation influence on bank capital was statistically
highly significant. Mingo's regression results (1975) indicate
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that lower ABC' values are associated with higher rates of capital
investment over the next time period; furthermore, the result is
statistically highly significant. Hence, Peltzman's result that
regulators' desires do not have any impact on bank capital
investment is not substantiated. These results indicate that the
level of bank capital is greater than it would be in the absence
of bank capital adequacy regulation.
Mingo's regression results support Peltzman's conclusion that
bankers treat deposit insurance as a substitute for bank capital.
In addition, the evidence suggests that regulators have made no
attempt to reduce this substitution effect. However, Mingo argues
that this result does not necessarily imply ineffective regulation
since regulators may be perfectly content with the trade-off
between capital and insured deposits. Insured deposits are the
least volatile of the bank's liabilities, and a greater proportion
of insured liabilities lowers the risk of a general "run" on the
bank.
The Dietrich and James (1983) differences in findings with
respect to Mingo can be attributed to Mingo's failure to
distinguish between the joint hypotheses, that regulators
influence capital and that the capital adequacy measure employed
is unrelated to factors affecting the demand for capital by
uninsured depositors. Since in periods when interest rate ceilings
are binding on large deposits (Regulation Q), the demand for
capital by these depositors is likely to be the greatest, the
period chosen (1970) for Mingo's analysis is open to question.
Dietrich and James (1983) argue that utilizing the period 1971 to
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1975 when interest rate ceilings on most large deposits were not
binding, they find no evidence to support the view that regulators
affect bank capital.
Marcus (1983) finds that the rate at which banks restored
capital to accustomed levels was much lower in the latter half of
the sample. This result is somewhat surprising: a typical convex
cost structure for deviations of capital from its target level,
together with economies of scale in raising equity, should have
caused the large swings of capital in the 1970s to produce faster
adjustment speeds. However, Marcus (1983) argues that the slower
adjustment speeds are consistent with the notion that regulators
do not judge banks by capitalization per se, but rather by capital
relative to other banks.
Hislop (1987) reports a survey among several large banks in
London by Coopers & Lybrand whose main objective was to evaluate
the awareness and action taken on capital allocation. It was found
that most banks were internally allocating their capital almost
exclusively on the basis of the Bank's of England minimum
regulatory requirements. Wall and Peterson (1988) also found that
the primary capital guidelines imposed by U.S. regulators
influenced changes in large banks equity capital-to-assets ratios
in 1982-84.
The evidence found by Keeley (1988) strongly suggests that
uniform capital requirements achieved their intended effects on
book or accounting measures of banks' capital-to-asset ratios. By
1986, he found that virtually all banks were complying with the
book-value capital requirements. Furthermore, the disparity of
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book capital ratios was reduced substantially - an effect
consistent with the goals of the capital regulations.
Capital-deficient banks (those originally not complying with
the regulatory requirements) augmented their capital ratios
primarily by slowing asset growth relative to capital growth. This
appears to suggest that the increase in book capital-to-asset
ratios reflected a true reduction in leverage and not just an
accounting gimmick.
Keeley showed that observed market-value capital ratios
(based on banks' stock prices) did increase overall, but there
seems to be no strong indication of a larger increase for
capital-deficient banks. There are several explanations for this
consistent with a regulatory-induced increase in capital ratios
for the capital-deficient banks. The explanations include
increased regulatory taxes or reduced subsidies, differential
responses to overall stock price and interest rate changes, and
differential changes in bank risk-taking. However, Keeley believes
that differential responses to stock price and interest rate
trends do not appear to play a large role.
6.4.2.- Synthesis and Testable Models.
The main empirical methodologies and models to test the
impact of capital adequacy regulation on bank capital
augmentations have been surveyed in this chapter. The early
methodology introduced by Peltzman (1970) has been improved later
by Mingo (1975) and Dietrich and James (1983). A model that can be
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employed to test the regulatory effects on bank capital
augmentations is that of equation (6.4), which is a synthesis of
Peltzman / Mingo / Dietrich and James methodologies:
% AK = f (NI/K, US/TD, K/TD, % ATD, INS, MEMBER, ABC')	 (6.4)
This model may be improved for the Spanish case by including
other managerial variables that theory suggested might influence
bank capital augmentations. Theories in Chapter 5 suggested that
liquidity and cost of capital with the related issues of
profitability, retained earnings, dividend policy and access to
domestic and international capital markets are likely to affect
bank capital augmentations.
This model may also be improved by considering different
definitions of capital: book-value, regulatory capital and
market-value capital. Within these three definitions of capital,
one can consider different subdefinitions. For example, within
book-value, as we examined in Chapter 4, one can consider
different parts of the capital base. Within the regulatory
capital, one can consider Tier 1 and Tier 2. Within market-valued
capital, one can consider amongst others, market capitalization.
Once the results for different measures of capital and
capital ratios based on the methodology of Peltzman / Mingo /
Dietrich and James, have been obtained, a second set of tests
based on Keeley methodology (1988) can be carried out to further
examine regulatory effects. Keeley's methodology is based on
equation (6.5) :
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d(C/A)/dt = (C/A) [(1/C)(dC/dt) - (1/A)(dA/dt)] 	 (6.5)
This equation indicates that the rate of change of the
capital-to-asset ratio is equal to the percentage growth rate of
capital minus the percentage growth rate of assets times the
initial capital-to-asset ratio. Consequently, with this model we
can test the impact of capital augmentations on capital ratios.
NOTES:
1.- See Weiss and Strickland (1976, Chapter 1) for a study of the
characteristics of the regulated industries.
2.- See Revell (1975), Llewellyn (1986), and Gardener (1986a) for
an analysis of banking regulation and supervision.
3.- This is a potential problem with all econometric work, and
specifically (or more significantly) related to the efforts to
estimate the effects of regulation.
4.- Schwert (1981) discusses many issues related to this method.
Despite potential complications, regulatory assets permit a fairly
clean test of profitability effects.
5.- Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia.
6.- See Marcus (1983) for a detailed explanation of the use of
these variables.
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CHAPTER 7 : HYPOTHESES, MODEL, DATA AND INITIAL RESULTS
7.1.- INTRODUCTION.
The main purpose of this chapter is to develop a general
empirical model of capital augmentations. This model will be
applied separately to private and savings banks, and the initial
empirical tests on the effects of capital adequacy regulation on
bank capital augmentations will be performed. Since no savings
bank in Spain has market-valued capital, and since our purpose is
to establish a general model here for both private and savings
banks, only book-value and supervisory (Tiers 1 and 2) capital
augmentations will be considered. The market-value capital
augmentations for the private banks quoted on the Spanish stock
market will be analyzed in Chapter 8.
Before the empirical tests and results are analyzed, the
researcher needs to provide the relevant hypotheses to be tested
and the model to be employed in this chapter. As has been
explained, the literature and evidence surveyed in the two
previous chapters are used to develop our hypotheses and empirical
model of capital augmentations. However, the researcher will have
to refine the hypotheses and model in order to reflect more
closely the characteristics of the Spanish banking system, our
'specific laboratory'.
It is necessary to review the main methodological issues that
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arise from the use of financial ratios since most variables in our
model are expressed in the form of ratios. The researcher also
needs to revise the main aspects of the statistical tools employed
in the analysis.
Therefore, the chapter will be organized in the following
manner. Firstly, the test hypotheses and the empirical model to be
employed are specified. Then, the main methodological issues
surrounding the use of financial ratios and multiple regression
analysis are reviewed. Next, the data source is described. Then, a
descriptive analysis of the summary statistics of the variables
employed is undertaken, followed by the results of the tests.
Finally, the synthesis of the chapter is provided.
7.2.- TESTING HYPOTHESES AND MODEL SPECIFICATION.
7.2.1.- Testing Hypotheses.
In this chapter, our main testing objectives are concerned
with the following hypotheses:
a) What is the impact of bank capital regulation on capital
augmentations of banks operating in Spain during 1987-90 ?
Is the impact different across different book-value and
supervisory definitions of capital augmentations ?
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Is the impact different across different types of banking
institution (domestic and foreign private banks and savings
banks) ?
Is the impact different in 1988 and 1989 when the BIS
Agreement (1988) on international capital adequacy convergence and
the EC Directive (1989/647) on Solvency ratios were approved,
respectively ?
How does the existence of a Deposit Guarantee Fund affect
capital augmentations ?
b) What managerial variables influence capital augmentations?
Are managerial influences more important than regulatory
ones ?
How do variables such as profitability, cost of capital,
portfolio risk, liquidity and access to capital markets influence
capital augmentations in banks operating in Spain ?
Are there different impacts across different types of
definitions of bank capital and across different types of
institutions ?
The above hypotheses will be tested together in a model of
capital augmentations for the banks operating in Spain. The next
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step is to specify such a model and the variables included in it.
7.2.2.- Specification of Model and Variables.
7.2.2.1.- Model Assumptions and Specification.
The model to be employed is a Classical Linear Regression
Multivariate Model (CLR multivariate model). This implies that the
dependent variable is a linear function of a specific set of
independent variables, plus a disturbance term. It can be written
as
Y = X + E 13 X +
	
(7.1)
.1=1
where a is the intercept, p are the unknown parameters, g is the
disturbance term, j is the number of variables (j = 1,...,m), and
i is the number of observations (i = 1,...,n). Kennedy (1992,
p.45) writes the expression in terms of matrices as follows
Y =xp+ c	 (7.2)
where Y is a vector of observations on the dependent variable, X
is a matrix of observations on the independent variables, p is the
matrix of the coefficients of the linear function and c is a
vector of disturbances.
According to Kennedy (1992, p.43-45), the main assumptions of
the CLR model are the followingl:
(1) The expected value of the disturbance terms is zero.
In other words, the mean of the distribution from which the
disturbance term is drawn is zero. This can be expressed
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mathematically as follows
Ec = 0	 (7.3)
(2) The disturbance terms all have the same variance and
are not correlated with one another. This can be written
mathematically as:
Ecc'= a2 I	 (7.4)
where a2 is the variance of the disturbances, c' is the transposed
matrix of c, and I is the identity matrix. Assumptions (1) and (2)
can be expressed as 4 , _ N (0, a2).
(3) The observations on the independent variables can be
considered fixed in repeated samples. In other words, it is
possible to repeat the sample with the same independent variables.
(4) The number of observations is greater than the
number of independent variables and there are no exact linear
relationships between these independent variables. This can be
expressed mathematically as
Rank of X = K T	 (7.5)
where K is the number of independent variables and T is the number
of observations.
Our general model for bank capital augmentations in Spain has
been constructed by both considering the main empirical models
found in the literature and by refining the model to reflect more
closely the Spanish case in terms of capital augmentations. Our
general model can be expressed as follows:
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AK = f( Profitability, Cost of Capital, Portfolio Risk,
Liquidity, ADeposits, Capital Regulation, Deposit
Insurance, Access to Capital Markets)
	 (7.6)
where AK are increases in capital (capital augmentations) and
ADeposits are increases in deposits. The latter is included in the
model in order to attempt to explain the capital augmentations
process apart from straightforward responses to deposit changes.
One can express the above model in mathematical terms as
follows (note that p0 is the intercept):
%AK =
	
+ p l pF + p 2cc + p 8 pic + p 4LQ + 13 8AD +
+ p8KR + p7DI + p8cm + c	 (7.7)
where:
%AK = variable representing banks' capital augmentations
PF = variable representing banks' profitability
CC = variable representing banks' cost of capital
PK = variable representing banks' portfolio risk
LQ = variable representing bank's liquidity
AD = variable representing deposits growth
KR = variable representing capital adequacy regulation
DI = variable representing deposit insurance
CM = variable representing access to capital markets.
The actual definitions and forms of the different variables
are explained in the following subsection.
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7.2.2.2.- Variable specification.
A) Capital Augmentation.
This chapter focuses upon the following three definitions of
capital augmentations (%AK):
A.1) Supervisory Tier 1 Capital Augmentation (%AK1):
when this definition is employed, the dependent variable of the
empirical model is the annual increase in the sum of book-value
share equity and published reserves in the case of private banks;
and foundation funds, published reserves, the Social Works funds
in the case of the savings banks. As examined in Chapter 5, this
is the preferred definition by regulators since it emphasizes
increases in permanent capital within the banking firm.
Peltzman (1970), Mingo (1975) and Dietrich and James
(1983) employed this same definition of capital growth.
Subordinated debt and other financial instruments were not
included in the definitions of supervisory capital in their
samples. Peltzman used a sample of 1963-65; Mingo's sample was
1969-70; Dietrich and James employed a sample of 1971-75. All
these studies employed U.S. banks' data.
The researcher will compute the values of %AK 1 as
follows:
% AKit
(Tier 1) t - (Tier 1) t.-1
(Tier 1) t-1
(7.8)
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(Tier 1 + Sub. Debt)
t -
2t
(7.9)
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A.2) Supervisory Tier 1 plus Tier 2 Capital Augmentation
(%AK2 ): the dependent variable with this definition, is the annual
growth in the sum of Tier 1 (above) and subordinated debt (Tier
2). This is the actual definition of bank capital applied by
Spanish regulators, but we must be aware that the subordinated
debt is limited to 20 % of the calculated capital requirements and
30 % of total own funds.
Mingo (1975) performed tests with the inclusion of
long-term borrowed capital in the definition of capital and he
found that that inclusion did not affect the results that he
obtained with only share equity and reserves.
The values of %AK2 will be computed in the following
way:
A.3) Book-Value Capital Base Augmentation (%AK 3 ): in
this case the dependent variable will be the growth of the capital
base computed as in Chapter 4. Therefore, in the case of the
private banks, the book-value capital base augmentation will
represent the growth in the sum of share equity, reserves, bad
loans provisions and subordinated debt. In the case of the savings
banks, it will include the growth in the sum of foundation funds,
reserves, Social Works funds, bad loans provisions and
subordinated debt.
Mayne (1972) employs this definition of bank capital
when she tested the supervisory influence on bank capital. Instead
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of employing the capital augmentation, she used the capital base
to asset's ratio as the dependent variable.
The values of %AK will be calculated as follows:3
(BV Capital Base)_t (BV Capital Base) t -1%AK3t (BV Capital Base)t_i
(7.10)
B) Profitability (PF).
The first independent variable considered is
profitability. Rather than the retained earnings ratio, we have
taken profitability for the initial tests. The reason for this is
that the concept of retained earnings and dividend pay-out is
irrelevant for the Spanish savings banks (they do not pay out
dividend), and thus in order to reflect in the same manner the
impact of internal capital generation on capital augmentations, it
will be proxied by profitability.
Foster (1986, p. 67) defines profitability as the
ability of a firm to generate revenues in excess of expenses. He
emphasizes that when making comparisons across firms (or over
time), it is useful to control for differences in their resource
base. He suggests three ratios as alternative ways of expressing
relative profitability: profit margin, return on equity and return
on assets. They all have the same numerator (net income), but
different denominators: total revenue, total equity capital, and
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total assets2.
Sinkey (1992, p.271) discusses the implications of the
three profitability ratios in the banking firm. Accounting ROE
measures profitability from the owners's perspective. Its main
shortcoming as a measure of bank profitability is that ROE can be
high because a bank has inadequate equity capital. In addition, a
bank with negative book equity but positive profits would show a
negative ROE. By decomposing ROE into ROA and the equity
multiplier, this dilemma can be resolved. Therefore, according to
Sinkey, ROA is the preferred accounting measure of bank
profitability. It measures how profitably all of a bank's assets
are employed. Sinkey maintains that the profit margin represents a
bank's ability to control expenses, rather than as a fully
informative measure of profitability.
Mayne (1972) uses the ratio of before-tax adjusted
operating earnings in year t to average total assets in year t as
the measure of profitability level. Mayne finds a positive
relationship between this variable and capital increases. This
positive association is consonant with retained earnings being the
primary source for increasing bank capital. The ROA relevant for
the capital augmentations of year t is that of year t-1, since the
retained profits of year t-1 are those which make capital augment
in year t. Thus, the ROA of year t-1 is, in our opinion, the
relevant measure of profitability in the present context.
The choice of ROA of year t-1 is also justified for practical
reasons. The cost of capital variable will be expressed in terms
of ROE. Therefore, ROA of year t-1 will represent profitability in
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the present context in order to avoid expressing both
profitability and cost of capital with the same variable.
The profitability measure (PF) will be calculated in the
following manner:
PFt-
(Before-Tax Net Income)
t-1
(Total Assets) t-1
(7.11)
C) Cost of Capital (CC).
The second independent variable is cost of capital.
There are no market values for savings banks and many private
banks operating in Spain, and no dividends payout for savings
banks. Thus, if one wishes the cost of capital variable to be the
same for all the banks, one cannot take a definition which
includes market values and/or dividend payouts.
Derry (1982) suggests that the present rate of return on
common equity (ROE) may be employed as a measure of the cost of
capital. This, then, may be considered as a proxy for the required
return that a bank's managers believe that it is necessary to
reach in order to fulfill owner's expectations in terms of the
return on their equity. In this context, one would expect the sign
of the impact of cost of capital on capital augmentations to be
negative. However, an interpretation problem emerges. ROE may also
be considered as a measure of profitability and, thus, the
expected relationship would be positive. Peltzman (1970), Mingo
(1975) and Dietrich and James (1983) employ the ratio of net
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income in year t to lagged capital in year t-1 as a proxy for the
expected rate of profitability in banking.
Therefore, for the reasons expressed above, one must be
very cautious about the interpretation of the sign of the variable
representing cost of capital. The researcher will employ the
present rate of ROE to represent a proxy of this year's cost of
capital. It can be expressed as
(Before-Tax Net Income) t
(7.12)
(Equity)t
D) Portfolio Risk (PK).
The fourth determinant of bank capital augmentations
considered is portfolio risk, which plays a key role in the model
since capital standards are computed according to the risk held in
the bank's portfolio. The interpretation of this variable can be
twofold:
- First of all, it is a market-based managerial variable
since it is important for bank managers to keep a proper balance
between portfolio risk and capital in order to achieve a good
market value. A bank which is considered too risky and/or is
considered to have low capital is likely to have a low value in
the marketplace and may be considered by depositors and investors
as an unsafe institution.
- However, its interpretation may also be a regulatory
one. Since in the current capital regulation in Spain there exists
a specific ratio whereby the portfolio risk of assets and capital
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standards are linked, the parameter of this variable may also be
understood as the effect of the risk-based capital adequacy on
bank capital augmentations.
In the literature, there seems to be a predominance of
the capital-market measures of bank risk 3 . Sinkey (1992, p. 406-7)
suggest three market measures of bank risk: (1) total return risk,
(2) market or systematic risk captured and (3) non-systematic or
firm-specific risk. A bank's total insolvency risk consists of
systematic risk and unsystematic risk. The Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) provides a method for measuring the risk that cannot
be eliminated (systemic risk) and calls it (beta). Statistically
g, is equal to
Cov(j,M)
where Cov(j,M) is the covariance between the return on the jth
security and the return on the market portfolio.
However, the researcher will not employ market-based
measures of bank portfolio since there is very limited data for
the Spanish banks and no general model could be suggested.
Instead, similar measures to those found in the literature of
capital augmentations will be utilized.
In the empirical literature, several proxies have been
used to represent portfolio risk in order to avoid capital-
market-based and overly complex expressions of bank portfolio mix
risk. Peltzman (1970), Mingo (1975) and Dietrich and James (1983)
employed the ratio of U.S. government bonds to deposits net of
cash assets as a measure of asset default risk. This ratio
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measures the proportion of the bank's portfolio held in riskless
assets. However, Mayne (1972) utilized the ratio of average
minimum risk assets (total U.S. Government securities exclusive of
Federal agency issues, plus securities loans to dealers and real
estate loans) to average assets. The higher the ratios, the less
risk from default associated with the portfolio and hence the less
capital required.
Our portfolio risk variable will be built employing the
ratio of Spanish Government securities in a bank's portfolio to
total assets. The portfolio risk variable is defined as the annual
increase in portfolio risk, since our variable of interest
(capital augmentations) is also defined in terms of increases. The
higher the increase in portfolio risk, ceteris paribus, the higher
the capital augmentation needed.
Our variable representing portfolio risk (PK) is as
follows:
(Ratio A) t - (Ratio A) t-1
(Ratio A) t-1
(Public Sector Securities)
where Ratio A - 	
Total Assets
E) Liquidity (LQ).
PK t - (7.14)
The fifth variable in our empirical model measures the
impact of bank's liquidity on bank's capital augmentation. As
indicated in Section 5.4.3, Sealey (1983) and Crouhy and Galai
(1986) maintain the important role of liquidity for the solvency
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of the banking firm. Mayne (1972) is the only case in the
literature of capital augmentations where the impact of liquidity
on bank capital is accounted for.
Several measures of bank liquidity have been suggested
in the literature. Sinkey (1992 (p. 535-40), in a review of the
main measures of bank liquidity, classifies liquidity into two
main segments: (i) the liquidity that can be stored in a bank's
balance sheet and (ii) the liquidity that can be purchased in the
marketplace. Sinkey argues that measuring stored liquidity is
easier since it is difficult to gauge the confidence that money
and deposit markets have in a particular borrower. A measure of
stored liquidity will be used since there are only data available
on stored liquidity for all the banks4.
Mayne (1972) employs the ratio of average cash accounts
(cash in vault, Federal Reserve Balances for member banks, due
from banks) to average assets as a proxy for liquidity. Her
results show that the higher the ratio of cash to total assets,
the higher the capital ratios. This seeming anomaly may be
understood according to Mayne when it is realized that an
association between two variables does nor necessarily imply a
cause-and-effect relationship. Mayne argues that the liquidity
variable may be a measure of management conservatism in which case
a bank that holds a high level of cash assets could also be
expected to desire a sizable cash cushion.
However, one could also expect the sign of this variable
to be negative since the lower the liquidity of the firm, the
higher the risk and hence the higher the capital required. Thus,
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one must be cautious about the interpretation of the sign of this
variable.
Our measure of liquidity will be expressed in terms of
annual increases of the liquidity ratios. Our liquidity ratio
(Liq. ratio) is cash accounts (cash and Bank of Spain's balances)
to total assets. Our variable (LQ) is measured as follows:
(Liq. Ratio) t - (Liq. Ratio) t-1
LQt -
	
	 	 (7.15)
(Liq. Ratio) t-
F) Deposits Growth (AD).
The percentage growth in deposits is included as an
explanatory variable because our empirical model for Spain
represents an attempt to explain the capital augmentation process
apart from straightforward responses to deposit changes. Peltzman
(1970), Mingo (1975) and Dietrich and James (1983) also included
this variable in their models since they also attempted to explain
bank capital increases apart from simple responses to deposit
trends.
The variable will be defined in the following manner:
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G) Capital Regulation (KR).
In order to measure the response of bank capital
augmentations to regulatory standards of capital adequacy, one
must employ a variable that contains a formula used by regulators
in bank examinations. We saw in Chapter 3 that the Spanish capital
standards regulation includes two ratios: (i) a specific or
risk-based ratio and (ii) a generic ratio. The impossibility of
computing the risk-based capital ratios because of the lack of
regulatory data on the different types of assets held by banks in
their portfolios prevents us from computing the risk-based ratios.
Therefore, the analysis will focus on the generic ratio
(capital/total investment), which can be computed with the data
available.
In the literature, the ratio employed to measure the
impact of capital regulation on bank capital augmentations is the
ratio of supervisory required capital to capital actually held by
banks (Peltzman, 1970; Mingo, 1975; Dietrich and James, 1983).
This variable measures the regulator-desired increment to bank
capital. Peltzman (1970) used three different formulas of capital
adequacy : a formula developed by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, an adjusted risk-assets formula and a
formula developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York s . Mingo
(1975) and Dietrich and James (1983) employed the same regulatory
capital formula in which "desired" capital is calculated using a
complex formula which attaches subjective weights to each of the
major balance-sheet items. These authors define the regulatory
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capital variable (denominated ABC') as the negative inverse of the
ratio of each bank's observed accounting equity capital to the
amount of capital desired by the regulator. The inverse
formulation is used to permit a nonlinear response to regulatory
pressure, i.e., a capital response decreasing in absolute value as
the regulator's ABC variable increases. The nonlinear response to
regulatory pressure reflects the likelihood that relatively
greater pressure to augment capital is exerted by regulators on
banks with accounting capital far below the required capital than
on banks whose accounting capital almost achieves the required
standard. They use the negative formulation for convenience, so
that if regulation is effective, the expected sign on the ABC'
coefficient is negative6.
Our capital regulation variable (KR) for the Spanish
banking system will be computed as the negative inverse of the
ratio of each bank's observed regulatory capital to the amount of
regulatory capital desired by the Spanish regulators in the
generic ratio (Spanish regulator-desired capital = 5 per cent
of Total Investments) 7 . This is calculated as follows:
KRt -
Regulator-desired Capitalt
Actual Regulatory Capitalt
H) Deposit Insurance (DI).
One of the main hypotheses this research aims to test is
(7.17)
that Spanish regulators have been able to prevent bankers from
substituting deposit insurance for bank capital. The Spanish
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Deposit Guarantee Fund is not explicitly obligatory, but
practically all banks are members of the Fund. This fact prevents
us from representing this variable as a dummy.
In the U.S. literature, the most common way of measuring
the impact of deposit insurance on capital augmentations has been
through the percentage of total deposits insured by the FDIC
(Peltzman, 1970; Mingo 1975; Dietrich and James, 1983). However,
this variable cannot be applied to the Spanish case since there is
a fixed percentage of deposits for all banks that wish to join the
Deposit Guarantee Fund, and all the banks would have the same
percentage of deposits insured, and only irrelevant results would
be obtained.
The variable employed to represent the deposit guarantee
will contain the annual contribution to the Deposit Guarantee Fund
for every bank, which varies according to the increase (or
decrease) of the deposits in every bank. For example, a bank which
experiences an important increase in its deposits will need to
make an important contribution to the Fund in order to insure
those new deposits and to maintain the required percentage of all
deposits in the Fund. In order to account for the different sizes
of the banks, the annual contribution to the Deposit Guarantee
Fund (DGF) will be divided by total assets. Total assets are
employed instead of total deposits in order to avoid
multicollinearity of this variable with the deposit growth
variable. Thus, the deposit insurance variable (DI) will be
computed as follows:
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(Contribution to DGF )t
Total Assets t
(7.18)
Sinkey (1992, pp. 160-162) argues that in the practice,
inter alia, the safety net to depository institutions reflects a
regulatory practice based on the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) doctrine
as a manifestation of the government guarantee behind deposit
insurance. When a bank, especially a large one, has serious
financial difficulties, one of the actions that bank supervisors
appear to encourage is to arrange for another bank to assume the
insured deposits. When this practice (which is called a
purchase-and-assumption transaction in the U.S.) is used, the
buyer assumes all of the failed bank's liabilities. This results
in 100 per cent deposit insurance protection.
This practice of protecting large banks has apparently
established a public perception and expectation that big banks are
too important to fail outright. In terms of our variable DI, the
TBTF doctrine appears to imply that big banks, which usually give
large contributions to the Deposit Guarantee Fund, might be
encouraged to substitute deposit insurance for capital: that is,
to rely on the regulatory safety net rather than on their own
safety cushion (capital).
Following the same line of reasoning as Peltzman (1970),
Mingo (1975) and Dietrich and James (1983), if regulation is
successful at preventing substitution of deposit insurance for
capital, the coefficient of this variable should be
insignificantly different from zero. A significantly negative
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coefficient would indicate some failure of the Spanish regulators
to prevent substitution of deposit insurance for capital.
I) Access to Capital Markets (CM).
The last variable included in this initial general model
of capital augmentations for the Spanish banking system is access
to capital markets. This variable is generally ignored in the
empirical literature of capital augmentations, but it seems a key
variable in capital augmentations, particularly when they need to
increase capital beyond the internal capital generation rate.
Sinkey (1992, p. 770) maintains that although in finance
theory the assumption of equal access to capital markets is
frequently invoked, in the real world equal access is a fiction,
since a large number of banks simply do not have the opportunity
to tap domestic and international capital markets. Thus, there
seems to be different opportunities to raise capital externally.
In order to reflect the different access possibilities
to capital markets, a dummy variable (CM) has been created. This
variable is equal to 1, when the bank is quoted on any Stock
Exchange, and is equal to zero when the bank is not quoted on any
Stock Exchange. This variable will not be included in the
empirical model for the savings banks since no savings bank in
Spain is quoted in any Stock Exchange. The coefficient of CM will
give the difference between the capital augmentations of the banks
quoted on the Stock Exchange (apparently, with easy access to
capital markets) and that of those banks not quoted.
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7.3.- METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES.
7.3.1.- Introduction.
This section is devoted to the review of the main
methodological problems which may arise from the use of the
econometric tools and the form of the variables (ratio) used in
our empirical analysis of the impact of capital regulation on bank
capital augmentation in the Spanish banking system. Fundamentally,
this section will only consider the methodological issues relevant
to our empirical analysis.
Basically, two methodological issues need to be discussed:
(i) the use of regression analysis and (ii) the use of financial
ratios to represent the variables included in the model. Firstly,
the main issues of the regression analysis are appraised. Then,
the main issues in the use of financial ratios are discussed.
7.3.2.- Regression Analysis: Main Methodological Issues.
In this subsection, the main methodological issues of the use
of the regression analysis tools in our empirical study are
analyzed. This subsection will only focus upon the issues involved
in our analysis. First the main issues related to the use of the
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators are reviewed. Then, the
problems with the model specification are examined and the
solution to overcome them is specified. Next, the main issues with
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the use of dummy variables are evaluated. Finally, the main tests
undertaken in our analysis are specified.
7.3.2.1.- Ordinary Least Squares (OZS).
The OLS estimators will be used to obtain our empirical
results. The OLS estimators generates the set of values of the
parameters that minimizes the sum of the squared residuals and is
denoted by eLS According to Kennedy (1992, p. 44-45), the OLS
estimator is extraordinarily popular among econometricians and
this popularity stems from the fact, that in the context of the
Classical Linear Regression Model, the OLS estimator has a large
number of desirable properties.
Kennedy suggests eight criteria to determine how the OLS
estimator rates in the context of the CLR model. The criteria are
the following:
(1) Computational Cost: all computer packages include
the OLS estimator for linear relationships, and many have routines
for nonlinear cases. Therefore, the OLS estimator is desirable for
its computational ease.
(2) Least Squares: sine the OLS estimator is designed to
minimize the sum of squares residual, it is automatically optimal
on this criterion.
(3) Highest R2 (coefficient of determination): R 2 is the
square of the correlation coefficient between the dependent
variable and its OLS estimate. R2 is given by the sum of squared
variations of the estimated values of the dependent variable about
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their mean (the regression sum of squares or ESS) divided by the
the total variation of the dependent variable about its mean (the
total sum of squares or TSS). Then, it is given by ESS / TSS or by
1 - (RSS / TSS), where RSS is the sum of squared residuals. Thus,
since the OLS estimator is designed to minimize the sum of squared
residuals, it will automatically be optimal on the highest R2
criterion.
•(4) Unbiasedness: an estimator g Is said to be an
unbiased estimator of g if the mean of its sampling distribution
is equal to g. The assumptions of the CLR model, explained at the
show that the OLS estimator is anbeginning of this chapter,
unbiased estimator of g.
(5) Best Unbiasedness: among all linear unbiased
estimators of g g OLS can be shown to have the smallest
variance-covariance matrix in the context of the CLR model. If one
adds the additional assumption that the disturbances are
distributed normally, it can be shown that the OLS estimator is
the best unbiased estimator.
(6) Mean Square Error: using the best unbiased criterion
allows unbiasedness to play an extremely strong role in
determining the choice of an estimator, since only unbiased
estimators are considered. It may well be the case that, by
restricting attention to only unbiased estimators, we are ignoring
estimators that are only slightly biased but have considerably
lower variances. This trade-off between low bias and low variance
is formalized by using as a criterion the minimization of a
weighted average of the bias and the average. However, this is not
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a viable formalization, because the bias could be negative. One
way to correct for this is to use its square. When the weights are
equal, the criterion is the mean square error criterion. Kennedy
(1992) maintains that it is not the case that the OLS estimator is
the minimum mean square estimator in the CLR model. This is the
OLS estimator's weakest point.
(7) Asymptotic criteria: the sampling distribution of
most estimators changes as the sample size changes. In many cases,
it happens that a biased estimator becomes less biased as the
sample size becomes larger and, in turn, the mean of its sampling
distribution shifts closer to the true value of the parameter
being estimated. Econometricians have formalized their study of
these phenomena by structuring the concept of an asymptotic
distribution. Since the OLS estimator in the CLR is unbiased, it
is also unbiased in samples of infinite size and thus is
asymptotically unbiased. Kennedy (1992) indicates that the
variance-covariance matrix of RMS goes to zero as the sample size
goes to infinity, so that the OLS estimator is also a consistent
estimator of p.
(8) Maximum Likelihood: the maximum likelihood principle
of estimation is based on the idea that the sample of data at hand
is more likely to have come from a "real world" characterized by
one particular set of parameter values than from a "real world"
characterized by any other set of parameter value. The maximum
likelihood estimate (MLE) of a vector of parameter values 0 is
simply the particular vector f3 gives the greatest
probability of obtaining the observed data. It is impossible to
276
CHAPTER 7: HYPOTHESES, MODEL, DATA AND INITIAL RESULTS
calculate the maximum likelihood estimator given the assumptions
of the CLR model, because these assumptions do not specify the
functional form of the distribution of the disturbance terms.
However, if the disturbances are assumed to be distributed
normally, it turns out that the gmE is identical to OLS
In the literature of the impact of bank supervision on bank
capital augmentations, several authors have employed the OLS
estimators to obtain their results (Peltzman, 1970; Mayne, 1972;
Mingo, 1975; Dietrich and James, 1983). As described in Chapter 6,
these studies provide an important methodological background to
the empirical analysis we will undertake.
7.3.2.2.- Model Specification : Problems and Solution.
The main problem with regard to the model specification is
the possibility of an incorrect set of independent variables in
our model. According to Kennedy (1992, p. 91-92), the consequences
of using an incorrect set of independent variables fall into two
categories:
(1) Omission of a relevant independent variable. There
are basically three main consequences :
- In general, the OLS estimator of the coefficients of
the remaining variables is biased.
- The variance-covariance matrix o f g OLS becomes
smaller.
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- The estimator of the now smaller variance-covariance
matrix of p OLS is biased upward, because the estimator of c2 , the
variance of the error term, is biased upward. This causes
inferences concerning these parameters to be inaccurate.
(2) Inclusion of an irrelevant variable. There are two
main consequences:
- The OLS estimator and the estimator of its
variance-covariance matrix remain unbiased.
- Unless the irrelevant variable is orthogonal to the
other independent variables, the variance-covariance matrix
becomes larger; the OLS estimator is not as efficient.
In order to obtain the correct set of explanatory variables,
the first and foremost ingredient is economic theory (Kennedy,
1992). If economic theory cannot defend the use of a variable as
an explanatory variable, it should not be included in the set of
potential independent variables. Such theorizing should take place
before any empirical testing of the appropriateness of potential
independent variables. The researcher has followed this criterion
when specifying our empirical model of capital augmentations for
the Spanish banking system. The empirical model of bank capital
augmentations is based upon the determinants that banking theory
suggests. This makes the model and general empirical approach more
robust.
Unfortunately, there is a limit to the information that
economic theory can provide in this respect. For example, economic
theory can suggest that lagged values of an explanatory variable
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should be included, but will seldom suggest how many such
variables should be included. The model also must contain
particular features of the population analyzed, such as our case,
the Spanish banking system, which may have not been directly
suggested (or completely covered) by the economic theory. In
short, 'good' theory and respective empirical methodologies may
also need to be adjusted and modified in order to reflect the
particular 'laboratory' data and conditions. The researcher has
followed this approach.
7.3.2.3.- The Use of Dummy Variables.
One needs to review the main aspects of the use of dummy
variables in the regression analysis since one dummy variable is
included in the equations: this variable is the access to capital
markets (CM).
Explanatory variables are often qualitative in nature (e.g.
banks quoted in the Stock Exchange versus banks not quoted in the
Stock Exchange), so that some proxy must be constructed to
represent them in a regression. Dummy variables are used for this
purpose. A dummy variable is an artificial variable constructed
such that it takes the value unity whenever the qualitative
phenomenon it represents occurs, and zero otherwise 8 . Once
created, these proxies, or dummies as they are denominated, are
employed in the CLR model just like any other explanatory
variable, yielding standard OLS results.
Dummy variables coefficients are interpreted as showing the
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extent to which behaviour in one category deviates from some base
(the "omitted" category). In our case, the researcher wishes to
examine the extent to which banks with easy access to capital
markets (proxied by quoting in Stock Exchange) deviate from those
banks with no easy access to capital markets (not quoted in Stock
Exchange), in terms of capital augmentations.
Kennedy (1992, p. 218) maintains that most researchers find
the equation (containing a dummy variable) with an intercept more
convenient because it allows them to address more easily the
questions in which they usually have the most interest: namely
whether or not the categorization makes a difference and if so by
how much. If the categorization (e.g. between banks with easy
access to capital markets and those without easy access to capital
markets) does make a difference, by how much is directly measured
by the dummy variable coefficient estimates. Testing whether or
not the categorization is relevant can be done by running a t test
of a dummy variable coefficient against zero. This will be further
examined in next subsection.
In the empirical literature on bank capital augmentations,
dummy variables have been employed in the equations estimated.
Peltzman (1970) employed dummy variables to distinguish between
the different years (1963 and 1965). Mayne (1972) used dummy
variable for the different bank regulatory classes (national
banks, state-chartered Federal Reserve System member banks and
state nonmember banks). Mingo (1975) and Dietrich and James (1983)
employed a dummy variable to distinguish between Federal Reserve
member banks and nonmember banks.
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7.3.2.4.- Main Tests in our Analysis.
In this chapter, the following tests will be undertaken after
obtaining the regression equations: test of significance, test for
multicollinearity, test for heteroskedasticity and test for
autocorrelation. The first test is to examine the significance of
the parameters and of the model as a whole. The other three tests
consider the three main problems that might emerge in our
analysis. Let us review the main aspects of these tests:
A) Tests of Significance: broadly speaking, a test of
significance is a procedure by which sample results are used to
verify the truth or falsity of a null hypothesis (Gujarati, 1988,
p. 109). The key idea behind the tests of significance is that of
a test statistic (estimator) and the sampling distribution of such
statistic under the null hypothesis, (H 0 ). In the language of
statistics, the stated hypothesis is known as the null hypothesis.
The null hypothesis is usually tested against an alternative
hypothesis, denoted by H 1 . The decision to accept or reject the
null hypothesis is made on the basis of the value of the test
statistic obtained from the data at hand. Two tests of
significance will be performed:
A.1) Testing the Significance of Individual
Regression Coefficients: if one invokes the assumption that
u_ N(0,(7.2 ), then one can use the t-test to test a hypothesis
about any individual partial regression coefficient. Our null
hypothesis will be that, pi is zero: that is, the variable which
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that parameter represents has no linear influence on the dependent
variable, in our case, bank capital augmentations. This is
postulated as
H: g = 0	 and	 H: g	 o0	 1	 1	 1
The t-statistic can be obtained as follows:
(7.19)
p.
g i — 0
t — 	 p.	 (7.20)
se()
which follows the t distribution with n - k degrees of freedom,
where g i is the estimated value of g i , se stands for standard
error, n is the number of observations, and k is the number of
independent variables. If the computed t value exceeds the
critical t value in the t-distribution table at the chosen level
of significance (denoted by a), one may reject the null
hypothesis. The researcher undertakes two-tail teste. The level
of significance chosen is a = 0.05 which gives a 95 per cent
confidence. In our case, if the null hypothesis is rejected with
95 per cent confidence coefficient, it means that the independent
variable has a significant influence on the dependent variable (in
our case, bank capital augmentations) with 95 per cent confidence.
The use of the t-tests, as they are denominated, is so common
that most packaged computer programs designed to compute the OLS
estimators have included in their output a number called
t-statistic for each parameter estimate. This will appear in the
output obtained from Minitab, which is the packaged computer
program employed in this research.
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A.2) Testing the Overall Significance of the
Regression: in this case we test the hypothesis that all slope
coefficients are simultaneously zero:
H
o :
	 = (3 =	 =	 = o
1	 2
versus
(7.21)
H : Not all slope coefficients are simultaneously zero.
One needs to compute the F-ratio as follows:
ESS/(k-1)
F - 
	
	 	
(7.22)
RSS/(n-k)
where ESS is the regression sum of squares, RSS is the sum of
squared residuals. If F > F a (k-1, n-k), one rejects the null
hypothesis; otherwise one may accept it, where F a (k-1, n-k) is the
critical F value at the a level of significance (in our case a =
0.05). If one rejects the null hypothesis at a = 0.05, it means
that the regression is significant as a whole with 95 per cent
confidence.
Most regression packages routinely calculate the F value
along with the usual regression output. This will also appear in
the output obtained with Minitab.
Once the tests of significance have been introduced, one
needs to introduce the other three tests to be undertaken, which
are associated with the three main problems that may emerge in the
regression analysis.
B) Test for Multicollinearity: it is possible to
have an approximate linear relationship among independent
variables. Kennedy (1992, p. 176) argues that although the
estimation procedure does not break down when the independent
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variables are highly correlated, severe estimation problems arise.
The OLS estimator in the presence of multicollinearity remains
unbiased; the R2
 statistic is unaffected. The major undesirable
consequence of multicollinearity is that the variances of the OLS
estimates of the parameters of the collinear are large (Gujarati,
1988, p. 290).
A very popular means of detecting multicollinearity is
through the use of the correlation matrix. The off-diagonal
elements contain the simple correlation coefficients for the given
data set. Cooper and Weekes (1983, p.195) and Kennedy (1992, p.
180) maintain that a high value (about 0.8 or 0.9 in absolute
value) of one of these correlation coefficients indicates high
correlation between the two independent variables to which it
refers. The researcher will compute the correlation matrix for all
the variables employed in the regressions in order to detect
potential bilateral multicollinearity.
Having high variances means that the parameter estimates are
not precise and hypothesis testing is not powerful. Gujarati
(1988, p. 293) suggests that a high R 2 but few significant t
ratios is one of the symptoms of multicollinearity: this is
another way of detecting multicollinearity.
With the statistical package used by the researcher the
program will signal and drop any variable causing
multicollinearity.
C) Test for Heteroskedasticity: heteroskedasticity
occurs when the disturbances do not all have the same variance. In
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the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance vector, if the
diagonal terms are not all the same, the disturbances are said to
be heteroskedastic. If they are all the same, they are said to be
homoskedastic (which is one of the assumptions of the CLR model).
According to Kennedy (1992, P. 114-5), the main consequences
of heteroskedasticity are as follows: (i) the OLS estimator
remains unbiased, but it no longer has minimum variance among all
linear unbiased estimators, and (ii) as a result of this,
hypothesis testing can no longer be trusted in this context.
In order to test for heteroskedasticity, we will follow
a test suggested by Newbold (1984, p. 586). Consider a regression
model:
(7.23)Y = a+px +px +...+px +c
i ii	 2 2i	 k ki
linking a dependent variable to k independent variables, and based
on n sets of observations. Let a, b i , b	 b be the usual
2
least squares estimates of the coefficients of this model, so that
the predicted values of the dependent variable are
yi = a + bx + bx +...+ bx11 	 221	 k ki
and the residuals from the fitted model are
(7.24)
e i = yi - y i
	(7.25)
In order to test the null hypothesis that the error terms,
c , all have the same variance against the alternative that their
variances depend on the expected values
we estimate a simple linear regression. In this regression, the
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dependent variable is the square of the residual, that is e 2 , and
the independent variable is the predicted value, yi.
Let R2 be the coefficient of determination in this auxiliary
regression. Then, for a test of significance level a, the null
hypothesis is rejected if nR2 is bigger than X2 , where X2 is1,a
that number exceeded with probability a by a chi-square random
variable with 1 degree of freedom.
D) Test for Autocorrelation: autocorrelation occurs when
the disturbances are correlated with one another. Then the
off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the
disturbance term are nonzero, and the disturbances are said to be
autocorrelated. Kennedy (1992, p. 119) suggest that autocorrelated
disturbances could arise for several reasons: spatial
autocorrelation, prolonged influences of shocks, inertia, data
manipulation and model misspecification. He also maintains that
autocorrelation arises most frequently in time series models.
The consequences for OLS estimation in a situation of
positive first-order autocorrelation (the most common in
econometric work) are similar to those caused by
heteroskedasticity as suggested by Gujarati (1988, p.360): the
OLS estimators are still linear-unbiased, but they are no longer
efficient (i.e. minimum variance). Thus, the usual t and F tests
are no longer valid in the presence of autocorrelation.
In order to detect autocorrelation, the researcher will use
the Durbin-Watson (DW) test. Most packaged computer regression
programs provide the DW or d statistic in their output. This
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statistic is computed from the residuals of an OLS regression and
is used to test for first-order autocorrelation. First-order
autocorrelation occurs when the disturbance in one period is a
proportion of the disturbance in the previous time period, plus a
disturbance. In mathematical terms, it can be expressed as et=
pe t-1	 ut , where p is the first-order autocorrelation
coefficient. The DW can be computed as d = 2(1- p) where p is the
first-order autocorrelation coefficient estimate. Since -1 Icp 1,
this implies 0 5 d s 4. These are the bounds of DW.
Table 7.1: Durbin-Watson d Test: Decision Rules.
Null Hypothesis	 Decision	 If
No positive autocorrelation 	 Reject	 0< d < d L
No positive autocorrelation 	 No decision
	
d 5 d s d
uL
No negative autocorrelation
	 Reject	 4-d L < d < 4
No negative autocorrelation
	 No decision
	
4-d
u
s
 d 5 4-dL
No autocorrelation,	 Do not reject	 d
u
< d < 4-d
u
positive or negative
Source: Gujarati (1988, p. 378)
When there exists no first-order autocorrelation, the DW is
approximately 2.0. The further away the d statistic is from 2.0,
the less confident one can be that there is no autocorrelation in
the disturbances. Unfortunately, the exact distribution of this
d statistic, on the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation, depends on
the particular observations on the independent variables, so that
a table giving critical values of the DW is not available.
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However, Durbin and Watson were successful in deriving a lower
bound d and an upper bound du such that if the computed DW lies
outside these critical values, a decision can be made regarding
the presence of positive or negative serial correlation. The
decision rules for the DW test are given in Table 7.1.
7.3.3.- The Use of Financial Ratios.
After the revision of the main aspects of the regression
issues relevant to our empirical methodology, one needs to examine
the main issues related to the use of financial ratios in our
model. In the initial model we have included several financial
ratios of the Spanish banking firms to represent certain economic
characteristics of the institution. In the empirical literature on
bank capital augmentations, the use of financial ratios is very
common and most variables appear in the form of ratios (Peltzman,
1970; Mayne, 1972;
1988).
The motivations for examining data
James, 1983; Keeley,
in ratio form have been
suggested by many authors. Foster (1986, p.96) suggests the
following motivations for the use of financial ratios:
- To control for the effect of size differences across
firms or over time.
- To make the data better satisfy the assumptions
underlying statistical tools such as regression analysis (for
example, homoskedastic disturbances).
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- To probe a theory in which a ratio is the variable of
interest. In our case, the capital ratios held by banks play a key
role in the analysis.
- To exploit an observed empirical regularity between a
financial ratio and the estimation or prediction of a variable of
interest (for example, the risk of a security or the likelihood of
a firm declaring bankruptcy).
Barnes (1987) also recommends the use of ratios to control
for industry-wide factors. It is suggested that corporations may
use industry averages to identify areas of abnormal performance in
their own organization. Rees (1990, p. 121-4), apart from the
already mentioned motivations of standardization for size and
identification of industry benchmarks, maintains that the ratios
act as a summary statistic (the substitution of a small set of
ratios to replace the complexity of the detailed financial
statements).
An important assumption underlying the use of ratios as a
control for size differences is strict proportionality between the
numerator and the denominator (Foster, 1986, p.96). The strict
proportionality assumption implies in the case, for example, of
the capital-to-assets ratio that Capital = p x Assets, where p is
the proportionality factor. The existence of a constant or
intercept term in the relationship and/or the existence of a
nonlinear relation between the two variables represented in the
ratio (due for example, to economies of scale), imply that there
exists no strictly proportional relation between the two variables
in the ratio.
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The main problems with the empirical use of ratio analysis are
suggested by Rees (1990, p. 124_8)10. These include
(i) Ratio selection: given the volume of published
financial information on any particular company, the scope for
camouflaging significant indicators in a mass of detail is
considerable. A solution could be to employ traditional sets of
key ratios which have become established.
(ii) Accounting estimation: ratios based on accounting
numbers incorporate, and sometimes exaggerate, the limitations of
accounting statements 11 . Foster (1986, p.223) and Rees (1990, p.
126) argue that firm managers have some leeway to "manage" or
"smooth" the behaviour of the accounting numbers (the so-called
"window-dressing"). Thus, it is important to select the most
convincing accounting estimator of any variable of interest.
(iii) Unavailable data: unfortunately, the financial
reports of private companies are often severely delayed. This will
not be a problem with our analysis, since we have chosen years
when all the relevant data are available for the Spanish banking
sector.
(iv) Unsynchronised data: in many countries, companies'
accounting year-ends are varied and this may cause problems when
making comparisons. This research will not have this problem since
we have taken only the 31 December data for every year.
(v) Non-standardized accounting: accounting policies and
practices can vary across firms with little to guide the analyst.
This is not our case, since there exists accounting standards for
all firms operating in Spain and particularly, the banking sector
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data are also standardized.
(vi) Negative numbers: they can be problematical where a
transformation of the original data is required, possibly to
approximate better to a normal distribution. Certain
transformations, such as logarithmic or square root, are
impossible for negative numbers. However, negative numbers can
often be avoided. For example, growth rate can be expressed as a
ratio of the preceding value rather than a percentage change.
All things considered, although some reservations must be
considered with regard to the use of financial ratios, it is
apparent that ratio analysis offers a useful and convenient method
of financial statement interpretation, and the researcher will
employ financial ratios in his analysis.
7.4.- DATA SOURCE.
The empirical analysis of this chapter will be based on
public accounting balance sheet and income statement data of
samples of the private and savings banks operating in Spain during
1987-90. The original samples employed in this Chapter contain 121
private banks (there are two banks less than in the exploratory
analysis of Chapter 4 since they did not have all the data needed)
and 76 savings banks operating in Spain for 1987-89 and 64 savings
banks in 1990 (some savings banks merged during 1990). The banks
included in these original samples account for over 99 % of the
total assets of the Spanish banking sector. Only those banks with
all the relevant information available throughout the period are
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included.
The existence of outlier observations must be taken into
consideration. Foster (1986, p.100) defines an outlier as "an
observation which appears to be inconsistent with the remainder of
that set of data". Barnett and Lewis (1978, p.4) argue that it is
a matter of subjective judgment on the part of the observer
whether or not s/he picks out some observation for scrutiny. In
this sense, if the empirical tests show that there appear to be
outliers in our sample and they affect the results negatively, and
no other functional form of the equation (by transforming the
variables) can improve the results, those banks may be deleted
from the sample in order to obtain better empirical results.
If necessary, the samples employed in the empirical analysis
may be reduced considerably in order to obtain a good fit in the
regressions and to avoid statistical problems such as
multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. When
the sample is reduced considerably, one must be very cautious
about the implications of the findings since they may not be
generalized. The fact that many banks in Spain operate in
different markets (local, regional, national and international
markets) might result in a very heterogeneous sample and might
cause poor statistical results. In this case, the sample would be
reduced as much as necessary in order to obtain a homogeneous
sample.
The private banks' data includes both domestic and foreign
banks' data. The data have been taken from the Anuario Estadistico
de la Banca Privada, published by the Consejo Superior Bancario.
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The savings banks' data have been taken from the Balances y
Cuentas de Resultados de las Cajas de Ahorro Espanolas, published
by CECA (ConfederaciOn Espanola de Cajas de Ahorro).
7.5.- DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE VARIABLES.
At this stage, one needs to examine the main summary
statistics of the variables that defined in this chapter. Two main
purposes govern this section. The first objective is examining the
evolution of the key indicators of the variables (mean and
standard deviation). The second objective is to identify potential
outliers in our sample. In other words, some of the banks may have
extreme values of some of the variables and this might damage the
results of our tests. If this were the case, those observations
would be deleted.
Let us start by studying two summary statistics of the
variables (mean and standard deviation). Table 7.2 displays the
mean and the standard deviation for the three measures of capital
augmentations (AK, AK, AK) and the explanatory variables used
(the variable CM is excluded since it is a dummy variable) in the
equations for the Spanish private banks for several years.
In Table 7.2, one can notice that there seem to be outliers
among the private banks in 1989 in terms of capital augmentations.
The means and the standard deviations for the three measures of
capital augmentations are far higher than for the other years. In
1989, there is a private bank in our sample which had a capital
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Table 7.2 Summary Statistics for Private Banks:	 (1987-90)
1987 1988 1989 1990
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
AK1 0.174 0.884 0.300 0.572 1.38 12.88 0.137 0.958
AK2 0.199 0.914 0.323 0.579 1.42 12.89 0.122 0.965
AK 0.165 0.765 0.266 0.547 1.41 13.28 0.103 0.6643
PF 0.008 0.022 0.011 0.036 0.009 0.020 0.018 0.047
CC 0.204 0.294 0.243 0.417 0.42 1.712 0.422 1.880
PK 1.022 8.462 0.399 5.358 0.53 3.288 3.72 24.13
LQ 24.3 203.7 1.544 9.078 4.22 31.00 1.48 21.55
AD 1.78 14.91 7.51 55.16 9.53 98.71 21.16 98.82
KR -1.08 1.055 -0.837 0.731 -0.84 0.634 -0.985 0.838
DI 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007
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augmentation rate of around 140. This appears to lie behind the
abnormal means and standard deviations in 1989.
The existence of outliers in the variables representing cost
of capital (CC), portfolio risk (PK), liquidity (LQ) and deposits
growth (AD) is a noticeable feature of their summary statistics
since their means are well above 1 and the variables are expressed
in terms of ratios whose expected values are usually well below 1.
The variable PK (portfolio risk) has a positive average value
during 1987-90. As this variable accounts for the increase in the
volume of risk-free assets as a percentage of total assets, the
positive mean during 1987-90 appears to indicate that the private
banks have increased their average holdings of risk-free assets
and ceteris paribus, they appear to have shifted from riskier
portfolios to less risky portfolios.
The means and standard deviations of the variables
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representing profitability (PF) and deposit insurance (DI) seem to
have an increasing trend in their means during 1986-89 in the case
of PF since it is a lagged variable, and during 1987-90 in the
case of DI. The increasing trend of the mean of the variable
representing profitability confirms the evidence provided in
Chapter 4 where it was shown that profits grew throughout the
period 1986-89 for the private banks. The increasing trend of the
mean representing the annual amount of resources devoted to
deposit insurance as a percentage of assets seem to be shaped by
the high growth rate in deposits, which can also be observed in
Table 7.2.
The evolution of the variable that the researcher is most
interested in is the variable representing capital regulation. A
value of -1 indicates that the amount of capital required by the
Spanish regulators, in terms of the Spanish generic ratio, and the
amount of capital actually held by the bank are equal. A value
below -1 indicates that the amount of capital actually held by the
bank is lower than that required by regulators. A value above -1
(that is between 0 and -1, indicates that the bank holds more
capital than is required by regulators.
In Table 7.2, it can be noticed that the private banks in
Spain have a mean below -1: thus, there appeared to be a
considerable number of private banks that did not satisfy the
regulatory requirements. However, this changed from 1988 onwards,
and the average values were between -1 and 0 during 1988-90. This
indicates that the numbers of private banks that did not satisfy
the regulatory requirements decreased in 1988.
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One also needs to examine the evolution of the two summary
statistics for the variables employed in our analysis for the
Spanish savings banks; Table 7.3 shows those summary statistics.
One of the main features that one can observe from Table 7.3
is that the values of the means and standard deviations for each
variable do not change dramatically throughout the period. Thus,
it would appear that there are less outliers among the savings
banks than among the private banks.
As far as the evolution of the means of the different
measures of capital augmentations is concerned, one can observe
that there have been smooth and continuous increases in the
different definitions of capital during 1987-90. 1988 appears to
be the time when the highest rate of capital augmentations took
place during the period. In addition, the fact that the highest
capital augmentations are in terms of the definition which
includes subordinated debt (AK) seem to indicate that the use of2
subordinated debt has become very common among the Spanish savings
banks. Although from the evidence in Table 7.2 one can notice that
this also appears to be the case for the private banks, the
importance of the subordinated debt for the savings banks seems
higher than for the private banks. The reason for this might be
the fact that the savings banks have a more limited set of
possibilities to augment capital.
The variable representing profitability (PF) seemed to have a
comparative lower mean value for 1989 than for the rest of the
years. However, the variable representing cost of capital (CC)
appeared to have the highest mean in 1987.
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The means for the variable representing portfolio risk (PK)
are negative during 1987-89 and positive 1990. Apparently, this
would indicate that, ceteris paribus, the average portfolios of
the savings banks became riskier during 1987-89 since their
holdings of risk-free Spanish Government securities decreased
during that period. However, this trend seemed to be reversed in
1990.
Table 7.3 : Summary Statistics for Savings Banks (1987-90)
1987 1988 1989 1990
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
AK1 0.199 0.124 0.252 0.196 0.145 0.224 0.246 0.334
AK 0.225 0.194 0.364 0.261 0.188 0.231 0.234 0.281
2
AK 0.180 0.138 0.331 0.252 0.174 0.198 0.229 0.220
3
PF 0.013 0.006 0.014 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.012 0.006
CC 0.388 0.200 0.189 0.128 0.265 0.174 0.248 0.142
PK -0.107 0.128 -0.252 0.372 -0.180 0.223 0.103 0.495
LQ 0.045 0.167 -0.083 0.179 0.100 0.261 -0.679 0.099
AD 0.149 0.076 0.202 0.106 0.152 0.118 0.099 0.062
KR -1.054 0.388 -0.930 0.343 -0.933 0.314 -0.836 0.238
DI 0.0007 0.00009 0.0002 0.00003 0.0002 0.00004 0.0002 0.00004
The means of the liquidity variable (LQ) appear to show that
the liquidity positions improved in 1987 and 1989 and worsened in
1988 and 1990. The non-existence of outliers in the savings banks
contrast with the existence of outliers with very extreme
observations in terms of liquidity among the private banks.
The deposit growth variable reflects a very interesting
result. Unlike the mean values for the private banks, which were
extremely high and erratic for the presence of outliers, the mean
297
CHAPTER 7: HYPOTHESES, MODEL, DATA AND INITIAL RESULTS
values for the savings banks are comparatively far lower and far
less erratic. Thus, there appears to be no extreme observations
among the savings banks in terms of deposit growth and this gives
far lower values for their means of deposit growth. In addition,
1990 seemed a particularly bad year for savings banks in terms of
deposit growth. As 1990 was the year when the "accounts war" began
in Spain, that low value for the savings banks might show that
they have lost some ground in terms of deposits growth. This may
lie behind that the mean values for the deposit insurance variable
(DI) are also lower for the savings banks than for the private
banks. Lower contributions to the Deposit Guarantee Fund were
needed for the savings banks since they increased their deposits
at a lower rate.
The final comments on Table 7.3 are devoted to the evolution
of the capital regulation variable for the savings banks. In 1987,
there seemed to be an important number of savings banks that did
not satisfy the generic capital ratio since the mean is smaller
than -1. However, since 1988, the number of savings banks that
did not satisfy the generic ratio requirements decreased: their
mean was between -1 and 0. This result was also found for the
private banks in Table 7.2.
After examining the summary statistics, one can compare the
evolutions of the average of the six variables associated with
regulation (AK, AK, AK, PK, KR and DI) between private and
savings banks, operating in Spain. In order to establish
comparisons, one can plot the values obtained in Tables 7.2 and
7. 3 .
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In Figure 7.1, one can observe the evolution of the three
measures of capital augmentations for private and savings banks. A
very noticeable feature is the existence of an abnormal mean of
the three measures of capital augmentations for the private banks
in 1989, which, as learnt in Table 7.2, was caused by the
existence of extreme observations among the private banks. Leaving
1989 apart, the evolution of the averages for the the three
definitions of capital augmentations appear to be relatively
similar for private and savings banks. However, a few differences
can be observed. First, savings banks have higher growth rates in
the definitions AK and AK3 throughout the period (except in2
1989). Once more, the reason for this might be the more limited
possibilities of increasing Tier 1 regulatory capital for savings
banks, which appears to lead them to employ more intensively other
capital instruments (such as subordinated debt) than the private
banks. By 1990, the savings banks have higher growth rates of
capital even for the definition Tier 1.
The evolution of the mean of the variable representing
portfolio risk (PK) for private and savings banks, is displayed
in Figure 7.2. It can be observed that the private banks had
positive averages throughout the period, which indicates that the
holdings of risk-free assets increased in the portfolios of the
private banks and ceteris paribus, the portfolios became less
risky during 1987-90. However, the savings banks had negative
values in 1987, 1988, and 1989, which indicates that they
decreased their holdings of risk-free assets. Only in 1990 did
they have a positive average of PK and increased their holdings of
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Figure 7.1: Mean of Capital Augmentations (KI , K2 , K3 ) (1987-90)
1987	 1988	 1989	 1990
— Private Banks —I— Savings Banks
DEFINITION K3
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Figure 7.2: Mean of Variable PK (1987-90)
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risk-free Spanish Government securities. These findings are in
line with those in Figure 7.1: that is, savings banks as a whole
increased their portfolio risks during 1987-89 and thus they
needed higher capital augmentations than the private banks (result
obtained in Figure 7.1).
Figure 7.3 shows the evolution of the variable representing
capital regulation (KR = - Required Ratio / Actual Ratio). It can
be observed, that except in 1990, the evolution of KR average for
private banks parallels the evolution of KR mean for savings
banks. Both types of institution had a value below -1 in 1987
(many banks maintained lower actual generic capital ratios than
required) and both types of institution improved their position
from 1988 onwards. The improvement in KR was higher for private
banks in 1988-89 than for savings banks. Then, the average of KR
deteriorated for private banks in 1990, which seemingly allowed
the savings banks to have higher positions in terms of generic
capital ratios than the private banks by the end of 1990.
Finally, the evolution of the variable representing deposit
insurance (DI) for both types of institutions is displayed in
Figure 7.4. As the Spanish Deposit Guarantee Fund is financed by a
fixed premium and the risk held by the bank is ignored, the annual
contribution to the Fund depends upon the growth in deposits. In
Figure 7.4, one can find an expected result also obtained in
Tables 7.2 and 7.3. Except in 1987, the means of the variable DI
appear to be much higher for the private banks than for the
savings banks. This is an expected result for the reason that the
rates of deposit growth have been far higher for the private banks
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Figure 7.3: Mean of Variable KR (1987-90)
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Figure 7.4: Mean of Variable DI (1987-90)
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than for the savings banks during the period considered. Thus, the
higher the deposits increase, the higher is the contribution to
the Deposit Guarantee Fund.
As a conclusion of this section, one must say that the
presence of outliers seems to be of importance and this may affect
the quality of the empirical results. As a result, a considerable
reduction of our sample, particularly for the private banks, may
be necessary.
7.6.- TESTS AND INITIAL FINDINGS.
7.6.1.- Background.
The regression analysis presented here has been carried out
for 1987-90. The choice of 1987 as the first year of our sample
results from the fact that 1987 was the first year when complete
freedom came into effect for the banking firms in Spain to set
interest rates on liabilities and assets. Any attempt to include
previous years involves the problem of regulated interest rates,
which, as seen in Section 6.4.1, was Dietrich and James' main
criticism (1983) of Mingo's analysis and findings (1975).
According to their institutional features, the researcher has
divided the sample of banking firms operating in Spain into two
main groups: private banks and savings banks. This distinction
appears also justified by the verification that the behaviour of
each group is different in terms of the capital augmentation
model.
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Before analyzing the actual results presented here, the
different stages of our research that led to the actual results
need to be examined. Firstly, we attempted regressions for private
and savings banks separately with all the observations (121
private banks and 76 savings banks during 1987-89, and 64 savings
banks in 1990). As the results were unsatisfactory (very low
values of R2
 and no significant variables), several
transformations were attempted.
The purpose of the first two transformations was to check for
nonlinearity in the equation: Kennedy (1992, p. 94) suggest two
types of transformations: employing squares of the observations
and taking logarithms. Both transformations were attempted in our
research, but no significant improvement was achieved in the fit
of the regressions.
Next, the private banks' sample was divided into domestic and
foreign banks on the grounds that (as suggested in Chapters 2 to
4), they seem to have different institutional characteristics.
However, again no improvement in our results was obtained.
Then, the regressions were attempted in the context of panel
data. Kennedy (1992, p.222) defines panel data as observations on
a cross-section of individuals (or firms) over time. The
fixed-effect model of panel data, in which the variables are
transformed into deviations with respect to their means, was
attempted. The fixed-effect model represents the structural
differences across sample units through using different intercepts
(Novales, p. 314). Kennedy (1992, p.225) argues that when the
cross-section units is large and the number of time periods over
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which those units are observed is small, the fixed-effect model
is recommended. However, no improvement in the fit of the
regression was achieved even after eliminating several extreme
observations and dividing the private banks' sample into domestic
and foreign banks.
The actual results presented here are the best obtained in
the different attempts. They result from reducing the sample for
the different years by leaving out a set of extreme observations.
These outliers were already found in the descriptive analysis of
the previous section. Our statistical package, Minitab, flags the
observations with large standard residual and/or large influence
on the estimator: these observations prevented a good fit in the
regression. Cooper and Weekes (1983, p. 157) and Foster (1986, p.
100) suggest this (reduced sample) approach to improve the fit of
the model; Domenech and Perez (1992) in a study of the
productivity of the Spanish banking sectors, also followed this
same procedure.
The final samples which achieved the best and actual results
were: 69 private banks and 58 savings banks in 1987; 83 private
banks and 53 savings banks in 1988; 92 private banks and 51
savings banks in 1989, and 75 private banks and 48 savings banks
in 1990. The reduction in the sample may imply that our model
cannot be generally applied to all banks in Spain. However, it has
been necessary to reduce the sample in order to obtain an
empirical model that at least can be applied to a large sample of
banks.
The private banks' samples have been reduced more than for
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savings banks, since the presence of outliers is higher among
private banks. Therefore, savings banks appear to follow a more
homogeneous pattern than private banks in terms of the variables
we have employed pertaining to capital augmentations.
7.6.2.- Tests Results.
A) Tests of Significance:
A.1) Testing the Significance of Individual Regressions
Coefficients: Tables 7.4 and 7.5 summarize the regression
estimates for private banks and savings banks, respectively. The
values in parentheses are t-statistics. The main results are:
a) Private banks: the critical t value with a = 0.05
(95 per cent confidence) is 2.00. Thus, the significant variables
for each definition of capital augmentation for private banks are:
* AK : the variable representing cost of capital (CC)
is statistically significant in two years (1988 and 1989 with
a positive sign in both years). The variable representing deposit
growth (AD) is also statistically significant in two years (1989
with a positive sign and 1990 with a negative sign). The variable
representing easy access to capital markets (CM) is statistically
significant in 1990 (with a positive sign). The rest of the
variables, including the variables representing the impact of
capital regulation and deposit insurance, are not significant in
any year.
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Table 7.4 : Regression Estimates for Private Banks (1987-90)
1987 1988
AK 1 AK AK 3 AK 1 AK AK 3
Constant 0.01358 0.01219 0.01185 0.00235 0.03462 0.02842
(1) (0.48) (0.42) (0.42) (0.63) (0.92) (0.72)
PF 1.678 1.763 1.662 -1.469 -4.057 -1.956
(1.29) (1.32) (1.28) (-0.67) (-1.83) (-0.84)
CC 0.07388 0.06239 0.06527 0.4311 0.6169 0.4733
(0.85) (0.70) (0.75) (3.83) (5.40) (3.95)
PK -0.05284 -0.05445 -0.02803 0.02122 0.01232 0.01386
(-1.73) (-1.75) (-0.92) (0.84) (0.48) (0.51)
LQ -0.00402 -0.00355 -0.00091 -0.00152 -0.00330 0.00314
(-0.46) (-0.40) (-0.10) (-0.08) (-0.17) (0.15)
AD 0.03466 0.03543 0.02039 0.01889 0.01238 0.03672
(1.86) (1.86) (1.10) (0.76) (0.49) (1.38)
KR 0.01030 0.00773 -0.00141 -0.02461 -0.00785 0.03223
(0.48) (0.35) (-0.07) (-0.69) (-0.22) (0.85)
DI 8.30 5.93 22.35 -22.91 -43.52 24.22
(0.24) (0.17) (0.64) (-0.33) (-0.61) (0.32)
CM 0.03778 0.04290 0.02943 0.06886 0.05937 0.05504
(1.59) (1.77) (1.24) (1.56) (1.33) (1.17)
Number
Observ. 69 69 69 83 83 83
R 2 0.312 0.309 0.233 0.32 0.397 0.281
F-stat. 3.41 3.35 2.28 4.36 6.08 3.61
Multicol. NO NO NO NO NO NO
Heterosk. NO NO NO NO NO NO
DW stat. 2.00 2.04 2.09 1.95 1.45 1.80
(2) NA NA NA NA ND ND
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•
•
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2
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•
1989 1990
AK 1 AK AK 3 AK 1 AK AK 3
Constant 0.05596 0.04112 0.01544 0.04857 0.05234 0.03564
(1.35) (1.12) (0.45) (1.98) (2.08) (1.26)
PF 0.400 1.436 1.969 0.7591 0.7996 1.288
(0.21) (0.85) (1.25) (0.80) (0.82) (1.17)
CC 0.02742 0.20857 0.19569 0.08469 0.15815 0.0635
(2.48) (2.12) (2.12) (0.88) (1.61) (0.57)
PK 0.01694 0.02402 0.01998 -0.01863 -0.01570 -0.02095
(0.89) (1.42) (1.26) (-1.04) (-0.85) (-1.01)
LQ -0.00739 -0.00237 -0.00138 -0.00405 -0.00111 0.00489
(-0.50) (-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.03) (0.12)
AD 0.10703 0.02349 0.04984 -0.00921 -0.01539 -0.01465
(2.67) (0.66) (1.49) (-3.20) (-5.20) (-4.41)
KR -0.02735 -0.04454 -0.06308 0.03618 0.0414 -0.00345
(-0.64) (-1.17) (-1.77) (1.21) (1.35) (-0.10)
DI -26.76 -15.54 -16.99 13.35 -4.42 27.26
(-0.83) (-0.54) (-0.63) (0.62) (-0.20) (1.10)
CM -0.05488 -0.05328 -0.07989 0.04644 0.03306 -0.00374
(-1.38) (-1.50) (-2.40) (2.13) (1.47) (-0.15)
Number
Observ. 92 92 92 75 75 75
R 2 0.257 0.210 0.296 0.512 0.613 0.480
F-stat. 3.60 2.76 4.37 8.66 13.07 7.63
Multicol. NO NO NO NO NO NO
Heterosk. NO NO NO NO NO NO
2.00 1.99 1.93 1.64 1.68 1.72
DW stat. NA NA NA ND ND ND
Notes:
(1) The t-statistics values are in parentheses.
(2) NA = No Autocorrelation;	 ND = No Decision
* AK2 :the variable representing cost of capital (CC) is
the only variable that is statistically significant for the second
definition of capital augmentation (including Tier 1 and Tier 2
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capital) in two years (1988 and 1989 with a positive sign in
both). The variable deposit growth (AD) is statistically
significant in one year (1990 with a negative sign). No other
variable is statistically significant in any regression.
* AK3 : the variable CC is statistically significant in
two years (1988 and 1989 with a positive sign in both years). The
variables deposit growth (AD, in 1990 with a negative sign) and
easy access to capital markets (CM, in 1989 with a negative sign)
are statistically significant in one year. The rest of the
variables are not statistically significant in any year.
b) Savings banks: the critical t value with a = 0.05 (95
per cent confidence) is 2.01. Hence, the significant variables for
each definition of capital augmentation for savings banks are:
* AKi : the variable representing capital regulation (KR)
is statistically significant in the four years analyzed (with a
negative sign in the four years). The variable representing
profitability (PF) is also statistically significant in these four
years (with a positive sign in the four years). The variable cost
of capital (CC) is statistically significant in two years (1987
and 1990 with a positive sign in both). The variable deposit
growth is only significant in 1988 (with a negative sign). No
other variable is significant in any year.
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Table 7.5 : Regression Estimates for Savings Banks (1987-90)
1987 1988
AK 1 AK AK 3 AK 1 AK AK 3
Constant -0.11186 -0.14934 -0.0209 -0.31958 0.2135 0.1052
(1) (-1.21) (-1.51) (-0.16) (-4.21) (1.08) (0.63)
PF 12.162 13.317 10.662 13.397 1.571 -0.098
(8.40) (8.63) (5.27) (10.48) (0.47) (-0.04)
CC 0.25892 0.19989 0.17927 0.09555 0.1970 0.1269
(5.48) (3.97) (2.72) (1.78) (1.42) (1.08)
PK 0.07286 0.08290 -0.0315 0.00481 -0.18394 -0.16769
(0.93) (1.00) (-0.29) (0.20) (-2.96) (-3.18)
LQ 0.02393 0.03465 0.05406 0.05948 -0.2380 -0.17296
(0.65) (0.88) (1.05) (1.39) (-2.15) (-1.84)
AD -0.1977 -0.1552 -0.0855 -0.24248 -0.7107 -0.2824
(-1.35) (-0.99) (-0.42) (-2.44) (-2.76) (-1.30)
KR -0.14999 -0.18430 -0.10609 -0.29753 -0.13331 -0.17297
(-4.14) (-4.78) (-2.10) (-9.58) (-1.65) (-2.54)
DI -88.7 -84.7 -165.7 472.7 -233.3 -152.5
(-0.73) (-0.66) (-0.98) (1.49) (-0.28) (-0.22)
Number
Observ. 58 58 58 53 53 53
R 2 0.842 0.819 0.641 0.843 0.433 0.422
F-stat. 38.07 32.25 12.73 34.63 4.90 4.69
Multicol. NO NO NO NO NO NO
Heterosk. NO NO NO NO NO NO
DW stat. 1.90 1.82 2.25 2.01 2.15 2.55
(2) NA ND ND NA ND ND
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•
1989 1990
AK 1 AK AK 3 AK 1 AK AK 3
Constant -0.16214 -0.13463 -0.22182 0.01157 -0.00532 0.0168
(-2.86) (-1.67) (-2.81) (0.13) (-0.07) (0.16)
PF 16.979 13.036 12.160 10.077 8.6096 6.214
(12.31) (6.67) (6.34) (7.73) (7.22) (3.99)
CC 0.00135 0.03418 -0.04166 0.19266 0.11044 0.05369
(0.04) (0.66) (-0.82) (2.72) (1.71) (0.64)
PK -0.02396 -0.01086 -0.01119 0.00169 -0.01411 -0.02795
(-1.05) (-0.34) (-0.35) (0.12) (-1.13) (-1.72)
LQ -0.02429 0.06572 0.07913 0.14479 0.14781 0.08585
(-0.96) (1.82) (2.24) (1.84) (2.05) (0.91)
AD -0.0130 0.0030 0.01828 -0.2825 0.0802 0.0126
(-0.12) (0.02) (1.19) (-0.97) (0.30) (0.04)
KR -0.08130 -0.03930 -0.04250 -0.15154 -0.1381 -0.08213
(-2.94) (-1.00) (-1.11) (-2.83) (-2.82) (-1.29)
DI 305.5 468.6 925.2 -196.6 -71.6 132.4
(1.52) (1.65) (3.31) (-0.74) (-0.29) (0.42)
Number
Observ. 51 51 51 48 48 48
R 2 0.830 0.571 0.545 0.770 0.733 0.455
F-stat. 30.04 8.18 7.35 19.08 15.69 4.76
Multicol. NO NO NO NO NO NO
Heterosk. NO NO NO NO NO NO
2.39 2.49 2.20 1.80 1.70 1.74
DW stat. ND ND ND ND ND ND
Notes:
(1) The t-statistics values are in parentheses.
(2) NA = No Autocorrelation;	 ND = No Decision
* AK 2 : the variable representing profitability (PF) is
statistically significant in three years (1987, 1989 and 1990 with
a positive sign in the three years). The variable representing
capital regulation (KR) is statistically significant in two years
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(1987 and 1990 with a positive sign). LQ (liquidity) is
significant in two years (1988 and 1990) but the sign is different
(negative and positive respectively). Cost of capital (in 1988
with a positive sign), portfolio risk (with a negative sign in
1988) and deposit growth (1988 with a negative sign) are
statistically significant in one year. The variable representing
deposit insurance (DI) is the only one with no significant impact
on this definition of capital augmentation for savings banks.
* AK3 : profitability (PF) is statistically significant
three years (1987, 1989 and 1990 with a positive sign). The impact
of capital regulation (KR) is significant in two years (1987 and
1988 with a negative sign). Cost of capital (in 1987 with a
positive sign), portfolio risk (in 1988 with a negative sign),
liquidity (in 1989 with a positive sign) and deposit insurance (in
1989 with a positive sign) are statistically significant in one
year. Deposit growth is the only variable that is not significant
in any year analyzed.
A.2) Testing the Overall Significance of the
Regressions: the critical F values with a = 0.05 (95 per cent
confidence) are 2.17 and 2.34 for private and savings banks,
respectively. As the F values for all the regressions in Tables
7.4 and 7.5 are well above the respective, critical F values for
private and savings banks, one can reject the null hypothesis that
the regressions are not significant as a whole. Thus, it implies
that all the regressions are statistically significant with 95
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per cent confidence.
B) Test for Multicollinearity: in Tables B.1 and B.2 of
Appendix B, the correlation matrices for all the variables in the
regressions are displayed. Considering only the independent
variables, one can note that all the correlation coefficients for
both private and savings banks, seem to be well below 0.8-0.9 in
absolute terms, which is the critical value for high correlation
between two variables (see Subsection 7.3.2.4.). Therefore, there
seems to be no high correlation among the independent variables in
the regressions estimated in this chapter. In addition, the
statistical package employed in our empirical analysis, Minitab,
has signalled and dropped no variable causing multicollinearity in
any regression. This has been reflected in Tables 7.4 and 7.5.
Therefore, apparently, multicollinearity is not a problem in our
analysis.
C) Test for Heteroskedasticity: Tables 7.4 and 7.5 indicate
that the tests for heteroskedasticity show heteroskedasticity in
no regression. The tests for heteroskedasticity have been computed
as specified in Subsection 7.3.2.4 (C), and the tests show that no
heteroskedasticity has been found in any of the regressions. This
is a positive feature of our analysis since cross-section data
often involve heteroskedasticity problems.
D) Test for Autocorrelation: in general, autocorrelation is
not a serious problem with cross-section analysis. This seems to
315
CHAPTER 7: HYPOTHESES, MODEL, DATA AND INITIAL RESULTS
be the case in our research, in which according to the Durbin
Watson statistic, no autocorrelated errors have been found in any
of the regressions. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show 9 regressions with no
autocorrelation and 15 regressions with no clear-cut decision on
autocorrelation. However, most DW values that mean 'no decision'
are very close to 'no autocorrelation' values.
7.6.3.- Economic Interpretation of Initial Findings.
In order to analyze the findings presented in the previous
section, the economic interpretation of our results will be
divided into the following main areas:
7.6.3.1.- Model Evaluation: the first considerations are in
terms of how well the model explains and predicts the conduct of
the private and savings banks operating in Spain. One can observe
that the R2 values for the savings banks' regressions are much
higher than for the private banks' regressions. This indicates
that savings banks appear to fit much better in our model of
capital augmentation than private banks. This seems to be the case
for all the years and the three definitions of capital
augmentations employed in our empirical analysis of this chapter.
Our model of capital augmentations seems to explain better
the behaviour of savings banks in terms of capital augmentations
than the behaviour of the private banks. Actually, one must
acknowledge that the model appears to explain very little about
the conduct of private banks in terms of capital growth. A
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possible explanation is that other variables have been left out of
the model. Peltzman (1970), Mayne (1972), and Dietrich and James
(1983) argue that a non-economic variable such as management
philosophy or discretion also seems to play an important role in
the way banks increase their capital. This could also be the case
for the Spanish banking system, in which many heterogeneous
institutions with different management philosophies and objectives
operate in the banking market. We will return to this phenomenon
below in this section.
7.6.3.2.- The Impact of the Regulatory-Based Variables on
Bank Capital Augmentations in Spain during 1987-90.
A) The Impact of Capital Adequacy Regulation: the
effects of the variable KR (capital regulation) on capital growth
is very important in our research. Two related issues are
important here:
(i) if the impact of capital adequacy regulation on
capital augmentations differs between private and savings banks,
and,
(ii) if the impact is different in 1988 when the BIS
Agreement was promulgated, and in 1989, when the EC Directive on
the solvency ratios was approved.
First of all, one can note that the variable KR is not
statistically significant in any of the regressions for the
private banks. In addition, the sign of the variable changes
317
CHAPTER 7: HYPOTHESES, MODEL, DATA AND INITIAL RESULTS
across different years and across definitions of capital
augmentations. This makes the impact of capital regulation even
more unclear for the private banks.
The impact of capital regulation for savings banks seems to
be completely different. In 8 (out of 12) regressions for savings
banks, the variable KR is statistically significant and the sign
is negative. As was explained in Subsection 7.2.2.2 (G), the
negative sign implies that capital regulation appears to have made
savings banks augment their capital during the period examined.
Thus, the impact of capital regulation on capital augmentations is
seemingly much more clear for savings banks than for private
banks. This is particularly true for the definition AK1
(augmentations in Tier 1) since the variable KR is statistically
significant in the regressions for the four years.
In the descriptive analysis of Section 7.5, we observed that
the average values of KR in 1987 showed that an important number
of private banks and savings banks had lower actual capital than
required by the generic capital ratio. Even in this case, the
impact of KR on capital augmentations in 1987 and 1988 for private
banks was not significant. Other means like reducing portfolio
growth must have been employed by the private banks, since in 1988
the average values of KR showed that private banks had improved
their capital positions.
The results for the private banks in Spain are similar to
those provided by Peltzman (1970), Mayne (1972) and Dietrich and
James (1983) for the US banks. These authors also found no
evidence of the impact of capital regulation on capital growth.
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However, the results for the Spanish savings banks are apparently
similar to those obtained by Mingo (1975) for the US banks. He
also found evidence of significant impact of capital regulation on
bank capital augmentations.
The reasons why the effects of capital regulation seem more
important for savings banks than for private banks must be
explored. First of all, capital adequacy regulation seems more
strict for savings banks than for private banks. Capital
regulation may not be more strict for savings banks than for
private banks in terms of the solvency ratios, but it certainly
seems more strict in terms of the capital instruments that both
types of institution can employ. Savings banks' management has
less legal possibilities for increasing capital, which in turn,
also reduces the leeway that management has with regard to
augmenting capital.
The fact that very few variables in the empirical model are
significant for private banks seems to indicate that other
variables may have been omitted. As mentioned above in the model
evaluation, in the literature of capital augmentations a
non-economic variable like management philosophy or discretion has
often been suggested as an essential variable with respect to
capital augmentations. Management philosophy seems to play a more
important role in terms of capital growth for private banks than
for savings banks since the regulatory variables appear to
influence savings banks' capital augmentations more than private
banks' capital augmentations. In other words, as the impact of
capital regulation is higher for savings banks than for private
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banks, the leeway for management philosophy that the regulation
gives to savings banks is not as wide as the leeway given to
private banks.
As far as whether the impact of capital adequacy differs over
time as a result of the promulgation of the 1988 BIS Agreement and
1989 EC Directive are concerned, one must say that there seems to
be no difference over time in terms of the impact of the variable
KR. Thus, the impact of the BIS Agreement on capital augmentations
from 1988 onwards and the impact of the EC Directive on capital
augmentations seem not to be significant.
Although the latter evidence appears to contradict the field
survey, in which several Spanish bankers affirmed that BIS and
particularly EC capital ratios were being regularly monitored in
their banking institutions, one can suggest several possible
explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, although the BIS and EC
ratios have been becoming very important for both regulatory and
strategic purposes in recent years, the ratios that banks
operating in Spain had to comply with during 1987-90, are the
Bank of Spain's specific and generic ratios. Hence, these two
ratios seemed to be the most important ones during 1987-90. A
second explanation is that the philosophy shaping the Bank of
Spain's capital adequacy regulation is in line with the philosophy
behind the BIS and EC regulations. Thus, the introduction of the
BIS and EC regulations should not change dramatically the
evolution of the bank conduct in terms of their capital
augmentation. A third explanation is that, as was found in Chapter
4, the Spanish banks appeared well-capitalized in terms of the BIS
320
CHAPTER 7: HYPOTHESES, MODEL, DATA AND INITIAL RESULTS
and the EC ratios. When banks are well-capitalized, ceteris
paribus the impact of the introduction of new solvency regulation
(BIS, EC) is likely to be less significant on bank capital
augmentations than when banks are not well-capitalized.
The evidence provided here indicates that the impact of
capital regulation has differed significantly between private
banks and savings banks, but it has not differed significantly
over time during 1987-90 even if new international regulations
(BIS, EC) were promulgated. The evidence indicating that there
seems to be significant differences in the effects of capital
adequacy regulation between private banks and savings banks could
have very important strategic and policy issues that require
further research.
B) The Impact of Portfolio Risk: as discussed in Subsection
7.2.2.2 D), the impact of the portfolio risk could be included
either among the regulatory variables or among the managerial
variables. It has been included among the regulatory variables for
its implications for the risk-based capital adequacy regulation.
The variable representing portfolio risk (PK) is only
statistically significant in two regressions for the savings banks
(in 1988 with a negative sign) and in no regression for private
banks. This appears to imply that the portfolio risk has only a
very limited impact on capital augmentation in banks operating in
Spain. This seems to be against the philosophy of the present
risk-based capital regulations (Bank of Spain, BIS, EC), which
associate capital with portfolio risk. The only exception occurred
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in 1988: savings banks took into consideration their portfolio
risk, when savings banks as a whole were holding lower actual
generic ratios than required. At the end of 1988, savings banks as
a whole had reached higher actual capital ratios than required for
both augmenting capital and reducing portfolio risk.
A possible explanation of the limited impact of portfolio
risk on capital augmentations could be found in the evidence
provided in Chapter 4. It was found that the Spanish banking
system as a whole seemingly kept very good risk-based capital
standards. Therefore, ceteris paribus, there appears to be no
strong need to change portfolio risk to maintain regulatory
capital standards.
C) The Impact of the Deposit Insurance : the last regulatory
variable considered is deposit insurance (DI). According to the
evidence displayed in Tables 7.4 and 7.5, its impact on capital
augmentations seems very weak since it is only statistically
significant in one regression (in 1989 for savings banks with the
definition AK). This would appear to confirm the evidence found
in the field survey among the largest private and savings banks in
Spain: most banks in the survey argued that the impact of deposit
insurance on capital growth was unclear. In other words, no
evidence can be provided with regard to whether deposit insurance
makes banks augment capital or on the contrary, makes banks reduce
capital ( the 'substitution effect' analyzed in Subsection
5.4.3.1(B)).
The positive coefficient of DI in 1989 for savings banks
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could be statistically significant as a consequence of the impact
of the regulatory decrease in the contribution to the Deposit
Guarantee Fund for the savings banks, as described in Chapter 3.
In this connection, a possible explanation is that as a result of
the lower contribution to the Deposit Guarantee Fund, savings
banks could have decided to allocate more resources to augment
their capital.
7.6.3.3.- The Impact of the Managerial Variables on Bank
Capital Augmentations in Spain during 1987-90.
A) The Impact of Profitability : profitability seems a key
managerial variable for savings banks since it is statistically
significant in 10 (out of 12) regressions. Naturally, it is highly
significant for AK 1 (Tier 1 capital augmentation) since in
practice the only way for savings banks to increase Tier 1 capital
is through profitability (Reserves and Social Works Funds).
Anyway, it is also significant for the other two definitions of
capital augmentation since both definitions include Tier 1, and
this reflects the great importance of profitability for all the
definitions of capital for savings banks.
The important impact of profitability on capital
augmentations for savings banks seems to contrast with the very
reduced impact of profitability for private banks. The variable
representing profitability (PF) is not statistically significant
in any regression. This is an unexpected result since private
banks may not need to rely on profitability so much as savings
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banks, but it was shown in Chapter 4 that the main source of
capital for private banks is retained earnings. A possible
explanation for this phenomenon is that profitability may not
capture completely the evolution of retained earnings. Private
banks pay out dividends and private banks' dividend policy has not
been completely reflected in our model. The model for the private
banks may be improved by including retained earnings instead of
return on assets. This improvement will be attempted in Chapter 8.
B) The Impact of Cost of Capital: the interpretation of the
variable representing cost of capital must be made with care since
the present ROE has been employed as a measure of cost of capital.
ROE may also be understood as a measure of profitability. The
variable representing cost of capital (CC) is statistically
significant in 6 regressions for the private banks (for the three
definitions of capital augmentation in 1988 and in 1989), and, in
4 regressions for the savings banks. Thus, it would appear that
cost of capital is more important for private banks than for
savings banks.
The sign of the impact of cost of capital on capital
augmentations is positive, which would appear to imply that the
higher the cost of capital, the higher the capital augmentation.
The latter does not support the economic theory which says that
the higher the cost, the more expensive the capital augmentation
and, ceteris paribus, the lower the capital growth.
A possible explanation for the positive sign may be as
follows: the higher the profitability required (cost of capital)
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by shareholders, ceteris paribus, the harder bank managers will
try to reach that level of profitability. If that level of
profitability is achieved, as occurred in Spain during 1987-90
(Chapter 4), the higher the retained earnings that can be
allocated to capital after fulfilling shareholders' required
return. In other words, with high levels of earnings like in the
Spanish banking system in 1987-89, both high required returns
(cost of capital) by shareholders and investors and high retained
earnings can be accommodated at the same time. If profitability is
not under pressure, banks can reach the required return for
shareholders and, at the same time, augment capital through
retained earnings. In 1990, the situation changed as a result of
the 'accounts war' (guerra del pasivo), in which the financial
cost of deposits increased dramatically, and in turn,
profitability came under pressure.
C) The Impact of Liquidity: the variable representing
liquidity (LQ) is only statistically significant in three
regressions for savings banks and in no regression for private
banks. Therefore, the impact of a bank's liquidity on capital
augmentations appears very weak for the Spanish banks,
particularly for the private banks. The strong relationship
between liquidity and capital decisions appears less evident in
our analysis than as argued by Sealey (1983) and Crouhy and Galai
(1986). Liquidity does not appear to be a very important variable
in terms of capital augmentations in the Spanish banking system,
particularly for private banks.
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A peculiar feature of the evolution of this variable in our
empirical analysis is the different sign of LQ between the 1988
and 1989-90 regressions for savings banks. This seeming
contradiction could be justified by the effects of the decreasing
trend in the regulatory required cash requirements during 1988-90.
When the required cash ratio was lowered, the sign of LQ is
positive, which appears to imply that savings banks could have
engaged in augmenting the capital cushion in order to counteract
the reduction in the required liquidity cushion. A reduction of
the required liquidity cushion could be considered, ceteris
paribus, as an increase in liquidity risk, which could induce
banks to augment capital.
D) The Impact of Deposit Growth: the deposit growth is
statistically significant in four regression for the private banks
(in 1989 and 1990) and in two regressions for the savings banks
(1988). In the case of the private banks, the behaviour of the
variable deposit growth changes in 1990,when the sign is
negative. In previous years the sign was positive, although only
in 1989 was it statistically significant.
Up to 1989, the sign of the impact of deposit growth for
private banks had been positive (the higher the deposit growth,
the higher the capital augmentations). However, in 1990, the sign
changed for the private banks. The effects of the 'accounts war',
in which Spanish banks, particularly private banks, began to offer
high interest rates on current accounts, seem to lie behind the
change of sign. The high interest rates on sight accounts,
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attracted many deposits and it seemed that capital could not
follow the fast pace of deposit growth.
E) The Impact of Access to Capital Markets: the impact of the
access to capital markets was tested through a dummy variable (CM)
only for the private banks quoted on the Stock Exchange. From
Table 7.4, one can note that this variable is only statistically
significant in two regressions (one in 1989 and one in 1990).
The variable CM appears to have played an important role in
1990, since the variable is statistically significant and with a
positive sign. The high interest rates on deposits seem to have
made private banks rely on external sources of capital to a larger
extent in 1990 than in previous years, as a consequence of the
pressure on profitability. In 1989, when profitability was not
under pressure, the sign of CM was negative which appears to imply
that banks with easy access to capital markets seem to rely very
little on the external sources of capital so long as their
internal sources of capital can be employed.
7.7.- SYNTHESIS AND FURTHER RESEARCH.
In this chapter, an empirical model of capital augmentation
has been applied for private and savings banks operating in Spain.
Three different (regulatory and book-value) definitions of bank
capital were employed and four years (1987-90) were analyzed.
The Spanish bank capital adequacy regulation appears to be a
stricter constraint for savings banks than for private banks. This
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is likely to result from the lower legal possibilities to augment
capital, since savings banks cannot issue share equity. As a
consequence of the latter, savings banks need to rely on their
internal capital generation to a larger extent than private banks.
In the private banks' capital augmentations, market-based
variables such as cost of capital and access to capital markets
seem to play a more important role than for savings banks.
In Chapter 8, the researcher will substitute the retained
earnings in year t-1 for ROA in t-1 in order to capture better the
way profitability influences private banks' capital augmentations.
In this chapter, our aim was to apply the same model to private
and savings banks. In the next chapter, inter alia, we will
attempt to upgrade the analysis of bank capital augmentations by
including other variables.
The empirical analysis undertaken in this chapter confirmed
to the researcher that further research is needed in order to
complete the evidence on bank capital augmentations in Spain. This
research must focus basically now on:
a) Re-testing the empirical model of bank capital
augmentations: two basic areas are important here:
- The use of retained earnings as the relevant measure
of profitability for private banks.
- The use of market-value definition of capital
augmentation.
b) Study of the impact of size on bank capital augmentations
and bank regulatory capital ratios: so far, size has not been
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considered to explain bank capital augmentations in Spain.
However, there exists certain literature that argues that size may
be a crucial variable in many of a bank's capital decisions.
NOTES:
1.- See Kennedy (1992, chapter 3) for a review of the main
features and assumptions of the CLR model.
2.- See Revell (1980) for a review of the main banking
profitability measures.
3.- See Sinkey (1992, p. 407-410) for a review of the main market
measures of bank risk applied to the banking firm.
4.- Nevertheless, liability management in Spanish banking
institutions has become very important in recent years, especially
for large banks. See Cuervo, Parejo and Rodriguez (1992, pp
225-232 and 251-257) for a study of importance and evolution of
liability management in the Spanish banking sector.
5.- See Peltzman (1970, Appendix) for a discussion of these three
formulas.
6.- In particular, ABC' = -1/ABC where ABC is the measure of
capital adequacy utilized by regulators. The relationship between
capital changes and the regulator's capital adequacy measure (ABC)
is hypothesized to be of the form
1
%AK = - p
	
	 (7.27)
ABC
so that
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6ABC	 ABC2
Thus, using ABC' permits a nonlinear response. Since the first
term is expected to be less than zero if regulation is effective,
multiplying the ABC ratio by -1 implies the expected sign of g is
less than zero.
7.- Although the minimum Bank of Spain's generic ratio is 5 per
cent, there could be cases in which certain banks, under
determined circumstances (for example, those with serious
financial difficulties), are requested to maintain capital ratios
above the minimum.
8.- See, for example, Kennedy (1992, Chapter 14) for a review of
the main characteristics of dummy variables and problems/
limitations with the use of dummy variables.
9.- The researcher has chosen two-tail tests instead of one-tail
tests, since banking theory is not conclusive with regard to the
expected sign of the coefficients of the different independent
variables.
10.- See Rees (1990) for a detailed explanation of the main
problems and techniques involved in the ratio analysis.
11.- See Foster (1986) and Rees (1990) for a review of the
limitations of financial statement information.
(7.28)
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CHAPTER 8 : FURTHER EVIDENCE ON BANK CAPITAL AUGMENTATIONS
IN SPAIN
8.1.- INTRODUCTION.
In this chapter, further empirical tests will be undertaken
in order to complete the evidence on bank capital regulation and
capital augmentations in the Spanish banking system. The need for
further research and tests in this area was suggested in the
conclusions of the previous chapter.
The research in this chapter will focus on two main areas:
(i) Re-testing the empirical model of bank capital
augmentations in Spain by employing a new measure of internal
capital generation rate for private banks and by employing the
market-value definition of bank capital augmentation for the
private banks quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange.
(ii) Analysis of the impact of size on bank capital
augmentations.
Hence, the chapter is to be organized in the following
manner. Firstly, the testing hypotheses are specified. Then, the
empirical model of capital augmentations is re-tested. Next, the
impact of bank size on capital augmentations is analyzed both
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theoretically and empirically. Finally, a synthesis and the
conclusions for this chapter are drawn.
8.2.- TESTING HYPOTHESES.
In this chapter, our main testing objectives are concerned
with the following hypotheses:
a) Hypotheses related to the empirical analysis in Chapter 7:
a.1) Is the empirical model of capital augmentations for
private banks improved by substituting retained earnings in t-1
for ROA in t-1 as a measure of profitability ?
a.2) Is book-value capital a good predictor of market-value
capital ? Can the conclusions drawn in Chapter 7 be applied to a
market-value definition of bank capital augmentation ? What is the
impact of capital regulation and profitability on market-value
capital ?
b) Hypotheses based on the impact of size on bank capital
augmentations:
b.1) Is the relation between market value of equity and book
value of equity different across different bank sizes ?
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b.2) Hypotheses based on the relationship capital growth -
assets growth (based on Keeley, 1988):
d(C/A)/dt = (C/A) [(1/C)(dC/dt) - (1/A)(dA/dt)]
	 (6.5)
b.2.1) Is the impact of capital augmentations on the generic
ratios different across bank sizes ? (based on Keeley, 1988)
b.2.2) Are there differences across sizes in terms of
retained earnings ? Can any size of private bank retain more
earnings ? Does any bank size have an advantage in terms of the
internal capital generation rate ?
b.2.3) What was the impact of the mergers between savings
banks on capital augmentations in 1990 ? Is the increase in size a
good strategy for savings banks in terms of capital augmentations
in order to counteract the more limited legal possibilities of
increasing capital ?
8.3.- RE-TESTING THE EMPIRICAL MODEL OF BANK CAPITAL
AUGMENTATIONS.
8.3.1.- Introduction.
The evidence provided in Chapter 7 seemed to suggest that our
empirical model of capital augmentations (described in Equation
(7.7)) explains the way Spanish savings banks augment their
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regulatory and book-value capital better than for the private
banks operating in Spain. One of the main empirical findings that
seemed to contradict the theory and the field survey carried out
among several Spanish bankers is that profitability does not
affect significantly bank capital augmentations. Both banking
theory in Chapter 5 and the field survey suggest that internal
capital generation (resulting from a bank's profitability) appears
to be the main capital source for private banks even if they have
more legal sources for increasing capital. A new variable
representing profitability must be tested in order to examine if
the empirical results may be improved.
A crucial test must also be undertaken in this chapter for
the private banks operating in Spain: testing the importance of
market-value capital augmentations. In the previous chapter, two
regulatory capital definitions and the book-value capital
definition were analyzed. Now, it is essential to examine a
definition of capital augmentations that is crucial for those
private banks quoted on the Stock Exchange: the market-value
capital. We must study whether the findings and conclusions from
the previous chapter also hold for the market-value definition of
capital augmentation. The main limitation in this analysis of the
market-value capital augmentation is that, as seen in Chapter 4,
the samples of private banks quoted on the Stock Exchange are
small: 29 banks in 1987 and 30 banks in 1988-90.
In this section, the two tests mentioned in the two
previous paragraphs are undertaken.
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8.3.2.- Substituting Retained Earnings for Net Income in the
Profitability Variable for the Private Banks.
8.3.2. 1.-
 Background.
The researcher employed a homogeneous variable representing
profitability (PF) for both private and savings banks: this was
ROA in year t-1. For a savings bank, which retains 100 per cent of
the profits that it generates, ROA in t-1 is a good proxy for the
internal capital generation rate. However, for a private bank that
is expected to distribute its profits between dividend payout and
retained earnings, ROA in t-1 may not be the best variable to
represent internal capital generation, since it does not capture
the dividend policy of the private banking firm. Thus, the
researcher must refine the variable representing the way
profitability affects the internal capital generation by
considering how the earnings are distributed in order to evaluate
whether or not the empirical results are improved for private
banks.
The measure employed now is the following:
In this section, the regressions undertaken in the previous
*	 .
chapter for private banks are re-tested by employing PF Instead
of PF. The definitions of bank capital augmentation considered
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here are the same as in Chapter 7: two regulatory bank capital
augmentations	 (AK	 and AK 2 ) and the book-value capital
augmentation (AK3 ). If the model is improved with PF , this
variable will also be used in the next section when the tests
with market-value capital are undertaken.
As in Chapter 7, two descriptive statistics (mean and
standard deviation) of the new variable PF *
 are analyzed. Table
8.1 displays the evolution of both statistics for PF* during
1987-90.
Table 8.1: Summary Statistics for PF (1987-90)
Mean	 Standard Deviation
1987	 0.00314
	 0.00465
1988	 0.00412	 0.00624
1989	 0.00484	 0.00583
1990	 0.00570	 0.00808
The mean of the variable PF* increased continuously
throughout the period considered; the standard deviation also
increased throughout the period. The increasing trend in the
average of PF appears to indicate that the mean of retained
earnings grew more rapidly than total assets even in 1990, when
bank profits came under pressure. Thus, the main internal source
of capital has been increasing during 1987-90.
8.3.2.2.- Results.
The researcher has undertaken the same tests as in Chapter 7
(significance,
	
multicollinearity, 	 heteroskedasticity	 and
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autocorrelation) for the regressions with PF * . Table 8.2 shows the
* •
results for the regressions when PF Is employed.
The tests of significance for individual regression
coefficients show that the variable representing retained
•	 •
earnings, PF
	 I, is statistically significant in three equations
(two in 1989 and one in 1990). This seems to contrast with the
results for PF in Chapter 7 since PF was not statistically
significant in any regression.
The variable CC (cost of capital) is significant in 8
regressions, and it is again the most significant variable in
general. The deposit growth variable (AD) is statistically
significant in five regressions, and again in 1990 the sign of the
coefficient is negative (whereas it was positive for 1987-90). The
variable representing easy access to capital markets (CM) is
statistically significant in three equations (one in 1989 with a
negative sign and two in 1990 with a positive sign). The variables
PK (portfolio risk) and LQ (liquidity) are not significant in any
regression.
As far as the tests of significance for the other two
variables, the variable representing the impact of capital
regulation (KR) is significant in three equations (one in 1989
with a negative sign and two in 1990 with a positive sign), and
the variable representing the impact of deposit insurance (DI) is
also significant in three regressions (and in 1990 with a positive
sign).
The tests for the overall significance of the regressions
(F-tests) indicate that 11 regressions are statistically
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significant and only one is not significant (in 1987 for the
regression with book-value capital augmentation).
Table 8.2 : Regression Estimates for Private Banks (1987-90)
1987 1988
AK
I
AK 2 AK 3 AK 1 AK 2 AK 3
Constant 0.02018 0.01988 0.02009 -0.00586 0.00797 0.01006
(1) (0.81) (0.78) (0.78) (-0.16) (0.20) (0.25)
PF 1.130 1.030 1.678 8.643 2.121 3.227
(0.54) (0.48) (0.77) (1.80) (0.42) (0.62)
CC 0.15514 0.14746 0.14466 0.2669 0.4702 0.3715
(2.57) (2.38) (2.32) (2.34) (3.90) (2.99)
PK -0.03801 -0.04031 -0.01985 0.02045 0.00868 0.01226
(-1.31) (-1.36) (-0.66) (0.82) (0.33) (0.45)
LQ -0.00512 -0.00454 -0.00023 0.00370 0.00361 0.00723
(-0.65) (-0.56) (-0.03) (0.19) (0.18) (0.35)
AD 0.03880 0.03968 0.02036 0.01437 0.00784 0.03373
(2.33) (2.33) (1.18) (0.59) (0.30) (1.27)
KR 0.01664 0.01491 0.00651 -0.05170 -0.02963 0.01635
(0.95) (0.83) (0.36) (-1.45) (-0.79) (0.42)
DI -0.62 -3.41 8.70 -52.20 -58.46 10.34
(-0.02) (-0.10) (0.26) (-0.74) (-0.78) (0.13)
CM 0.03591 0.04131 0.02736 0.08379 0.06026 0.05955
(1.56) (1.74) (1.15) (1.90) (1.29) (1.24)
Number
Observ. 69 69 69 83 83 83
R 2 0.305 0.298 0.214 0.345 0.371 0.278
F-stat. 3.29 3.18 2.04 4.87 5.45 3.56
Multicol. NO NO NO NO NO NO
Heterosk. NO NO NO NO NO NO
DW stat. 1.98 2.01 2.05 1.84 1.45 1.80
(2) NA NA NA ND ND ND
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• • • •
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•0
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1989 1990
AK 1 AK AK 3 AK 1 AK AK 3
Constant 0.04033 0.02613 0.00351 0.04869 0.06906 0.06140
(0.98) (0.72) (0.10) (1.60) (1.82) (1.61)
*PF 4.676 6.345 6.512 5.509 4.554 3.740
(1.38) (2.13) (2.32) (2.43) (1.62) (1.31)
CC 0.2250 0.17131 0.17382 -0.06627 -0.0108 -0.0586
(2.23) (1.93) (2.08) (-0.68) (-0.09) (-0.48)
PK 0.01303 0.01939 0.01561 0.01184 0.00633 -0.00163
(0.69) (1.16) (1.00) (0.65) (0.28) (-0.07)
LQ -0.00736 -0.00218 -0.00111 0.01659 0.02707 0.03075
(-0.50) (-0.17) (-0.09) (0.40) (0.53) (0.59)
AD 0.10699 0.02424 0.05106 -0.00334 -0.00305 -0.00331
(2.71) (0.70) (1.56) (-2.61) (-1.92) (-2.07)
KR -0.04096 -0.05682 -0.07225 0.07236 0.1068 0.06983
(-0.98) (-1.54) (-2.09) (2.20) (2.61) (1.69)
DI -28.25 -17.89 -19.58 65.91 65.00 93.32
(-0.89) (-0.64) (-0.74) (2.75) (2.18) (3.10)
CM -0.05846 -0.05377 -0.07797 0.07196 0.08969 0.04820
(-1.52) (-1.59) (-2.45) (2.71) (2.71) (1.44)
Number
Observ. 92 92 92 75 75 75
R 2 0.274 0.245 0.327 0.646 0.600 0.538
F-stat. 3.91 3.36 5.04 15.06 12.37 9.59
Multicol. NO NO NO NO NO NO
Heterosk. NO NO NO NO NO NO
2.00 2.03 1.98 1.94 1.90 1.79
DW stat. NA NA NA NA NA ND
Notes:
(1) The t-statistics values are in parentheses.
(2) NA = No Autocorrelation;	 ND = No Decision
The tests for multicollinearity (see correlation matrices in
Table B.3 of Appendix B) seem to show that there was no high
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correlation between the paired independent variables: all
correlation coefficients were well below 0.8-0.9 in absolute
terms, and, in addition, no variable was signalled and dropped by
the statistical package, Minitab when estimating the regressions.
Thus, multicollinearity is not seemingly a problem in these
regressions. The tests for heteroskedasticity indicate that no
regression seem to suffer from this problem. The tests for
autocorrelation (DW) show that no autocorrelation was found in 8
regressions, and that only in 4 regressions, could no decision be
made.
8.3.2.3.- Economic Interpretation of the Results.
The results found in Table 8.2 compared with those in Table
7.4 for private banks and in Table 7.5 for savings banks (Chapter
7) appear to indicate the following findings:
a) Model evaluation: one can note that the model with PF*
appears to improve the results of Table 7.4. The values of R 2 and
the F-statistic values are higher in Table 8.2 than in Table 7.4.
In addition, more individual variables are statistically
significant in the regressions with PF (retained earnings / total
assets in year t-1 ) than in the regressions with PF (ROA in t-1).
Thus, the fit of the model is apparently better with PF * than with
PF.
The empirical model of capital augmentation with a measure of
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retained earnings for the private banks operating in Spain seems
to explain better the behaviour of the private banks in terms of
capital augmentations for 1987-90 than the empirical model with a
more general measure of profitability that does not consider the
impact of dividend policy. An empirical model of bank capital
augmentations for private banks that considers a very important
bank policy like dividend policy is certain to explain better the
behaviour of private banks in terms of capital augmentations.
.
Therefore, it seems more robust to employ PF* In the empirical
analysis with market-value capital augmentations than to use PF.
b) The Impact of the Regulatory Variables on Bank Capital
Augmentations: in Table 7.4, we observed that the variables
representing the impact of capital regulation and the impact of
deposit insurance on bank capital augmentations were not
significant in any regression for the private banks in Spain; it
was also found that the impact of portfolio risk on capital
augmentations was very weak. In Table 8.2, one can note that the
variable representing portfolio risk has again a very weak
influence on capital augmentations. The non-significant influence
of portfolio risk on capital augmentations seems again to
contradict RAR philosophy. The variables representing capital
regulation (KR) and deposit insurance are statistically
significant in three regressions in Table 8.2.
The interpretation of the impact of capital regulation needs
to be analyzed. The variable KR is significant with a negative
sign for the third definition of capital in 1989 and with a
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positive sign for the first and second definition of capital in
1990. This contradiction seems to reinforce the hypotheses that
the impact of capital adequacy regulation on bank capital
augmentations is much weaker for the private banks in Spain than
for savings banks: unlike the private banks' capital
augmentations, which were rarely (and with different sign)
affected by bank capital adequacy requirements, savings banks'
capital augmentations were influenced by capital adequacy
regulation in a larger number of regressions and years and the
sign was negativel
 (regulation-induced capital augmentations).
This appears to support again Peltzman's (1970), Mayne's (1972)
and Dietrich and James' (1983) findings, in which no significant
and clear impact of capital regulation on bank capital
augmentations was found.
The influence of deposit insurance on capital growth is
significant and with a positive sign in 1990. A possible
explanation for the significance and the positive sign in 1990 is
the impact of the increasing competition derived from the
'accounts war': 1990 deposits grew spectacularly and the
contribution to the Deposit Insurance Fund followed suit. In
addition, as a consequence of the 'accounts war' and the
increasing competition for deposits, bank profitability came under
pressure, and, in turn, ceteris paribus, banks could have been
considered as riskier institutions in this very competitive
environment. This is a possible explanation for why the impact of
deposit insurance on capital augmentations was positive in 1990:
the higher deposits growth resulting from the 'accounts war' led
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to private banks increasing their deposit insurance contribution,
but this higher contribution did not affect negatively the capital
augmentations in order to counteract the view that may have
considered the banks as riskier firms in 1990.
C) The Impact of the Managerial Variables on Bank Capital
•	 .
Augmentations: the variable PF Is statistically significant in
three regressions and, in general, its coefficients appear to be
higher than those in the equations with PF (Chapter 7). Thus,
although the improvements of the model may be considered as
modest, the use of Pi' has improved the results in terms of the
impact of the internal capital generation on capital growth.
However, the importance of profitability is higher for savings
banks (Table 7.5) than for private banks. Private banks appear to
rely less on their internal capital generation than the savings
banks, since the private banks have more legal possibilities for
increasing capital.
The effects of a wider range of capital sources for private
banks can also be seen in the significant impact of the variable
CM (easy access to capital markets) on capital augmentations in
three regressions. It seems particularly important in 1990, when
banks' earnings came under pressure, and private banks appeared to
turn to external sources of capital.
The variable cost of capital (CC) is again the most
significant variable for private banks. As in Chapter 7, this
could be explained by the importance of shareholders' return
expectations on the capital decisions in the private banking
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firms.
Seemingly, the variable deposit growth is also an important
variable in terms of capital augmentations since it is
statistically significant in five regressions. As in Chapter 7,
the negative sign of AD in 1990 regressions seemed to be shaped by
the effects of the 'accounts war': although private banks
increased their capital in 1990, the capital growth pace could not
follow the fast pace of deposit growth.
The non-significance of the liquidity variable seems to
confirm the findings in Chapter 7: liquidity appears to be of
little importance in terms of capital augmentations. Thus, no
support has be found in the Spanish case for Sealey (1983) and
Crouhy and Galai (1986).
All things considered, one must draw the following
conclusion: although the empirical model of capital augmentations
for private banks has been improved with the use of retained
earnings ( PF ), the findings in this subsection still support the
findings in Chapter 7. The empirical model still appears to
explain better the behaviour for savings banks than for private
banks. In addition, the impact of the capital adequacy regulation
is still more important and stricter for savings banks than for
private banks. Private banks seemed to have wider leeway in terms
of the process of increasing capital.
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8.3.3.-	 Empirical	 Analysis	 of	 Market-Value	 Capital
Augmentations.
8.3.3.1.- Introduction.
The findings obtained with the two definitions of regulatory
capital augmentation and the definition of book-value capital
augmentation need to be re-tested on the definition of
market-value capital augmentation for the Spanish private banks
that have those values available.
Before re-testing the empirical model of capital
augmentations for the market-value definition of capital, one must
analyze the relationship between book-value capital and
market-value capital in the Spanish banking system. There should
be a 'bridge' between the book-value capital analysis performed in
the previous chapter and in the previous section, and the
market-value capital analysis to be undertaken in this section.
As described in Chapter 4, there is only a limited sample of
private banks operating in Spain that are quoted on the Stock
Exchange. Our empirical research on market-value bank capital
augmentations will be based on the information disclosed by the
Madrid Stock Exchange since it is the largest in Spain in terms of
volume and it comprises a larger number of private banks than any
other Stock Exchange in Spain.
As some of the banks have left the Stock Exchange and others
have entered the Stock Exchange during 1987-90, the actual sample
of private banks with market-value capital needs to be reduced
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from the original sample (Table 4.22) to those that have the
information for two consecutive years. Indeed, in order to compute
the capital augmentation for any bank in a certain year, the
researcher needs the market values of capital for this year and
the previous year. Therefore, a bank needs to have been quoted in
those two consecutive years in order to compute its market-value
capital augmentation, and, in turn, to be included in the sample
of the year considered. The actual samples of private banks
considered in this sections are: 23 banks in 1987, 24 banks in
1988, 27 banks in 1989, and 26 banks in 1990.
In the next subsection, the researcher analyzes
empirically the relationship between book-value capital and
market-value capital for the Spanish banks. Then, a descriptive
analysis of the variables considered in the empirical model of
capital augmentations is performed. Then, the results of the
empirical analysis are reported and interpreted.
8.3.3.2.- The Relation between Market-Value of Equity and
Book-Value of Equity for the Spanish Banks.
As described in Chapter 4, when the accounting representation
of a firm's net worth diverges from its market value, the firm is
said to have hidden capital. According to Sinkey (1992, p. 264),
there are two sources of hidden capital: (i) accountants'
misvaluations of the credit and interest rate risks embodied in
items on banks' balance sheets and (ii) accountants' neglect of
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the contingent claims or values associated with off-balance-sheet
activities and government guarantees that are not formally
captured in the book-value figures.
In our empirical analysis, both book-value and market-value
definitions of capital augmentations are used for the Spanish
banks. As a link between both definitions of capital, one can
estimate how well bank book values of equity reflect market valued
equity for the Spanish banks.
Kane and Unal (1990) employ a statistical market value
accounting model (SMVAM) in order to estimate the relation between
market value of equity and book value of equity. They simply
regress total market value (MV) of equity against total book value
(BV) for a sample of U.S. banks during 1975-85:
MV = a + b (BV) + c	 (8.2)
where c is a random-error term. In Equation (8.2), if a = 0 and
b = 1, MV = BV. A positive intercept strongly suggest that the
unbooked government guarantees behind federal deposit insurance
were supporting bank market values. Keeley (1988) defines it as
subsidized deposit insurance (which underprices risk). If the
intercept is negative, then unbooked assets and liabilities serve
as a drain on bank capital. If the estimated slope coefficient (b)
is greater than 1, a premium exists, which can be interpreted as a
reward for the present value of future growth opportunities not
captured by assets in place. In contrast, when the slope
coefficient is less than 1, it suggests accounting overvaluation
of booked assets and liabilities relative to market valuations.
Kane and Unal (1990) found that the interest and market
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sensitivities of bookable and unbookable values often prove
offsetting in sign. In particular, the evolution of the value and
sensitivity of hidden capital at the nation's 25 largest banks
during the interest-rate spike of 1978-1982 is consistent with the
hypothesis that during this period increases in the unbookable
value of FDIC guarantees and enhancements in franchise values fed
by technological change and relaxations of regulatory restrictions
cushioned a sharp decline in the valuation ratio for their net
bookable assets.
Equation (8.2) has been estimated for the Spanish private
banks with market-value capital information available during
1987-90, and the results are displayed in Table 8.3 and Figure
8.1. In Section 8.4, the same equations will be estimated
separately for the largest banks and the medium-sized banks in the
sample in order to examine the impact of size on the relation
MV-BV for the Spanish banks.
Table 8.3 and Figure 8.1 appear to show that the intercept
was positive in two years (1988 and 1990), and negative in the
other two (1987 and 1989). However, if one observes the t-ratios
for the four intercepts, they imply that no intercept is
statistically significant. Two-tail t-values have been considered
since there is no strong theory or view to support a priori
direction in the sign of the intercept. As for the slope
coefficients, both one-tail and two-tail critical t-values are
considered, because the direction of the sign of the slope is
expected to be always positive. With both values, they are
statistically significant. One must test if they are significantly
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different from 1 (H0 : b = 1). This can be done through a very
similar t-test to that of (7.20):
A
p - 1
t= 	 1	 (8.3)
se(pi)
The slope coefficients are significantly greater than 1 for
three years (1987, 1988, and 1989). The slope coefficient for 1990
is less than one, but it is not significantly different from 1.
Table 8.3: Estimates of the SMVAM for the Spanish Banks
(1987-90)	 (intercept in Spanish pesetas million)
Year	 Intercept (a) Slope (b) R2
Number
Observations
1987 - 1751.75 1.9073 0.844 23
(-0.10) (10.65)
1988 10160.01 1.6079 0.776 25
(0.44) (8.72)
1989 - 5974.06 1.83589 0.943 27
(-0.45) (20.42)
1990 18766.44 0.95324 0.829 25
(1.18) (10.55)
The findings here appear to indicate that Spanish banks had
significant hidden value during 1987-89, and in 1990 the hidden
value seems to disappear; even the market values are slightly
lower than book values in 1990. As described several times already
in this thesis, 1990 was the year when banking growth
opportunities appear to weaken, and profits came under pressure.
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Figure 8.1: SMVAM Regression Estimates (1987-90)
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The values of the intercept are positive in 1988 and 1990,
when the values of the slope coefficients are the lowest during
the period, particularly in 1990. Thus, it appears that the
unbooked government guarantees behind deposit insurance seem to
support bank market values in those years when banks had the lower
hidden capital (lower slope coefficients). Thus, when banks market
values are falling as a result of lower hidden value, the
government appears to enhance their guarantees for banks. This is
particularly true for 1990 (in which MV falls below BV), and the
value of the intercept is the highest during the period.
The TBTF doctrine seems to shape the government guarantees
behind bank market values, since the banks quoted on the Stock
Exchange are usually among the largest in Spain. When these large
banks are unable to keep up their market values in terms of hidden
value, the government guarantees seem to support them.
8.3.3.3.- Descriptive Analysis of the Variables.
There are two new variables that need to be defined: AK4 and
AK5 , which are the two measures of market-value capital
augmentation employed in this analysis. The first variable of
market-value capital augmentation is defined as follows:
(Market-value Capital) t - (Market-value Capital)t_i
AK4- 
	
	
(Market-value Capital) t-1
(8.4)
where the Market-value Capital = Number of Shares x Market Share
Price.
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The second variable of market-value capital augmentations is
defined in terms of the ratio P/BV:
(8.5)
where P is computed as the Market-value Capital in (8.4) and the
By as the book-value definition of capital in Chapters 4 and 7.
The independent variables employed in this analysis have been
already defined previously: CC, PK, LQ, AD, KR and DI were defined
•in Chapter 7; PF has been defined in this chapter. The dummy
variable CM (access to capital markets) will not be used since all
the banks considered were in the same category (value 1= easy
access to capital markets).
Table 8.4 shows the mean and the standard deviation for the
variables and the sample employed in this section. The first
feature that one can note is that the presence of outliers seems
to be much more limited than in Table 7.2, when all the private
banks were included. There seem to be less extreme observations
because unlike in Table 7.2, the means of the variables do not
reach dramatically different values over time and the standard
deviations are not large in most cases. Although there are
different trends and even different signs, the means of the
variables seem to remain within a small interval. The only
exception is the mean of PK (portfolio risk) in 1990. Therefore,
the sample of private banks with market-value information seems to
be more homogeneous than the sample of private banks considered in
Chapter 7.
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In Table 8.4 and in Figure 8.2, one can observe that the two
means of the market-value capital augmentations variable seem to
have a decreasing trend. The average of AK 4 is decreasing but
positive during 1987-89, and it is negative in 1990, which
indicates that the average market-value bank capital diminished in
1990. The average of AK5 is positive in 1987, which appears to
imply that the average of market-value capital augmented more than
the mean of book-value capital in that year, and it is negative
for 1988-90, which indicates that the mean of market-value capital
augmented less than the average of book-value capital in 1988-89,
and from the evolution of AK
s
 it was found that the average
market-value capital decreased in absolute terms in 1990.
Table 8.4 : Summary Statistics for Private Banks in the
Market-Value Capital Samples (1987-90)
1987 1988 1989 1990
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.	 Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
AK 0.332 0.410 0.194 0.212 0.092 0.224 -0.160 0.222
4
AK 0.142 0.297 -0.031 0.211 -0.025 0.232 -0.260 0.224
PF 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.004
CC 0.270 0.183 0.289 0.125 0.316 0.143 0.322 0.143
PR -0.030 0.481 0.013 1.770 -0.052 0.664 1.054 4.714
LQ 0.401 0.797 -0.100 0.272 0.038 0.399 -0.753 0.119
AD 0.260 0.373 0.477 1.757 0.139 0.303 0.113 0.105
KR -0.851 0.347 -0.771 0.3051 -0.782 0.223 -0.761 0.197
DI 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006 0.0002 0.0009 0.0003 0.0011 0.0004
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The decreasing trend in the means of both definitions of
market-value capital augmentations could have resulted from two
main causes: firstly, the 1987 Stock Markets crash and the slow
recovery of the markets afterwards, which affected negatively
almost every single share price in the market; secondly, the more
fierce competition in the Spanish banking markets, particularly
from 1990 onwards, could have induced expectations of profits
coming under pressure and this seemed to influence negatively
private banks' share prices in 1990.
As far as the regulatory variables (KR and DI) are concerned,
the means of KR appear to show that the average bank in the sample
had a generic capital ratio well above the required level and that
position has improved during 1987-90. The means of DI also show
an increasing trend.
The mean of the variable PF remains similar throughout the
period. This is also the case for CC. The variable PK and LQ had
negative signs in two years (1987 and 1989 for PK, and 1988 and
1990 for LQ) and positive signs in the other two years. The
means of the variable AD were well above 10 per cent throughout
the period.
All things considered, the main conclusions that one can draw
from this descriptive analysis are that the sample of private
banks operating in Spain with market-value information available
is more homogeneous than the sample of private banks in Chapter 7
and that there seems to be a decreasing trend in banks'
market-value capital augmentations during 1987-90.
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8.3.3.4.- Results.
Employing AK4 and AK5 as dependent variables, two regressions
have been estimated for each year during 1987-90. The researcher
has undertaken the same tests as in Chapter 7 and those also
reported in Section 8.3.2: significance, multicollinearity,
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Table 8.5 displays the
results for the regressions with market-value bank capital
augmentations.
In the t-tests for the significance of individual
coefficients, the critical values are 2,069 in 1987, 2,064 in
1988, 2,052 in 1989, and 2,060 in 1990. Thus, no variable is
statistically significant in 1987; two variables (PF * and DI) are
statistically in the regression with AK 5 in 1988; one variable
(CC) is significant in the regression with AK 5 in 1989, and one
variable (AD) is statistically significant in the two regressions
for 1990.
The critical F-values to test the overall significance of the
regressions are 2.74 for 1987, 2.70 for 1988, 2.60 for 1989, and
2.66 for 1990. Consequently, one can note that only two
regressions (one in 1988, and the other in 1989) are statistically
significant as a whole.
Both individual coefficients' significance and overall
significance appear to indicate that the empirical model of
capital augmentations has not been improved by employing
market-value definitions of capital.
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Table 8.5: Regression Estimates for Private Banks (1987-90)
1987 1988
AK AK s AK AK s
-0.5754
(-3.39)
9.743
(2.26)
Constant
(1)
1.1731
(2.24)
0.6868
(1.60)
0.1047
(0.42)
PF 5.66
(0.12)
-20.24
(-0.51)
0.366
(0.06)
CC -0.2656
(-0.28)
0.1974
(0.25)
0.1742
(0.41)
-0.3525
(-1.20)
0.0349
(1.12)
PK 0.2316
(0.91)
0.0727
(0.35)
0.0495
(1.09)
LQ -0.3010
(-1.59)
-0.1660
(-1.07)
0.3814
(1.57)
0.1849
(1.11)
0.0192
(1.02)
AD 0.5182
(1.29)
0.0047
(0.01)
-0.0051
(-0.19)
KR 0.4346
(0.96)
0.2148
(0.58)
0.2676
(1.10)
-0.0203
(-0.12)
DI -733.1
(-1.86)
-409.2
(-1.27)
504.9
(1.39)
1014.6
(4.08)
Number
Observ. 23 23 24 24
R 2 0.418 0.254 0.218 0.627
F-stat. 1.54 0.73 0.64 3.85
Multicol. NO NO NO NO
Heterosk. YES NO NO NO
DW 1.79 2.11 2.04 2.50
ND ND ND NA
357
CHAPTER 8: FURTHER EVIDENCE ON BANK CAPITAL AUGMENTATIONS IN . . .
1989 1990
AK
0.2731
(0.68)
-20.18
(-1.24)
AK
s
-0.0827
(-0.23)
-3.56
(-0.24)
AK
-0.2962
(-0.83)
16.99
(0.93)
AK 5
-0.2123
(-0.63)
20.40
(1.18)
Constant
(1)
PF
CC -0.0007
(-0.00)
-1.0585
(-2.21)
0.2964
(0.44)
0.3947
(0.62)
PK 0.0425
(0.56)
0.0449
(0.67)
0.0036
(0.31)
0.0050
(0.46)
LQ 0.1764
(1.10)
0.0095
(0.07)
0.2184
(0.50)
0.6716
(1.63)
AD 0.1235
(0.76)
0.0071
(0.05)
-0.8849
(-2.10)
-0.9931
(-2.37)
KR 0.0630
(0.20)
-0.0033
(-0.01)
-0.1413
(-0.42)
-0.3673
(-1.15)
DI -9.9
(-0.04)
480.3
(1.91)
83.2
(0.37)
34.8
(0.16)
Number
Observ. 27 27 25 25
R 2 0.277 0.462 0.330 0.407
F-stat. 1.04 2.34 1.20 1.67
Multicol. NO NO NO NO
Heterosk. NO NO YES NO
DW 1.86 1.42 1.85 2.15
ND ND ND NA
Notes:
(1) The t-statistics values are in parentheses.
(2) NA = No Autocorrelation;	 ND = No Decision
As far as the tests for multicollinearity, the correlation
matrices shown in Table B.4 of Appendix B, indicate that all the
correlation coefficients between independent variables were well
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below 0.8-0.9 in absolute terms, and in turn there seems not to be
high correlation between the independent variables. In addition,
no regression has been signaled by Minitab. Therefore,
multicollinearity is not apparently a serious problem.
As for the rest of the tests, only two regressions were found
to have heteroskedasticity (one in 1987 and one in 1990). Two
regressions had no autocorrelation and in the other six, no
decision could be made in terms of autocorrelation.
8.3.3.5.- Economic Interpretation of the Results.
The economic interpretation of the results can be divided
into the following main points:
a) Model Evaluation: the market-value capital results
provided in the previous subsection seem to demonstrate that the
empirical model of capital augmentations works better when
regulatory and book-value capital augmentations are used. Indeed,
the relatively weaker results found in the regressions with
definitions of market-value capital augmentations for the private
banks operating in Spain that are quoted on the Madrid Stock
Exchange appear to indicate that the empirical model does not
explain adequately the evolution of the market-value bank equity
in Spain during 1987-90. Theoretical and empirical justifications
can be suggested in the literature in order to explain why the fit
of the model seems weaker for the market-value bank capital
augmentations.
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The models suggested in the literature of bank capital
augmentations, on which the researcher based his empirical model,
were not primarily conceived to explain the evolution of
market-value capital augmentations. Rather, the emphasis was
placed on book-value and regulatory capital. Hence, the empirical
model employed in this thesis might not contain variables which
are specifically related to the evolution of market-value equity,
and which are beyond the scope of this research. Although the
issues involved in the market valuation of equity are beyond the
scope of this analysis, a brief synthesis of the main models and
sources can usefully be included in order to substantiate the
empirical difficulties and the need for the researcher to focus on
the specific objectives of this thesis.
A theoretical justification for the poor fit of the model
reflects simply the fact that valuing banks is conceptually
difficult. The theoretical difficulties of valuing banks are
succinctly captured by Copeland, Koller and Murrin (1990, p. 381):
"Banks remain among the most difficult companies to value,
because in spite of the multitude of regulatory and reporting
requirements imposed on them, it is hard to determine the
quality of their loan portfolio, to figure out what
percentage of their accounting profits results from
interest-rate mismatch gains, and to understand which
business units are creating or destroying value".
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These authors distinguish between an outsider and an insider
trying to determine the value of a banks. Unlike for an insider,
valuing banks is a more difficult task for an outsider because of
lack of complete and accurate information about the risks that
banks face. Although securitization and the development of
secondary markets for some bank loans make the task of determining
the quality of a bank's loan portfolio a little easier, it is
still difficult for an outsider to determine accurately loan
quality, and, consequently, the value of the loan portfolio. Since
banks 'bet' on interest-rate and exchange-rate movements on a
daily basis, monitoring these bets and mismatches poses a problem
for an outsider. In addition, an outsider has difficulty
determining the value and riskiness of the contingent claims
associated with off-balance-sheet activities.
Unless profits are disaggregated by business unit, an
outsider has difficulty in knowing which business units are
driving the bank's success (creating value) or reducing it
(destroying value).
Although Copeland, Koller and Murrin (1990) recommend the
entity approach for valuing nonfinancial businesses, they prefer
the equity approach for valuing banks. The entity approach focuses
on after-tax, free cash flow from operations discounted by the
weighted average cost of capital. Equity value, then, equals
entity value minus the market value of debt. As a consequence of
the difficulties in valuing banks employing the entity estimation
(e.g., estimating the cost of capital for demand deposits), they
recommend utilizing the equity method for valuing banks. This
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method equates equity value with forecast free cash flow (FCF) to
shareholders discounted at the cost of equity. The foundations of
this approach are (i) the definition of FCF to stock holders and
(ii) use of the spread model.
Copeland et al. define FCF to bank equity holders as:
FCF = NI + NCO + S - U = (NI + NCO) + (S - U) = D	 (8.6)
where NI = net income, NCO = noncash outlays (e.g., depreciation
and loan charge-offs), S = sources of funds from the balance
sheet2 , U = uses of funds from the balance sheet3 ,	 and
D = dividend pay-out to equity holders. The first two terms in
Equation (8.6) equal cash flow from bank operations, and the last
two are cash flow needed for balance-sheet growth. The sum of
these two items is mathematically equal to the dividends paid to
stockholders.
According to Sinkey (1992, p. 262), spread management
(managing the difference between lending and borrowing rates)
captures the heart of
Measuring bank net
incorporating transfer
within the bank the
wholesale unit, and,
the loan-and-deposit business of banking.
income using the spread model means
pricing and an equity credit. Assuming that
retail unit is supplying funds to the
thus, that there is a transfer rate
representing the opportunity cost of funds to the retail unit as
well as a rate for equity credit and for the opportunity cost of
holding nonearnings reserves, the calculation of net income
employing the spread model is as follows4:
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(Spread on Loans) x (Loans) (the wholesale unit)
(Spread on Deposits) x (Deposits) (the retail unit)
(Equity Credit rate) x (Equity)
(Opportunity Cost) x (Reserves)
Net interest income
Operating expenses
Net operating income before taxes
Income tax
Net income
Since the purpose of the spread model is to estimate the
profitability of internal business units, one should not confuse
the equity credit with the cost of equity or shareholders'
required rate of return. The cost of equity is not involved in the
computation of the net income of the internal business units.
The allocation of shared costs also influences the
profitability of business units within the bank. Copeland, Kollen
and Murrin (1990) argue that business units should be assigned
only the costs they would incur as stand-alone entities, with
unallocated costs kept at headquarters as a cost center. They
contend that most U.S. banks use cost-accounting systems to spread
overhead costs across all of their business units. This cost
allocation makes it difficult to determine cost efficiency by
comparing internal costs with those of outside vendors.
It seems difficult, then, to employ the equity method to
value U.S. banks. The same (indeed, multiplied) difficulties arise
in the case of the Spanish banks, since there is a lack of
reliable information in terms of business units within a bank,
which prevents the equity model from being applied to the Spanish
banks. Therefore, valuing Spanish banks seems conceptually very
difficult, and this may lie behind the weak results found in the
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previous subsection.
There are also empirical and practical issues in the Spanish
Stock Exchange that appear to lie behind the relatively weak
results found in the previous subsection. As described in
Chapter 2, although there have been improvements and reforms in
the Stock Exchange, one of the main features of the Spanish
financial system is the thinness of its stock market.
An illustrative example of the thinness of the Spanish stock
market is that only a limited sample of stocks are considered
sufficiently liquid for any major investor to contemplate buying
them. Caminal, Gual and Vives (1990) reported that the number of
quoted companies in the Spanish stock market was 312, but only
about 60 stocks were active and frequently traded. With trading
concentrated in a relatively small number of stocks, and an even
smaller number of sectors, the market appears to be inevitably
volatile with plenty of room for large-scale shareholders to
manipulate stock prices.
As discovered in Chapter 2, when examining the market power
of banks in Spain, one of the sectors of the stock market where
large firms seem to 'control' stock prices is the banking sector.
Econometric evidence of particular aspects of pricing in the
Spanish equity market is provided by Rubio (1986) and Alonso and
Rubio (1988). The price of the stock of a bank appears to be
typically manipulated by the same institution buying or selling in
the market. In Chapter 4, the market value of the big Spanish
banks was found to be very high indeed, compared with other
European countries.
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Considering all the evidence reported so far in this thesis,
three main reasons can be suggested for the high valuation of
banks' stock in Spain:
1) Although in 1990 banks' profits seemed to come under
pressure in Spain, the evidence provided in Chapters 2 and 4
appears to imply that the Spanish banking market had a
relatively high profitable growth compared with other European
Countries. This factor would influence positively the market
valuation of bank equity.
2) In Chapter 4 and in Subsection 8.3.3.2, it was suggested
that Spanish banks had 'hidden value' in their balance-sheets,
which results in market-value equity tending to be higher than
book-value equity.
3) There seems to be econometric evidence (Rubio, 1986;
Alonso and Rubio, 1988) showing that stock prices tend to be
manipulated, particularly banks' stock prices.
The last two factors (hidden value and price manipulation)
seem to shape, to a large extent, the evolution of stock prices.
They may lie behind the weak results of our empirical analysis of
market-value capital augmentations. In addition, the sample of
private banks quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange is very
heterogeneous since there are banks with stock frequently traded,
and at the same time, banks with stock rarely traded. Thus, the
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evolution of the stock prices may be very different, which may
lead to the non-existence at this time of a general model of
market-value bank capital augmentation in Spain.
b)The Impact of the Regulatory Variables on Market-Value
Capital Augmentations in Spain: keeping in mind the weak results
in the fit of the empirical model of capital augmentations with
market-value capital, it is not surprising to find that the
individual coefficients are rarely significant statistically.
Among the regulatory variables (PK, KR, and DI), only DI is
statistically significant in one regression (in 1988). This seems
to confirm the evidence of Chapter 7 and Section 8.3.2, in which
the impact of the regulatory variables, particularly, capital
adequacy regulation, seems much weaker for private banks than for
savings banks. Therefore, private banks appear to have wider
leeway in terms of decisions related to capital augmentations.
The fact that the market valuation of capital seems to be
well above the book-value capital for private banks - that is to
say, private banks seem well-capitalized in terms of market-value
capital- could make the impact of capital regulation and other
regulatory variables less crucial than if banks were badly
capitalized. If banks were badly capitalized, ceteris paribus, the
regulatory pressure and impact would be expected to become far
stronger.
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C) The Impact of the Managerial Variables: the individual
coefficients of the managerial variables are statistically
significant in four cases: PF Is only significant in one equation
(in 1988); CC is significant in one equation (in 1989); and AD is
significant in two equations (in 1990). Again, the results seem
very weak compared with what the theoretical and empirical
literature suggests s . The literature of equity valuation and
capital structure suggests that earnings (and the related issues
of retained earnings and dividends) and cost of capital are two of
the main determinants of equity valuation and capital structure.
However, apparently this is not supported by the evidence provided
in our market-value capital augmentation analysis of the Spanish
private banks.
The variable AD is significant (with a negative sign) in the
two equations for 1990. A possible explanation for this is again
related to the 'accounts war' (guerra del pasivo). The fact that
private banks engaged in an 'accounts war' in order to capture
deposits could have been viewed by the stock market as a negative
factor, leading to smaller margins and earnings, and higher risk,
since certain banking firms may have engaged in riskier business
in order to capture more deposits. Thus, one would expect the
impact of the deposit growth on market-value capital augmentations
to be negative.
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8.4: THE IMPACT OF SIZE ON BANK CAPITAL AUGMENTATIONS IN THE
SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM.
8.4.1.-	 Introduction.
In this section, the impact of size, a variable that has not
yet been explicitly considered in our analysis, on bank capital
augmentations is examined. Size is a variable on which the
economic and banking literatures have devoted a great deal of
attention.
As described in Section 8.2 (testing hypotheses), two main
empirical analysis are undertaken in this section: (i) the impact
of size on the relation between market value of equity and book
value of equity, and (ii) the impact of size on bank capital
augmentations, and the impact of these augmentation on the Bank of
Spain's generic capital ratios.
This section is to be organized as follows. In the next
subsection, theoretical and empirical background on the impact of
size on bank capital augmentations is provided. Then, the
relation MV-BV is estimated for different sizes. Next, following
Equation (6.5) and some extensions of it, an analysis of the
impact of size on bank capital augmentations is performed.
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8.4.2.- The Impact of Size on Bank Capital Augmentations
in Spanish Banking: Theoretical and Empirical Background.
As found in Chapter 2, in the Spanish banking system size
became a very important issue in the late 1980s as a result of
Spain's entry into the EC and the prospect of the Single European
Market by 1992: a certain number of Spanish banks considered the
possibility of increasing in size in order to be able to compete
with the European banks 6 . In fact, the number of large banks seem
to have increased during 1987-90. This can be observed in Table
8.6, where the number of Spanish banks listed on The Banker's
World Top 100, 500 and 1000 banks in 1987 (Top 1000 were not
available that year) and in 1990 are displayed. Size is measured
in terms of capital value.
Table 8.6: Number of Spanish Banks in World Top Banks
(1987, 1990)
Top 100 Top 101-500	 Top 501-1000
Private Savings	 Private Savings	 Private Savings
1987	 2	 6	 5	 n.a.	 n.a.
1990	 4	 1	 8	 3	 10	 10
Source: The Banker (1988, 1991)
In Table 8.6, one can note that the number of Spanish banks
in the Top 100 has increased during 1987-90: in 1987, there were
only two Spanish private banks and no savings bank in the Top 100;
in 1990 this number doubled for the private banks; and there was
one Spanish savings bank in the World Top 100. Two private banks
and one savings that were in the Top 101-500 in 1987 had moved
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upwards in the list by 1990, and they were among the Top 100. The
sum of the number of Spanish private and savings banks in the Top
101-500, remained the same in 1990, which implies that banks that
were not in the Top 500 in 1987 had moved upwards in the list by
1990. Therefore, the number of Spanish large banks has increased
in terms of international standards during 1987-90.
Another characteristic that one can observe in Table 8.6 is
that the number of large private banks is higher than the number
of large savings banks in Spain. This seems particularly the case
in 1990, even after several mergers took place among savings
banks.
The theoretical and empirical advantages of size in banking
have been largely discussed in the literature. Revell (1987 and
1989) suggests several potential advantages of larger size in
banking: cost economies', benefits of size on risk and capital,
benefits of size on fulfilling large customers needs, easier
access to international banking, a better position for the
competitive struggle in the banking markets, and benefits on
management. The researcher is merely interested in the analysis of
the impact of size on bank capital decisions, and, particularly,
on bank capital augmentations. The analysis of the rest of the
potential advantages of size is beyond the scope of this study,
and will not be undertaken.
One must examine the impact of size on the relationship
between bank risk and capital. Revell (1989, p. 76) maintains that
one of the undoubted advantages of size is the reduction of
overall risk through the pooling of more individual risks: this
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pooling means that the probability of a loss that would be
disastrously large in relation to the operations of the bank are
much reduced. Therefore, there appear to be potential economies of
scale in risk-bearing.
The scale economies in risk-bearing that accrue to large
banks are part of the explanation of the fact that these banks
normally have the lowest capital ratios in any banking system. The
other part of the explanation is that the markets expect that the
supervisory authorities will come to the rescue of any of the core
banks with serious financial problems (Revell, 1987, p. 80). The
TBTF doctrine seems to shape that expectation.
Peltzman (1984) provides empirical evidence of lower capital
ratios for larger banks by showing a steady and cumulative
dramatic decrease in the capital to assets ratio with bank size
over the whole range of bank sizes for the Insured US Commercial
Banks in 1980. He also remarks that the relationship has not
always been so ( it was found that the negative relationship
between the capital to assets ratio and bank size holds only over
the four smallest size classes for 1967).
Gilbert (1984) argues that the lower capital ratios for
larger banks seem to reflect the implicit assumption by the bank
regulatory agencies that larger banks bear less risk. Peltzman
(1984) defines it as economies of scale in capital issue and it is
viewed as the crucial determinant of the equilibrium bank size
distribution in a deregulated environment. The issue of different
capital requirements for different bank sizes is considered by
Peltzman as one of the most important matters in the topic of
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capital adequacy because of its many potential consequences on the
banking industry structure, competition and performance.
In contrast, Whitehead and Schweitzer (1982) find that the
studies which investigate the determinants of bank risk find no
systematic relation between risk and bank size. They study five
different types of bank risk (credit risk, interest rate risk,
operating risk, management risk, and overall risk). Since they
find no systematic relation between risk and bank size, they argue
that small banks appear to be on an equal footing with large
banks. Dince and Fortson (1983) conclude that differences in
capital requirements for large and small banks are arbitrary, and
do not reflect differences in risk. They show that their survey
does not bear out any consistent relationship between capital
adequacy and risk as measured by the variance of return on assets
and return on equity. Peltzman (1984) emphasizes that from the
1970s onwards, the relevant policy makers have given large banks a
competitive advantage in the form of de facto socialization of the
default-risk on large-deposit accounts by allowing them to operate
with lower capital-to-assets ratios.
From the theoretical and empirical issues identified above,
the researcher needs to test the impact of size on bank capital
ratios in Spain. The researcher will study the impact of size on
the Bank of Spain's generic capital ratios during 1987-90. This
analysis will be undertaken by computing Equation (6.5) (based on
Keeley, 1988) across bank sizes in order to examine the impact of
size on the capital ratios as well as the impact of capital
augmentations on capital ratios across sizes.
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Lower capital ratios are not the only potential benefit for
large banks. As described in Chapter 5, bank capital can be
augmented from two main sources: (i) undistributed or retained
earnings, and (ii) the raising of new capital on the market. In
terms of retained earnings, if all banks had profits ceteris
paribus one would expect larger banks to have higher absolute
values of retained earnings. However, in relative terms (that is,
in terms of retention ratios), one must test and prove that there
are different levels of retained earnings across bank sizes. The
relation between bank size and retention ratios is not so clear as
the relation between bank size and the absolute value of retained
earnings.
In terms of raising new capital on the market, Revell (1987,
p. 80) contends that large banks can raise new capital more
cheaply than smaller banks; not only may their risk premium be
lower, but also the transactions costs of raising new capital are
much lower for large companies than for small ones. In the case of
the Spanish private banks, this appears to be true, since the
private banks listed on the Spanish and international stock
markets, and, in turn ceteris paribus which have easier and
cheaper access to capital markets, are among the largest banks in
Spain. They have easier access to new capital instruments, since
their capital instruments are more easily negotiated because of
the existence of secondary markets. They have cheaper access to
new capital instruments, since the market has more information
about these banks (and the banks with no market information are
likely to pay a higher premium for the higher information
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uncertainty).
Table 8.7 provides empirical evidence of the advantage of
larger private banks quoted on the Stock market in Spain, in terms
of raising new equity (some of these data come from Table 4.13).
One can notice that approximately 50 per cent of the new bank
equity issues in Spain during 1987-90 are those of the banks
quoted on the Spanish stock market. These large banks quoted on
the Spanish stock market (between 25-30 banks during 1987-90) are
in number only between 20 and 25 per cent of all private banks in
Spain. Thus, the larger banks appear to have easier access to new
equity issues, and, in turn, an advantage in terms of external
sources of capital.
Table 8.7: New Equity Issues by Banks Quoted on the Spanish
Stock Market (1987-90).
New Equity Issues
by Banks on the	 Total New
Stock Market	 Equity Issues
1987 23 39
1988 36 76
1989 24 55
1990 23 47
Source: Consejo Superior Bancario (1987-90), Own Results.
Finally, there is a practical issue in Spain that could have
a significant impact of bank capital augmentations. This issue is
the fiscal gains that could emerge from a process of increasing in
size through mergers. The Spanish legislation exempts asset
revaluations from the corporate income tax resulting from
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mergers 8 . This implies an immediate tax gain for both merging
firms and an artificial subsidization of mergers. Consequently,
Spanish banks appear to have another way of augmenting capital:
increasing in size through mergers. The 'hidden value' in the
banks' balance sheet may emerge by means of a merger at no tax
cost, and, then augment bank capital.
Mergers seem to have been more common among savings banks
than private banks during 1987-90. There was only one merger
between private banks during that period: that of Banco de Bilbao
and Banco de Vizcaya into BBV at the end of 1987. However, there
were 12 savings banks involved in merger processes in 19909.
Thus, it seems that mergers are an instrument to increase size and
augment capital that is more frequently employed by Spanish
savings banks than by private banks. The lower possibilities to
augment capital for savings banks could be one of the reasons
shaping the mergers among them. From this, we need to study and
test the impact of the mergers (increase in size) on capital
augmentations for the Spanish savings banks.
8.4.3.- Size Effects in the Relation between Market Value and
Book Value of Equity.
In Subsection 8.3.3.2, the researcher estimated the relation
between market value of equity and book value of equity for the
sample of Spanish private banks wich have market information
available. In this section, the researcher investigates the
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potential size effects in that relation, and estimates the same
regressions, but now the sample will be divided into two
subsamples: the largest banks in terms of total assets (10 in
1987, 1989 and 1990, and 9 in 1988), and the medium-sized banks in
terms of total assets (13 in 1987, 15 in 1988 and 1990, and 17 in
1989).
Kane and Unal (1990) also estimate the regressions described
in Equation (8.2) (MV = a + b (BV) + c) for different bank sizes
in the U.S., in order to control statistically for
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional differences. Our purpose in
undertaking these tests is to investigate to what extent the
relation between MV capital and BV capital is different across
sizes, and to what extent that possible divergence is caused by
differences in 'hidden value' and by government guarantees.
The regression estimates of the relation MV-BV are displayed
in Table 8.8 and in Figure 8.3. The intercept is represented by a,
and the slope by b. The intercept is only statistically
significant in one case (in 1989 for the medium-sized banks) 10 ,
being always positive for the medium-sized banks, and being
positive in two years (1988 and 1990) and negative in the other
two (1987 and 1989) for the largest banks.
The slopes appear to be always higher for the largest banks
than for the medium-sized banks. These are above 1 during 1987-89,
and they are below 1 in 1990. They are only significantly greater
than 1 for two years for the largest banks (1987 and 1989).
The results found in Table 8.8 seem to indicate that during
1987-89, the largest banks had significantly higher 'hidden value'
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than the medium-sized banks in the sample. In 1990, the slopes for
both groups are very similar (below 1), and they imply that both
groups of banks apparently had a dramatic decrease in 'hidden
value', and even that there was an overvaluation of banks' assets.
Table 8.8: Estimates of the SMVAM across Different Sizes.
1987-90 (intercept in Spanish pesetas million)
Year
_
Largest Banks Medium-sized Banks
a b R 2 a	 b	 R 2
1987 -9840.04 1.9514 0.75 8382.65 1.2221 0.387
(-0.17) (4.89) (1.45) (2.63)
1988 41339.63 1.4866 0.584 11231.85 1.1372 0.507
(0.42) (3.13) (2.07) (3.66)
1989 -20710.39 1.8873 0.895 9640.29 1.1833 0.842
(-0.38) (8.27) (3.20) (8.95)
1990 80792.53 0.7723 0.636 9572.28 0.7563 0.493
(1.41) (3.74) (1.90) (3.55)
As far as the economic interpretation of the intercepts, the
medium-sized banks seem to have the government guarantees behind
their market values during the whole period. However, the largest
banks had only positive values of the intercept in those years
when the market values appeared to fall dramatically. In addition,
the values of the intercept in 1988 and 1990 were far higher for
the largest banks than for the medium-sized banks. This seems to
imply that whenever the largest banks are unable to keep up their
market values, the government guarantees emerge. This appears to
support the TBTF doctrine, since whenever it is hard for a large
bank to keep up its market values, the government guarantees
emerge.
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Figure 8.3: SMVAM and Size (1987-90)
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To sum up, the main conclusions of this subsection is (i)
that the largest banks seem to have higher 'hidden value' than the
medium-sized, although in 1990 there was a dramatic decrease in
market value; and (ii) although medium-sized banks seem to always
have the government guarantees behind their market values, the
government guarantees appear to reach far higher values when the
largest banks cannot keep up their market values. The latter
finding is again consistent with the TBTF hypothesis.
8.4.4.- The Impact of Size on the Bank of Spain's Generic
Capital Ratios.
This section analyzes the possible size effects in the actual
generic capital ratios maintained by the Spanish banks, and how
those capital ratios came about during 1987-90. Specifically, the
researcher first investigates whether the capital regulation
caused banks with a deficient Bank of Spain generic ratio to raise
regulatory capital, and whether there were differences across bank
sizes in this context. Then, we examine how regulatory capital
augmentations and asset growth affected the actual generic ratios
held by Spanish banks, and whether there were differences across
bank sizes in this context.
The methodology employed is an application of Equation (6.5)
to the Bank of Spain's generic ratio:
d(K/I)/dt = (K/I) [(1/K)(dK/dt) - (1/I)(dI/dt)]
	 (8.7)
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where K is regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) and I is total
bank investments (as defined in Subsection 3.6.2.3). The three
main variables in Equation (8.7) are the actual capital ratio and
the rates of capital augmentations and asset growth. Our analysis
will compute these three variables for different sizes in the
Spanish banking system.
Keeley (1988) distinguished between capital-deficient and
capital-sufficient banks in his study in order to examine the
effectiveness of U.S. capital regulation. In other words, his
concern was whether capital-deficient banks in the previous year
had increased their capital ratios, and if that increase in
capital ratios was caused by capital augmentation and/or changes
in assets. Our research will also divide the sample into
capital-deficient and capital-sufficient banks to account for the
possible different impact of capital regulation between
capital-deficient and capital-sufficient banks in Spain during
1987-90: those banks with a generic capital ratio (capital / total
investments) below 5 per cent in the previous year will be
regarded as capital-deficient banks, whereas those with value
equal to or above 5 per cent will be deemed as capital-sufficient
banks.
In order to account for size, the two samples of private and
savings banks have also been divided into four class sizes,
respectively, according to the four quartiles in terms of total
assets 12 : the first quartile comprises the smallest banks in the
samples; the second and the third quartiles contain medium-sized
banks; and the fourth quartile comprises the largest banks in the
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samples. Consequently, in the case of the private banks, each
class size contains 30 banks (except that of the second quartile
which contains 31 banks) during the whole period 1987-90, and in
the case of the savings banks, each class size comprises 19 banks
during 1987-89, and 16 banks in 1990.
The averages of the Bank of Spain's generic capital ratios,
the regulatory capital augmentation rates and the investments
growth rates across different bank class sizes and between
capital-deficient and capital sufficient banks in Spain during
1987-90 are displayed in Table 8.9 for the private banks, and in
Table 8.10 for the savings banks. The terms capital-deficient and
capital sufficient refer to the previous year: for example, in the
case of 1987, those banks that the previous year (1986) had a
capital ratio below 5 per cent are considered capital-deficient
(K-def), and those banks above 5 per cent in 1986 will be
considered capital-sufficient banks.
Let us first consider the generic ratios. Comparing the
the 'all banks' columns in Table 8.9 and Tables 8.10, one can note
that the private banks tend to have higher generic ratios than the
savings banks throughout the period 1987-90. The seemingly higher
generic capital ratios for the private banks appear to be
influenced strongly by the relatively very high values in bank
class size 1. The presence of outliers or extreme observations in
class 1 of private banks (very small banks) seems to shape the
high values of the generic ratios. The existence of outliers was
also found in Chapter 7, and here the very small banks seem to
have been identified as those with extreme values.
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Size	 Average Generic
Quart.	 Ratio
K-def	 K-suf	 All
1	 .240	 .275	 .264
2	 .032	 .083	 .059
3	 .031	 .079	 .050
4	 .028	 .070	 .056
All	 .067	 .137	 .107
1	 .052	 .356	 .295
2	 .042	 .111	 .073
3	 .041	 .086	 .062
4	 .048	 .082	 .066
All	 .044	 .185	 .124
1	 .084	 .370	 .332
2	 .038	 .092	 .075
3	 .040	 .082	 .064
4	 .041	 .069	 .059
All	 .044	 .172	 .132
1
1	 .051	 .350	 .290
2	 .051	 .125	 .098
3	 .042	 .061	 .054
4	 .047
	 .073	 .064
All	 .047	 .163	 .126
1 1987 1
Average Capital
Growth Rate
K-def
-.306
.229
-.327
.119
.149
1 1988 1
.112
.372
.541
.440
.412
1 1989 1
.322
.261
.248
.244
.258
1990 1
-.087
-.002
1.10
.281
.380
K-suf	 All	 K-def	 K-suf	 All
.	 418	 .201	 -.245	 -.107	 -.106
.	 006	 -.114	 .147	 .917	 .544
.	 164	 .263	 .029	 .185	 .091
.	 272	 .221	 .276	 .159	 .198
.	 236	 .199	 .063	 .258	 .174
.	 194	 .177	 -.347	 .205	 .095
.	 322	 .350	 .064	 .180	 .117
.	 248	 .404	 .165	 .165	 .165
.	 286	 .358	 .115	 .152	 .135
.	 253	 .323	 .062	 .179	 .128
5	 .87	 5.13	 -.704
	 19.56	 16.86
.	 170	 .199	 .089	 .254	 .201
.	 185	 .213	 .131	 .248	 .198
.	 116	 .163	 .173	 .271	 .235
1	 .94	 1.41	 .044	 6.31	 4.34
-.	 180	 -.162	 -.209	 .019	 -.026
-.	 158	 .101	 -.091	 .268	 .141
-.	 069	 .362	 .125	 .166	 .152
.	 143	 .189	 .129	 .097	 .108
.	 004	 .122	 .011	 .132	 .094
Average
Investments
Growth Rate
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Table 8.9: Private Banks: Average Generic Capital Ratios,
Capital and Assets Growth Rate Across Bank Sizes. (1987-90). 
One can observe from Table 8.10 that the average values of
the generic capital ratios for the savings banks seem far more
homogeneous than for the private banks. In the case of the private
banks, it can also be noted that the largest banks (Groups 3 and
4) seem to maintain lower generic capital ratios than the smaller
banks during 1987-90. In the case of the savings banks, this does
not appear to be the case, since the capital ratios seem very
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Size
Quart.
Average Generic
Ratio
K-def K-suf All
1 .041 .074 .055
2 .037 .065 .047
3 .040 .069 .051
4 .047 .064 .056
All .041 .068 .052
1 .047 .070 .058
2 .046 .065 .053
3 .050 .070 .058
4 .058 .064 .062
All .050 .067 .058
1 .055 .068 .065
2 .038 .061 .052
3 .048 .063 .060
4 .046 .055 .054
All .045 .062 .058
1 .049 .069 .063
2 .052 .064 .060
3 .063 .064 .064
4 .055 .077 .067
All .055 .068 .063
Average
Investments
Growth Rate
K-def K-suf All K-def K-suf All
.196 .241 .128 .246 .178
.147 .253 .128 .101 .118
.168 .254 .132 .142 .136
.125 .152 .089 .123 .108
.156 .225 .122 .152 .135
.205 .299 .177 .243 .208
.234 .367 .167 .226 .189
.214 .410 .201 .215 .207
.245 .378 .207 .195 .200
.225 .364 .186 .218 .201
.220 .304 .153 .145 .147
.097 .151 .150 .141 .144
.223 .228 .176 .220 .213
.057 .068 .200 .211 .209
.150 .188 .164 .183 .178
.181 .217 .061 .066 .064
.126 .141 .078 .130 .114
.128 .275 .054 .080 .072
.298 .302 .116 .105 .110
.178 .233 .081 .095 .090
I 1987 I
Average Capital
Growth Rate
.274
.313
.304
.190
.278
I 1988 I
.385
.444
.554
.562
.482
I 1989 I
.537
.243
.255
.127
.307
I 1990 I
.298
.174
.596
.307
.340
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similar across bank sizes. The evidence for the private banks
operating in Spain is similar to that found for the U.S. banks13.
Table 8.10: Savings Banks: Average Generic Capital Ratios,
Capital and Assets Growth Rate Across Bank Sizes. (1987-90). 
If one now analyzes the differences between capital-deficient
banks and capital-sufficient banks, one can observe again that the
presence of extreme observations in the small private banks (Class
1), particularly among the capital-sufficient banks, seem to
influence the different results for private and savings banks.
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Apparently, savings are again far more homogeneous. Considering
the capital-deficient banks, and except in class size 1, savings
banks tend to have higher capital ratios, and these ratios tend to
approach the minimum required (0.05). In 1990, the average for all
capital-deficient savings banks seems above 0.05, whereas
capital-deficient private banks still remain with an average ratio
below 0.05. This evidence again seems to be consistent with the
results shown in Chapter 7, in which capital regulation was found
to be a harder constraint for savings banks than for private
banks. Those savings banks with values of the generic ratio below
the minimum required appear to have improved in general their
capital positions during 1987-90, whereas the average
capital-deficient private banks have not reached the minimum
required. Examining the differences across sizes, it can be
noticed that both within the capital-deficient and the
capital-sufficient banks, the differences in the case of the
private banks appear once again to be larger than for the savings
banks. There seems to be no clear size effects within
capital-deficient and capital-sufficient savings banks in terms of
generic ratios, yet in the case of the private banks, smaller
banks appear to maintain higher generic capital ratios than larger
banks.
In the case of the private banks, there tend to be larger
variations (except for 1990) across sizes than between
capital-deficient and capital-sufficient banks in terms of average
generic ratios. This seems to be influenced by the extreme
observation in bank class size 1. However, in the case of the
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savings banks, although the differences seem very small, there
tend to be higher variations across sizes than between
capital-deficient and capital-sufficient savings banks.
As far as how these generic capital ratios came about, one
must analyze the capital and investments growth rates. If one
first compares the 'all banks' columns for both rates for both
private and savings banks, one can note that again the presence of
extreme observations is seemingly more frequent among private
banks than savings banks. Among private banks (particularly class
1, very small banks), there are negative averages of capital and
investment growth rates (particularly in 1987 and 1990), and also
there are huge capital and investment growth rates (in 1989). Once
again, the average values for capital growth rates and investment
growth rates appear to be far more heterogeneous for private banks
than for savings banks. Both capital and investment growth rates
tend to be higher for savings banks than for private banks. As far
as the size effects in the capital and investment growth rates,
the evidence does not appear to support any clear relation: in
some cases the capital and investment growth rates are greater for
the larger banks, and in other cases, are smaller than for the
small banks. This seems to occur for both private and savings
banks. Therefore, one could expect to find any rate of capital
and/or investment growth in any bank size.
The average capital growth rates seem to be far higher than
the investment growth rates, even when the investment growth rates
reach average values around 20 per cent (0.20). This evidence
seems to be consistent with the field survey, in which it was
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found that Spanish banks tend to alter capital growth, rather than
investment growth, in order to improve their capital ratios.
If one now examines the average values for the
capital-deficient and capital-sufficient banks, it can be noted
that in the case of the savings banks, both capital-deficient and
capital-sufficient banks seem to have a higher differential
between mean capital augmentations rate and investment growth
rates than in the case of the private banks. Therefore, savings
banks appear to have made stronger efforts to augment capital than
private banks during 1987-90, even if they have more restricted
possibilities of increasing capital.
In both private and savings banks, the capital-deficient
banks seem to have lower investment growth rates than the
capital-sufficient banks 14 . In addition, the capital-deficient
savings banks tend to have a higher differential between the
average capital and investment growth rates than the
capital-sufficient savings banks. However, this does not appear to
be so clear for the private banks, since the presence of outliers
seems to produce changes in the direction of the differential.
As far as the size effects in the differential between
average capital augmentation rate and investment growth rate, the
evidence is mixed: one can find years when the smaller banks had
higher means of capital growth and/or investment growth rates than
the larger banks, and one can also find years when the larger
banks (both private and savings banks in Spain) had higher average
values.
In the case of the private banks, the variations across bank
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sizes tend to be larger than those between capital-deficient and
capital-sufficient banks in terms of both capital augmentations
and investment growth rates. The presence of extreme observations
(with negative values and very large values) again seems to be one
of the causes shaping this result. However, in the case of the
savings banks, the evidence is not so clear as that of the private
banks: in terms of capital augmentations rates, the variations
across bank sizes tend to be larger than the variation between
capital-deficient and capital-sufficient banks only in 1989,
whereas in 1987, 1988, and 1990, the former are smaller than the
latter variations; in terms of investment growth rates, the
variations across bank sizes tend to be larger than the
variations between capital-deficient and capital-sufficient banks
in 1987, 1989 and 1990, but the former are smaller than the latter
variations in 1988.
The evidence provided here in terms of size effects seems to
be clear only in terms of capital ratios: larger private banks
maintain lower generic capital ratios than smaller private banks,
whereas all sizes of savings banks maintain very similar capital
ratios. However, in terms of capital augmentations, the evidence
is mixed: there is no clear impact of size on capital
augmentations, and further evidence on the impact of size on
capital augmentations is needed in this thesis.
In order to provide further evidence to explain the size
effects in terms of capital augmentations, one needs to
disentangle the capital augmentations into internally generated
capital augmentations (internal capital generation rate) and
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externally generated capital augmentations. In Section 8.4.2
(Table 8.7), evidence on the size effects in terms of external
capital generation for the Spanish banks was provided. Now, we
need to examine and provide empirical evidence on the impact of
size on the internal capital generation rates. As there exist
differences in the ways that private and savings banks distribute
their profits (private banks pay out dividend and savings banks do
not), and as in 1990 there were several mergers among Spanish
savings banks that could have caused important effects on their
capital augmentations, the study of the internal capital
generation rate will be divided into two: one for the private
banks, and the other for the savings banks. These are undertaken
in the two following subsections.
8.4.5.- Size Effects in the Internal Capital Generation in
the Spanish Private Banks.
The study of the impact of size on the internal capital
generation rate for the private banks operating in Spain is based
on Equation (4.1):
g = ROE x RR	 (4.1)
where g is the internal capital generation rate, ROE is return on
equity, and RR is the retention ratio. One needs to analyze the
differences in terms of internal capital generation rates across
bank sizes. In order to examine how these possible differences in
internal capital generation rates came about, the variation in ROE
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and RR across sizes will also be examined.
In order to account for size, the sample of private banks in
Spain, will be again divided in to the same quartiles as in the
previous section. The distinction between capital-deficient and
capital-sufficient banks will also be used in this analysis in
order to investigate whether or not capital-deficient banks made
stronger efforts to augment capital in terms of internal capital
generation rates. As in the previous section, this distinction
will again be undertaken on the basis of the Bank of Spain's
generic capital ratios maintained by the private banks in the
previous year.
Table 8.11 displays the means of ROE, Retention Ratios (RR)
and the internal capital generation rates (g) across the four
private banks' sizes, and between the capital-deficient and the
capital-sufficient private banks in Spain for 1987-90. It must be
said that the relevant values of ROE, RR and g for a certain year
are those of the previous year: for example, the values for the
internal capital generation rate in 1987 come from 1986, since the
internal capital generation in 1987 results from the retained
earnings of 1986 (ROE and RR).
In the columns 'all banks' of Table 8.11, one can note that
class size 3 appears to have higher average internal capital
generation rates throughout 1987-90; it can also be observed that
the smallest banks (class 1) tend to have the lowest mean of
internal capital generation rates. Thus, there seems to be certain
'economies of scale' in terms of internal capital generation in
the Spanish private banks, although these economies tend to peter
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out for the largest banks (class 4). It seems that the top
medium-sized private banks have a certain advantage with regard to
internal capital generation.
Table 8.11: Private Banks: Mean of ROE, Retention Ratio and
Internal Capital Generation Rate Across Bank Sizes. (1987-90). 
I 1987 I
Average
Retention Ratio
Average
Internal Capital
Generation Rate
K-def K-suf All K-def K-suf All K-def K-suf All
1 .100 .097 .098 .302 .181 .217 .035 .028 .030
2 .212 .061 .134 .213 .331 .274 .293 .572 .405
3 .147 .214 .174 .293 .572 .405 .065 .132 .092
4 .434 .164 .254 .230 .370 .323 .041 .066 .058
All .213 .128 .165 .260 .339 .305 .060 .061 .061
I	 1988	 I
1 .110 .080 .087 .524 .239 .296 .074 .028 .037
2 .288 .133 .218 .314 .453 .377 .112 .074 .095
3 .295 .226 .263 .402 .379 .391 .111 .099 .105
4 .129 .178 .155 .721 .394 .547 .084 .073 .078
All .228 .144 .181 .472 .348 .402 .100 .063 .079
I	 1989	 I
1 -.138 .126 .090 .326 .290 .295 .083 .040 .046
2 .239 .137 .170 .351 .347 .348 .102 .072 .081
3 .227 .230 .229 .354 .460 .414 .105 .110 .108
4 .448 .202 .292 .508 .417 .450 .081 .082 .082
All .256 .167 .195 .395 .368 .377 .095 .072 .079
I	 1990	 I
1 3.29 .121 .756 .163 .379 .336 .054 .057 .056
2 .254 .146 .184 .361 .346 .351 .077 .055 .062
3 .464 .245 .325 .294 .354 .332 .147 .081 .105
4 .124 .284 .231 .441 .358 .385 .042 .103 .083
All .761 .195 .372 .332 .361 .351 .084 .073 .767
If one considers the distinction between capital-deficient
banks and capital-sufficient banks, it can be noticed that except
for 1987, the capital-deficient banks tend to have higher average
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internal capital generation rates than the capital-sufficient
banks, and this tends to happen for all bank sizes. Therefore,
seemingly, capital-deficient banks appear to have made stronger
efforts in terms of internal capital generation than
capital-sufficient banks.
The variation across bank sizes appear to be larger than the
variations between capital-deficient and capital-sufficient banks
in terms of internal capital generation rates. Thus, there seems
to be more heterogeneous values across different private banks'
sizes than between capital-deficient and capital-sufficient banks.
As far as how these values of internal capital generation
came about are concerned, one can note that the relatively higher
internal capital generation rate for bank class size 3 seems to
result from the fact that its means of both ROE and RR are always
in the highest range of values in the sample, although separately
they are not necessarily the highest means of ROE and RR. The
contrary appears to happen to the class size 1, which tends to
maintain their means of ROE and RR in the lowest range of values
in the sample. This results in this class size having the lowest
internal capital generation rate.
Rather than having the highest ROE and/or the highest
retention ratio (which could result in not satisfying
shareholders' dividend expectations), it seems that a combination
of comparatively high ROE and RR allows private banks in class 3
to have the highest average internal capital generation rate. The
largest banks (class 4) had the highest average ROE in two years
(1987 and 1989), but their internal capital generation rate was
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not the highest, since their average retention ratio was
comparatively lower.
Capital-deficient banks tend to have both higher average ROE
and RR than the capital-sufficient banks. This seems to reflect
the stronger efforts made by the capital-deficient banks in order
to augment their capital internally. However, the variation
between capital-deficient and capital-sufficient banks in terms of
both average ROE and RR seems to be lower than the variation
across private bank sizes in Spain for 1987-90.
The main conclusion that one can draw in this subsection is
that there seems to be certain 'economies of scale' in terms of
internal capital generation, but they seem to peter out for the
largest private banks in Spain. These economies of scale seem to
be influenced by a combination of comparatively high (but not
necessarily the highest) ROE and retention ratio.
8.4.6.- Size Effects and the Impact of Mergers on the
Internal Capital Generation in the Savings Banks.
The case of the internal capital generation of the Spanish
savings banks during 1987-90 need to be analyzed separately
because of their peculiarities in terms of internal capital
generation rate (their RR is 100 per cent), and because of the
merger processes that took place in 1990. Savings banks in Spain
do not pay out dividend and their retention ratios can be
considered as 100 per cent. In addition, 12 savings banks were
involved in mergers in 1990, and this could have influenced the
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capital augmentations of these banks as a result of the
non-taxable 'hidden value' emerging from the merger (see Section
8.4.2).
The same analysis as in the previous subsection is undertaken
here for the savings banks, but now the estimate of the internal
capital generation rate is ROE as a consequence of RR being 100
per cent. Again, the relevant ROE for the internal capital
generation of the year considered is that of the previous year.
The results are captured in Table 8.12, which shows the average
return on equity across savings banks' sizes and between
capital-deficient and capital-sufficient savings banks.
In Table 8.12, one can note that the capital-deficient
savings banks tend to have average values of ROE well above those
of the capital-sufficient banks throughout the period 1987-90.
Thus, the internal capital generation seems higher for the
capital-deficient banks than for the capital-sufficient banks.
This seems to reflect the stronger efforts of the
capital-deficient banks in terms of profitability and internal
capital generation.
As far as the differences in average ROE across bank sizes
are concerned, it can be observed that the medium-sized savings
banks (class size 2 and 3) appear to have higher average ROE than
the very small (class 1) and the large Spanish savings banks
(class 4) during 1987-90. Consequently, again there seems to be
certain 'economies of scale' in terms of profitability and
internal capital generation (up to class 3 - medium-sized banks)
for the Spanish savings banks during 1987-90, but they tend to
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disappear for the very large bank sizes.
Table 8.12: Savings Banks: Average Return on Equity Across
Bank Sizes (1987-90).
'Average ROE'
Size
	
1987	 1988Quart.
K-def	 K-suf
	 All	 K-def	 K-suf	 All
1 .262 .183 .229 .333 .275 .306
2 .282 .156 .236 .441 .215 .358
3 .264 .254 .261 .429 .261 .359
4 .235 .158 .190 .263 .235 .247
All .263 .184 .229 .377 .247 .317
1989 1990
K-def K-suf All K-def K-suf All
1 .123 .119 .119 .243 .162 .188
2 .167 .107 .129 .252 .219 .229
3 .181 .135 .142 .175 .180 .178
4 .169 .114 .122 .211 .158 .181
All .157 .119 .128 .219 .181 .194
The variations of the average internal capital generation
rates across savings banks' sizes seem only larger than those
between capital-deficient and capital-sufficient savings banks in
1990. However, the variations across sizes tend to be smaller than
the variations between capital-deficient and capital-sufficient
banks in 1987, 1988 and 1989. Therefore, the variations across
bank sizes tend to be more frequently quantitatively smaller than
the variations between capital-deficient and capital-sufficient
banks.
Finally, we need to investigate the impact of mergers on
capital augmentations for the savings banks. The increase in size
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through mergers seems to have become an important strategy for
savings banks: 12 Spanish savings banks were involved in merger
processes in 1990. One of the main advantages of mergers appears
to be the tax gains, since the 'hidden value' that arises in the
mergers is non-taxable. Therefore, mergers seem to induce internal
capital augmentations by allowing the 'hidden value' to be
converted into on-balance-sheet capital.
The researcher has explored how the capital augmentations for
the savings banks in 1990 were affected by the mergers. The sample
of savings banks for 1990 (64 banks) has been divided into two
subsamples: (i) those Spanish savings banks involved in merger
processes in 1990, and (ii) those Spanish savings banks not
involved in merger processes in 1990. The average capital growth
rates have been computed across bank sizes (the same four
quartiles as in Table 8.12), and between merged banks and
non-merged banks for 1990. These results are shown in Table 8.13,
which also displays the average ROE (the estimate of the internal
capital generation rate for savings banks). One can note that the
the mergers resulted in medium-sized and large savings banks
(class 3 and 4).
Table 8.13: Savings Banks: Merger Effects on Capital
Augmentations. (1990)
Size
Quart.
Average ROE 1989	 Average Capital
Augmentation Rate
Non-merged Merged All Non-merged Merged All
1 .188 .188 .217 .217
2 .229 .229 .141 .141
3 .199 .134 .179 .133 .888 .275
4 .221 .114 .181 .223 .433 .302
All .206 .121 .194 .176 .585 .233
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If one observes the average capital augmentation rates for
the non-merged and merged banks, it can be noticed that the means
of the capital augmentation rates for the savings banks involved
in mergers seem to be far higher than those of the non-merged
savings banks 15 . The average of the capital augmentation rate for
the merged savings banks of class 3, seems to be particularly
higher.
If one now compare the averages of capital augmentations with
the average ROE for both merged and non-merged banks, it can be
noted that those banks involved in mergers appeared to have lower
average ROE (the estimate of internal capital generation) than
those Spanish non-merged savings banks. It seems that mergers are
a strategy mostly undertaken by those savings banks, whose
internal capital generation rates were comparatively low.
The fact that the average capital augmentation rate for
merged medium-sized savings banks (class 3) seems to be higher
than that of the largest banks (class 4) could be indicating that
in terms of capital augmentations, medium-sized banks benefit from
mergers to a larger extent than the largest banks. In other words,
the 'economies of scale ' in terms of capital growth that could
result from mergers tend to be more important for the medium-sized
savings banks than for the largest savings bank sizes.
Increasing in size through mergers for those savings banks
with low internal capital generation could be an important
strategy to augment capital. However, this strategy cannot be
undertaken continuously because it would involve dramatic
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operational and managerial changes in the banks. Banks cannot
afford to have such disruptive, dramatic changes continuously
since the 'managerial restraint' involved in such a strategy may
come into play16 . In short, it may involve costs associated with
changing management cultures and increasing management
complexities associated with the new, reconstructed organisation.
This strategy could be useful to augment capital on a short-term
basis, but there seem to be more difficulties in employing the
merger strategy on a long-term basis.
8.5.- SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS.
This chapter completes the empirical analysis of the bank
capital augmentations and of the impact of bank prudential
regulation on capital augmentations in Spain during 1987-90. In
this chapter, the empirical model of capital augmentations for the
private banks operating in Spain has been refined by employing a
measure of profitability (PF ) where only the retained earnings
are accounted for; the results were improved with this
profitability measure. However, the findings in the equations with
PF support the findings in Chapter 7: our basic empirical model
still seems to explain better the behaviour for savings banks than
for private banks.
The empirical model of capital augmentations has also been
estimated and tested for those private banks with market-value
capital information available, and the relationship between market
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value and book value capital has also been estimated for those
private banks. Apparently, as a consequence of the thinness and
inefficiencies of the Spanish stock markets, the results were
relatively weak.
Then, an empirical study of the size effects in terms of the
Bank of Spain's generic capital ratios, capital augmentation rates
and the internal capital generation rates has been undertaken.
Larger private banks seems to maintain lower capital ratios than
smaller private banks. Mergers seemed to play an important role in
helping savings banks augment their capital.
The implications of the findings of Chapters 7 and 8 need to
be studied. First of all, the possible contradictions found in the
results of chapters 7 and 8 need to be discussed. In addition, the
apparently different impact of bank prudential regulation on
capital augmentations for private and savings banks, and also
across sizes, seems to have implications on the competitive
neutrality of the bank prudential regulation process in Spain. In
this connection, the role of the market in regulating capital
adequacy needs to be discussed. In the next chapter, the
implications of all these issues for both bank supervisors and
bank managers are analyzed.
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NOTES:
1.- In Chapter 7, it was indicated that a negative sign of KR
means that the capital adequacy regulation influences positively
bank capital augmentations.
2.- The main sources of funds are net loan repayments, securities
sales, decrease in reserves, decrease in cash and due, increase in
deposits, increase in nondeposit debt and issuance of new equity
(Sinkey, 1992, p. 262).
3.- The main uses of funds are new loans, securities purchases,
increase in reserves, increase in cash and due, decrease in
deposits, decrease in nondeposit debt and repurchase of equity
(Sinkey, 1992, p. 262).
4.- See Sinkey (1992, pp 262-263) for an example of the
calculation of banks net income using the spread model.
5.- See, for example, Copeland and Weston (1988, Chapter 13-16)
for a review of the main determinants of equity valuation.
6.- See, for example, Revell (1987 and 1989).
7.- See also, for example, Lewis and Davis (1987, pp. 199-209) and
Clark (1988) for a review of the main issues and findings on the
economies of scale and scope in banking.
8.- The corporate income tax exemption is subject to
discretionary government approval based on national interest
grounds. This provides the government with a way for intervening
in bank mergers.
9.- After 1990 there have been more mergers between private banks
and between savings banks in Spain.
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10.- Two-tail t-values are employed for the intercept, since there
is no clear direction in the sign of a. However, one-tail and
two-tail t-values are used for the slope, since the direction of
the sign of the slope is expected to be always positive.
12.- This is an application of Humphrey's mean dispersion analysis
(1987) for the measurement of cost economies in U.S. banking.
13.- Peltzman (1984)
14.- This evidence seems to be in line with the 'capital crunch'
hypothesis (Syron, 1991; Peek and Rosengren, 1992; Torrero, 1992).
This hypothesis implies that in order to reach the regulatory
capital-adequacy ratios, the capital-deficient banking firms need
to pursue lower rates of asset growth than the capital-sufficient
banks. Peek and Rosengren (1992) provide empirical evidence of
this phenomenon for the New England banks.
15.- A t-test was carried out to find out if the means of capital
augmentation rates for 1990 were significantly different between
merged and non-merged savings banks. The t-test showed that the
mean of the capital augmentation of the merged savings banks was
significantly higher (with 95 per cent level of confidence) than
that of the non-merged banks.
16.- See, for example, Penrose (1980).
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9.1.- INTRODUCTION.
This chapter examines the policy implications of the
empirical findings of Chapters 7 and 8. As depicted in Figure 9.1,
three main areas will be considered in this examination:
1) Implications for the Role of the Market in Monitoring
Capital Adequacy : in the light of the findings of Chapters 7-8
for both regulatory and market-based determinants of capital
augmentations, it is necessary to evaluate the role of the market
versus the role of bank regulation in monitoring capital adequacy.
In other words, the researcher must examine to what extent it is
necessary to have capital adequacy regulation, and to which extent
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the market alone could monitor capital adequacy in Spanish
banking.
2) Implications of the Findings in a Banking Deregulation -
Supervision Re-regulation Framework: in the period considered
(1987-90), there have been two forces which have been shaping
banking regulation in Spain very differently: (i) Structural
deregulation or liberalization, and (ii) Enhancement of
supervision, particularly in terms of capital adequacy
requirements. These two seemingly contradictory forces appear to
lie behind the somehow contradictory empirical findings for
Spanish banking shown in Chapters 7-8.
3) Implications for the Competitive Neutrality of Bank
Prudential Regulation in Spain: the apparently different effects
of bank prudential regulation on capital augmentations for private
and savings banks in Spain and also across different sizes, need
to be read in terms of the existence (or non-existence) of
competitive neutrality in regulation. In other words, the
researcher needs to evaluate whether any type or size of banking
institution in Spain benefits from capital adequacy regulation to
a larger extent than others.
This chapter is organized as follows (see Figure 9.1). In the
next section, the set of implications (1) are discussed. Then,
implications (2) are examined. Next, implications (3) are
considered. Finally, the conclusions are drawn.
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9.2.- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF THE MARKET IN MONITORING
CAPITAL ADEQUACY.
Our empirical analysis of the impact of capital adequacy
regulation on bank capital augmentations in the Spanish banking
system has implications for the role of the market (versus bank
supervisors) in monitoring capital adequacy. In Chapter 5 in
general, and particularly in Section 5.3.2, the researcher
discussed the theoretical impact of bank prudential regulation and
of the market-based and managerial variables on bank capital
decisions, and particularly on bank capital augmentations.
As depicted in Figure 9.2, two main areas of implications can
be identified with regard to the role of the market in monitoring
bank capital adequacy:
A) Microeconomic Implications for the Banking Firm in Spain:
as indicated in Section 5.2, a basic aim of bank capital
regulation is to increase microeconomic (the banking firm) and
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macroeconomic (the banking system) prudential safety and
stability. This seems to imply that bank supervisors assume that
regulation can obtain higher levels of micro and macro prudential
stability of the banking markets than the market alone.
Consequently, bank supervisors seem to assume, inter alia, that
regulation monitors bank capital adequacy better than the market
alone.
Bank capital adequacy, at a micro level, is basically,
related to the amount of capital and the risks held by a banking
firm. As far as the amount of capital held by a bank, there seems
to be evidence that the key variable in terms of capital
augmentations is capital regulation l . Thus, some major banks
appear to allocate internally their capital primarily on the basis
of supervisory capital standards. As found in Chapter 7, there
could be some differences between Spanish private and savings
banks in the way capital regulation affects capital augmentations:
as a consequence of the different capital instruments that both
types of institution can employ, capital regulation seems to be a
harder constraint for savings banks than for private banks.
The evidence that some major banks may internally allocate
their capital primarily on the basis of supervisory capital
standards seems to imply either that supervisory capital standards
are set too high and/or that management systems of internal risk
allocation are inadequately developed (Gardener, 1991a). This can
be applied to the Spanish case, since the field survey appears to
indicate that most banks in Spain allocate their capital primarily
on the basis of supervisory capital requirements. As the
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econometric analysis demonstrated, this seems particularly true
for the savings banks.
As far as the risk held by a banking firm, it seems necessary
to discuss the implications of the non-significance of the
portfolio risk variable included in the model of bank capital
augmentations. One of the basic aims of bank prudential regulation
is risk containment both at a micro and macroeconomic level. In
this context, it appears contradictory that there is no
significant influence of portfolio risk on bank capital decisions
in general, and on capital augmentations in particular. The fact
that the portfolio risk variable (PK) does not comprise all the
risks of the banking firm, and, therefore, may be considered as a
crude representation of portfolio risk, could justify the
non-significance of PK.
The difficulties in defining a ratio that would represent all
the risks of the banking firm also emerge in the BAR model.
Although the BAR model (employed in the Spanish regulation) may be
considered as a very good methodology for practical
capital-adequacy analysis, there are certain difficulties that
need to be examined. Firstly, the use of capital ratios tends to
(over-) simplify a bank's risks into a crude measure, which may
not represent and capture all of the risks banking business. As
described in Chapter 3, the Spanish risk-based capital adequacy
requirements fundamentally consider only relative credit risk. As
the banking firm faces a wider range of risks (for example
position risk, settlement risk, interest rate risk and exchange
rate risk), the Spanish capital-adequacy regulation should be
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extended to a wider range of risks. At BIS and EC levels, a wider
range of banking risks for commercial bank capital-adequacy
analysis is now being considered2.
As reviewed in Chapter 5, several authors have emphasized
that different capital ratios are likely to have different effects
on the risks held by a banking firm (Koehn and Santomero, 1980;
Lackman, 1986; Di Cagno, 1990). This seems to imply that bank
supervisors need to be fully aware of the effects of particular
supervisory capital ratios (alternatives) on risk containment. It
is necessary to provide a theoretical and empirical basis to any
capital ratio to be employed by regulators, and its impact on the
risks of the banking firm need to be analyzed before it is
implemented.
The role of the market (versus bank supervisors) in
regulating and monitoring a bank's risk appears to be
relevant in this context. It seems typical of financial markets
that they have a tendency towards intense competition,
overcapacity and overshooting behaviour under deregulation3. There
seem to be risks associated with deregulated markets as
institutions react to the new environment. Therefore, it seems
that, in liberalised banking markets, banking institutions may be
affected negatively by a too risky behaviour. Gardener (1989a)
argues that the supervision of capital adequacy is one possible
policy response to the perceived build-up of risks. In the case of
Spain, after several banking institutions went bankrupt during the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the enhancement of supervision in 1985
appeared to be a policy response to the build-up of risks
406
CHAPTER 9: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
associated with the liberalization of the Spanish banking markets.
The emergence of stricter capital standards, however, can
give rise to other problems. Paradoxically, supervisory demands
for more capital may even increase risk levels within the banking
industry4 . Any supervisory ratio system may operate as a 'tax' on
the banks. One possible reaction, inter alia, is to seek increased
profit in order to meet the new capital requirements. However, the
law of diminishing marginal utility of money and the risk/return
trade-off in finance theory indicate that higher potential returns
are usually accompanied by more risks. If the latter are not
priced correctly, a bank's net exposure may actually increase.
Therefore, in a highly competitive environment, supervisory
demands for increased capital adequacy may be risk-producing for
some banks and the system as a whole. In the Spanish case,
however, the evidence during 1987-90 did not appear to support
this hypothesis (increased regulatory demands for capital are
risk-producing). Nevertheless, this hypothesis of bank behaviour
could become more evident in the future and Spanish bank
supervisors should be aware of this possibility.
Next, the role of the market-based and managerial variables
in regulating capital augmentations need to be examined. The
impact of the market-based and managerial variables differed
between private and savings banks. As a result of their higher
dependence on internal capital generation sources, profitability
was a very important variable for savings banks in terms of
capital augmentations, whereas it seemed far less important for
private banks. However, market-based variables like cost of
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capital and easy access to capital markets, seemed to play a more
important role in the capital adequacy decisions of the private
banks in Spain.
Unlike savings banks (in which as a result of the
non-existence of shareholders, the interests of depositors and/or
of the public authorities in control of the institution are likely
to play a more important role than in private institutions),
private banks need to consider and fulfill shareholders'
interests. Therefore, in the private banking institutions in
Spain, as a consequence of the existence of shareholders, the role
of the market in monitoring bank capital decisions seems to be
more important than in the case of the savings banks.
The findings for the the Spanish private banks are in line
with the work developed by Pringle (1974), in which he views the
capital decisions from the standpoint of shareholder interests,
rather than from the viewpoint of depositors. In the banking
institutions where shareholders' private interests are taken into
consideration, Pringle finds that market-based variables play a
key role in determining the institution's optimal capital
position. In Spanish banking, this appears to be the case in the
private banks, where there exist shareholders, in which the
capital regulatory variable KR was not significant in any
regression, whereas several market-based variables were
significant (Chapter 7).
In the context of market-based versus supervisory capital
adequacy positions, there are Spanish authors that maintain that
the non-existence of private shareholders in savings banks seems
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to make a stronger case for regulation of savings banks than of
private banks. Perez and Quesada (1991, p. 143) emphasize that
savings banks need to be regulated because there are no
stockholders that control the capital adequacy of those
institutions. In other words, since private banks' capital
adequacy are primarily controlled and monitored by shareholders',
there seems to be a less strong case for the regulation of those
institutions. This argument is in line with the findings which
appear to indicate that capital regulation seems a stricter
constraint for savings banks (the variable KR was statistically
significant in several equations for the savings banks).
B) Macroeconomic Implications for the Financial Stability of
the Spanish Banking System: there are different views in terms of
the role of the market (versus regulation) in maintaining the
financial system stability and avoiding financial crisis.
Baltensperger and Dermine (1986) emphasize that no general
macroeconomic case can be made for banking regulation or its
deregulation. Rather than on macroeconomic grounds, it is on
microeconomic grounds that a much stronger case can be developed:
capital adequacy regulation appear necessary to lessen the
probability of financial crises. Minsky (in Kindleberger and
Laffargue, 1982, pp 13-47) has formalized the crisis-prevention
role of regulation. He considers bank supervision as a way of
aborting the periodic tendency towards crises that is enshrined
within his financial instability hypotheses. However, Gardener
(1989a) argues that despite the crisis-reduction role of capital
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regulation, there is no generally accepted theory that one can
apply.
As examined in Chapter 2, during the last two decades in
Spain there appears to be empirical evidence of the macroeconomic
implications of capital adequacy regulation for the financial
stability of Spanish banking markets. If one compares the
situation of the banking markets in Spain before the prudential
regulation was enhanced in 1985 (before 1985 the role of the
market-based and managerial variables in monitoring bank capital
adequacy seemed to be much more important than after 1985, when
the new capital requirements were introduced), with the situation
after 1985, one appears to find two very different worlds.
As described in Chapters 2 and 3, before 1985 bank
supervision and prudential regulation in Spain did not seem to be
monitored adequately by the Bank of Spain because of the lack of
legal and technical instruments, which, otherwise, would have made
banks comply with regulation. In this context, the bank capital
decisions in Spain were apparently made in practice on a
market-based and managerial basis, rather than on a regulatory
basis. However, as noted in Chapter 2, the thinness and
inefficiencies of the Spanish banking markets appeared to prevent
the emergence of market signals from the poor solvency standards
of some banks that could have helped to identify the banks with
problems, and, in turn, to attempt to avoid the banking crisis. In
a banking environment like this, in which there seemed to be no
'real' supervision and the market was unable to regulate capital
adequacy, the risk positions of many banks increased, and
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contrarily, their solvency positions decreased. As a consequence
of the poor solvency position of certain banks, several banks went
bankrupt during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and Spain suffered
one of the worst banking crisis that any OECD country has ever
had.
As found in Chapter 4, after the introduction of the new
risk-based capital adequacy requirements in 1985, bank solvency
appears to have improved dramatically in Spain. It was found that
most Spanish banks were well-capitalized during 1987-90 compared
with their European counterparts. The introduction of the new
capital adequacy standards in Spain in 1985 seems to lie behind
those good levels of capitalization. In the field survey performed
among several Spanish bankers, capital regulation was considered
as a key variable in terms of capital augmentations. Thus, the
enhancement of capital adequacy requirements at a micro level seem
to have made banks improve their solvency positions. At a macro
level, it appears to have increased the macro-financial system
potential safety and stability of Spanish banking, since the
number of bank failures fell dramatically after 1985. In other
words, during 1985-90 the Spanish bank capital-adequacy regulation
appears to have played the crisis-prevention role that Minsky (in
Kindleberger and Laffargue, 1982, pp 13-47) suggested in a
normative context.
All things considered, the role of the market in monitoring
capital adequacy, especially when the banking markets are thin and
inefficient in providing signals of banks with financial problems
(for example, Spain before 1985), is very limited, and there could
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be negative consequences for the financial stability of the
banking markets. The case for bank capital regulation seems
stronger in the case of relatively thin and inefficient markets.
9.3.- IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS IN A BANKING DEREGULATION-
SUPERVISION RE-REGULATION FRAMEWORK IN SPAIN.
The picture obtained in Chapters 7 and 8 about the effects of
bank capital regulation on capital augmentations in Spanish
banking during 1987-90 appears to be somehow confusing, since some
of the findings seem contradictory. It was found that several
signs of certain significant variables, such as deposit growth,
deposit insurance and liquidity, changed over time, and across
different definitions of capital augmentation. In addition, there
were different directions in the impact of size on the
relationship MV-BV, on the impact of size on bank capital
augmentations, and on the Bank of Spain's generic capital ratios
held by the banking institutions.
As depicted in Figure 9.3, the mixed empirical evidence can
be justified with the two following causes:
A) A Theoretical Justification: the picture found in Chapters
7 and 8 may be considered as confusing, but so is banking theory.
Banking theory is apparently inconclusive in most decisions of the
banking firms . In Chapter 5, the researcher surveyed the main
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theoretical studies on the effects of capital adequacy regulation
on bank capital decisions (Table 5.1), and particularly on capital
augmentations. Different models with different theoretical
solutions were reviewed. This is an example of the confusing
picture that banking theory provides and has led to a significant
divergence between practice and theory in the banking world.
Figure 9.3: Main Explanations for the Mixed Empirical Findings.
Diverse Perspectives and
Models in the Theory of
the Banking Firm
A)
Inconclusive Theory of
the Banking Firm
Mixed Evidence on the Impact of Capital Adequacy Regulation
on Capital Augmentations in Spanish Banking during 1987-90
In the latter connection, Santomero (1984) examined the
specific complexities of the capital adequacy problem in the
banking literature. He maintains that this complexity is true
because the optimal choice of scale and leverage is determined by
the assumed firm environment and the raison d'être of the firm.
This can be applied to our analysis, since part of the complexity
results, firstly, from the firm environment in the Spanish banking
system during 1987-90, and, secondly, from the distinct
traditional management philosophies between private and savings
413
CHAPTER 9: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
banks in Spain.
As far as the firm environment in the Spanish banking system
during 1987-90 is concerned, this has suffered major changes
during that period. The regulatory pressures and the resulting
competitive effects have shaped the changing firm environment in
Spanish banking during 1987-90. This is investigated in the second
justification B).
As for the different traditional management philosophies
between private and savings banks, these differences used to
result from the distinct ownership and legal and operational
features. However, as described in Chapter 2, nowadays the legal
and operational differences between private and savings banks have
practically disappeared. The main feature that distinguishes
private and savings banks nowadays is ownership.
The differences in ownership are likely to produce
differences in terms of the objectives of the banking
institutions, since private banks' objectives will be shaped, at a
fundamental level, by the shareholders; savings banks' objectives
will result, at a fundamental level, from the philosophy of the
public body (usually, local or regional government) that controls
the bank. Although nowadays both type of banking institution
generally pursue, inter alia, profit maximization, the earnings
distribution, which affects the internal capital generation, will
be different between private and savings banks.
Thus, although some of the complexities for the study of the
Spanish banking firm have disappeared, a major complexity in terms
of capital decisions still remains: ownership, and, in turn, the
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legal possibilities of augmenting Tier 1 capital. Private banks
and savings banks in Spain still differ in terms of ownership,
and, as we found in Chapter 7, in terms of capital augmentations.
The competitive implications of the differences in ownership are
discussed in Section 9.3.
B) The Simultaneous Impact of Deregulation and Supervisory
Re-Regulation: during the 1980s, two main regulatory pressures
have been shaping the banking world: (i) the structural
deregulation process, whereby most Western banking industries,
including the Spanish banking industry, have liberalized their
banking markets, and (ii) the supervision (or prudential)
re-regulation process, whereby the bank solvency regulation was
strengthened and new risk-based bank capital adequacy standards
were introduced in Western countries. As described in Chapter 3,
the period chosen for the Spanish banking system in this analysis
is 1987-90, in which both regulatory pressures were operating in
the Spanish banking markets and affecting the banking firms in
Spain. Although our main concern has been the impact of
supervisory regulation (our regulatory variable KR) on capital
augmentations, other variables included in the analysis, like
liquidity and deposit growth, have been affected by deregulation.
In the banking literature, there has been virtually no
theoretical discussion of the simultaneous effects that arise when
controls in some areas are dismantled (deregulation) but controls
in other areas are strengthened (re-regulation) (Fry, 1988,
p.255). Unlike studies that focus only on deregulation s or only on
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prudential re-regulation, this study has analyzed a decision of
the banking firm (capital augmentations) in which both regulatory
pressures were operating. These two different regulatory pressures
are likely to cause different results, and somehow, contradicting
findings.
In order to study specifically how deregulation and
re-regulation influenced the results very differently, one needs
to divide the analysis into two separate parts: (i) the analysis
of the impact of deregulation, and (ii) the analysis of the impact
of supervisory re-regulation.
As far as the influence of deregulation on the findings, the
main deregulatory forces during 1987-90 have resulted from:
a) Liberalization of the Banking Markets in Spain: although
the total deregulation on interest rates was effective in 1987,
other deregulatory measures were taken during 1987-90. As
described in Chapter 3, these include the lowering of the
obligatory investment ratios and liquidity ratios. In addition, in
the case of the savings banks, the contribution to the Deposit
Guarantee Fund was lowered in 1989. This deregulatory trend is
likely to lie behind the changing signs over time for the
liquidity variable and the deposit insurance variable for the
savings banks. It is also likely to enhance competition in the
banking markets, and, therefore, the changing sign for the deposit
growth appears to be affected by this deregulatory trend.
b) Spain's Entry to the EC: the second deregulatory force in
the Spanish banking markets has been Spain's entry to the EC in
1986 and the 1992 benchmark for the creation of the European
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internal market, whereby, inter alia, the banking markets had to
be opened to the banking institutions of the rest of the EC. This
deregulatory force, alongside the liberalization of the banking
markets in terms of obligatory coefficients, seems to have
encouraged competition, since EC banks have entered the Spanish
market. Several of these EC banks have set up extensive networks
of branches, and introduced financial innovations that have
enhanced banking competition in Spain. This seems to lie behind
the changing sign in the deposit growth variable, particularly in
1990 when the competition appeared to be more fierce.
As for the supervisory re-regulatory forces during 1987-90
for the Spanish banking system, the main re-regulatory trends have
resulted from:
a) The Spanish Solvency Regulation: although the new capital
adequacy requirements were introduced in Spain in 1985, it was
noted in Chapter 8 that there were still a few banks which
appeared to have capital ratios below the minimum required during
1987-90. Thus, the Spanish supervisory regulation seems to have
needed several years years to accomplish the minimum level of
capital for all banks in Spain. In other words, the impact of the
new Spanish capital-adequacy regulation seems to have required
several years to influence the capital decisions of all banks. In
addition, it was found that the impact of the regulation appeared
stronger on savings banks than on private banks. In other words,
due to the seemingly higher restrictions that savings banks have
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to augment capital, this prudential re-regulatory force is a
stricter constraint for savings banks than for private banks. This
shows the complexity of the impact of capital regulation on the
bank decisions, since the impact is different across different
type of institutions, and, at the same time, it has needed several
years to accomplish its objectives.
b) International Convergence in Capital Adequacy Standards:
as explained in Chapter 3, there has been a convergence movement
towards the international homogenization of capital standards,
both at the BIS level and at the EC level. This seems to have
resulted in an increasing complexity in the impact of capital
adequacy regulation on bank capital augmentations. Although only
the Spanish capital standards were obligatory for the banks
operating in Spain during 1987-90, the field survey undertaken
among the largest banks in Spain showed that most banks in Spain
were also monitoring their BIS and EC capital ratios. This
international re-regulatory force brings more complexity to the
problem examined in this thesis, and seems to have influenced some
of the confusing signs of the regulatory variables.
To sum up, the confusing picture drawn in the empirical
results seems to result from the complexities involved in the
study of the banking firm in general, and particularly in a
deregulation - re-regulation framework, like in this research. In
this latter context, theory cannot guide as to the net,
incremental effects.
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9.4.- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY OF BANK
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION IN SPAIN.
As with all forms of regulation, the Spanish bank
capital-adequacy regulation has major implications for the
business operations of the banking institutions operating in
Spain. Llewellyn (1989, p. 120) maintains that potentially there
could also be implications for the structure of the banking
industry. In this connection, the implications of the findings of
Chapters 7 and 8 for the competitive neutrality of the banking
institutions in Spain could be very important for the future of
the banking structure in Spain.
First of all, one needs to distinguish between competitive
equality and competitive neutrality. According to Gardener
(1991a), the legitimate aim of 'level playing fields' has
sometimes been misinterpreted as a corresponding objective of
competitive equality. However, the concept of competitive equality
is too complex to be implemented. First, the notion of competitive
equality is most complex to conceive, let alone operationalise7.
There exist different types of competitive equality (equality for
depositors, equality for lenders, and equality for shareholders),
and this typifies the conceptual and practical difficulties,
since, first of all, one would need to decide what type of
equality is to be targeted.
A second problem arises with competitive equality: no
regulatory authority can make unequals equal (in a competitive
sense) by simply prescribing the same capital adequacy ratios for
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all. In the Spanish case, as a result of the different types of
ownership, one obvious reason is that private banks' cost of
equity capital and savings banks' cost of equity capital are
likely to differ. At an international level, banks' cost of equity
capital differs in different countries. Competitive equality under
these conditions would seek to relate minimum capital levels to
the corresponding costs of capital. The operational problems and
dubious economic logic of such attempts seem very clear, and,
thus, the implementation of the concept of competitive equality of
regulation is too complex and non-operational.
According to Gardener (1991a), competitive neutrality is a
more useful and operational aim. At a national level, bank
regulation should aim to ensure that no institution performing
banking activities is disadvantaged compared with their
competitors. At an international level, convergence should aim to
ensure that banks in one country or market sector are not
disadvantaged compared with their foreign competitors. The
continual eroding of traditional institutional barriers between
competing financial firms (that is, deregulation) implies that a
greater emphasis in supervision must be accorded to functional
supervision, rather than supervision of institutions. Gardener
(1991a) argues that practical supervision should aim for
competitive neutrality, consistent with systemic risk containment
and market contestability, reducing the barriers to entry of new
competitors.
One of the main objectives of the Spanish capital-adequacy
regulation has been to introduce capital requirements which are
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competitively neutral across banking institutions. At an
international level, this objective has also shaped the (1988) BIS
Agreement on Capital Adequacy Standards and the (1989) EC Capital
Adequacy Directive. However, in practice the competitive
neutrality of the bank capital-adequacy regulation is still a
complex concept8 . As displayed in Figure 9.4, the complexity
involved in the competitive neutrality of the Spanish bank capital
regulation fundamentally results from the following three reasons:
(a) Although all banking institutions in Spain are subject to
the same minimum capital requirements, the range of capital
instruments that the different institutions are allowed to use,
vary. For example, Spanish savings banks cannot issue share
equity, which, as described in Chapters 7 and 8, seems to impose a
serious constraint on their possibilities of augmenting capital
externally. Therefore, competitive neutrality does not appear to
be accomplished in terms of the possibilities to augment capital.
(b) The capital adequacy regulation in Spain fixes minimum
(risk-based and generic) capital ratios. However, it may happen
that a certain institution is asked to maintain a capital ratio
above the minimum required. For example, although the minimum Bank
of Spain's generic ratio is 5 per cent, there could be cases in
which certain banks under determined circumstances (such as those
with serious financial difficulties) are requested to maintain
capital ratios above the minimum. In this case, even if such an
action was deemed as necessary and crucial for the survival of the
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bank, the competitive neutrality philosophy would not be
maintained. In Chapter 8, we found evidence that largest Spanish
private banks seem to maintain lower generic capital ratios than
the smaller private banks. Apparently, this evidence is not
consistent with the competitive neutrality philosophy.
Figure 9.4: Main Complexities in the Competitive Neutrality
Implications of the Spanish Bank Capital Regulation
COMPLEXITIES
(c)
Different Range
Capital Instruments
Lower Capital Ratios
for Certain Banks
Functional Versus
Type of Institution
Regulation
(c) A complexity arises because the Spanish capital
regulation is imposed on institutions rather than on functions. It
implies that the Spanish capital requirements seem to be far more
onerous on banks than on non-bank institutions performing banking
activities. In other words, the capital requirements impose a
'tax' on the activities performed by banking institutions, whereas
the 'tax' is not imposed on the corresponding banking activities
of non-bank institutions. In this case, the competitive neutrality
does not appear to be accomplished, since there are institutions
performing banking activities that are not subject to the Spanish
regulation.
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The implications of these reasons, whereby, in practice, the
competitive neutrality of the Spanish bank capital adequacy
regulation may not be accomplished, need to be discussed. As far
as the first reason (a) is concerned, the implications of the
apparently stricter constraint on savings banks than on private
banks, could induce savings banks to search for alternative ways
to overcome such a constraint. A possible way for savings banks to
circumvent the apparently stricter capital regulation is financial
innovation9 . Financial innovation is frequently employed to
circumvent or to lessen a supervisory restriction (Gardener,
1989a). Although all banks subject to the capital regulation might
attempt to lessen this supervisory restriction, as a result of the
higher regulatory constraint in terms of the legal range of
capital instruments, Spanish savings banks seem more likely to
attempt to lessen the impact of this regulation.
The use of subordinated debt appears to have become a partial
solution for savings banks in terms of external capital. However,
subordinated debt is not deemed as primary or Tier 1 capital, and,
thus, it has not solved the problem of needed Tier 1 capital
augmentations for savings banks.
As described in Chapter 4, a financial innovation denominated
'participation capital' was introduced in Spain in 1988. It was
meant to help savings banks augment capital. However, it did not
appear to be attractive enough for savings banks, since no Spanish
savings bank had issued participation capital during 1988-90.
Therefore, it would seem that financial innovation has not solved
the problems that savings banks encounter in terms of capital
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augmentations.
As we found in Chapter 8, a strategy that seems to be more
effective for savings banks to lessen the impact of the more
limited legal possibilities of augmenting capital is a merger
process. The Spanish savings banks involved in mergers in 1990 had
far higher capital augmentations than the non-merged savings
banks. The tax exemption on the 'hidden value' that arises in a
merger seems to be one of the major reasons behind these mergers,
since it allows banks to convert 'hidden value' into accounting
and regulatory capital at no additional tax cost. In other words,
merged savings banks were able to augment book-value and
regulatory capital at no extra tax cost. However, as discussed in
Chapter 8, as a consequence of the managerial and operational
difficulties involved in any merger process, this strategy is
likely to be effective only in the short term, since it does not
appear advisable for a bank to be engaged in mergers continuously.
There are implications of these mergers between savings banks
for the structure of the Spanish banking industry. During 1987-90,
as a result of the mergers in 1990, the number of savings banks
have decreased, whereas the average size of the savings banks has
increased. In other words, in the case of the savings banks'
sector, there has been a concentration into a smaller number of
larger banking units. One could argue that, inter alia, the
stricter regulatory constraint on savings banks in terms of
capital instruments appears to induce merger processes that could
lead to a concentration process in the savings banks' sector. The
capital supervisory constraint seems to be one the major causes
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behind the concentration processes in the savings banks. In other
words, it would appear that the competitive neutrality of the bank
capital regulation in Spain is not accomplished, since this
regulation seems to benefit merged savings banks in terms of
capital augmentations.
As for the second reason (b), the apparently different
generic capital ratios maintained across bank sizes has
implications for the competitive neutrality of regulation, and
also for the structure of the Spanish banking industry. In Tables
8.9 and 8.10, the estimates of the generic capital ratios seemed
to indicate that larger private banks held lower capital ratios
than the smaller private banks, whereas the generic capital ratios
across savings banks' sizes were very similar. In addition,
private banks seemed to maintain higher capital ratios than the
savings banks. These differences in terms of capital ratios across
bank sizes and between types of institutions are not in line with
the competitive neutrality philosophy.
If certain banks are explicitly or implicitly induced by bank
regulators to maintain higher capital ratios, regulators are
imposing a higher 'tax' on these banks. The setting of higher
capital requirements for certain banks raises the required level
of basic profitability, since capital needs to be raised
(internally through retained earnings, or externally where the
bank's profitability is equally important in order to attract
external capital) and serviced. Therefore, the higher capital
requirements for certain banks mean higher costs of capital, and
in turn, ceteris paribus, a higher supply price of services by
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these institutions (Llewellyn, 1989). Consequently, those banks
that are induced to maintain higher capital ratios are
disadvantaged, and the competitive neutrality philosophy is not
accomplished.
Another disadvantage for those banks maintaining higher
capital ratios is the impact of the capital ratios on the rates of
Return on Capital (ROC). In order to examine this disadvantage,
the following formula will be examined:
ROC = ROA / (K/A)	 (9.1)
where K is capital and A is total assets. Essentially, bearing
that formula in mind, one can argue that banks with higher capital
ratios, ceteris paribus, need to have higher ROAs in order to
obtain values of ROC similar to those of the banks with lower
capital ratios. As ROC is the relevant performance measure for
shareholders and potential investors, capital will flow to where
rates of ROCs are highest10 . The theoretical relationship between
the bank capital-to-assets ratio and ROC is very frequently
hypothesized to be negative ll . Consequently, banks with higher
capital ratios need to make stronger efforts in the form of higher
rates of ROA, in order to obtain attractive rates of ROC for
shareholders and potential investors. These stronger efforts to
obtain attractive rates of ROC can be read as a disadvantage for
those banks with higher capital ratios.
In Chapter 8, the researcher found evidence that the larger
private banks in Spain maintained lower capital ratios than the
smaller private banks during 1987-90. Peltzman (1984) found
similar results for the U.S. banking system. The evidence found in
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our research seems to be consistent with the Spanish banking
supervisory authorities acknowledging that larger banks bear less
risk12.
This evidence seems to have implications for the structure of
the private banks' sector in Spain. The lower capital ratios for
larger private banks imply the existence of 'economies of scale in
terms of capital ratios', which could encourage private banks to
increase size in order to take full advantage of those scale
economies. Increasing size through mergers would have the
additional advantage of the tax exemption on the capital
augmentations resulting from the emergence of the 'hidden value'.
One can argue that, again, the Spanish bank capital-adequacy
regulation seems to benefit larger banks (in this case, larger
private banks), and, somehow, seems to induce private banks to
increase size. This could lead to a concentration into a smaller
number of larger banking units, which could change the structure
of the Spanish banking industry.
The empirical evidence in Chapter 8 also showed that private
banks in Spain seemed to maintain higher capital ratios than
savings banks during 1987-90. This can be understood as savings
banks bearing lower risk than private banks, and, in turn, as
savings banks needing lower capital ratios than private banks.
This seems to be consistent with the regulatory decrease in the
contribution to the Deposit Guarantee Fund for the savings banks
in 1988 13 . This deregulatory decrease in their DGF contribution
resulted from the fact that no Spanish savings bank had needed to
be saved or helped by the DGF to overcome a financially difficult
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situation. Therefore, from this evidence, one can argue that
Spanish savings banks appear to be generally less risky than
private banks.
Finally, the competitive neutrality implications of reason
(c) are likely to affect the business structure of banking firms
in Spain. The fact that in Spain, non-bank institutions engaged in
banking activities are not subject to the capital adequacy
requirements implies that they are on a better legal footing,
since they do not have to comply with the higher cost (in other
words, 'tax') associated with obligatory capital requirements.
Hence, banking institutions are disadvantaged in terms of capital
regulation compared with the non-bank institutions performing
banking activities.
There are authors who argue that competitive neutrality would
need a common set of regulatory arrangements for all institutions
potentially in competition with banks (Llewellyn, 1989, Gardener,
1991a). At both national and international levels, it is partly
for this reason that it is likely that further attempts at
regulatory convergence will be made to encompass a wider range of
institutions and markets than just banks.
Llewellyn (1989) suggests that capital regulation encourages
certain trends in the business structure of the banking firms that
can be applied to those banking firms operating in Spain. These
banking trends, whose main purpose is apparently to circumvent the
higher cost that is comprised in the capital regulation, follow
from (c)14:
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1) The encouragement of off-balance-sheet business in order
to raise the rates of ROA and ROC.
2) The development of fee income and non-balance-sheet
services.
3) Securitisation of actual and potential bank assets to
alleviate balance sheet constraints determined by capita115.
4) Sales of parts of the business that are not sufficiently
provided to generate the required ROC. This represents a
restructuring of the business of the banking firm in Spain.
5) The trading of assets (such as asset endorsement,
frequently observed in Spain16 ) to generate fee income.
6) The loss of high-quality assets if capital regulation
implies a change in pricing in a way that makes some lending
business less competitive with regard to the capital markets.
In a general strategic dimension many of these implications
appear to indicate, at the margin, a shift in the nature of
banking away from the traditional role of financial intermediation
on the balance sheet, towards a brokerage role implying
intermediation without expanding the size of the balance sheet;
and, thereby, a lower proportion of financial intermediation
business being conducted through the balance sheet of banks. As
seen in Chapter 2, this disintermediation process appeared in
Spain during the 1980s, and changed the structure of the banking
business in Spain. This process is likely to continue, since
financial intermediation activities conducted by banks are subject
to ('penalized' by) the capital adequacy regulation, whereas
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financial intermediation conducted by non-bank firms is not
subject to capital requirements.
9.5.- SYNTHESIS.
In this chapter, the implications of the findings in Chapters
7 and 8 have been examined. Firstly, the implications for the role
of the market (versus bank regulation) in regulating and
monitoring capital adequacy in Spain were studied. At a micro
level, one can argue that the non-existence of shareholders in
savings banks seems to make a stronger case for capital regulation
of savings banks than of private banks. It was also emphasized
that in order to capture all the risks of the banking firm,
Spanish RAR capital ratios should be extended to a wider range of
risks. At a macro level, the enhancement of supervisory regulation
in 1985 seems to have increased the financial stability of the
Spanish banking markets.
Secondly, the somewhat confusing picture of findings drawn in
Chapters 7 and 8 was analyzed and justified: (i) banking theory
appears to be inconclusive in many decisions of the banking firm,
and (ii) two contradictory forces (deregulation and re-regulation)
were influencing the Spanish banking markets during 1987-90.
Finally, the implications for the competitive neutrality of
the Spanish capital adequacy regulation were discussed. Despite
the regulatory efforts to obtain a 'level playing field' for all
bank institutions in Spain, there seem to be cases in which the
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competitive neutrality is not maintained.
NOTES:
1.- There is also international evidence of this: see, for
example, Hislop (1987), and Gardener (1990b).
2.- The EC Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) and the Investment
Services Directive take account of a wider range of bank risks.
3.- See, for example, Llewellyn (1986, p.64)
4.- See Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Gardener (1989a, 1991a).
5.- See, for example, Santomero (1984) and Sinkey (1992, pp
102-105) for a review of the theoretical models of the banking
firm, in which different perspectives and models of behaviour of
the banking firm are identified.
6.- See, for example, Cecchini's study on the Single European
Market (Commission of the European Communities, 1988).
7.- Molyneux (1988) discusses the complexities involved in the
concept of competitive equality.
8.- See Llewellyn (1989, p. 120-122) for an evaluation of the main
reasons of the complexities involved in the competitive neutrality
of implementation of the BIS and the EC capital requirements.
Price Waterhouse (1991) surveys the main issues in the
implementation of the BIS and the EC capital adequacy requirements
in different countries.
9.- There is an extensive literature on financial innovation: see,
for example, Podoloski (1986, Chapters 7 and 8) and Miller (1986)
for a review of the main theoretical and practical issues on
financial innovation.
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10.- See Peltzman (1984).
11.- See, for example Peltzman (1984). However, contrary to
conventional wisdom, Berger (1992) provides empirical evidence of
a positive relationship between the capital-to-assets ratio and
ROE for the U.S. banks during 1983-89.
12.- In Section 8.4.2, it was noted that a potential advantage of
size is the higher possibilities of diversification, and, in turn,
of lower risk.
13.- See Section 3.5.4 (Chapter 3).
14.- Tables 2.9 and 2.10 (Chapter 2) provide empirical evidence of
the changes in the on-balance-sheet business structure of the
Spanish private and savings banks during 1982-87.
15.- See Gardener and Revell (1987) for a study of the
securitisation process in modern banking.
16.- See Table 2.10.
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10.1.- INTRODUCTION.
In this final chapter, the main conclusions and limitations
of this research are examined. This chapter attempts to summarize
the main findings and limitations of this thesis.
Section 10.2 will be devoted to the conclusions, whereas
Section 10.3 will revise the main limitations.
10.2.- CONCLUSIONS.
The importance of bank capital adequacy in an era of
financial deregulation and intense competition, and the little
empirical research on capital adequacy in the Spanish banking
system, lies behind the motivation for the theoretical and
empirical analysis of this thesis. This research has examined the
impact of the Spanish capital-adequacy requirements on bank
capital augmentations of the banking institutions operating in
that country during 1987-90.
Until very recently, the Spanish banking sector has been
considered as a rather static, sheltered, over-regulated and
relatively inefficient sector. However, as studied in Chapter 2,
major changes (liberalization, new perspectives in the prudential
supervision of banks and Spain's entry to the EC) took place in
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the Spanish banking system during the 1980s that resulted in a
dramatic transformation of the competitive conditions of the
Spanish banking sector.
One of the most important aspects of the transformations in
the Spanish banking system during the 1980s, was the changes in
regulation. The liberalization of the Spanish banking markets was
completed in 1987. The reform of the capital adequacy requirements
in Spain in 1985, inter alia, resulted from the severe banking
crisis that the Spanish banking industry suffered during the late
1970s and early 1980s. As described in Chapter 3, these capital
adequacy requirements are merely related to credit risk, and are
in line with the BAR model of the 1988 BIS Agreement and the 1989
EC Directives.
'After 1985, the capital positions of the Spanish banks seemed
to improve. The exploratory evidence provided in Chapter 4 seems
to imply that during 1987-90 the Spanish banks were
well-capitalized in terms of accounting, regulatory and market
values of capital. They appeared to maintain higher capital ratios
than banks in other major European banking systems.
After revision of the theoretical aspects that shape bank
capital decisions in Chapter 5, several testable hypotheses with
regard to the impact of capital regulation on bank capital
augmentations were suggested. With the theory revised in Chapter
5, and a field survey undertaken among several Spanish bankers, an
empirical model of bank capital augmentations was developed in
order to test those hypotheses.
In Chapters 7 and 8, the methodology, tests and main
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findings were reported. The main findings of Chapters 7 and 8 are
summarized in Table 10.1. In Chapter 9, the policy implications of
these findings were discussed.
Table 10.1 : Main Empirical Findings in this Research
Feature Main	 Findings
1) Fit of the empirical
model in Spain
Better for savings banks than for
private banks.
2) Impact of regulatory
variables
Capital regulation seems a harder
constraint for savings banks.
3) Impact of market-
based variables
Profitability seems more important
for savings banks. Cost of capital
and access to capital markets seem
more important for private banks.
4) Impact of size a) MV-BV relationship appears
consistent with the TBTF
doctrine.
b) Lower capital ratios for larger
than for smaller private banks.
c) Important impact of mergers on
capital augmentations of
savings banks.
The picture obtained in Chapters 7 and 8 appears to offer
mixed evidence. This seems to result from the fact that banking
theory appears inconclusive on many key decisions of the banking
firm, and from the fact that two simultaneous regulatory pressures
(structural deregulation versus supervisory re-regulation) were
operating in Spain during 1987-90
At a macroeconomic level, the main conclusions of this
research seems to be that since the introduction of risk-based
capital requirements in 1985, the Spanish banking system appears
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to have significantly higher levels of financial stability and
safety than before 1985.
The main microeconomic conclusions of the empirical analysis
are the following:
1) The Fit of the Model: in the case of the book-value and
regulatory definitions of capital augmentations, the empirical
model of capital augmentations seems to explain savings banks'
capital augmentations far better than private banks' capital
augmentations. There appear to be variables not included in the
model, like management philosophy, which are very difficult to
quantify, but which seemingly play an important role in terms of
capital augmentations. Private banks appear to have wider leeway
in terms of management discretion when it comes to capital
augmentations.
When the empirical model of capital augmentations was applied
to the market-value definitions of capital for the Spanish private
banks quoted on the stock markets, the results were relatively
weak. The difficulties suggested in the literature in employing
market values and the relative thinness and inefficiencies of the
stock markets in Spain seem to lie behind these weak results.
2) The Impact of the Regulatory Variables: the impact of
capital adequacy regulation on capital augmentation appears to be
different between private and savings banks. It was found to have
an apparent strong influence on the process of capital
augmentations for savings banks, whereas the influence on capital
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augmentations for private banks is seemingly much weaker. Capital
regulation appears to be a much stricter constraint for savings
banks than for private banks. The fact that savings banks have a
more restricted set of legal instruments to augment capital
appears to lie behind the different impact for savings banks and
private banks. Although the minimum required capital ratios are
equal for both types of institution, the more limited set of
capital instruments for savings banks seems to imply that these
banks apparently have to operate in the increasingly competitive,
Spanish banking markets with a stricter regulatory constraint. In
this case, the competitive neutrality of regulation does not
appear to be maintained.
Despite the promulgation of the BIS Agreement and the EC
Directive in 1988 and 1989, respectively, the impact of the
capital regulation variable did not change significantly over
1987-90. This seems to imply that although many banks monitor
their BIS and EC solvency ratios, they still give more importance
to the domestic capital ratios they have to meet: the Bank of
Spain's specific and generic capital ratios.
As far as the impact of portfolio risk on capital
augmentations is concerned, its influence seems to be very weak.
This finding appears to be against BAR philosophy. A possible
explanation is that Spanish banks seem to be well-capitalized
during the period analyzed, and this could make the relationship
of capital-portfolio risk less stringent.
In order to reflect fully the risks of the banking firm, the
Spanish credit risk-based solvency ratio needs to be extended to
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other risks of the banking firm (i.e. liquidity risk, settlement
risk, interest rate risk, etc.).
Finally, the effects of the deposit insurance on capital
augmentations seem very weak and unclear. This confirms the
opinions given by several Spanish bankers in the field survey. Two
bankers said that deposit insurance does not affect capital
augmentations, and four bankers said that the sign of the impact
was unclear.
3) The Impact of the Managerial and Market-Based Variables:
profitability seems to be a key managerial variable for savings
banks. However, it does not appear to be so important for private
banks. Profitability is a key variable with regard to capital
augmentations since in practice it is the only way for savings
banks to increase Tier I capital.
Market-based variables such as cost of capital, deposit
growth and access to capital markets appear to be more important
for private banks than for savings banks. However, liquidity seems
to play a limited role in the process of capital augmentations in
the Spanish banking system.
4) The Impact of Size on Bank Capital Augmentations in the
Spanish Banking System: the estimations of SMVAM model for large
private banks and medium-sized banks separately appear to imply
that the largest banks have higher 'hidden value' than the
medium-sized banks, although in 1990 there was a dramatic decrease
in market value. In addition, although medium-sized banks seem to
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always have the government guarantees behind their market values,
the government guarantees appear to reach far higher values when
the largest banks cannot keep up their market values. This is
seemingly consistent with the TBTF hypothesis.
As far as the impact of size on bank generic capital ratios
and how capital augmentation affected those ratios is concerned,
the empirical findings seem to be clear only in terms of capital
ratios: larger private banks appear to maintain lower generic
capital ratios than smaller private banks, whereas all sizes of
savings banks maintain very similar capital ratios. The findings
for the private banks appear to imply that the competitive
neutrality of regulation is not maintained. This advantage for
larger private banks could encourage them to increase size and the
private banking sector might become more concentrated.
In terms of capital augmentations, the evidence is mixed:
there is no clear sign in the impact of size on capital
augmentations. As a result, it was necessary to test the impact of
size on the internal capital generation rates for both private and
savings banks operating in Spain. In the case of the private
banks, there seem to be certain 'economies of scale' in terms of
internal capital generation, but they appear to disappear for the
largest banks sizes in Spain. In the case of the savings banks,
again there seem to be certain 'economies of scale' in terms of
profitability and internal capital generation for the Spanish
savings banks during 1987-90, but they tend to disappear for the
very large bank sizes.
In the case of the savings banks, the impact of the mergers
439
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
on capital augmentations was also estimated. It was found that the
means of the capital augmentation rates for the savings banks
involved in mergers seem to be far higher than those of the
non-merged savings banks. Therefore, there seem to be benefits for
the banks involved in mergers in terms of capital augmentations.
In addition, the certain 'economies of scale ' in terms of capital
growth that could result from mergers tend to be more important
for the medium-sized savings banks than for the largest savings
bank sizes. This advantage for merged banks could encourage banks
to increase size through mergers, and the banking sector could
become more concentrated.
10.3.- LIMITATIONS.
The limitations of the analysis undertaken in this research
have been mentioned throughout this thesis. Nevertheless, the main
limitations are summarized in this section.
As depicted in Figure 10.1, there are three main areas into
which the limitations can be classified:
1) Limitations of the Banking Theory: as discussed in Chapter
9, banking theory is inconclusive on most of the decisions of the
banking firm. Most aspects and problems of the banking firm can be
viewed and solved from very different perspectives and models.
This results in contradictory theories and perspectives. One
must also consider that many of the perspectives employed in this
research comprise assumptions and restrictions. Thus, there seem
to be contradictions and restrictions in the banking theory, which
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impose limitations on any analysis that attempts to explain the
behaviour of the banking firm.
A major limitation of the banking theory with regard to the
effects of bank regulation is that most studies focus either on
the impact of deregulation or on the impact of supervisory
re-regulation. However, there is very limited work developed in an
environment in, which both deregulation and re-regulation are
operating simultaneously (as in Spain).
In order to overcome some of the limitations of the banking
theory, and in order to define a model of bank capital
augmentations for Spain, the researcher performed a field survey
among Spanish bankers.
Figure 10.1 : Classification of Limitations
LIMITATIONS
Banking Theory Methodology Peculiarities of theSpanish Banking Sector
2) Methodological Limitations: as described in Chapter 7, the
use of statistical tools such as regression analysis, the
econometric tests employed in this research, and the use of
financial ratios can be very useful to obtain rigorous empirical
evidence. However, these instruments have their own limitations.
It is necessary to emphasize that the kinds of empirical
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experiments and tests possible in social sciences, like economics,
are restricted. Statistical tools such as regression analysis and
dummy variables, and the use of financial ratios are a selection
of the limited types of test that can be carried out.
3) Limitations of our 'laboratory': the Spanish Banking
System: as described throughout this thesis, the Spanish banking
system has certain peculiarities that involve limitations for the
analysis. The dramatic transformations in the Spanish banking
system during the last two decades seem to have helped foster the
existence of a very heterogeneous sample of banking institutions.
The heterogeneous sample of banks in the sector is an important
limitation, since, as has happened to other researchers using
Spanish banking data, it involves dividing the sample (into
private and savings banks), and deleting several extreme
observations.
The fact that only a certain number of private banks have
market-value information imposes quantitative limitations on the
market-value analysis. In addition, the thinness and
inefficiencies of the Spanish stock markets appears to be a
limitation for the quality of market-value information.
Finally, as a consequence of the lack of extensive
market-value data, this research needed to rely heavily on
accounting data, which seem to be manipulated more easily by the
firm, and which might offer a somewhat distorted view of the firm.
Nevertheless, it is accounting and regulatory capital adequacy
data that banks and regulators do appear to target in practice.
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APPENDIX A
FIELD SURVEY
In this Appendix, the field survey that the researcher
carried out among several private and savings banks is described.
The researcher first spoke with four Spanish bankers (Banco de
Santander, Bankinter, Banco Popular Espanol and Caixa de Pensions)
in February 1992. In April 1992, in order to systematize the
information, a written questionnaire was sent out by mail to
twelve of the largest private and savings banks (Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya, Banesto, Banco de Santander, Banco Popular Espanol,
Bankinter, Banco Central HispanoAmericano, Banco Zaragozano, Banco
Exterior de Espana, Banco de la Pequena y Mediana Empresa, Caixa
de Pensions de Barcelona, Caja de Madrid, Caja de Ahorros de
Cataluna). It was optional to state the name of the institution in
their responses to the questionnaire. Seven questionnaires were
answered and returned in May 1992. The questionnaire, which was
written and completed in Spanish, contained the following
questions (the version presented here is the translation of the
original questionnaire into English):
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QUESTIONNAIRE
Name of the Banking Institution (optional):
According to the experience and knowledge that you may
have, with regard to the impact of the capital adequacy regulation
on your institution and on the Spanish banking system in general,
answer the following questions:
1) Sort the following variables according to their importance when
it comes to augmenting your institution's capital accounts:
The existing solvency regulation.
Profitability.
Cost of capital.
The market valuation of your institution's risk.
The easy access to capital markets to issue new equity and
capital instruments.
Liquidity
Other variables (specify):
2) Tick the main action that you would carry out if your
institution considered that the existing capital was 'inadequate'
in terms of the definition of the solvency regulation (tick only
one answer):
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a) The capital accounts would be augmented.
b) The portfolio mix would be modified.
c) The asset growth would be reduced.
d) The three previous actions would be undertaken simultaneously.
e) Other actions (specify):
3) Tick the solvency ratios that your institution is regularly
monitoring:
a) The specific ratio of the Spanish regulation.
b) The generic ratio of the Spanish regulation.
C) The BIS capital ratio.
d) The EC Directive capital ratio.
e) Other (specify):
4) Sort the following ratios according to the importance given in
your institution when it comes to monitoring them:
The specific ratio of the Spanish regulation.
The generic ratio of the Spanish regulation.
The BIS capital ratio.
The EC Directive capital ratio.
Other (specify):
5) Tick according to your knowledge and experience the main
impact of the existence of a Deposit Guarantee Fund on capital
augmentations:
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a) It reduces capital augmentations, and therefore, it produces
the denominated 'substitution effect' of deposit insurance for
capital.
b) It does not affect capital augmentations at all.
c) It induces capital augmentations.
d) The impact remains unclear.
e) Other effects (specify):
Additional Comments:
RESULTS:
The results of the questionnaire were the following:
1) In the first question, five banks answered that the existence
of profits and the capital regulation were the two main variables
considered in terms of capital augmentations. Three private banks
also considered cost of capital as a very important variable but
the savings banks put cost of capital at the bottom of the list.
Liquidity, access to capital markets and the market valuation of
the institution's risk were not considered so important as
profitability and regulation. One of the private banks added a
comment which said that they were very proud of having increased
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their capital accounts during the last ten years only by means of
retained earnings (profitability).
2) In the second question, four banks answered that the only
action they undertake is to augment capital. The other three banks
answered c): the three actions would be undertaken
simultaneously). The fact that 4 banks (out of 6) answered that
the only action they would undertake is to augment capital appears
to be against RAR philosophy.
3) In the third question, the Bank of Spain's specific and generic
ratios and the EC solvency ratio were ticked by the seven banks.
The BIS ratio was only ticked by two banks. Thus, it seems that
the Spanish banks are more concerned with the evolution of the
Spanish and EC capital regulation.
4) In the fourth question, the Bank of Spain's specific and
generic ratios were considered the most important ratios in
general. The EC ratio came third in five answers and first in one
answer. The BIS ratio was generally considered at the bottom of
the list.
5) In the fifth question, five banks said that the effects of
the deposit insurance on capital augmentations is unclear whereas
two banks said that it does not affect capital augmentations at
all. Therefore, the impact of deposit insurance on capital
augmentations appears unclear and very limited.
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CORRELATION MATRICES
CHAPTER 7:
Table B.1: Correlation Matrices for Private Banks (1987-90)
AK2
AK3
PF
CC
PK
LQ
AD
KR
DI
CM
AK 1
.973
.961
-.012
-.019
.005
.177
.026
.075
-.085
-.014
AK
2
.981
-.014
-.008
.001
.169
.022
.085
-.097
.017
AK
3
-.012
-.062
.009
.147
.027
.098
-.075
.038
1987
PK
-.021
-.018
.039
.019
-.071
LQ
.055
-.106
-.103
-.067
AD
.020
-.111
-.059
KR
.129
.122
DI
.343
PF
.505
.039
.022
-.057
.165
-.047
.096
CC
-.048
.151
-.004
-.323
.025
.124
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AK2
AK
.980
AK
1	 2
AK
3
PF
1988
PK LQ AD KR	 DICC
AK .950 .968
3
PF -.057 -.065 -.051
CC .025 .025 .014 .062
PK .021 .045 .036 -.027 .338
LQ .097 .108 .102 -.034 -.026 -.008
AD -.044 -.018 .003 -.041 -.062 -.005 .146
KR .036 .020 .033 .070 -.673 -.020 -.036 .027
DI -.109 -.117 -.145 -.031 .094 -.129 -.174 -.133 -.047
CM -.015 -.020 -.013 .077 .084 -.053 -.107 -.074 .053 .395
1989
AK AK AK PF CC PK LQ AD KR DI1 2 3
AK
2
AK
3
PF
CC
PK
LQ
AD
KR
DI
CM
.999
.999
-.039
-.023
-.012
-.013
-.003
.098
-.091
-.052
1.000
-.039
-.024
-.014
-.014
-.003
.103
-.094
-.054
-.037
-.030
-.014
-.015
-.003
.103
-.094
-.054
-.277
.067
-.064
-.120
-.015
.168
.243
.015
-.032
-.005
-.228
-.061
-.033
-.042
.357
-.190
-.187
-.106
-.004
-.038
.046
-.076
.078
-.095
-.054
.018
.061 .282
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AK 1	AK2
AK	 .994
2
AK	 .977	 .987
3
PF	 .032	 .037
CC	 .057	 .059
PK	 .005	 .007
LQ -.013 -.012
AD -.132	 -.136
KR	 .260	 .261
DI	 .029	 .041
CM	 .004	 .015
AK 3
.057
.074
.018
-.014
-.181
.300
.084
.029
PF
.541
.012
.185
-.045
.050
-.068
.006
1990
PK
-.007
-.020
-.072
.027
-.068
LQ
-.015
.063
-.081
-.060
AD
-.306
-.201
-.123
KR
.230
.158
DI
.293
CC
.019
.046
-.034
-.080
-.060
-.032
AK
2
AK
3
PF
CC
PK
LQ
AD
KR
DI
Table B.2:
AK	 AK1	 2
792
.768	 .847
.554	 .291
.592	 .450
-.161	 -.164
-.063	 -.039
-.113	 -.061
-.059	 -.155
.262	 .266
Correlation
AK 3	PF
.426
.408	 .190
-.155 -.061
-.052	 .167
.017	 .119
.027	 .441
.109	 -.014
Matrices
1987
for Savings Banks (1987-90)
PK	 LQ	 AD	 KR
-.015
.090	 .118
.124	 -.194	 .229
-.189	 -.032	 -.616	 -.376
CC
-.137
-.061
-.186
-.541
.333
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1988
AK	 AK	 AK	 PF	 CC	 PK	 LQ	 AD	 KR1	 2	 3
AK
2
.722
AK .730 .936
3
PF .161 -.050 -.116
CC -.004 -.066 -.105 .295
PK -.160 -.119 -.138 -.046	 .154
LQ .046 -.129 -.120 .260	 .029 -.399
AD -.139 -.166 -.077 .119	 -.003 .351 -.107
KR .161 .149 .133 .268	 -.107 .084 .142 .081
DI .211 .181 .187 .179	 .038 -.550 .224 -.368 -.192
1989
AK AK AK PF	 CC PK LQ AD KR1 2 3
AK
2
AK
3
PF
CC
PK
LQ
AD
KR
DI
.885
.825
.489
.118
-.015
-.138
-.006
.279
.086
.894
.354
.079
.021
-.135
-.016
.190
.137
.395
-.016
.057
-.135
.046
.343
.128
.241
-.027
-.259
.169
.395
-.148
-.015
-.132
.005
-.299
.138
-.016
-.156
.149
-.042
-.406
-.045
-.048
-.185
-.499 -.022
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1990
AK
2
AK
3
PF
CC
PK
LQ
AD
KR
DI
AK 1
.979
.939
.165
.341
-.075
-.321
-.058
.472
-.454
AK
2
.971
.162
.314
-.087
-.328
-.041
.470
-.444
AK
3
.077
.211
-.071
-.330
-.141
.397
-.423
PF
.423
-.106
.132
.309
.314
.085
CC
-.115
.056
.209
-.065
.200
PK
-.113
.087
-.230
-.101
LQ
.004
-.176
.351
AD
.130
-.108
KR
-.338
CHAPTER 8
Table B.3: Correlation Matrices for Private Banks with PF .
1987 1988 1989 1990
*
PF
*
PF
*
PF
*
PF
AK 1 .052 -.002 -.073 .033
AK .046 -.015 -.075 .042
2
AK: .051 -.020 -.075 .071
CC .277 .214 -.017 .020
PK .299 -.067 .056 .037
LQ -.072 -.089 -.108 -.014
AD -.054 -.087 -.079 -.060
KR .175 .036 .125 .243
DI .089 .189 .157 .073
CM .220 .255 .297 .036
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Table B.4: Correlation Matrices for Private Banks with
Market-Value Capital (1987-90).
AK s
PF .,
AK 4
.816
.291
AK s
.069
•PF
1987
PK LQ AD KRCC
CC .181 .045 .570
PK -.007 .038 -.306 -.201
LQ -.206 -.391 -.150 -.084 .011
AD .065 -.282 .059 .079 -.161 .695
KR .264 .234 .526 .336 -.624 -.498 -.307
DI -.394 -.092 -.243 -.208 -.060 -.407 -.489 .161
1988
•AK AK PF CC PK LQ AD KR
4 s
AKs
PF
CC
PK
LQ
AD
KR
DI
.470
-.005
.152
-.114
-.269
.041
.203
-.080
.004
.009
-.159
-.326
.120
-.129
.685
.411
-.163
-.040
-.063
.450
-.293
-.180
.008
-.036
.180
.077
-.169
-.050
-.614
-.358
.182
.289
-.483
.106
-.040 -.174
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AK
5
PF•
CC
PK
LQ
AD
KR
DI
AK	 AK
4	 5
.581
-.434-.495
-.050 -.275
.081	 .001
.211	 .198
-.024	 -.196
-.284	 -.228
.264	 .343
PF
.308
-.070
.051
.198
.679
-.286
1989
PK
-.239
-.105
.147
-.120
LQ
-.230
.005
.632
AD
-.094
-.263
KR
-.153
CC
.070
.335
-.017
.118
.563
AK
4
AK	 .932
s
*
PF	 .194
CC	 .369
PK	 .026
LQ	 .034
AD	 -.396
KR	 .136
DI	 .312
AK
5
.081
.296
.061
.220
-.462
.041
.257
PF
.355
-.172
-.203
.165
.642
.056
1990
PK
.165
-.044
.005
.106
LQ
-.111
.230
-.082
AD
-.011
-.013
KR
.017
CC
-.266
-.210
-.054
.165
.668
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